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T  he  present  work  represents  a  re-assessment  of  Roman  siegecraft,  based  on  the 
twin  foundations  of  a  comprehensive  collection  of  historical  narratives,  and  a 
thoroughgoing  discussion  of  the  archaeological  evidence.  The  historical  material  is  pre- 
sented  chronologically,  and  analysed  statistically  in  order  to  test  various  common  as- 
sumptions,  such  as  the  supposed  Roman  predilection  for  blockade  as  the  principal  be- 
sieging  strategy,  and  circumvaUation  as  the  principal  tactic;  the  statistical  findings  are 
tabulated  for  ease  of  reference.  71'his  provides  a  context  for  the  ensuing  study  of  the  ar- 
chaeological  materiaL  gathered  and  discussed  under  the  three  headings  of  encampments, 
circumvaUations,  and  embankments.  The  phenomenon  of  the  embankment  is  subjected 
to  particular  scrutiny,  in  order  to  question  the  common  acceptance  of  Napol6on's  tripar- 
tite,  timber-built  design.  Separate  analyses  of  Roman  artillery  and  siege-machinery 
round  off  the  work,  exposing  several  persistent  fallacies  concerning  the  operation  and 
siting  of  stone-projecting  catapults,  and  discussing  the  function  of  the  different  siege 
machines.  Finally,  amongst  other  myths,  the  recurring  theme  of  decline  in  siegecraft  is 
dismissed  in  the  conclusion. 
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vi Introduction: 
The  Study  of  Roman  Siegecraft 
No  book-length  study  of  Roman  siegecraft  exists,  nor  has  the  topic  ever  been  scru- 
tinised  systematically,  in  the  way  that  Greek  siegecraft  has  been  (e.  g.,  Garlan 
1974).  Nevertheless,  it  has  provoked  discussion  among  German  scholars  throughout  the 
20th  century.  One  strand  of  debate  goes  back  to  the  appearance,  in  1867,  of  a  selection 
of  original  poliorcetic  texts  (Wescher  1867);  a  different  strand  originated  in  the  publica- 
tion  of  excavations  carried  out  at  Alise  St.  Reine,  ancient  Alesia  (Napol6on  111  1866). 
Both  were  given  a  fillip  by  the  compilation  of  the  Real-encyclopadie,  which  continued 
to  provide  scholarly  exposition  of  all  aspects  of  ancient  siegecraft,  from  the  overviews 
of  Hans  Droysen  (1909)  and  Willy  Liebenam  (1909),  via  a  whole  series  of  articles  by 
Friedrich  Lammert  (1919-1939),  down  to  Alfred  Neumann's  entry  on  "Krioe'  (1968). 
The  tradition  has  been  continued  into  the  new  millennium  by  Dietwulf  Baatz  in  Der 
Neue  Pauly  (I  999a;  200  1). 
Besides  the  Real-encyclopadie,  one  other  work  has  been  enonnously  influential  in  the 
study  of  Roman  siegecraft  (indeed,  of  ancient  warfare  in  general);  namely,  Heerwesen 
und  KrieViiihrung  der  Griechen  und  Rbmer  (Kromayer  &  Veith  1928).  In  that  work, 
the  artillery  officer,  Major  General  Erwin  Schramm,  made  only  brief  remarks  on  Roman 
siegecraft  as  an  appendix  to  his  lengthy  discussion  of  Greek  'ToUorketik!  '  (1928,244- 
245).  But,  in  preparing  the  individual  Roman  chapters,  Georg  Veith  and  Erich  von 
Nischer  included  sections  on  'Testungskrieg"  (Veith  1928,373-376,442-449;  Nischer 
1928,564-567,600-601). 
I Some  years  previously,  Adolf  Schulten  had  approached  the  subject  of  Roman  siegecraft 
from  the  evidence  unearthed  at  Numantia.  His  observations  at  that  site  (Schulten  1927), 
and  at  Masada  (Schulten  1933),  Bettir  (ibid.,  180-184)  and  Burnswark  (Schulten  1914), 
had  wide-ranging  implications  for  Roman  military  studies,  not  least  in  moulding  the 
opinions  of  men  like  Sir  Ian  Richmond.  However,  a  more  lively  debate  ccntred  on  the 
poliorcetic  texts,  a  group  of  technical  manuals  of  broadly  Roman  date,  describing  the 
construction  of  various  siege  machines.  The  opinion  of  the  scholar  Erich  Sander,  that 
the  texts,  taken  in  combination  with  other  evidence,  demonstrated  a  sharp  decline  in 
Roman  siegecraft  during  the  Principate  (Sander  1934),  continued  to  echo  in  later  work, 
despite  Lammert's  crushing  rebuttal  (Lammert  1938).  Study  of  the  ancient  texts  has 
continued  in  the  work  of  Otto  Lendle  on  siege-machinery  (Lendlc  1975;  1983)  and 
Dietwulf  Baatz  on  artillery  (e.  g.,  Baatz  1994),  but  they  have  never  been  integrated  with 
an  overview  of  Roman  siegecraft. 
It  is  significant  that  the  single  most  important  monograph  on  the  subject  to  appear  since 
1928,  %mimel's  study  of  Avaricurn  (Wimmel  1974),  received  no  attention  from  Eng- 
lish-language  periodicals.  Reviewed  by  Dietwulf  Baatz  for  Gnomon  (Baatz  1976),  and 
by  Jacques  Harmand  for  both  Revue  des  budes  Anciennes  and  Latomus  (Harniand 
1974;  1976),  it  did  not  even  rate  a  notice  in  the  Journal  of  Roman  Studies.  Ile  same 
indifference  has  greeted  Lendle's  work  on  siege  machinery,  so  that  his  brilliant  elucida- 
tion  of  the  puzzling  devices  on  Trajan's  Column  (Lendle  1983,184-187)  has  gone 
largely  unnoticed.  And  Baatz's  continuing  work  on  artillery  has  only  achieved  currency 
in  English-speaking  circles,  one  suspects,  from  its  relevance  to  the  burgeoning  field  of 
military  equipment  studies  (cf  Bishop  &  Coulston  1993,80-81,114-115). 
Consequently,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Roman  siegecraft  has  never  engendered  the  same 
atmosphere  of  scholarly  debate  in  Britain  as  in  Germany.  Anglophone  offerings  consist 
primarily  of  a  dozen  pages  in  Webster's  Roman  Imperial  Army,  largely  based  on  a  re- 
telling  of  Caesar's  siege  of  Alesia  and  Vespasian's  siege  of  Jotapata  (Webster  1985, 
239-254);  a  similar  recital  in  Peddie's  Roman  War  Machine,  this  time  of  Caesar's  siege 
of  Avaricurn  and  Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem  (Peddie  1994,123-147);  and  the  brief  arti- 
cles  in  successive  editions  of  the  Oxford  Classical  Dictionary  (Parker  1949;  Marsden 
2 1970;  Coulston  1996),  which  bear  no  comparison  with  their  detailed  yet  concise  coun- 
terparts  in  Der  Kleine  Pauly  (Neumann  1972)  and  Der  Neue  Pauly  (Baatz  2001).  Re- 
cently,  Davies  has  presented  a  study  of  the  physical  remains  of  Roman  siegecraft 
(2001),  but  I  believe  his  approach  to  be  misguided  and  his  analysis  fundamentally 
flawed  (cf.  below,  pp.  155,182,209ff.,  214ff.  ).  Prior  to  that,  the  only  original  contribu- 
tion  in  the  field  was  the  late  Eric  Marsden's  work  on  artillery  (Marsden  1969;  1971), 
which  was  noticeably  short  on  Roman  material  (cf  Snodgrass  1971,106f  ). 
The  present  work  is  an  attempt  to  redress  the  balance  somewhat,  with  a  new  examina- 
tion  of  the  archaeological  evidence,  underpinned  by  a  systematic  study  of  the  literary 
sources.  Those  two  giants  of  Roman  military  studies,  Alfred  von  Domaszewski  and  Sir 
Ian  Richmond,  recognised  the  special  relationship  between  the  literary  sources  and  the 
physical  remains.  Both  men  were  captivated  by  the  conjunction  of  the  two  at  Masada. 
It  was  the  technicalities  of  castrametation  that  exercised  von  Domaszewski,  then  en- 
gaged  in  elucidating  Hyginus's  de  munitionibus  castrorum,  and  he  was  quick  to  appre- 
ciate  Masada  as  "eines  der  merkwürdigsten  Zeugnisse  Rir  die  Technik  des  römischen 
Lagerbaueg"  (Domaszewski  1909,220).  But  it  was  the  wider  picture  that  informed  the 
work  of  Richmond:  the  marriage  of  the  material  evidence,  gleaned  from  archaeology, 
with  his  wide-ranging  knowledge  of  the  Roman  army,  culled  from  diligent  study  of  the 
literary  sources  (e.  g.,  Richmond  1955;  1982).  An  appreciation  of  the  former  requires  a 
grounding  in  the  latter,  in  order  to  bring  a  sense  of  perspective. 
However,  in  my  view,  an  understanding  of  Roman  siegecraft  does  not  require  prior 
knowledge  of  the  siegecraft  of  other  cultures  or  nations.  It  is  well-known  that  the  Ro- 
mans  utilised  and  developed  the  technology  of  their  Greek  neighbours;  indeed,  it  is  one 
of  Vitruvius's  regrets  that  so  many  of  his  sources  are  Greeks  and  so  few  Romans  (De 
arch.  7-praef-14).  Nevertheless,  an  analysis  of  Alexander  the  Great's  siegecraft,  for  ex- 
ample,  is  of  questionable  relevance  to  a  study  of  Roman  siegecraft.  Occasionally,  I 
have  found  it  helpful  to  point  up  similarities  with  Greek  siegecraft,  but  it  is  unnecessary 
to  expound  at  length  on  a  subject  already  well  covered  by  specialists  (e.  g.,  Garlan 
1974).  It  seems  to  me  even  less  defensible  to  discuss  the  siegecraft  of  nations  further 
removed  from  the  Romans.  Gilliver  has  thought  it  relevant  to  preface  her  chapter  on Roman  siege  warfare  with  remarks  on  Assyrian  and  Persian  siegecraft  (1999,131-132; 
likewise,  Davies  2001,47-59).  In  my  opinion,  this  is  out  of  place  in  a  work  dealing 
with  The  Roman  Art  of  War.  Quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  interested  reader  can  eas- 
fly  access  the  material  in  greater  detail  elsewhere  (e.  g.,  Kern  1999,29-85),  there  is  no 
question  of  a  causal  relationship  between  Assyria  and  Rome.  At  least,  an  event  from 
the  lifetime  of  Alexander,  retold  by  a  Hadrianic  writer  for  a  senatorial  readership,  has 
the  potential  to  influence  subsequent  Roman  military  actions,  but  this  cannot  be  said  for 
the  likes  of  Sennacherib's  siege  of  Lachish. 
In  compiling  the  "Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges"  (Appendix  1),  1  have  selected  those 
events  which  the  ancient  authors  describe  in  reasonable  detail.  There  is,  I  think,  little  to 
be  gained  from  the  inclusion  of  the  lists  of  besieged  towns  which  crop  up  from  time  to 
time  in  the  sources,  such  as  M.  Baebius  Tamphilus's  capture  of  thirteen  named  towns  in 
Thessaly  in  191  B.  C.  (Livy  36.13.3-6).  Nor  do  I  believe  that  any  usefid  conclusions  can 
be  drawn  from  the  bare  mention  of  an  event,  such  as  the  repeated  capture  of  Nisilais  and 
Ctesiphon  during  every  Roman  invasion  of  Mesopotamia  (e.  g.,  Cass.  Dio  68.18.2  and 
68.28.2,  for  Trajan's  capture  of  those  two  towns  in  A.  D.  115/116). 
Of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  take  account  of  the  unnamed  towns  which  the  sources  of- 
ten  briefly  mention;  for  example,  Plutarch,  on  the  four  hundred  towns  which  M.  Porcius 
Cato  allegedly  captured  in  Spain  in  195  B.  C.  (Cato  Maior  10.3),  or  Suetonius,  on  the 
"more  than  twenty  towns"  in  Britain  captured  by  Vespasian  in  the  40s  (Vesp.  4.1). 
These  and  others,  such  as  the  two  Armenian  forts  which  Cn.  Domitius  Corbulo  took  in 
A.  D.  59,  one  by  force,  the  other  by  blockade  (Tac.,  Ann.  14.24),  are  omitted  for  lack  of 
useful  information.  Unfortunately,  interesting  sidelights  cannot  easily  be  incorporated 
into  the  catalogue  structure,  such  as  the  fact  that  Gabinius,  suffering  from  a  shortage  of 
supplies  in  Illyricum  in  the  winter  of  48/47  B.  C.,  was  forced  to  assault  forts  and  towns, 
but  repeatedly  failed  on  account  of  the  bad  weather  (BeIL  . 41ex.  43). 
Where  archaeological  investigation  has  illuminated  our  appreciation  of  a  she,  this  has 
been  noted  in  the  catalogue,  with  fidl  discussion  in  the  main  text.  Here,  special  mention 
must  be  made  of  two  sites,  Burnswark  and  Narbata,  which  undoubtedly  saw  siegecraft 
4 of  some  description,  but  which  cannot  be  fitted  into  the  catalogue's  chronological 
scheme,  for  lack  of  dating  evidence;  these  are  discussed  in  the  main  text  (Burnswark: 
pp.  90ff.  and  127ff.;  Narbata:  11  9ff.  ). 
I  have  made  no  attempt  to  exhaustively  catalogue  the  sieges  from  Rome's  regal  era,  but 
have  entirely  omitted  material  purporting  to  describe  events  in  the  seventh  century,  and 
have  selectively  omitted  material  from  the  sixth  and  fifth  centuries  B.  C.  (see  further, 
below,  p.  10).  The  accuracy  of  much  early  history  is  so  suspect  (cf  Veith  1928,285- 
286)  that,  in  the  general  analysis  of  siegecraft  (pp.  80ff.  ),  1  have  excluded  everything 
prior  to  the  First  Punic  War,  in  what  has  become  standard  practice  for  students  of  Ro- 
man  warfare  (cf.  Roth  1999;  Goldsworthy  1996,  imposes  even  stricter  limits). 
The  record  is  ftirther  skewed  by  lacunae  in  our  sources.  A  glance  through  the  catalogue 
will  reveal  decade-long  gaps;  for  the  period  of  the  Republic,  the  230s,  the  220s,  and  the 
120s  are  entirely  absent,  and  there  is  a  gap  between  26  B.  C.  and  4  B.  C.;  for  the  Princi- 
pate,  there  are  so  many  missing  decades  that  to  list  them  would  be  tedious.  It  seems 
unlikely  that  no  siegecraft  was  practised  during  these  periods,  which  after  all  saw  the 
continuance  of  warfare,  and  we  must  conclude  either  that  no  historian  thought  the  ac- 
tions  worthy  of  record,  or  that  the  relevant  historical  reports  have  not  survived.  Never- 
theless,  the  laws  of  averages  encourage  the  belief  that  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  in- 
dividual  events  will  form  a  representative  picture  of  Roman  siegecraft. 
A  previous  version  of  the  catalogue  included  sixty  non-Roman  sieges,  for  comparative 
purposes,  but  constraints  of  space  have  forced  their  excision  from  the  final  draft.  Like- 
wise,  the  discussion  of  Carthaginý  Macedonian,  Seleucid,  Pontic,  Germanic,  Gothic, 
and  Sassanid  siegccraft,  which  originally  formed  part  of  chapter  1,  has  been  omitted,  in 
order  to  meet  the  stipulated  word-limit. 
I  have  been  mindful  throughout  of  Landels'  criticisn-4  that,  in  his  own  field  of  technol- 
ogy,  many  historians  fail  to  examine  the  sources  in  detail,  and  to  analyse  the  Greek  and 
Latin  terminology  (1978,7);  consequently,  I  have  attempted  to  do  both.  I  also  follow 
Landels  in  providing  my  own  translations  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  sources,  and  for  the 
5 same  reason  as  Landels:  namely,  that  existing  translations  (wWch  may  be  superior  in 
literary  merit)  may  misconstrue  points  of  technical  importance. 
Besides  a  grounding  in  the  historical  narratives,  the  study  of  Roman  siegecraft  demands 
a  familiarity  with  the  contemporary  technical  writers.  It  would  be  inappropriate  here  to 
enter  into  a  philological  discussion  of  the  texts,  which  have  vexed  generations  of  schol- 
ars  (e.  g.,  Lammert  1928;  Lendle  1975;  1983),  but  their  relevance  to  an  understanding  of 
the  Roman  besieging  process  should  not  be  underestimated.  Similarly,  artillery  has  al- 
ways  cast  a  long  shadow  over  the  sub  ect.  From  the  pioneering  work  of  Schramm 
(1918)  through  to  Marsden's  reinterpretations  (1971),  the  application  of  these  weapons 
to  siegecraft  has  continued  to  fascinate.  Accordingly,  I  have  included  a  study  of  the  use 
of  both  types  of  machinery  in  Roman  siegecraft  (below,  chapters  5  and  6).  H.  M.  D. 
Parker  had  already  based  his  Oxford  Classical  Dictionary  entry  around  the  use  of  artil- 
lery  and  machinery  (Parker  1949),  so  it  was  natural  for  Marsden  to  follow  suit,  when  he 
revised  the  entry  for  the  second  edition  (Marsden  1970);  only  with  the  recent  third  edi- 
tion  has  an  attempt  been  made  to  balance  this  largely  literary  evidence  with  the  archaeo- 
logical  remains  of  siegecraft  (Coulston  1996). 
The  historical  sources  undoubtedly  provide  a  foundation  for  a  study  of  Roman  siege- 
craft,  but  it  is  the  archaeological  evidence  which  forms  the  core.  In  this,  Schulten's 
work  has  been  fundamental  (above,  p.  2),  and  can  now  be  extended  with  reference  to 
new  material  accruing  from  Alesia  (Reddd  &  Schnurbein  1997;  Reddd  et  al.  1995)  and 
Cremna  (Mitchell  1989;  1995).  These  are  all  noted  by  Coulston  (1996,1405)  and  Baatz 
(2001,21),  unfortunately  without  discussion,  owing  to  constraints  of  space.  Curiously, 
although  Gilliver  mentions  circumvallations  at  Alesia,  Machaerus,  Masada  and  Bettir, 
she  eschews  discussion  of  the  archaeological  remains  (1999,148-149),  and,  although 
the  recent  study  by  Davies  (2001)  is  archaeologically  based,  his  conclusions  are  quite 
different  from  my  own.  Consequently,  I  have  taken  the  opportunity  to  collate  and  re- 
assess  the  evidence  of  the  physical  remains,  according  to  the  three  main  classes  of 
monument  which  are  encountered  archaeologically:  the  encampments  of  the  besieging 
armies  (below,  chapter  2);  the  circumvallatory  works  (chapter  3);  and  the  assault  em- 
bankments  (chapter  4). 
6 In  general  terms,  the  archaeological  evidence  for  siege  encampments,  such  as  it  is,  tends 
to  support  conclusions  drawn  from  the  historical  evidence.  This  has  important  reper- 
cussions  for  sites  such  as  Burnswark,  Woden  Law,  and  Hatra,  where  scholars  have  been 
divided  as  to  whether  the  remains  represent  Roman  sieges.  As  for  the  archaeological 
examples  of  circurnvallation,  these  display  some  uniformity  of  form  and  layout,  as  is  to 
be  expected  from  such  a  functional  phenomenon,  although  there  is  diversity  in  the  num- 
ber,  shape  and  size  of  the  associated  guard-posts.  However,  it  is  with  the  embankments 
that  most  controversy  exists,  and  Rice  Holmes's  comment,  that  "the  whole  subject  [of 
embankments]  is  very  difficult"  (Holmes  1911,607),  is  as  true  today  as  it  was  last  cen- 
tury. 
Central  to  the  present  study  has  been  an  attempt  to  accurately  gauge  the  usage  of  differ- 
ent  besieging  techniques  by  Roman  annies.  To  this  end,  each  of  the  225  Roman  sieges 
has  been  classified  according  to  outcome  and  procedure,  and  the  results  tabulated  in  a 
series  of  analytical  tables.  Only  by  such  systematic  analysis  can  the  study  of  Roman 
siegecraft,  and  consequently  the  relevance  of  the  physical  remains,  be  put  on  a  firm 
footing,  with  a  view  to  reviving  interest  in  the  new  millennium. 
7 Part  1: 
The  History  of  Roman  Siegecraft 
T  he  catalogue  of  Roman  sieges  (Appendix  1)  presents  summary  outlines  of  225 
besieging  operations,  spanning  almost  900  years  of  Roman  history.  In  order  to 
create  a  framework  for  basic  statistical  analysis,  they  have  been  arranged  into  discrete 
groupings.  Statistical  objectivity  would  have  been  satisfied  by  arbitrary  division  into 
equally-sized  groups  (e.  g.,  sixteen  groups  of  fourteen).  But,  in  an  historical  discipline, 
there  is  an  obligation  to  respect  chronological  boundaries,  defined  in  a  military  context 
by  wars  and  campaigns.  Only  in  this  way  can  we  gain  an  appreciation  of  development 
over  time,  and  highlight  any  anomalies  related  to  individual  military  episodes  (whether 
arising  from  geography  or  personalities),  which  may  otherwise  be  lost  in  the  mass  of 
data. 
Consequently,  the  following  groupings  have  been  adopted.  1.  The  early  history  of 
Rome;  2.  The  First  Punic  War;  3.  The  Illyrian  Wars;  4.  The  Second  Punic  War;  5.  The 
Macedonian  Wars;  6.  The  Spanish  Wars;  7.  The  Third  Punic  War;  8.  The  Jugurthine 
War;  9.  Sulla  to  Pompey  (early  Ist  century  B.  C.  );  10.  Julius  Caesar  (mid  Ist  century 
B.  C.  );  11.  The  Late  Republic;  12.  The  Early  Empire;  13.  The  Jewish  War;  14.  The  Sec- 
ond  Century-,  15.  The  Third  Century-,  16.  The  Fourth  Century. 
Chapter  I  is  divided  into  sections,  corresponding  to  the  sixteen  groupings.  Each  section 
begins  with  a  synopsis  of  the  relevant  source  material,  followed  by  a  summary  of  the 
siegecraft  of  the  period,  a  broad  discussion,  incorporating  a  critique  of  modem  scholar- 
8 ship,  and  a  brief  statistical  analysis  of  the  grouping.  At  the  end  of  the  chapter,  the  indi- 
vidual  group  statistics  are  consolidated  to  support  some  generalised  statements  on  Ro- 
man  siegecraft. 
9 Chapter  1: 
Roman  Siegecraft:  an  overview 
rlv  Historv  of  Rome  (Catalop-ue.  nos.  1-37:  Table 
-1-1-Sources 
Our  main  source  of  information  on  the  siegecraft  practised  in  the  earliest  period  of  Ro- 
man  history  is  the  historian  Livy,  writing  in  Augustan  Rome.  It  is  generally  accepted 
that  military  details  from  Livy's  first  decade,  which  covers  the  period  down  to  293  B.  C., 
will  have  little  basis  in  fact.  Briscoe,  for  one,  believes  that  "the  actual  details  of  the  ma- 
jority  of  the  battles  are  clearly  invention,  and  indeed  extremely  stereotyped  invention7' 
(Briscoe  1971,7),  while  Walsh  has  advised  the  reader  to  "ignore  the  great  conflicts  of 
the  first  decade,  and  the  improbabilities  involved  there"  (Walsh  1961,160;  ef  197ff.  ). 
It  is  known  that  Livy  utilised  the  original  annalistic  accounts  (or  earlier  historians  who 
had),  so  that,  in  writing  of  events  three-  or  four-hundred  years  in  the  past,  he  at  least  had 
a  basic  fi-arnework.  His  contemporary,  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus,  also  writing  at 
Rome,  will  have  followed  the  same  procedure  (Gabba  1991,85-90).  But  little  in  the 
way  of  written  records  seems  to  have  survived  the  390s  (e.  g.,  Ogilvie  1976,16f  ),  inevi- 
tably  casting  doubt  on  catalogue  entries  1-  13  (see  Appendix  1). 
1.2  The  Earliest  Roman  siegecraft:  Commenta1y 
The  smple  grouping  of  early  Roman  sieges,  cornprismg  those  operations  for  which  we 
have  a  reasonable  level  of  detail,  has  thirty-seven  entries  spanning  the  years  510  to  293 
B.  C.  (see  Table  1,  p.  16).  One  fact  is  immediately  striking:  even  making  allowance  for 
10 the  uncertain  cases  of  Sutrium  (no.  14)  and  Milionia  (no.  34),  almost  half  of  the  opera- 
tions  took  the  form  of  a  storming  assault.  At  several,  the  method  employed  remains  un- 
known,  but  ladders  feature  strongly  in  fourteen  sieges:  Cameria  (no.  3),  Corion  (no.  4), 
Antium  (no.  5),  Labici  (no.  7),  Anxur  (no.  9),  Satricum  (no.  17),  Sutrium  (no.  18),  Ne- 
pete  (no.  19),  Tusculum  (no.  21),  Privernum  (no.  22),  Satricum  again  (no.  23),  Cales 
(no.  24),  Romulea  (no.  3  1),  and  Cominium  (no.  36). 
It  is  clear  that  some  form  of  blockade  was  attempted,  unsuccessfully,  at  Carventum  (no. 
8).  The  same  strategy  at  Artena.  (no.  11)  and  Anxur  (no.  12)  was  aided,  on  the  one  hand 
by  treachery,  and  on  the  other  by  trickery.  Falerii  (no.  13)  was  apparently  under  block- 
ade,  when  the  attempted  treachery  of  a  school-master  was  famously  rejected  by  the  Ro- 
man  commander,  Camillus.  Finally,  the  siege  of  Saticula  (no.  27)  spanned  two  seasons, 
during  which  the  town  was  perhaps  under  continuous  blockade. 
The  encircling  earthworks  of  a  circumvallation  figure  in  six siege  narratives:  at  Antiurn 
(no.  5),  Fideme  (no.  6),  Veii  (no.  10),  Anxur  (no.  12),  Falcrii  (no.  13),  and  Satricurn 
(no.  17).  A  cordon  of  troops  is  mentioned  in  connection  with  Labici  (no.  7),  Satricurn 
(no.  23),  Cominiurn  (no.  36),  and  perhaps  also  Nequinurn  (no.  29). 
1.3  The  Earliest  Roman  sietzecraft:  Discussion 
Liebenam  has  criticised  the  accounts  of  early  sieges  as  being  unhistorically  embellished 
(1909,2236:  "die  ErzAhlungen  sind  unhistorisch  ausgescbmilcke';  cf  Veith  1928,285: 
"Was  die  Quellen  geben,  ist  ausschlieBUch  Rekonstruktioxf).  He  draws  attention  in 
particular  to  the  reported  presence  of  the  battering-ram  at  Cameria  in  502  B.  C.  (no.  3), 
Corioli  in  493  B.  C.  (no.  4),  and  Antium  in  459  B.  C.  (no.  5),  and  appeals  to  the  testi- 
mony  of  Diodorus  Siculus  (12.28.3)  as  proof  that  the  ram  only  made  its  d6but  at  Samos 
in  440  B.  C.  But  even  this  date  is  not  universally  accepted.  Neumann,  for  one,  has  con- 
demned  Diodorus  and  Ephorus  for  recording  battering-rams  prior  to  the  Peloponnesian 
War  (e.  g.,  Plut.,  Per.  27.3,  citing  Ephorus  as  the  authority;  Neumann  1968,872;  1972, 
975:  "fraglich!  ),  although  Garlan  inclines  towards  giving  Ephorus  the  benefit  of  the 
doubt  (Garlan  1974,133f  ). 
11 The  real  question  is  whether  Dionysius  is  guilty  of  fabrication  in  his  descriptions  of  the 
sieges  at  Cameria,  Corioli  and  Antium.  The  fact  that  the  battering-ram  is  absent  from 
all  of  the  other  early  siege  operations  is  a  powerful  argument  against  its  presence  at 
these  towns.  Note,  however,  that  we  are  not  told  the  means  by  which  the  gates  of  Tus- 
culum  in  377  B.  C.  (no.  21)  and  Aquilonia  in  293  B.  C.  (no.  35)  were  broken  down. 
Of  course,  there  is  nothing  inherently  unlikely  about  ramming  operations  at  any  date. 
Reduced  to  its  basic  form,  the  battering-ram  is  hardly  a  complex  piece  of  machinery, 
and  it  is  noteworthy  that,  on  the  two  occasions  when  rams  allegedly  effected  entry  (viz., 
at  Cameria  and  Antium),  it  was  by  breaking  the  gates,  not  the  walls.  It  is  not  inconceiv- 
able  for  an  enterprising  officer  to  have  recognised  the  potential  of  a  stout  tree-trunk,  car- 
ried  by  a  squad  of  men  and  directed  with  force  at  a  wooden  gate.  Nor  is  it  inconceiv- 
able  that  the  same  stratagem  was  rediscovered  by  different  men,  in  different  places  (e.  g., 
Pericles  at  Samos;  Archidamus  at  Plataea),  and  we  must  concede  that,  at  Tusculum  and 
Aquilonia,  ramming  the  gates  ought  to  be  at  least  as  likely  as  hacking  them  with  axes 
and  crowbars. 
Liebenarn  is  also  suspicious  of  Livy's  treatment  of  the  siege  of  Veii  (no.  10),  where,  in 
the  third  season  (403  B.  C.  ),  the  Romans  reportedly  deployed  turres,  vineae,  testudines, 
"and  the  other  apparatus  for  besieging  a  city"  (Livy  5.5.6);  these  devices,  as  Liebenarn 
says,  were  not  yet  known  in  Italy  (Liebenarn  1909,2236).  He  could  also  have  drawn 
attention  to  the  improbability  of  the  Romans  tunnelling  their  way  into  the  citadel.  To  be 
sure,  the  locality  is  noted  for  its  honeycomb  of  drainage  tunnels,  and  it  may  be  that  one 
of  these  was  pressed  into  service  by  the  Romans  as  a  ready-made  underground  route 
into  the  town,  but  surely  not  up  into  the  citadel.  When  a  similar  stratagem  is  claimed 
for  the  Romans  in  435  B.  C.  at  Fidenae  (no.  6),  Ogilvie  notes  that  "it  is  only  too  likely 
that  military  details  were  used  more  than  once  to  fill  out  a  bare  notice  and  that  the  tak- 
ing  of  an  Etruscan  city  by  means  of  cuniculus  was  a  story  remembered  more  for  the 
stratagem  than  the  locality"  (1965,569  ad  Livy  4.22.2;  cf  ibid.,  570  ad  Livy  4.22-4: 
"there  are  no  visible  traces  of  cuniculi  as  there  are  at  Veir). 
In  fact,  Ogilvie  is  sometimes  overly  criticA  as  when  he  denounces  the  use  of  fire  by  the 
I defenders  of  Pometia  (no.  2)  as  "a  conventional  stratagem  without  any  basis  in  fact" 
(1965,278  ad  Livy  2.17.2):  the  first  point  is  true;  the  second  must  remain  unproven. 
When  Livy  attributes  the  success  of  the  Roman  escalade  at  Anxur  (no.  9)  to  the  distract- 
ion  of  the  defenders  by  a  noisy  feint,  Ogilvie  wearily  diagnoses  "a  textbook  stratagem 
advocated  by  Frontinus  and  employed  by  Pericles  (3.9.5)  and  Antiochus  at  Ephesus 
(3.9.10)"  (1965,622  ad  Livy  4.59.5).  Of  course,  there  can  be  no  question  of  plagiaris- 
ing  an  author  who  wrote  a  hundred  years  later,  so  Ogilvie's  intention  must  be  to  high- 
light  a  tactical  clichd.  However,  the  charge  that  a  particular  tactic  cannot  have  been 
used  because  it  was  familiar  enough  to  appear  later  in  a  book  of  stratagems  is  illogical. 
A  similar  criticism  is  levelled  at  the  Artena  (no.  11)  operation,  which  Ogilvie  character- 
ises  as  "another  textbook  method  of  taking  a  city  recommended  by  ancient  strategists" 
(1965,624  ad  Livy  4.61.8).  It  is  permissible  to  discount  details  on  the  basis  of  anach- 
ronism,  as  with  the  siege  apparatus  at  Veii  (no.  10)  and  Cales  (no.  24),  but  not  on  the 
basis  that  they  might  be  stock  scenarios  inserted  to  provide  colour,  and  certainly  not 
without  arguing  the  case. 
Of  course,  as  Ogilvie  succinctly  states  in  connection  with  Livy's  first  five  books,  "the 
fact  that  most  of  the  flesh  and  blood  of  Livy's  narrative  is  fictitious  should  not  lead  one 
to  doubt  the  bare  bones"  (Ogilvie  1971,14;  cf  Oakley  1997,100).  The  question  is: 
where  does  the  flesh  and  blood  end,  and  the  bare  bones  begin? 
1.4  The  Earliest  Roman  siegecraft:  Conclusion 
From  a  straightforward  reading  of  Livy,  it  appears  that  the  favoured  tactic  in  the  early 
period  was  the  storming  assault  with  ladders.  Of  the  thirty-seven  sieges  selected  from 
this  period,  almost  half  (in  fact,  49%,  including  two  uncertain  cases)  record  the  taking 
of  a  town  by  storm;  the  next  most  common  methods  involve  surrender  (16%)  or  be- 
trayal  (14%)  (see  Table  1,  p.  16).  Scholars  are  content  to  accept  this,  because  the  rela- 
tive  simplicity  of  ladders  appears  well  within  the  capabilities  of  the  early  Romans;  any 
mentions  of  more  sophisticated  equipment  can  be  excused  as  anachronisms  introduced 
from  the  realities  of  Augustan  warfare.  It  might  legitimately  be  suggested  that  Livy's 
annalistic  source  may  well  have  preserved  details  of  the  method  of  assault,  but  we  can- 
not  be  certain.  Oakley  has  rightly  stated,  "No  one  has  yet  found  a  yardstick  by  which 
13 truth  and  fiction  in  Livy  may  be  securely  distinguished,  and  probably  no  one  ever  wUr 
(Oakley  1997,100). 
It  would  be  inappropriate  to  compare  the  earliest  Roman  siegecraft  with  contemporary 
developments  in  the  Greek  world.  For  one  thing,  the  fourth  century  saw  the  flourishing 
of  mechanised  siegecraft  in  Sicily,  and  its  enthusiastic  employment  by  the  Macedonians 
and  their  successors  in  Greece  and  the  Near  East;  this  was  clearly  a  dynamic  period  for 
Greek  siegecraft,  but  it  evidently  bypassed  Rome,  to  judge  from  her  subsequent  lack  of 
sophistication  (cf.  §2,  pp.  ME).  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that,  at  this  early  date,  Rome 
was  immersed  in  domestic  affairs,  and  it  was  only  with  the  arrival  of  Pyrrhus  in  280 
B.  C.  that  she  was  brought  into  contact  with  the  wider  Mediterranean  world. 
A  more  accurate  comparison  may  be  made  between  the  hoplite  annies  of  fifth  and 
fourth  century  Rome,  and  the  Greek  armies  of  the  Peloponnesian  War  period.  For  this 
earliest  period  of  Greek  siegecraft,  Garlan  has  identified  a  reluctance  to  commit  to  fron- 
tal  assault,  except  where  fortifications  were  weak  or  non-existent,  or  where  the  town 
lacked  a  garrison  (Garlan  1974,125-128,147).  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  profile  of  early  Roman  siegecraft,  as  presented  by  Livy  and  Dionysius,  is  not  like 
this  at  all.  In  fact,  it  is  more  reminiscent  of  the  pattern  displayed  by  the  siegecraft  of  the 
Macedonian  wars  (§S,  pp.  28ff.  )  or  the  early  Empire  (§12,  pp.  60ff.  ),  rather  than  the 
chronologically-proximate  First  Punic  War  period  (§2,  pp.  l7fl. 
But  if  the  Augustan  historians  have  retrojected  later  tactics  onto  their  treatment  of  fifth 
and  fourth  century  events,  perhaps,  following  a  kind  of  domino  effect,  their  tales  of 
Rome's  legendary  past  preserve  vestiges  of  fifth  and  fourth  century  practice.  Describ- 
ing  Romulus'  war  with  Fidenae  and  VeiL  Livy  records  two  typical  courses  of  events 
(Livy  1.14-15).  At  Fidenae,  part  of  the  Roman  army  lay  concealed  in  dense  under- 
growth  while  their  companions  made  a  feint  at  the  town  gates;  the  enemy  were  drawn 
from  the  safety  of  their  walls  by  the  promise  of  an  easy  victory,  and  unwittingly  fell  into 
the  ambush.  As  the  Fidenates  retreated  in  disorder,  the  Romans  pursued  them  and  burst 
through  the  gates  at  their  heels.  Ogilvie  objects  (1965,81)  that  the  battle  is  based  on  a 
conventional  textbook  trick  found,  for  instance,  in  Frontinus  (Strat.  2.5.1;  cE  Polyaenus, 
14 Strat.  8.3.2).  The  implication  is  that  Livy  has  been  guilty  of  fabrication.  Of  course,  that 
is  probably  quite  literally  true,  as  we  have  acknowledged.  But  the  fact  that  the  trick  is 
universally  attributed  to  Romulus  shows  that  there  was  a  tradition  to  this  cffect,  and 
equally  that  the  ambush  was  a  credible  stratagem  under  these  circumstances. 
In  contrast,  the  Veientes  did  not  wait  for  the  Roman  arrival,  but  immediately  took  the 
field,  we  are  told,  to  avoid  being  shut  up  in  their  town.  However,  the  blistering  Roman 
attack  forced  them  to  seek  the  shelter  of  their  walls,  whereupon  Romulus  laid  waste  to 
the  countryside  and  departed.  Again,  Ogilvie  draws  attention  (1965,83)  to  the  strata- 
gem  of  preferring  open  battle  to  standing  siege,  citing  Frontinus,  (Strat.  2.6;  note  that  the 
chapter  indicated  by  Ogilvie  is  actually  on  how  a  cornered  enemy  should  be  allowed  to 
escape  lest  desperation  give  him  the  advantage). 
These  two  stories  serve  to  illustrate  the  paradox  of  primitive  (that  is,  pre-mechanised) 
siegecraft,  and  may  well  preserve  the  bare  bones  of  actual  events.  On  the  one  hand, 
Romulus'  capture  of  Fidenae  is  shown  to  have  depended  upon  the  opening  of  the  gates 
by  the  townsfolk;  similarly,  he  is  powerless  to  take  Ven  once  the  townsfolk  retreat  with- 
in  her  walls.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Fidenates  are  easily  tricked  by  the  lure  of  certain 
victory  to  leave  the  security  of  their  defences,  and  the  Veientes  are  portrayed  as  wishing 
to  avoid  being  caught  within  the  town,  as  they  would  then  be  powerless  in  the  sequel.  It 
seems  that  neither  the  aggressor  nor  the  defender  enjoyed  a  particular  advantage. 
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16 2.  The  First  Punic  War  (CatalogLie,  nos.  38-44;  Table  2) 
2.1  Sources 
Livy's  account  of  the  First  Punic  War  is  lost,  but  a  certain  amount  of  information  can  be 
gleaned  from  another  of  his  contemporaries,  the  Greek  historian,  Diodorus  Siculus,  who 
drew  upon  the  third  century  Sicilian  writer,  Philinus.  There  are  also  the  early  books  of 
Cassius  Dio's  Roman  History,  written  around  A.  D.  220,  but  which  survive  only  as  ex- 
ccrpts  made  by  the  Byzantine  monk,  Zonaras.  However,  the  major  source  for  this  per- 
iod  is  Polybius,  whose  Histories,  written  in  the  second  century  B.  C.,  bring  a  solid  relia- 
bility  to  the  history  of  events  from  264  B.  C.  down  to  the  mid-second  century. 
2.2  Roman  siegecraft  during  the  First  Punic  War:  Commentary 
Although  overwhelmingly  a  naval  contest,  the  First  Punic  War  nevertheless  presents  a 
small  sample  group  of  seven  siege  operations,  for  which  we  have  a  reasonable  amount 
of  information  (see  Table  2,  p.  21).  At  only  one  of  these,  Lilybaeum  (no.  44),  did  the 
Romans  pursue  a  strategy  of  blockade,  in  the  sense  that  the  besieging  army  contained 
the  defenders  within  a  circumvallation  and  waited  for  their  surrender.  At  one  other  site, 
Agrigenturn  (no.  38),  and  possibly  also  at  Panormus  (no.  42),  the  Romans  constructed 
encircling  fieldworks.  At  the  former,  the  Roman  blockading  strategy  failed  when  the 
distraction  of  a  Carthaginian  relieving  force  enabled  the  beleaguered  garrison  to  slip 
out;  whereas,  at  the  latter,  the  action  was  played  out  along  different  lines.  Nothing  re- 
sembling  a  blockade  was  ever  attempted  at  the  four  remaining  sieges. 
In  its  later  stages,  Lilybaeum  presents  a  classic  example  of  the  blockade,  but  it  began  as 
a  straightforward  assault.  Polybius  records  that  two  camps  were  established,  one  on  ei- 
ther  side  of  the  town,  hence  to  the  north-east  and  south-east,  as  the  whole  western  side 
faced  the  sea  (Polyb.  1.42.8;  cf  Diod.  Sic.  24.1.1)  (fig.  2).  Interestingly,  the  camps 
were  linked  by  a  ditch,  a  palisade  and  a  wall,  presumably  to  safeguard  the  movement  of 
Roman  troops  to  and  fro  (cf.  Caesar's  fines  at  Gergovia,  no.  133,  fig.  12).  The  ",  work!?  ' 
(erga)  which  enabled  the  Romans  to  bring  up  battering-rams  will  have  involved  level- 
ling  the  terrain  and,  in  particular,  filling  the  deep  ditch  which  surrounded  the  town 
(Polyb.  1.42.7).  Such  levelling  will  have  created  a  gentle  glacis  of  some  depth,  which 
17 the  defenders  perhaps  attempted  to  destabilise  from  beneath,  although  Polybius  uses  the 
term  "countermining"  (Polyb.  1.42.12),  which  ought  to  imply  measures  taken  to  neutral- 
ise  Roman  mines.  At  any  rate,  after  a  year  of  fruitless  assaults,  the  Romans  changed 
tack,  and  the  ditch  and  palisade  were  extended  to  surround  the  town  (Polyb.  1.48.10), 
with  the  obvious  exception  of  the  western  seaboard  and  its  north-facing  harbour. 
By  this  stage,  the  Romans  appear  also  to  have  established  a  successful  naval  blockade. 
Diodorus  claim  that  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  block  the  barbour  mouth  with  fifteen 
light  vessels,  loaded  down  with  stones  and  presumably  scuttled  to  present  an  obstacle; 
he  further  mentions  stones,  jetties  and  an  anchored  boom,  which  was  destroyed  in  a 
storm.  (Diod.  Sic.  24.1.1-2).  Yet,  despite  the  presence  of  the  Roman  fleet,  the  Carthag- 
inians  had  been  able  to  sail  in  and  out  of  the  harbour  at  will,  during  the  whole  of  the 
first  year  (Polyb.  1.46.6-13;  47.3).  It  was  only  when  the  Romans  finally  managed  to 
pile  up  a  mound  of  some  kind  (Polyb.  1.47.5),  on  which  blockade-runners  were  liable  to 
run  aground,  that  the  relief  expeditions  appear  to  have  ceased.  Diodorus's  list  of  obsta- 
cles  perhaps  belongs  here  rather  than  earlier. 
The  siege  was  by  no  means  a  model  of  efficiency.  By  the  end  of  249  B.  C.,  the  Roman 
fleet  was  in  ruins,  and  it  was  only  the  Carthaginian  failure  to  press  her  advantage  that 
allowed  the  Roman  policy  of  passive  siege  at  Lilybaeum.  to  continue.  It  is  unlikely  that 
the  town  could  have  survived  an  eight-year  blockade  without  relief,  and  the  Carthagin- 
ians  had  probably  resumed  revictualling  the  town  by  sea,  until  the  arrival  of  a  new  Ro- 
man  fleet  in  242  B.  C.  But  even  then,  the  town  did  not  succumb,  and  the  siege  was  only 
lifted  when  the  war  was  won  elsewhere. 
At  Agrigcntum  (no.  37),  in  the  fu-st  major  action  of  the  war,  the  Romans  built  two 
camps,  one  to  the  west,  the  other  probably  to  the  south  (see  below,  p.  87),  and  ringed 
the  town  with  two  lines  of  ditches,  the  inner  of  which  guarded  against  sorties  from 
within,  the  outer  against  a  relieving  force,  while  preventing  the  introduction  of  aid  into 
the  town;  guard-posts  were  established  in  the  resulting  secure  zone  (Polyb.  1.18.2-4). 
After  five  months,  the  blockade  seemed  to  be  paying  off,  but  the  tables  were  turned 
when  the  Carthaginians  seized  the  nearby  Roman  supply  base  and  moved  on  the  be- 
18 siegers  (Polyb.  1.18.6-10).  Furthermore,  an  epidemic  of  some  kind  had  broken  out 
amongst  the  Romans  (Polyb.  1.19.1),  as  may  also  have  happened  at  the  later  siege  of 
Lilybaeum  (Diod.  Sic.  24.1.4),  and  it  was  all  they  could  do  to  maintain  the  blockade 
with  minimal  support  from  their  ally,  Hiero  of  Syracuse  (Polyb.  1.18.11).  Rather  than 
waiting  for  the  blockade  to  succeed,  they  eagerly  accepted  the  offer  of  pitched  battle 
and  defeated  the  Carthaginians.  In  the  event,  the  blockade  itself  was  lax,  as  the  Cartha- 
ginian  garrison  confined  within  the  town  was  able  to  break  out  by  night  (Polyb.  1.19.12- 
13). 
The  alleged  earthworks  at  Panormus  (no.  42)  are  more  problematic:  it  is  Diodorus  who 
mentions  a  ditch  and  palisade  around  the  town  (Diod.  Sic.  23.18.4);  by  contrast,  Poly- 
bius  states  that  the  Romans,  "erecting  works  against  two  positions,  and  making  other 
preparations,  brought  up  the  machinee'  (Polyb.  1.38.8-9).  The  operation  was  swift:  a 
tower  was  knocked  down  and  the  town  stormed.  If  there  was  a  circurnvallation  around 
the  town,  it  is  odd  that  Polybius  does  not  mention  it,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that,  in  this 
particular  case,  a  circurnvallation  does  not  tie  in  with  the  tactics  adopted  by  the  Romans. 
Mytistratum  (no.  39)  and  Aspis  (no.  41)  present  cases  of  unopposed  entry;  Polybius 
claims  that  the  former  had  been  under  siege  for  a  while,  but  there  is  no  mention  of  any 
investing  works.  Camarina  (no.  40)  and  Lipara  (no.  43),  Eke  Panormus,  are  straightfor- 
ward  assaults,  the  former  through  a  breached  wall.  Of  course,  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  Lilybaeum  began  as  a  failed  assault;  the  Romans  had  spent  a  year  throwing  all 
manner  of  equipment  at  her  walls. 
2.3  Roman  sicgecraft  during  the  First  Punic  War:  Discussion 
In  his  overview  of  the  pre-Caesarian  army,  Veith  has  canvassed  the  opinion  that  Roman 
siegecraft  of  the  period  lacked  the  finer  technical  skills,  having  been  denied  any  cross- 
fertilisation  with  Greek  practice,  and  concentrated  instead  on  the  construction  of  field- 
works.  For  him,  the  efficiency  of  the  Roman  legion  in  all  aspects  of  entrenching  work 
brought  the  art  of  the  blockade  to  its  peak  (Veith  1928,373).  He  thereby  begs  two 
questions:  first,  that  the  Roman  legion  was  already  expert  in  field  fortifications;  and 
second,  that  the  Romans  developed  blockading  into  a  fine  art. 
19 On  the  first  point,  Veith  accepts  the  testimony  of  Frontinus  (Strat.  4.1.14;  cf.  Livy 
35.14),  that  the  Romans  adopted  the  idea  of  the  marching-camp  from  Pyrrhus  in  275 
B.  C.  (Veith  1928,288),  a  theory  which  still  divides  scholars  (e.  g.,  Le  Bohec  1989,139, 
for,  Keppie  1984,38,  against).  (Incidentally,  Pyrrhus  is  probably  the  third  century  for- 
eigner  to  whom  Richmond  1969,194,  alludes,  rather  than  Polybius,  as  conjectured  by 
Richmond's  editors,  and  his  text  may  be  allowed  to  stand  without  being  cmendcd  to 
"second  century".  Richmond  may  thus  be  counted  amongst  those  opposing  the  above 
theory.  )  No-one  would  dispute  that  the  Romans  were  competent  field  engineers  prior  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  First  Punic  War,  but  Veith  implies  that  this  competence  was  unusual 
in  antiquity.  There  is  no  justification  for  this  view;  the  Spartans  of  the  Peloponnesian 
War  period,  for  instance,  were  fidly  capable  of  building  field  fortifications,  and  Alexan- 
der's  Macedonians,  regularly  fortified  their  camps. 
Veith  further  assumes,  not  only  that  the  Romans  surpassed  all  others  in  achieving  res- 
ults  by  blockading,  but  also  that,  acknowledging  their  superiority,  they  concentrated 
upon  this  form  of  siegecraft  more  than  any  other  people  in  antiquity.  Veith's  assess- 
ment  applies  to  the  entire  period  of  the  so-called  "Manipulartaktik",  namely  pre- 
Caesarian  times;  here,  I  examine  its  application  to  the  middle  years  of  the  third  century 
(cE  below,  pp.  31,36  &  45,  for  further  discussion). 
It  is  difficult  to  divine  what  Veith  intends  by  his  comment  that  the  Romans  conducted 
the  blockade  more  successfiffly  than  any  other  ancient  peoples.  For  example,  he  char- 
acterises  Lilybaeurn  as  "a  purely  land  blockade  of  a  sea-town,  which  necessarily  re- 
mained  quite  incomplete"  (Veith  1928,374:  "eine  reine  Landzenderung  einer  Seestadt, 
die  demnach  ganz  unvollstandig  blieb!  '),  but  an  instructive  parallel  may  be  drawn  with 
the  situation  at  Potidaea,  another  sea-town,  in  432  B.  C.  There,  the  Athenians  blockaded 
the  town,  half  way  along  a  narrow  isthmus,  by  constructing  a  cross-wall  on  each  side 
and  keeping  a  watch  on  the  coasts  in  between  (Thuc.  1.64.1-3);  the  town  held  out  until 
late  in  430  B.  C.,  when  starvation  forced  its  capitulation.  The  important  point  is  that  the 
blockade  was  complete,  despite  the  maritime  setting.  Admittedly,  an  assault  was  at- 
tempted  at  one  stage,  in  the  vain  hope  of  speeding  the  process,  as  the  besiegers  were 
succumbing  to  disease  (Thuc.  2.58.1),  but  the  Athenians  were  able  to  force  a  successful 
20 conclusion  in  a  little  over  two  years.  By  contrast,  the  Romans  made  a  poor  showing  at 
LilybaeunL 
2.4  Roman  siegecraft  during  the  First  Punic  War:  Conclusion 
Statistically,  the  sample  grouping  is  too  small  to  support  definitive  conclusions,  but  we 
may  note  that  the  storming  assault  appears  to  be  at  least  as  common  a  besieging  tactic 
during  this  period  as  the  blockade.  In  fact,  of  the  seven  sieges  selected  from  this  period, 
almost  half  (in  fact,  43%)  record  the  taking  of  a  town  by  assault;  blockade  was  at- 
tempted  twice  (29%)  and  sustained  only  once  (14%). 
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3.  The  Illyrian  Wars  (Catalogrue,  no.  4Z 
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Polybius  mentions  three  sieges  mounted  by  the  Illyrians  along  the  Adriatic  coast  in  229 
B.  C.  (Polyb.  2.9.7-10.8,  Corcyra;  11.8-9,  Epidamnus;  11.11,  Issa)  as  a  prelude  to  the  so- 
called  First  Illyrian  War,  during  which  the  Roman  fleet  apparently  took  several  towns 
by  assault  (Polyb.  2.11.13),  but  these  are  omitted  from  the  present  discussion  for  lack  of 
21 detail.  Ten  years  later,  in  the  lightning  strike  known  as  the  Second  Illyrian  War,  the 
Romans  captured  the  town  of  Dimallum  (no.  45)  in  a  seven-day  operation.  Although 
Polybius  implies  that  siege-works  (erga)  of  some  kind  were  involved,  the  town  was 
taken  by  assault. 
4.  The 
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Iýjnic  War  (Catalogue.  nos.  46-53.55-57,59-64;  Table 
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4.1  Sources 
Livy's  narrative  resumes  with  the  Second  Punic  War,  and  is  supplemented  by  Poly- 
bius's  account,  origin*  covering  the  period  220-146  B.  C.,  but  surviving  only  as  frag- 
ments  after  216  B.  C.  A  third  major  source  now  emerges  in  the  form  of  Appian,  a  writer 
who  flourished  under  the  emperor  Antoninus  Pius,  but  utilised  earlier  sources,  including 
Polybius;  the  volumes  of  his  Roman  History  dealing  with  Spain,  Hannibalic  Italy,  and 
Carthage  all  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the  siegecraft  of  this  period. 
4.2  Roman  siegecraft  in  the  Second  Punic  War:  Commenta1y 
We  have  details  of  seventeen  Roman  sieges  during  the  Second  Punic  War  (see  Table  3, 
p.  27),  and  a  sharp  contrast  with  contemporary  Carthaginian  practice  is  imrnediately  ap- 
parent:  nowhere  do  the  Romans  dispose  of  the  same  range  of  siege  machinery  as  the 
Carthaginians  (cf.  Hanniibal  at  Saguntum:  Appian,  Hisp.  10-12;  Livy  21.7.4-9.2,11.3- 
15.2).  Only  in  Scipio  Africanus's  siege  of  Utica  (no.  64),  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Cin- 
cius  Alimentus's  attempt  on  Locri  (no.  56),  do  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  kind  of  mech- 
anisation  common  in  Carthagirtian  sieges. 
Blockades  were  mounted  at  four  towns,  all  of  which  surrendered:  at  Atanagrum  (no. 
46),  the  townsfolk,  abandoned  by  their  Carthaginian  ally,  Hasdrubal,  capitulated  within 
days;  the  Ausetani  took  thirty  days  to  surrender  (no.  47),  perhaps  trusting  that  the  deep 
snow  would  discourage  the  Romans;  the  two-year  blockade  of  pro-Carthaginian  Capua 
(no.  53)  ended  in  surrender;  and,  in  the  final  stages  of  the  siege  of  Syracuse  (no.  50), 
when  Marcellus  settled  down  to  blockade  the  walled  Achradina  quarter  (fig.  3),  the 
Syracusans  capitulated. 
22 Marcellus  established  three  camps,  with  pickets  in  between,  but  the  security  of  his 
blockade  was  never  put  to  the  test.  Gnaeus  Scipio  perhaps  threw  a  cordon  around 
Atanagrum,  as  no  investing  works  are  mentioned,  but  he  seems  to  have  intended  some- 
thing  more  substantial  against  the  Ausetani.  At  any  rate,  he  had  brought  screens  and 
shelters,  probably  implying  an  intention  to  undertake  construction  work,  which  was 
perhaps  prevented  by  the  deep  snow.  At  Capua,  two  consuls  and  a  praetor  converged 
on  the  town,  each  establishing  his  camp  in  a  different  sector.  Then,  they  dug  a  fairly 
sophisticated  circumvallation.  Livy  refers  to  a  double  ditch  and  rampart,  studded  with 
guard-posts  (25.22.16:  duplexfossa  uallumque;  cf  25.22.8:  fossa  uallumque  ...  et  cas- 
tella),  but  Appian  gives  a  full  description:  "they  dug  a  ditch  round  Capua  ...  and  in  ad- 
dition  to  the  ditch  they  built  a  wall  in  a  circle  round  the  whole  place.  Then  the  generals 
built  another  one  outside  the  encircling  wall,  using  the  middle  as  a  camp.  There  were 
battlements  turned  towards  the  besieged  Capuans,  and  others  towards  those  outside" 
(App.,  Hann.  37).  The  scheme  is  strikingly  reminiscent  of  the  Roman  siege-works,  fifty 
years  earlier,  at  Agrigentum  (no.  3  8),  but  the  strategy  paid  off  this  time. 
Surrender  was  achieved  at  a  fifth  town,  Castax  (or  Castulo,  no.  59),  where  the  Cartha- 
ginian  garrison  refused  to  submit  to  Scipio  Africanus's  deputy,  Silanus;  however,  when 
Scipio  arrived  in  person,  fresh  from  the  slaughter  at  Ilourgeia  (no.  60),  the  townsfolk 
suddenly  found  the  incentive  to  overpower  their  erstwhile  overlords  and  hand  the  town 
over  to  the  Romans. 
Scipio  Africanus  perhaps  initially  attempted  a  blockade  at  Locha  (no.  63),  to  judge  from 
Appian's  comment  that  the  siege  had  been  long,  but  the  town  was  taken  by  assault.  An 
assaulting  strategy  was  adopted  at  Locri  (no.  56),  for  which  the  Romans  requisitioned 
equipment  from  Sicily  (see  below,  p.  163)  and  constructed  siege-works  (opera)  of  some 
sort,  but  quickly  abandoned  them  at  the  news  of  Hannibal's  approach. 
At  Orongis  (no.  57),  Scipio  Asiaticus  began  by  constructing  a  double  ditch  and  rampart 
around  the  town,  but  proceeded  to  launch  waves  of  escalading  assaults,  and  finally 
hacked  the  gates  open.  Since  he  originally  hoped  to  win  the  town  over  by  diplomacy, 
the  circumvaHation  may  have  been  a  psychological  device,  designed  to  encourage  the 
23 townsfolk's  capitulation;  this  is  the  first  indication  that  siege-works  might  have  more 
than  purely  practical  significance.  If  the  opera  which  Livy  mentions  at  Locri  (no.  56) 
were  entrenchments,  they  were  perhaps  designed  more  to  safeguard  the  besiegers  than 
to  hem  in  the  besieged,  as  Cincius's  strategy  was  based  squarely  on  assault;  but  Livy's 
use  of  the  word  is  problematic,  often  implying  no  more  than  siege-equipment  (see  be- 
low,  pp.  97f.  ). 
When  Marcellus  brought  up  equipment,  including  shelters,  at  Casilinurn  (no.  48),  the 
inhabitants  began  to  leave  the  town,  seeking  the  protection  of  Marcellus's  consular  col- 
league,  Maximus.  Many  of  the  townsfolk  were  killed  in  the  ensuing  disorder,  and  the 
Romans  easily  re-occupied  the  town,  but  it  seems  that  Marccllus  had  been  prepared  for 
entrenching  work.  Equally,  the  mere  sight  of  the  equipment  was  enough  to  persuade  the 
inhabitants  to  flee. 
Besides  Orongis,  another  seven  towns  were  carried  by  assault,  in  four  cases  via  the 
gates,  in  three  cases  by  scaling  the  walls.  At  Leontini  (no.  49),  the  gates  were  stormed 
from  the  outside,  but  at  the  other  three,  they  were  opened  from  the  inside,  following  a 
successful  escalade.  At  Arpi  (no.  51),  a  heavy  downpour  drowned  the  noise  of  the  ass- 
ault  and  kept  the  guards  under  cover,  where  they  could  not  interfere.  At  Cartagena  (no. 
55;  fig.  4),  by  some  oversight,  many  of  the  ladders  were  too  short,  and  the  resulting  con- 
fusion  gave  the  Carthaginians  time  to  organise  a  defence,  but,  in  the  meantime,  a  less 
well-defended  sector  was  identified  and  successfully  scaled,  and  the  gates  were  broken 
open  from  within.  Events  took  a  similar  course  at  Syracuse  (no.  50)  in  the  second  year 
of  the  siege:  after  all  attempts  at  frontal  assault  had  been  frustrated  by  the  engineering 
skill  of  Archimedes  (Livy  24.34.16),  Marcellus;  finally  took  the  town  by  nocturnal  es- 
calade  during  a  local  festival  (Livy  25.24.2),  and  the  storming  party  then  broke  open  the 
gates  from  inside  to  admit  the  army.  As  we  have  seen,  this  was  not  the  end  of  the  affair, 
for  Marcellus  still  had  to  deal  with  the  walled  Achradina,  sector  around  the  harbour. 
Mass  escalade  was  employed  at  Ilourgeia  (no.  60),  where  Scipio  Africanus  was  obliged 
to  embolden  his  troops  by  threatening  to  mount  the  ladders  himself,  if  this  was  simply  a 
cunning  stratagem,  Scipio's  bluff  was  not  called,  and  he  was  spared  the  same  fate  as 
24 Alexander  in  the  town  of  the  Mallians  (Arrian,  Anab.  Alex.  6.9.3-6;  Curtius,  Hist.  Alex. 
9.4.30-33;  Plut.,  Alex.  63.3).  Scaling  parties  were  sent  forward  at  Locha  (no.  63),  appar- 
ently  as  a  last  resort,  but  the  prospect  of  an  escalade  prompted  the  townsfolk  to  sur- 
render;  unfortunately,  the  frustrated  soldiers  chose  to  disregard  Scipio's  order  to  desist, 
but  their  insubordination  did  not  go  unpunished.  At  Locri  (no.  62),  the  Romans  gained 
access  via  ladders  let  down  by  sympathetic  townsfolk,  but  the  subsequent  assault  on  the 
citadel  required  the  assistance  of  craftsmen,  who  had  worked  there,  to  manufacture  lad- 
ders  of  the  correct  length. 
Finally,  the  siege  of  Utica  (no.  64;  fig.  5)  saw  a  forty-day  assault  by  land  and  sea,  but 
ended  inconclusively  when  the  Romans  withdrew  to  winter  quarters.  In  the  following 
year,  Scipio  maintained  the  pretence  of  a  blockade,  but  the  main  theatre  of  war  had 
moved  elsewhere  and  there  was  no  longer  the  requirement  to  capture  the  town.  Scipio 
is  said  to  have  employed  artillery  and  machinery,  partly  requisitioned  from  Sicily  and 
thus,  like  the  machines  deployed  by  Cincius  Alimentus  at  Locri  (no.  56),  arguably  Car- 
thaginian  in  origin.  Livy  says  that  the  latter  included  "machines  with  which  they  were 
shaking  the  walW'  (27.28.17),  which  implies  battering-rams,  and  Scipio's  machinery  at 
Utica  likewise  included  rams  (Appian,  Pun.  16).  In  something  of  an  innovation,  if  only 
for  Roman  siegecraft  (see  below,  pp.  132ff.  ),  he  constructed  an  embankment  to  carry 
the  rams  up  to  the  wall. 
4.3  Rom  .  11ft  in  the  Second  Punic  War:  Discussion 
Syracuse  stands  out  amongst  Rome's  adversaries  in  the  Second  Punic  War  for  the  diver- 
sity  and  sophistication  of  its  defences.  The  Romans  based  their  strategy  on  the  frontal 
assault,  against  the  sea  wall  using  the  mechanical  scaling-ladders  known  as  sambucae 
mounted  on  shipboard  (Polyb.  8.4.1-11),  and  against  the  land  wall  with  ladders  and 
wicker  screens  (Polyb.  8.3.6).  Veith  is  quite  correct  in  his  assessment  that  the  Romans 
were  completely  outclassed  by  the  engineering  skill  of  Archimedes,  but  his  appeal  to 
"the  towering  superiority  of  Greek  fortification7'  (Veith  1928,375:  "die  turmhohe  10ber- 
legenheit  der  griechischen  Festungskriegskunst")  is  misguided:  generalising  from  this 
one  town  ignores  its  uniqueness  and  belittles  the  genius  of  Archimedes.  Much  the  same 
attitude  is  adopted  by  Connolly,  who  uses  the  siege  as  an  illustration  of  "the  Romans' 
25 rather  unsuccessful  attempts  at  scientific  warfare"  (1981,294).  Liebenam  oversimpli- 
fies  in  a  different  way-,  for  him,  Syracuse  simply  illustrates  the  general  difficulties  of 
besieging  a  coastal  town  (Liebenam  1909,2248:  "Besondere  Schwierigkeiten  brachte 
die  Belagerung  der  am  Meere  gelegenen  Städte'). 
Ile  implication  underlying  Veith's  (and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Connolly's)  damning  cri- 
tique  is  that  Roman  methods  were  at  fault,  and  Syracuse  would  easily  have  fallen  to 
Greek  siegecraft.  However,  on  the  landward  side,  the  steep  approach  to  the  walls  would 
have  made  the  use  of  heavy  machinery  difficult,  particularly  when  faced  with  Ar- 
chimedes'  artillery,  arranged  on  several  levels  and  firing  on  different  trajectories.  And 
the  unsuccessful  naval  assault  is  strikingly  reminiscent  of  Demetrius's  siege  of  Rhodes 
in  305-304  B.  C.,  where  repeated  ship-borne  assaults  supported  by  saturation  artillery 
bombardment  failed  to  secure  the  harbour  (cf  Droysen  1909,2230-2234).  Third  cen- 
tury  Syracuse  was  perceived  as  the  epitome  of  impregnability,  far  more  so  than  fourth- 
century  Rhodes;  if  the  eponymous  "Besieger"  was  unable  to  capture  the  latter,  it  can 
only  be  to  Marcellus'  credit  that  he  eventually  managed  to  capture  the  former. 
D- 
Roman  efforts  in  this  period  are  also  belittled  by  Goldsworthy,  who  maintains  that,  "if 
the  Romans  failed  to  take  a  fortified  city  by  surprise  assault  or  treachery,  they  were  not 
skilled  at  prosecuting  a  formal  siege  and  usually  had  to  rely  on  starving  the  enemy  into 
submission7'  (2000,49).  His  assessment,  that  Roman  armies  of  the  middle  Republic 
were  unskilled  in  formal  siegecraft,  must  be  based  on  the  evidence  of  Scipio's  perform- 
ance  at  Utica,  because  that  was  the  only  occasion,  throughout  the  Second  Punic  War,  on 
which  a  Roman  army  attempted  a  Hellenistic-style  mechanised  siege  (though  we  have 
seen  that  Cincius  Alimentus  may  well  have  intended  this  at  Locri).  In  that  respect, 
Goldsworthy's  criticism  is  unfair.  But  his  implication  that  the  preferred  methods  were 
coup  de  main  and  treachery  does  not  stand  up  to  scrutiny,  either. 
The  assault  on  Leontini  (no.  49)  was  sudden,  and  the  assault  on  Arpi  (no.  51)  was 
launched  under  cover  of  dark,  but  none  of  the  remaining  six  assaults  depended  upon  the 
element  of  surprise.  The  case  for  treachery  fares  even  worse,  for  only  one  of  our  sample 
grouping  of  seventeen  sieges  relied  upon  betrayal  (Tarentum,  no.  52).  Finally,  Golds- 
26 worthy's  claim  that,  when  all  else  failed,  Roman  annies  of  the  period  resorted  to  passive 
blockade,  does  not  accurately  reflect  the  evidence,  either.  At  the  four  sites  from  this 
period  where  a  policy  of  blockade  was  pursued,  it  seems  that  the  strategy  was  deliber- 
ately  selected,  not  fallen  back  upon. 
In  the  final  analysis,  it  appears  that  the  besieging  method  preferred  by  Roman  annies 
during  the  Second  Punic  War  was  the  storming  assault,  usually  by  escalade,  often 
accompanied  by  forcing  open  the  gates. 
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In  summary,  out  of  seventeen  Roman  sieges,  four  were  conceived  as  blockades  (includ- 
ing  the  siege  of  Achradina  at  Syracuse),  all  of  which  resulted  in  a  surrender  (241/o). 
Eight  (including  the  capture  of  Epipolae  at  Syracuse)  represent  towns  taken  by  assault 
(47%);  nine  (53%),  with  the  inclusion  of  Astapa  (no.  61),  where  the  townsfolk  chose 
suicide  over  the  continued  defence  of  their  town;  and  ten  (59%),  with  the  inclusion  of 
Casilinum  (no.  48),  where  the  townsfolk  did  not  oppose  the  Roman  assault.  In  only  two 
cases  (12%)  was  a  siege  abandoned  before  completion,  and  in  only  one  case  (61/6)  was 
treachery  the  deciding  factor. 
27 S.  The  Macedonian  Wars  (Catalogue.  nos.  54.58.65-83.88-90:  Table  4) 
5.1  Sources 
When  we  turn  to  Roman  involvement  in  Greece  and  the  Balkans,  the  surviving  frag- 
ments  of  Appian's  Macedonica  present  no  siege  narratives,  so  our  main  sources  are, 
again,  Polybius  and  Livy;  some  details  preserved  by  Zonaras  from  the  early  books  of 
Cassius  Dio  are  also  pertinent. 
5.2  Roman  siegecraft  during  the  Macedonian  Wars:  Comment= 
We  have  details  of  only  two  Roman  sieges  from  the  First  Macedonian  War  (nos.  54  & 
58),  but  the  profusion  of  Second  Macedonian  War  sieges  yields  eleven  detailed  exam- 
ples  (nos.  65-75),  to  which  may  be  added  two  (nos.  76-77)  properly  belonging  to  the 
war  of  195  B.  C.  with  Sparta,  five  (nos.  78-81  &  83)  from  the  Aetolian  War  of  191-189 
B.  C.,  and  three  from  the  Third  Macedonian  War  (nos.  88-90).  A  single  example  (no. 
82),  strictly  relating  to  the  war  with  Antiochus  111,  has  been  included  here,  also,  on  the 
grounds  of  contemporaneity  (see  Table  4,  p.  33). 
The  emphasis  is  very  much  on  the  storming  attack,  or  the  threat  of  the  storming  attack. 
Anticyra  (no.  54)  was  intimidated  into  surrender  by  overwhelming  force;  artillery  first 
appears  in  Roman  hands  here  (see  below,  p.  163),  and  the  Greeks  were  perhaps  all  too 
familiar  with  its  effects.  Celetrum  (no.  66)  surrendered  at  the  approach  of  a  legionary 
testudo;  Andros  (no.  67)  and  Carystus  (no.  69),  too,  surrendered  at  the  unfamiliar  sight 
of  Roman  troops.  At  Gytheurn  (no.  76),  the  townsfolk  surrendered  when  the  walls  were 
breached,  and  at  Sparta  (no.  77),  where  a  cordon  was  thrown  around  the  town,  the  inces- 
sant  harassing  attacks  of  the  Romans  against  the  unwalled  sectors  persuaded  the  inhabi- 
tants  to  surrender. 
Besides  Gytheum  (no.  76),  several  other  sieges  feature  the  breaching  of  walls  by  bat- 
tering-ram.  A  long-drawn  operation  at  Oreus  (no.  68)  was  brought  to  an  end  when 
troops  stormed  through  a  breached  wall,  but  at  Corinth  (no.  73),  although  a  section  of 
wall  was  demolished,  the  besiegers  withdrew  at  the  rumour  of  Macedonian  reinforce- 
ments.  At  Leucas  (no.  75),  Heraclea,  (no.  78)  and  Haliartus  (no.  88),  wall  breaches  were 
28 repaired  before  they  could  be  exploited,  and  a  storming  assault  through  a  wall  breach  at 
Atrax  (no.  71)  was  repulsed.  Similar  assaults  at  Elatea  (no.  74)  and  Phocaea  (no.  82) 
were  coordinated  with  escalades  elsewhere  around  the  circuit;  Elataea  was  captured  and 
sacked,  but  Phocaea  surrendered  to  avoid  a  similar  fate.  When  the  defenders  at  Haliar- 
tus  (no.  88;  fig.  6)  repaired  their  breached  wall,  Lucretius  Gallus  resorted  to  escalade 
around  half  of  the  town.  The  breach  made  at  Eretria  (no.  70)  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  repaired,  but  the  townsfolk  maintained  an  effective  defence  until  they  finally  suc- 
cumbed  to  a  nocturnal  escalade. 
Ladders  could  be  an  effective  means  of  assault  in  their  own  right.  Chalcis  (no.  65), 
Heraclea  (no.  78)  and  Lan-da  (no.  80)  were  captured  in  dawn  escalades,  Lamia  at  the 
second  attempt,  and  the  troops  attacking  Heracleurn  (no.  89)  adopted  the  unusual  ex- 
pedient  of  clambering  onto  the  walls  from  the  top  of  a  testudo  shield-formation.  Of 
course,  under  the  right  circumstances,  using  the  gate  was  more  convenient:  when  a  force 
sortied  out  of  Daulis  (no.  72),  Roman  troops  repulsed  them  and  stormed  through  the 
open  gate  at  their  heels. 
Several  sites  exhibit  the  kind  of  full-blown  operation  hitherto  restricted  to  Carthaginian 
and  Macedonian  armies.  When  Flamininus's  storming  assault  at  Atrax  (no.  71)  was  re- 
pulsed,  an  embankment  (agger)  was  constructed  for  the  advance  of  a  siege-tower,  a  de- 
vice  which  appears  in  the  Roman  arsenal  for  the  first  time  here;  its  utter  failure  can  be 
put  down  to  Roman  unfamiliarity  with  this  type  of  assault.  Later  in  the  same  year, 
Flamininus  again  built  embankments  for  his  attack  on  Corinth  (no.  73),  but,  fearing  the 
arrival  of  enemy  reinforcements,  he  ordered  all  of  the  siege-works  (opera)  to  be  burned 
and  made  an  orderly  withdrawal.  Several  years  later,  Acilius  Glabrio's  assault  on 
Heraclea  (no.  78)  involved  the  construction  of  embankments  (aggeres)  for  the  advance 
of  battering-rams,  but  when  the  townsfolk  burned  the  Roman  equipment,  Acilius  re- 
sorted  to  escalade. 
In  the  same  year,  he  appears  to  have  blockaded  Naupactus  (no.  79)  by  surrounding  the 
town,  perhaps  with  a  ring  of  pickets,  such  as  are  mentioned  at  Amphissa,  (no.  81).  The 
troops  surrounding  Haliartus  in  171  B.  C.  (no.  88)  were  perhaps  distributed  as  pickets, 
29 also.  There  is  no  mention  of  earthworks  at  Naupactus,  but  there  must  have  been  fre- 
quent  assaults,  as  the  town  was  said  to  be  "near  to  destructiorf'  after  two  months;  it  was 
this  that  persuaded  the  garrison  to  surrender.  The  siege  of  Amphissa  was  raised  when 
the  Aetolians  agreed  to  a  truce. 
Flamininus  appears  to  have  launched  a  major  operation  at  Leucas  (no.  75),  with  under- 
mining  and  ramming,  but  he  made  no  headway,  until  a  sympathetic  faction  within  the 
town  gave  him  access.  Treachery  was  also  instrumental  in  the  taking  of  Oreus  (no.  58), 
where  the  Macedonian  garrison  was  expelled  with  the  compliance  of  its  commander. 
Siege-works  of  some  kind  are  mentioned  in  the  second  siege  of  Oreus  (no.  68),  and  per- 
haps  at  Eretria  (no.  70),  Haliartus  (no.  88),  and  Meliboea  (no.  90),  although  the  word 
opera  is  ambiguous  (see  further  below,  pp.  97f)  and  perhaps  simply  refers  to  equipment 
at  the  last  three;  ultimately,  Oreus,  Eretria  and  Haliartus  were  carried  by  assault,  while 
operations  at  Mehiboea  were  abandoned.  One  siege  that  definitely  involved  earthworks 
was  at  Ambracia  (no.  83;  fig.  7),  where  Fulvius  Nobilior  linked  his  three  camps  (Livy 
calls  one  of  them  a  castellum)  with  a  rampart  and  ditch.  Attacks  at  five  different  sectors 
were  vigorously  repulsed,  so,  in  a  change  of  tack,  the  Romans  began  tunnelling,  perhaps 
attempting  a  technique  which  they  must  have  seen  their  erstwhile  Macedonian  allies  us- 
ing  (e.  g.,  at  Lamia,  two  years  earlier,  while  the  Romans  were  besieging  neighbouring 
Heraclea:  Livy  36.25.1-2).  However,  not  realising  the  importance  of  concealing  the  ex- 
cavated  spoil,  they  unwittingly  alerted  the  Ambracians,  who  were  then  able  to  take 
counter-measures.  The  siege  was  only  raised  when  the  Ambracians  were  persuaded  to 
surrender. 
Again,  it  is  pertinent  to  ask  why  a  circunivallation  was  dug,  probably  at  Oreus,  definite- 
ly  at  Ambracia,  if  the  strategy  was  one  of  assault.  The  solution  would  seem  to  be  two- 
fold:  the  visual  confirmation  of  the  besiegers'  resolve  to  press  the  assault,  with  the  con- 
sequent  psychological  pressure  on  the  besieged;  and  the  securing  of  the  besiegers'  posi- 
tion,  with  the  attendant  boost  of  confidence  for  the  attackers.  Much  the  same  psy- 
chological  effect,  but  with  a  reduced  practical  benefit,  would  be  achieved  by  establish- 
ing  a  cordon  of  troops,  such  as  we  see  at  Sparta  and  Lamia.  Visual  confirmation  that 
30 the  place  was  surrounded,  and  that  there  could  be  no  escape,  simply  underlined  the 
hopeless  position  of  the  besieged. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  artillery  with  the  allied  fleet  at  Eretria  (no.  70)  and  Leu- 
cas  (no.  75)  was  probably  supplied  by  Rhodes  and  Pergarnum;  only  the  Pergamene  con- 
tingent  had  artillery  at  Oreus  (no.  68).  The  artillery  that  featured  in  Fulvius,  Nobilior's 
triumph  in  187  B.  C.  (Livy  39.5.16)  will  have  been  seized  from  Ambracia  (no.  83)  (be- 
low,  p.  163). 
5.3  Rom  -aft  during  the  Macedonian  Wars:  Discussion 
For  this  period,  too,  Veith's  characterisation  of  Roman  siegecraft  in  the  Polybian  era  as 
the  art  of  blockade  (1928,373)  is  at  fault.  He  considers  the  coup  de  main  to  have  been 
rare  (1928,374:  "die  prin-dtive  Form  des  Handstreiches  ist  selteW';  cf.  446),  which  is 
correct,  if  by  this  he  means  the  surprise  escalade  at  dawn;  this  tactic  accounts  for  only 
four  of  the  sieges  in  our  sample  group  (17%).  However,  in  quoting  Nobilior's  long 
drawn-out  siege  of  Ambracia  as  a  typical  Roman  besieging  assault,  and  drawing  the 
conclusion  that  the  Romans  avoided  this  type  of  operation  (1928,375),  he  commits  a 
grave  error.  Likewise,  his  assertion  that  machinery  was  only  used  in  a  subordinate  role 
(1928,374)  goes  against  the  evidence,  for  the  Romans  used  battering-rams,  in  this  pe- 
riod,  at  more  than  one  siege  in  three. 
Connolly  has  put  a  slightly  different  emphasis  on  the  same  argument.  In  an  essay  treat- 
ing  the  Roman  army  of  the  period  from  200  B.  C.  down  to  120  B.  C.  (and  thus  of  rele- 
vance  to  §6,  also),  he  states  that,  "if  they  were  unable  to  storm  the  walls,  the  Romans 
preferred  to  blockade  a  towif'  (Connolly  1989,168).  Few  modem  writers  have  dealt 
with  the  subject,  and  the  tendency  to  follow  where  Connolly  leads  is  compelling  (e.  g., 
Goldsworthy  2000,145).  But  there  are  sufficient  examples  of  the  breaching  of  walls  to 
demonstrate  that  the  blockade  came  a  poor  third  in  the  ranking  of  siege  techniques;  in- 
deed,  the  blockade  is  virtually  absent  from  the  period  of  the  Macedonian  wars.  If  the 
Roman  sieges  of  this  period  were  to  be  characterised  by  the  dominant  method  of  cap- 
ture,  it  would  be  the  escalade. 
31 Another  persistent  notion  is  that,  once  operations  were  begun,  the  Romans  persevered 
doggedly.  Connolly,  for  instance,  has  written,  in  a  discussion  of  Roman  circumvaU- 
ation,  that  "because  [the  Romans]  never  gave  up  a  siege  once  it  had  been  started,  the 
besieged  knew  that  they  stood  no  chance  of  winning  and  were  usually  quick  to  submit"' 
(Connolly  1981,293;  followed  by  Gillivcr  1999,160).  His  argument  is  based  on  a  false 
prcmise,  as  fully  one  in  eight  of  the  sieges  from  the  period  of  the  Macedonian  wars  was 
abandoned  before  completion.  His  conclusion  regarding  speedy  surrender  is  equally 
difficult  to  substantiate.  Certainly,  nine  of  our  twcnty-four  sieges  (ten,  including  Am- 
phissa)  ended  in  surrender,  four  of  them  before  the  Romans  had  even  approached  the 
walls,  but  it  is  apparent  that  the  townsfolk  were  intimidated,  not  by  the  horror  of  a 
lengthy  blockade,  but  by  the  ferocity  of  a  legionary  attack. 
5.4  Roman  siegecruft  during  the  Macedonian  Wars:  Conclusion 
In  summary,  of  the  twenty-four  Roman  sieges,  none  can  strictly  be  characterised  as  a 
blockade  in  the  sitting-and-waiting  sense:  there  is  one  clear  case  of  a  circumvallation 
and  another  probable  case  (8%),  though  continuous  assaults  were  actively  pursued  at 
both.  In  two  cases,  a  cordon  of  troops  surrounded  the  town  in  preparation  for  an  as- 
sault;  in  another  three  cases,  pickets  were  probably  established  around  the  town,  again 
in  conjunction  with  assault  operations.  Embankments  were  raised  for  three  sieges 
(131/o),  two  of  which  were  abandoned;  only  one  other  siege  was  abandoned  (13%).  In 
ten  cases,  the  walls  were  breached  by  battering-rams,  though  in  only  five  of  these  was 
capture  effected  by  an  assault  through  the  breach,  four  of  them  in  combination  with  es- 
calade;  two  led  to  surrender,  two  were  abandoned,  and  one  was  taken  by  other  means. 
Fully  ten  towns  surrendered  (including  the  special  case  of  Amphissa,  which  ended  in  a 
truce:  42%),  four  of  them  before  the  assault  had  even  begun,  and  two  were  delivered  by 
treachery  (8%).  The  remaining  nine  towns  were  stormed  (380/o),  all  but  one  by  esca- 
lade.  (See  Table  4,  p.  33.  ) 
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33 6.  The  Spanish  Wars  (Catalogue,  nos.  84-87.91-94.97-102;  Table__51 
6.1  Sources 
Following  the  defeat  of  the  Carthaginians  in  Spain,  the  Romans  continued  to  maintain  a 
military  presence  in  the  peninsula,  but  the  sources  are  notoriously  short  on  dates  and 
topographical  detail.  M.  Porcius  Cato  allegedly  captured  four  hundred  Spanish  towns  in 
195  B.  C.  (Plutarch,  Cato  Malor  10.3;  Frontinus,  Strat.  3.1.2,  relates  to  this  campaign); 
in  193  B.  C.,  C.  Flaminius  captured  the  Oretanian  town  of  Inlucia  (Livy  35.7.7);  and  in 
181  B.  C.,  the  besieged  town  of  Contrebia  surrendered  to  Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus,  who  pro- 
ceeded  to  capture  many  strongholds  in  Celtiberia  (Livy  40.33.9:  multa  castella).  Un- 
fortunately,  we  have  no  detailed  narrative  of  these. 
6.2  Roman  Siep-ecraft  during  the  f'qpanish  Wars:  Commentary 
Besides  the  Celfiberian  and  Lusitanian  operations  down  to  the  capture  of  Numantia  in 
133  B.  C.,  the  bounds  of  geography  have  been  stretched  to  permit  the  inclusion  of  con- 
temporary  operations  outwith  Spain:  the  siege  of  Nesactium.  (no.  87)  properly  belongs 
to  the  war  of  178/177  B.  C.  in  the  Istrian  peninsula,  and  the  siege  of  Dehninium  (no.  91) 
occurred  during  a  punitive  expedition  in  Illyria  in  155  B.  C.  (Table  5,  p.  40). 
At  Certima  (no.  85)  and  Alce  (no.  86),  Sempronius  Gracchus  employed  siege-works 
(opera),  by  which  Livy  probably  means  machinery  rather  than  entrenchments  in  at  least 
one  of  the  two  cases  (Livy  40.47.3:  opera  admoveret;  see  below,  p.  98).  Claudius  Mar- 
cellus  is  said  to  have  constructed  embankments  (ch6mata)  at  Nertobriga,  (no.  92), 
probably  to  enable  the  advance  of  the  'ýmachinery"  (michanimata)  mentioned  by  Ap- 
pian,  which,  in  this  context,  must  surely  be  battering-rams.  This  was  certainly  the  pur- 
pose  of  the  embankments  (ch6mata)  at  Intercatia  (no.  94).  The  townsfolk  there  eventu- 
ally  succumbed  to  starvation,  and  the  towns  of  Certima,  Alce  and  Nertobriga  all  surren- 
dered,  but  Aemilius  Lepidus  was  not  so  fortunate  at  Pallantia  (no.  101);  fiUstrated  in  his 
attempts  to  break  in  with  machines  (michanai),  he  finally  abandoned  his  equipment  and 
withdrew.  Metellus,  too,  failed  to  break  into  Centobriga  (no.  97),  when  he  fen  victim  to 
compassion  for  the  children  whom  the  defenders  had  positioned  in  the  path  of  his  bat- 
tering-ram.  Only  at  Munda  (no.  84)  and  Lagni  (no.  100)  do  we  hear  of  genuine  storm- 
34 ing  assaults,  and  the  surrender  of  Cauca  (no.  93)  was  achieved  after  a  skirmish  outside 
the  town. 
The  town  of  Nesactium.  (no.  87)  was  surrounded  by  troops,  perhaps  distributed  as  pick- 
ets,  since  Livy  does  not  mention  a  cordon;  when  the  starving  townsfolk  resorted  to  self- 
slaughter,  the  Romans  were  able  to  mount  an  unopposed  escalade.  The  year-long 
blockade  of  Delminium.  (no.  91)  was  probably  maintained  by  pickets,  while  Marcius, 
Figulus  targeted  the  surrounding  strongholds;  no  earthworks  are  mentioned,  and  the 
hilly  location  prevented  the  use  of  machinery.  A  cordon  was  definitely  thrown  around 
the  town  of  Intercatia  (no.  94),  while  Lucullus,  built  embankments  for  bringing  up  bat- 
tering-rams,  but  his  troops  began  to  suffer  from  dysentery,  a  frequent  bugbear  of  long- 
term  blockading  operations  (cf  Agrigentum,  no.  38;  Lilybaeum,  no.  44;  Carthage,  no. 
95;  Numantia,  no.  98;  Pallantia,  no.  101;  Dyrrachium,  no.  143);  in  the  event,  the  Inter- 
catians,  repaired  their  breached  wall,  but  surrendered  from  starvation.  At  Numantia,  af- 
ter  two  Wed  attempts  (nos.  98-99),  the  town  was  ringed  by  a  stone  wall  connecting 
seven  camps,  and  starved  into  surrender  (no.  102). 
6.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Spanish  Wars:  Discussion 
Clearly,  in  siegecraft,  the  site  dictated  the  means,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  Celtic 
towns  of  the  period  appear  to  have  been  less  vulnerable  to  the  storming  assault  than  the 
Greek  towns  of  the  Macedonian  and  Punic  wars.  This  may,  in  part,  be  due  to  the  diffi- 
culties  of  capturing  a  hill-top  site;  certainly,  this  was  the  complaint  of  the  author  of  the 
Bellum  Hispaniense,  that  "the  nature  of  the  place  so  prevented  besieging  assaults  that 
Spanish  towns  were  not  easily  captured  by  an  enemy"  (Bell.  Hisp.  8).  The  inhabitants 
were,  however,  intin-ddated  by  siege  machinery. 
The  classic  siege  of  the  period  is,  of  course,  Scipio  Aemilianus'  blockade  of  Numantia 
(no.  102;  fig.  9),  which  has  always  excited  interest  on  account  of  Appian's  full  descrip- 
tion  of  the  siege-works,  and  the  surviving  archaeological  remains.  Veith  holds  it  up  as 
the  exemplar  (1928,374:  "Das  Paradigma  der  Zernierungen  dieser  Zeit"),  and  his  opin- 
ion  is  evidently  shared  by  Connolly,  who  has  stated  that  "Numantia  was  a  typical  Ro- 
35 man  siege"  (1989,168).  This  is  demonstrably  untrue:  in  no  respect  can  it  be  taken  as 
representative,  either  of  sieges  of  this  period,  or  of  Roman  sieges  in  general. 
In  fact,  far  from  exemplifying  a  routine  strategy,  Scipio's  siege  of  Numantia  stands  out 
as  an  anomaly,  which  prompts  the  question,  why  this  strategy  at  this  site?  It  is  a  crucial 
factor  that  the  Numantines  had  already  frustrated  two  Roman  attempts  on  their  town 
(nos.  98-99),  and  Scipio  was  perhaps  anxious  to  avoid  repeating  previous  mistakes.  He 
was  allegedly  disapproving  of  generals  who  risked  fives  unnecessarily  (Appian,  Hisp. 
87);  but,  far  from  championing  the  blockade  as  the  besieging  technique  par  excellence, 
he  may  have  settled  on  the  strategy  after  having  attempted  a  frontal  assault  himself 
(reading  between  the  lines  of  Frontinus,  Strat.  2.8.7;  4.1.1).  Schulten,  the  excavator  of 
Numantia,  recognised  that  the  blockade  was  by  no  means  the  only  strategy  open  to  the 
Romans  here  (1927,11),  but  Pompeius  had  already  attempted  the  storming  assault  (no  - 
98)  to  no  avail,  and  Popilius  Laenas  had  tried  escalade  (no.  99),  so  the  blockade  was,  in 
effect,  a  last  resort. 
The  blockade  theories  of  Veith  and  Connolly  fare  no  better  for  this  period,  than  for  the 
period  of  the  Macedonian  wars  (above,  p.  3  1).  In  what  is  surely  an  oversight,  Connolly 
(1981,293)  lists  Numantia  along  with  Lilybaeum,  Capua  and  Alesia,  as  examples  of 
"bicircumvallatiorf',  a  word  coined  to  describe  the  technique  of  encircling  a  town  with 
two  fines  of  fortifications,  one  facing  inwards,  the  other  facing  outwards.  Lilybaeurn  is 
presumably  a  slip  for  Agrigenturn,  which  he  mentions  earlier  in  the  passage,  but  there 
was  never  more  than  one  line  of  encirclement  at  Numantia. 
More  seriously,  Comolly  states  that  "bicircumvaHation  became  the  standard  Roman 
systea'  (1981,293;  followed,  e.  g.,  by  Peddie  1994,126;  cf.  Fuller  1965,96),  but  we 
have  seen  that,  for  the  Spanish  wars  at  any  rate,  the  battering  assault  was  most  com- 
monly  used.  Tbis,  in  turn,  contradicts  Connolly's  subsequent  statement,  that  "the  Ro- 
mans  only  adopted  Hellenistic  machinery  when  they  were  operating  with  Greek  allies 
... 
but  they  made  little  effort  to  understand  or  develop  these  techniques"  (Connolly 
1981,294).  Curiously,  he  highlights  "the  building  of  rampe'  as  a  Roman  preference, 
but,  in  the  first  place,  embankments  were  still  infrequently  used  by  Roman  commanders 
36 in  the  second  century,  appearing  only  twice  in  the  period  of  the  Spanish  wars  (15%  of 
our  sample  group)  and  three  times  in  the  period  of  the  Macedonian  wars  (13%  of  our 
sample  group);  and  in  the  second  place,  they  were  invariably  used  at  this  time  to  facili- 
tate  the  advance  of  machinery,  particularly  the  battering-ram,  which  Connolly  under- 
rates  as  a  Roman  weapon. 
6.4  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Spanish  Wars:  Conclusion 
The  fourteen  sieges  of  this  section  may  be  summarised  as  follows:  two  towns  were 
stormed  in  a  coup  de  main,  and  two  were  stormed  after  blockades  of  unspecified  length 
(total:  29%);  six surrendered  (43%),  one  after  defeat  outside  the  town,  three  after  wit- 
nessing  the  arrival  of  siege  machinery,  and  two  as  a  result  of  starvation;  and  four  sieges 
failed  (29%)  (see  Table  5,  p.  40).  Only  one  town,  Numantia,  was  subjected  to  a  purely 
blockading  strategy  (representing  7%  of  the  sample  group),  and  this  is  the  only  site 
where  a  circumvallation  was  constructed,  although  three  other  towns  were  surrounded 
by  troops,  probably  distributed  as  pickets.  Machinery  was  present  at  six  towns,  but  only 
two  of  them  saw  the  construction  of  siege-embankments;  four  of  these  ended  in  surren- 
der,  and  operations  were  abandoned  at  the  other  two. 
7.  The  Third  Punic  War  (Catalogue. 
-nos, 
95-96;  TabLc_,  % 
7.1  Sour= 
The  historian,  Appian,  mentions  several  sieges  from  the  Third  Punic  War  (e.  g.,  Pun. 
110,  Aspis;  Pun.  126,  Nepheris),  but  preserves  a  detailed  narrative  of  only  two:  Car- 
thage  itself  (no.  95),  and  Hippagreta  (no.  96).  No  other  ancient  authority  mentions  the 
siegecraft  of  the  period. 
7.2  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Third  Punic  War:  Commentary 
At  Hippagreta  (no.  96),  the  Roman  commander,  Ca1purnius  Piso,  launched  several  at- 
tempts  on  the  town,  but  the  inhabitants  persisted  in  burning  his  machinery,  until  he 
abandoned  the  attempt.  At  Carthage  (no.  95;  fig.  8),  however,  operations  dragged  on 
for  four  seasons.  In  149  B.  C.,  an  attempted  escalade  was  repulsed,  so  machinery  was 
constructed;  but,  when  the  waR  was  breached,  the  townsfolk  were  able  to  repair  it  and 
37 even  burned  the  Roman  equipment.  Sickness  broke  out  in  one  of  the  two  Roman 
camps,  and  the  Carthaginians  continued  to  mount  sorties  against  the  other  camp.  The 
following  year  saw  no  action  at  Carthage,  and  it  was  late  in  147  B.  C.  that  Scipio  Aemil- 
ianus,  the  future  conqueror  of  Numantia,  arrived.  Shortly  beforehand,  the  Romans  had 
launched  an  escalade  at  a  poorly  guarded  sector  of  the  wall,  along  the  coast  to  the  north; 
although  they  were  discovered,  they  managed  to  rout  a  Carthaginian  force  which  had 
sallied  out  in  response,  and  burst  into  the  city's  Megara  quarter  at  their  heels;  trapped 
inside,  they  had  to  be  extricated  by  Scipio  next  day. 
Scipio  now  put  the  hitherto  haphazard  operation  onto  a  new  footing  by  confming  the 
Carthaginians  within  their  walls  and  isolating  the  city  with  a  double  ditch  and  wall 
across  the  isthmus  (see  below,  p.  100).  He  then  tightened  the  naval  blockade  by  sealing 
the  harbour  with  a  mole,  and,  although  the  Carthaginians  opened  a  new  entrance  to  their 
harbour,  the  Romans  defeated  her  fleet  and  seized  the  quay.  The  final  assault  was  de- 
layed  until  146  B.  C.,  when  Scipio's  troops  broke  into  the  city  from  the  harbour. 
7.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Third  Punic  War:  Discussion 
Piso's  attempt  on  Hippagreta  (no.  96)  falls  comfortably  into  the  category  of  mechanised 
sieges  familiar  from  the  Spanish  wars,  but  it  is  the  sequence  of  events  during  the  first 
season  at  Carthage  (no.  95)  that  is  most  revealing.  Manilius  and  Censorinus  assumed 
that  the  city  could  be  taken  in  a  coup  de  main  by  escalade,  and  when  that  faed  they  fell 
back  upon  a  mechanised  battering  attack;  when  that  also  failed,  the  siege  deteriorated 
into  apathy.  It  was  left  to  Scipio  to  bring  the  operation  into  line.  The  parallel  with  Nu- 
mantia  is  striking,  with  the  failed  assaults  of  Manilius  and  Censorinus  matching  Pom- 
peius'  and  Popillius'  misjudged  attacks  on  the  Spanish  town  (nos.  98-99).  Scipio's 
strategy  at  Carthage  is  also  interesting  in  the  fight  of  his  later  treatment  of  Numantia 
(no.  102).  Troops  were  inserted  into  the  city  in  a  nocturnal  escalade,  perhaps  as  a  prob- 
ing  attack;  we  have  seen  that  he  may  well  have  done  the  same  thing  at  Numantia.  How- 
ever,  Veith  is  mistaken  to  categorise  Carthage  purely  as  a  blockade  (1928,373:  "rein 
Zemierung").  Like  Numantia,  it  was  certainly  isolated  by  entrenchments,  a  rather  more 
difficult  proposition  in  a  maritime  location,  but  Scipio's  objective  was  always  the 
38 storming  assault.  Perhaps  if  the  Numantines,  had  not  surrendered,  they  would  have  been 
subjccted  to  a  final  assault  hikc  the  Carthaginians. 
In  passing,  we  may  note  that  the  punishment,  whereby  a  captured  town  was  "destroyed 
and  ploughed  into  the  ground,  and  salt  was  sown  so  as  to  make  the  ground  uncultiv- 
able",  which  Connolly  attributes  to  Carthage,  Numantia  and  Jerusalem  (Connolly  1981, 
295),  was  only  ever  claimed  for  the  first  of  these  towns,  and  has  now  been  revealed  as  a 
fiction  (Ridley  1986,143-144). 
7.4  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  :  [hird  Punic  War:  Conclusion 
The  sample  grouping  for  this  period  is  too  small  for  formal  conclusions.  However, 
when  added  to  the  fourteen  broadly  contemporary  sieges  of  the  Spanish  Wars  (see  Table 
5,  p.  40),  Carthage  joins  Nesactium.  and  Delminiurn  as  towns  that  were  stormed  after  a 
temporary  blockade,  and  the  number  of  successful  assaults  rises  to  five  out  of  sixteen 
(31%  of  the  increased  sample).  Carthage  also  increases  the  number  of  circumvallations 
to  two  out  of  sixteen  (130/o),  while  the  addition  of  Hippagreta  increases  the  number  of 
abandoned  sieges  to  five  out  of  sixteen  (3  1  %). 
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40 hine  War  (Cataloeue.  nos.  103-108-  Table  6 
8.1  Sources 
Polybius's  account  never  extended  beyond  146  B.  C.,  and  Livy's  narrative  runs  out  in 
167  B.  C.,  although  the  so-called  Periochae  ("contente)  continue  down  to  Augustan 
times.  As  a  source  of  detailed  siege  narratives,  however,  we  have  the  work  of  Sallust,  a 
historian  writing  shortly  after  the  death  of  Julius  Caesar.  His  Bellum  Iygurthinum,  cov- 
ering  the  war  of  112-105  B.  C.  in  Numidia,  provides  six  examples  of  Roman  sieges  (see 
Table  6,  p.  42). 
8.2  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Jugurthine  War:  Commentary 
At  Thala  (no.  106),  Caecifius  Metellus  surrounded  the  town  with  a  ditch  and  palisade, 
and  proceeded  to  throw  up  embankments  (aggeres)  at  two  locations,  presumably  for  the 
advance  of  the  battering-rams  which  he  subsequently  directed  at  the  walls.  Sallust  says 
that  a  tower  was  erected  on  each  embankment  (Sallust,  Iug.  76.3),  to  safeguard  the 
siege-works  (opus),  no  doubt  by  enabling  covering  fire  to  clear  the  battlements  of  def- 
enders.  When  the  wall was  finally  breached,  the  Roman  entry  was  greeted  by  mass  sui- 
cide  and  the  destruction  of  valuables. 
Earlier,  Metellus  surrounded  the  town  of  Zama  (no.  104),  though  probably  with  pickets 
of  troops,  as  there  is  no  mention  of  earthworks.  The  town  of  Suthul  (no.  103),  on  the 
other  hand,  was  surrounded  by  marshes,  so  Postumius  Albinus  built  an  embankment 
(agger),  no  doubt  to  serve  as  a  dry  causeway;  strangely,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  had 
machinery,  but  perhaps  there  had  been  no  time  for  its  construction  before  Jugurtha 
turned  the  tables  on  him.  By  contrast,  Marius  arrived  at  the  fort  on  the  Muluccha  River 
(no.  108)  with  a  fiffl  siege-train,  but  the  inaccessibility  of  the  site,  channelling  traffic 
along  a  single,  narrow  approach,  fiustrated  any  attempts  at  frontal  assault,  until  a  diver- 
sionary  attack  threw  the  defenders  into  disarray. 
The  Romans  easily  captured  the  towns  of  Vaga  (no.  105)  and  Capsa  (no.  107)  by  coup 
de  main.  The  former  was  taken  without  resistance,  when  the  attackers  were  mistaken 
for  allies,  and  the  latter  was  left  undefended,  relying  upon  its  remote  location  to  deter 
41 any  attack.  In  both  cases,  the  Romans  travelled  light,  which  implies  that  a  storming  as- 
sault  was  intended.  At  Zama  (no.  104),  after  surrounding  the  town,  the  Romans  at- 
tempted  simultaneously  to  undermine  and  to  scale  the  walls,  but  were  obliged  to  with- 
draw  in  the  face  of  ferocious  defence.  The  siege  of  Suthul  (no.  103)  was  also  abandon- 
ed,  after  Jugurtha  subverted  some  of  the  Roman  allies,  whose  treachery  compromised 
the  security  of  the  Roman  camp. 
8.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  sjugurthine  War:  Disc 
There  is  no  modem  discussion  of  siegecraft  during  the  Jugurthine  War,  although  it  falls 
into  Veith's  pre-Caesarian  period  (1928,373-375).  It  is  perhaps  sufficient  to  note  that 
the  sole  example  of  a  circurnvallation,  the  ditch  and  palisade  at  Thala  (no.  106),  was  ac- 
companied  by  embankments  and  a  mechanised  assault.  There  is  no  sign  of  a  blockading 
strategy  in  any  of  the  Roman  operations. 
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42 8.4  Siegecraft  during  the  Jugurthine  War:  Conclusign 
Throughout  the  Jugurthine  War,  the  dominant  Roman  strategy  was  the  assault  (see  Ta- 
ble  6,  p.  42);  the  only  hint  of  a  blockade  is  Jugurtha's  siege  of  Cirta  (Sall.,  Iug.  21.3- 
26.3).  In  one  case,  a  full-blown  mechanised  operation  culminated  in  a  wall-brcach 
(Thala,  representing  17%  of  our  sample  group),  but  in  the  other  three  successful  assaults 
the  Romans  stormed  an  undefended  gateway  (50%).  A  major  assault  was  perhaps 
planned  at  Suthul;  an  embankment  was  erected  there,  and  at  Thala  (33%).  Two  sieges 
were  abandoned  (33%),  representing  a  similar  proportion  to  the  preceding  period  (cf. 
Table  5,  p.  40). 
9.  From  Sulla  to  Pompcy  (Catalogue, 
-nos. 
109-123;  Table 
-7) 
9.1  Sources 
Appian  is  our  main  source  for  the  next  set  of  siege  narratives,  particularly  the  first  book 
of  his  Bella  Civilia,  and  the  Mithridatica,  both  of  which  encompass  the  period  from 
Sulla  to  Pompey.  Although  Appian  does  not  name  his  sources,  he  is  generally  regarded 
as  a  reliable  compiler  of  history.  Some  information  is  also  gleaned  from  the  Vitae  Par- 
allelae  of  Plutarch,  his  approximate  contemporary,  and  both  men  probably  drew  upon 
the  memoirs  of  Sulla,  amongst  other  material. 
Many  sieges  of  the  80s  are  known  only  by  name,  and  consequently  have  been  omitted 
from  the  Catalogue.  Canusiurn  (App.,  Bell.  Civ.  1.52)  and  Pompen  (Orosius,  Contra 
pag.  5.18.22;  VeU.  Pat.  2.16.2)  were  reportedly  besieged  in  89  B.  C.,  Nola  in  88  (Vell. 
Pat.  2.18.4),  Norba  in  82  (App.,  Bell.  Civ.  1.94),  and  Volaterrae  some  years  later  (Livy, 
Per.  89),  but  we  have  no  details.  Similarly,  Fimbria's  siege  of  Ilium  (Oros.,  Contra 
pag.  6.2.11;  App.,  Mithr.  53),  which  he  sacked  and  burned  in  85  B.  C.,  remains  a  shad- 
owy  affair,  as  does  his  own  confinement  by  Sulla  in  Thyatira  (Oros.,  ibid.  ),  an  event 
which  ended  in  his  suicide.  Fimbria's  operation  at  Pitane  (Oros.,  Contra  pag.  6.2.10; 
App.,  Mithr.  52),  where  he  began  a  surrounding  ditch  but  abandoned  the  exercise  when 
his  quarry,  Mithridates,  escaped,  is  also  omitted. 
For  siegecraft  of  the  70s,  many  of  the  Sertorian  and  Lucullan  operations  are  extremely 
43 uninformative:  for  example,  Sertorius's  sojourn  in  a  mountain  town  (apparently  named 
Clunia:  Livy,  Per.  92)  where  he  was  ineptly  blockaded  by  Metellus's  forces  (Plut.,  Sert. 
21.34),  or  Lucullus's  siege  of  Lampsacus  (App.,  Mithr.  76),  where  Mithridates  evacu- 
ated  the  defenders  by  sea.  Such  episodes  are  instructive  in  ren-dnding  us  of  the  gaps  in 
our  corpus  of  evidence. 
2.2  Roman  sie=craft  during  the  early  Ist  C.  B.  C.:  Commentary 
Apart  from  Sulla's  attempt  on  Piraeus  in  87-86  B.  C.  (no.  I  11),  and  Pompey's  siege  of 
Jerusalem  in  63  B.  C.  (no.  122),  both  fiffl-scale  operations,  there  are  few  hints  of  heavy 
machinery  in  the  remaining  examples  from  this  period. 
Only  five  of  the  sieges  show  signs  of  having  been  based  on  the  strategy  of  blockade. 
Asculum  (no.  109)  was  invested  for  over  a  year,  but  there  is  no  mention  of  entrench- 
ments,  and  it  is  likely  that  the  besiegers  simply  encamped  on  the  approach  roads.  A 
similar  situation  obtained  at  Heraclea  Pontica  (no.  117),  which  finally  fell  to  treachery; 
a  naval  blockade,  rather  than  earthworks,  kept  supplies  out.  By  contrast,  Praeneste  (no. 
113)  was  surrounded  by  ditches  and  a  walL  The  siege  of  Isaura  Vetus  (no.  115)  may 
have  involved  earthworks,  to  judge  from  the  reference  to  a  Roman  fortification  (munl- 
tio),  but  the  term  is  ambiguous;  the  town  surrendered  when  the  water  supply  was  inter- 
rupted.  Similarly,  the  water  supply  of  Langobriga  (no.  114)  was  cut,  in  order  to  force 
the  townsfolk's  surrender.  Only  at  Asculum  and  Praeneste  did  a  formal  blockade  lead 
to  the  surrender  of  the  town. 
At  a  sixth  town,  Amisus  (no.  118),  the  siege  is  said  to  have  proceeded  in  a  leisurely 
fashion,  but  this  perhaps  had  less  to  do  with  a  blockading  strategy  than  with  the  hope 
that,  if  in  the  meantime  Mithridates  were  defeated  in  battle,  the  garrison  would  capit- 
ulate.  No  doubt,  a  watch  was  placed  on  the  gates,  but  the  townsfolk  evidently  repulsed 
several  Roman  assaults  before  the  final,  successful  escalade. 
Despite  the  appearance  of  a  blockade  at  Athens  (no.  112),  with  the  intercepting  of  sup- 
plies  and  the  digging  of  a  surrounding  ditch,  it  is  clear  that  the  eventual  assault  was 
simply  delayed  by  SulWs  overseeing  of  the  operations  at  Piraeus  (fig.  10).  There  was 
44 never  any  intention  to  starve  the  city  into  submission;  rather,  it  was  simply  taken  by  es- 
calade  during  a  lull.  in  SuRa's  operations  at  Piraeus.  Tigranocerta  (no.  120),  too,  was 
encircled  by  a  ditch,  but  not  as  part  of  a  blockading  strategy;  the  Romans  were  in  the 
process  of  undermining  the  walls,  when  the  town  was  betrayed  to  them.  No  doubt,  a 
storming  assault  would  have  been  launched  against  Aeclanum  (no.  110),  had  not  the 
town  surrendered  when  her  wooden  palisade  was  threatened  by  fire. 
Embankments  were  constructed  for  the  approach  of  towers  at  Themyscira  (no.  116),  but 
a  simultaneous  tunnelling  attack  was  fiustrated  by  the  counter-tunnelling  of  the  de- 
fenders.  Lucullus's  strategy  at  Nisibis  (no.  121)  seems  also  to  have  involved  embank- 
ments;  although  the  strength  of  the  defences  thwarted  all  direct  attempts,  he  was  eventu- 
ally  able  to  utilise  the  embankments  for  a  coup  de  main.  By  what  means  Sinope  (no. 
119)  was  assaulted,  remains  unknown;  events  came  to  a  head  when  the  garrison  in- 
stalled  by  Mithridates  opted  to  escape,  and  it  is  likely  that  the  townsfolk,  freed  from 
Cilician  oppression,  simply  opened  their  gates  to  Lucullus.  Similarly,  we  know  nothing 
of  the  means  by  which  Solonium.  (no.  123)  was  captured,  although  parts  of  the  town  had 
been  set  on  fire,  probably  by  incendiary  missiles. 
Operations  at  Piraeus  (no.  I  11)  and  Jerusalem  (no.  122)  are  of  quite  a  different  order. 
At  the  first,  after  an  escalade  failed,  Sulla  unleashed  a  full  scale  attack,  involving  an 
embankment  and  battering-rams;  amongst  other  machinery,  there  is  mention  of  a  shed, 
no  doubt  to  protect  the  workers,  and  two  towers,  giving  covering  fire.  Piraeus  finally 
fell  when  a  section  of  wall  was  breached  by  battering-ram;  the  same  feat  had  been  ac- 
complished  once  already,  but  had  not  been  exploited  rapidly  enough,  thus  allowing  re- 
pairs  to  be  effected.  At  the  second,  Pompey  constructed  embankments  to  carry  his  bat- 
tering-rams  across  the  Temple's  defensive  ditches  under  covering  fire  from  siege- 
towers,  and  eventually  demolished  one  of  the  towers,  enabling  his  troops  to  storm  in. 
9.3  Rom  ._  -aft  during  the  early  1st  C.  B.  C.:  Discussion 
Agah  it  is  difficult  to  substantiate  the  claims  of  modem  writers  that  Roman  siegecraft 
of  the  period  was  based  on  the  blockade.  There  is  no  explicit  evidence  for  the  use  of 
cordons  or  pickets,  such  as  had  been  used  in  the  Macedonian  wars  (above,  p.  32)  and,  to 
45 a  lesser  extent,  in  the  Spanish  wars  (above,  p.  35),  to  isolate  towns.  Encircling  en- 
trenchments  were  dug  for  three  sieges,  but  a  blockading  strategy  was  pursued  at  only 
one  of  these:  Praeneste.  By  contrast,  the  town  of  Asculum  was  reduced  by  blockade, 
but  neither  it  nor  Heraclea  were  apparently  hemmed  in  by  siege-works.  Nor  was  Lan- 
gobriga,  where  Metellus  was  prepared  to  sit  and  wait  for  the  inhabitants  to  surrender 
from  lack  of  water,  although  the  same  strategy  at  Isaura,  Vetus  may  have  been  accompa- 
nied  by  some  form  of  siege-works.  Five  blockades  out  of  a  sample  grouping  of  fifteen 
sieges  is  not  evidence  of  a  preferred  strategy.  Even  adding  Amisus  and  Athens,  where  it 
may  be  argued  that  a  defacto  blockade  existed  prior  to  the  successful  storming  assault, 
increases  the  total  to  only  seven  out  of  fifteen. 
Two  of  the  sieges  demonstrate  the  survival  of  the  fun-blown  Hellenistic-style  of  mech- 
anised  assault,  with  siege-towers  providing  covering  fire  while  battering  machines  ad- 
vanced  along  an  embankment.  Piraeus  (no.  I  11)  and  Jerusalem  (no.  122)  stand  in  the 
Hellenistic  tradition  of  siegecraft  rather  than  any  contemporary  Roman  operations. 
Cotta's  failed  attempt  to  assault  Heraclea,  (no.  117)  with  machinery  demonstrates  that  it 
was  not  a  guaranteed  method  of  conquest,  but  required  patience  and  expertise. 
9.4  Rgman  siegecraft  during  the-early  1st  C.  B.  C.:  Conclusion 
Encircling  entrenchments  were  dug  at  three  (perhaps  four)  of  the  fifteen  sites  (20% 
27%),  but  only  one  (perhaps  two)  took  the  form  of  a  blockade;  one  was  stormed,  and 
another  was  in  the  throes  of  a  mining  assault  when  it  was  treacherously  handed  over. 
Out  of  five  blockades  (33%),  one  was  abandoned  and  another  ended  when  the  town  was 
taken  by  treachery.  Embankments  were  constructed  at  four  sites  (27%)  for  the  advance 
of  heavy  machinery;  at  two  of  these,  the  walls  were  breached  and  the  objective 
achieved;  at  another,  operations  were  abandoned  in  the  face  of  tenacious  defence;  and  in 
the  last,  the  embankments  facilitated  a  surprise  escalade.  In  total,  operations  at  two  sites 
were  abandoned  (13%),  a  modest  proportion  more  in  keeping  with  the  Second  Punic 
War  and  the  Macedonian  Wars  (Tables  3-4,  pp.  27,33)  than  with  the  more  recent 
Jugurthine  War  (Table  6,  p.  42).  Six  towns  were  stormed  successfully  (40%)  and  one 
was  left  undefended  (7%);  two  towns  were  delivered  by  treachery  (13%);  and  four 
towns  surrendered  (27%)  (see  Table  7,  p.  47). 
46 97  -4 
a  sn  z  to 
CA  i 
1141  115  11161117  11181  119112011211  1 
invesfing  works  constructed  x  x  ?  x  4 
cordon  trown  around  town  0 
assault  ramp(s)  constructed  x  x  x  +  4 
blockading  sh"  x  x  x  ?  x  5 
siege  abandoned  x  x  2. 
town  abandoned  x  I 
town  surrendered  x  x  x x  x  4 
town  delivered  by  tea&iery  x 
a 
x ,  2 
mass  suicide  0 
town  stortned  x  x  x x  x  x  x  61 
-  wal  brea&,  ed  x  x  2 
-  gate  forced  0 
-  escalade  x  x  ?  x  1  4 
-  open  gate  x 
-  wall  crossed 
-  wall  undennined  x  x  2 
I-  tunnelling  x  x  2 
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10.  Caesarian  Siemcraft  (Catalogue.  nos.  124-149;  Table  8) 
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The  period  down  to  44  B.  C.  is  covered  by  the  second  book  of  Appian's  Bella  Civilia, 
and  the  books  of  Cassius  Dio's  History  covering  the  years  68-10  B.  C.  have  survived 
intact.  Incidental  details  of  siegecraft  can  again  be  gleaned  from  certain  of  PlutarcWs 
Vitae  Parallelae,  as  well  as  book  two  of  the  Historiae  Romanae,  written  by  Velleius 
Paterculus  in  A.  D.  30.  But  the  ma  or  source  for  this  section  is  the  corpus  Caesarianum, 
comprising  the  work  of  Julius  Caesar  and  his  continuators,  describing  the  campaigns  in 
Gaul  and  the  subsequent  Civil  War  with  Pompey  and  his  supporters. 
19.2  Roman  Sicizecraft  in  the  Caes  i-.  od:  Commentaa 
Widespread  use  of  the  circumvaUation  constitutes  a  major  departure  from  previous  pe- 
riods  (Table  8,  p.  55).  The  best-known  exmnple  is  Alesia  (no.  134),  where  archaeology 
47 provides  an  interesting  counterpoint  to  Caesar's  description.  But,  at  the  unnamed  town 
of  the  Atuatuci  (no.  126),  and  at  Vellaunodunurn  (no.  130),  Uxellodunurn  (no.  135), 
Corfmium.  (no.  137),  Brundisium.  (no.  138),  Thapsus  (no.  147),  and  Ategua  (no.  149), 
Caesar's  operations  commenced  with  the  encirclement  of  the  town.  Cicero  acted  simi- 
larly  at  Pindenissus  (no.  136),  during  his  governorship  of  Cilicia,  as  did  Scribonius  Cu- 
rio,  besieging  Utica  (no.  140)  on  Caesar's  behalf,  and  the  Caesarian,  Cassius  Longinus, 
was  hemmed  in  by  Claudius  Marcellus's  circumvallation,  while  encamped  outside  Ulia 
(no.  146).  Interestingly,  the  reference  to  Marcellus's  "outer  fortificatior&'  at  Ulia  hints 
at  a  double  line,  the  so-called  "bicircumvallatioW'  (above,  p.  3  6). 
Caesar  employed  virtually  the  same  tactic  in  his  attempt  to  immobilise  Pompey  near 
Dyffachium.  (no.  143;  fig.  17),  but  the  strategy  was  subtly  different.  Caesar's  narrative 
shows  that  he  appreciated  the  unorthodox  nature  of  the  operation:  he  aimed  to  pin  down 
Pompey's  army,  to  prevent  it  from  disrupting  his  foraging  activities  and  to  deny  it  ac- 
cess  to  the  armaments  stored  at  Dyrrachium;  he  finiher  hoped  to  humiliate  his  adversary 
(Caes.,  Bell.  Ov.  3.43,47).  However,  in  the  game  of  manoeuvre  and  counter-man- 
oeuvre,  Pompey  managed  to  break  out  of  the  trap  before  Caesar  could  develop  his  strat- 
egy. 
But  are  the  other  Caesarian  circumvallations  necessarily  indicative  of  a  blockading 
strategy?  Alesia  (no.  134;  fig.  13)  demonstrates  such  glorious  overkill  in  the  profusion 
and  diversity  of  its  defences  that  it  is  usually  highlighted  as  the  ideal  Roman  siege;  it  is 
also  one  of  the  few  clear  examples  of  "bicircumvallatiorf'.  However,  besides  Alesia 
and  Dyrrachium,  there  are  only  three  sieges  where  Caesar  opted  for  the  passive  con- 
taininent  of  an  opponent,  as  Scipio  had  done  at  Numantia  or  Appius,  Claudius  at  Capua. 
The  siege  of  Uxellodunum  (no.  135)  was  clearly  a  blockade,  with  the  interception  of 
foodstuffs  and  the  cutting  of  the  water  supply.  So  was  the  confinement  of  the  Pom- 
peians  in  Thapsus  (no.  147;  fig.  19);  here,  like  the  Carthaginians  in  Lilybaeum  two  hun- 
dred  years  earlier,  the  inhabitants  held  out  until  the  war  was  lost  elsewhere.  And  Caes- 
ar9s  attempt  to  hold  Pompey  at  Brundisium  (no.  138),  while  perhaps  more  reminiscent 
of  Dyrrachium  than  Alesia  in  its  unorthodox  circumstances,  was  based  on  a  blockade;  it 
48 was  only  on  receiving  news  of  Pompey's  imminent  break-out  that  Caesar  attempted  an 
impromptu  escalade. 
Another  two  may  be  added:  Curio  would  perhaps  have  adopted  a  blockading  strategy  at 
Utica  (no.  140)  if  the  ruinour  of  Juba's  approach  bad  not  prompted  his  withdrawal,  but 
we  cannot  be  certain.  And  Marcellus  clearly  would  have  blockaded  Longinus  at  Ulia 
(no.  146),  had  not  Lepidus  obliged  him  to  desist.  The  only  other  contemporary  block- 
ades  occurred  at  Salonae  (no.  141),  where  the  Pompeian,  Octavius,  surrounded  the 
town,  not  with  a  circumvallation,  but  with  five  separate  camps,  and  Ulia  again  (no. 
148),  where  Caesarian  forces  easily  ffiffltrated  the  Pompeian  fines  and  entered  the  town 
unseen;  the  former  ended  in  failure  when  the  townsfolk  stormed  Octavius's  camps  in 
sequence,  and  the  latter  when  other  commitments  forced  the  Pompeians  to  withdraw. 
Five  circumvallations  remain  to  be  explained.  One  of  these,  Vellaunodunum  (no.  130), 
surrendered  on  the  third  day,  before  Caesar's  strategy  was  made  clear,  and  another,  Cor- 
fmium  (no.  137),  was  delivered  by  treachery  while  the  circurnvallation  was  under  con- 
struction.  The  other  three  fall  into  a  category  already  encountered  at  Orongis  (no.  57) 
during  the  Second  Punic  War  (above,  pp.  23f.  ),  and  at  Ambracia  (no.  83)  and  perhaps 
Oreus  (no.  68)  during  the  Macedonian  wars  (above,  pp.  30L):  the  investment  divorced 
from  a  blockading  strategy.  At  the  unnamed  town  of  the  Atuatuci  (no.  126),  Caesar's 
intention  was  clearly  a  battering  assault,  but  the  inhabitants  stalled  until  they  could 
mount  a  sortie;  Caesar  broke  down  the  gate  and  sacked  the  town.  Similarly,  at  Ategua 
(no.  149),  the  main  thrust  was  a  battering  attack,  and  the  townsfolk  surrendered  when 
the  expected  Pompeian  reinforcements  failed  to  materizalise;  and  at  Pindenissus  (no. 
136),  the  steady  approach  of  Cicero's  embankment  drove  the  inhabitants  to  surrender. 
In  each  case,  the  circumvallation  was  clearly  intended  as  a  psychological  device,  to  un- 
derline  the  inevitability  of  the  Roman  assault  and  to  promote  despair  in  the  defenders. 
Besides  these  three,  a  further  six  sieges  involved  the  construction  of  an  embankment. 
At  three  sites,  this  was  clearly  for  the  advance  of  heavy  machinery:  at  Noviodunum  (no. 
124),  the  townsfolk  surrendered  when  they  saw  how  rapidly  the  siege-works  were  con- 
structed;  the  Sotiates  (no.  128)  made  the  same  decision  when  their  attempts  to  disrupt 
49 the  siege-works  failed;  and  so  did  the  inhabitants  of  Massilia  (no.  139),  though  after 
more  prolonged  efforts.  At  another  two  sites,  the  embankments  were  evidently  con- 
ceived  as  causeways,  to  facilitate  the  delivery  of  a  massed  infantry  attack.  During  the 
campaign  against  the  Veneti  (no.  125),  Caesar  constructed  an  embankment  to  bridge  the 
flood-watcrs  protecting  each  town  at  high  tide,  but  the  final  assault  was  foiled  each  time 
by  the  townsfolk's  timely  departure  by  sea.  However,  at  Avaricum  (no.  132;  fig.  11), 
where  the  embankment  carried  a  successful  assault  up  to  the  battlements,  the  townsfolk 
fought  to  the  end,  and  were  slaughtered  when  the  legionaries  poured  over  the  ramparts. 
In  the  sixth  and  final  instance,  at  Uxellodunum  (no.  135;  fig.  15),  the  embankment  was 
not  intended  to  carry  a  direct  assault  on  the  town,  but  to  elevate  an  artillery-armed  siege- 
tower,  so  that  fire  could  be  directed  at  an  otherwise  protected  location.  Luce  the  other 
examples,  the  Uxellodunurn  embankment  will  have  taken  the  forni  of  a  ramp,  up  which 
the  siege-tower  was  propelled. 
Of  course,  an  embankment  was  not  a  prerequisite  of  an  assault.  At  Gergovia  (no.  133; 
fig.  12),  Caesar's  strategy  appears  to  have  been  a  gradual  creeping  forward,  consolidat- 
ing  ground  as  he  went,  but  the  impetuosity  of  his  troops  botched  his  plans,  and  the  op- 
eration  was  abandoned.  Sudden  attack  marked  the  operations  at  Cenaburn.  (no.  13  1)  and 
Gomphi  (no.  144);  at  the  former,  when  the  townsfolk  attempted  to  depart  by  night,  Cae- 
sar  gave  the  order  to  bum  the  gates  and  sack  the  town,  while  at  the  latter,  finding  the 
gates  closed  against  him,  Caesar  took  the  place  by  escalade.  During  the  events  at  Alex- 
andria  in  48  B.  C.  (no.  145;  fig.  18),  Caesar  made  an  amphibious  landing  on  the  Pharos 
island  and  routed  the  defenders.  The  method  of  Crassus's  assault  on  Zenodotiurn  (no. 
129),  en  route  to  his  death  at  Carrhae,  is  not  known,  nor  of  Pornpeius's  assault  on 
Oricum.  (no.  142),  after  he  captured  the  harbour.  And  the  surrender  of  Alexandrion  (no. 
127)  to  Gabinius,  while  conceivably  occasioned  by  a  blockade,  seems  more  likely  to 
have  followed  some  kind  of  assault. 
-IU-3 
Roman  Sieg-e-craft  in  the  Cgesarian  period:  Discussion 
Seventeen  of  the  twenty-six  sieges  from  this  period  were  prosecuted  by  Caesar  himselý 
which  accounts  for  the  huge  influence  he  exerts  on  modem  siegecraft  studies.  A  signif- 
50 icant  shift  in  siegecraft  techniques  is  evident,  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  encircling 
of  an  opponent  with  entrenchments.  Unfortunately,  this  mode  of  practice,  which  had 
occasionally  been  employed  in  the  past  but  was  frequently  adopted  by  Caesar  seemingly 
out  of  personal  preference,  has  become  enshrined  in  modem  scholarship  as  the  arche- 
typal  Roman  method.  For  example,  Roth  has  recently  asserted  that  "circumvallations 
remained  a  feature  of  Roman  sieges  ...  (and)  practically  every  siege  involved  the  build- 
ing  of  these  siege  wal&'  (1999,316).  The  same  sentiment  is  implicit  in  the  choice,  by 
both  Webster  (1985,246-252)  and  Goldsworthy  (2000,86-87),  of  Alesia  to  exemplify 
Roman  Republican  siegecraft,  and  Le  Bohec;  traces  imperial  siegecraft  back  to  Alesia 
(1989,144-145).  Fuller's  "classical  siege"  (by  which  he  probably  means  "standard  Re- 
publican  siege")  involves  two  lines  of  encirclement,  in  the  manner  of  Alesia  (1965,96), 
and  Caesar's  use  of  the  circumvallation  is  surely  at  the  root  of  Veith's  general  theory  of 
Roman  blockade,  with  its  emphasis  on  "the  specifically  Roman  art  of  field  fortific- 
ation7,  which,  he  claims,  reached  its  zenith  in  the  period  of  the  so-called  "Kohorten- 
taktiV  of  Caesar  (1928,442:  "dcr  spezifisch  r6mischen  Feldbesfestigungskunst"). 
However,  Caesarian  circumvallations  have  more  to  do  with  Caesar's  use  of  field  fort- 
ifications  in  general,  than  with  any  development  of  siegecraft  per  se.  At  Gergovia  (no. 
133;  fig.  12),  for  instance,  he  linked  his  two  camps  with  earthworks,  comprising  twin 
12-foot  ditches  and,  it  is  assumed,  the  accompanying  banks  of  upcast  material.  (Fuller 
1965,141,  wrongly  interprets  the  ditches  as  "communication  trenchee'.  )  Nor  was  it 
only  in  the  context  of  siege  operations  that  Caesar  dug  earthworks,  but,  for  example,  in 
support  of  his  position  against  the  Belgae  in  57  B.  C.  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  2.8),  or  pro- 
tecting  his  flanks  in  an  advance  on  Uzitta  in  46  B.  C.  (Bell.  Afr.  5  1).  Incidentally,  Fuller 
has  misunderstood  the  function  of  such  field  fortifications,  and  indeed  the  entire  Roman 
practice  of  encamping,  when  he  condemns  them  as  the  signs  of  "mobile  trench  warfare" 
(1965,87;  enthusiastically  followed  by  Peddie  1994,60-62;  criticised  by  Goldsworthy 
1996,112-113). 
If  the  circurnvallation  is  symptomatic  of  Caesar's  siegecraft,  unfortunately  the  form  and 
layout  of  the  entrenchments  have  led  to  a  misinterpretation  of  the  underlying  : ftmction, 
for,  as  we  have  seen,  in  only  a  very  few  instances  were  these  siege-works  indicative  of  a 
51 passive  blockading  strategy.  This  distinction  is  appreciated  by  Liebenam,  who  class- 
ifies  the  straightforward  blockade  separately  from  the  blockade  in  combination  with  a 
mechanised  attack  (Liebenam  1909,2236:  "die  EinschlieBung,  Blockade,  ...  den  fdrm- 
lichen  Angriff  mit  Bclagerungswcrkzeugen  und  Blockade).  Even  With  appears  to 
concede  that  a  distinction  exists,  for  the  Caesarian  period  at  any  rate;  although  he  gives 
pride  of  place  to  the  simple  blockade,  as  exernplified  by  Alesia,  he  allows  that  the  be- 
sieging  attack  might  include  an  encirclement  (Veith  1928,445;  cf  1906,55).  Neverthe- 
less,  modem  authorities  continue  to  generalise  from  the  example  of  Alesia,  rather  than 
from  the  likes  of  Pindenissus  (e.  g.,  Connolly  1981,293). 
There  is  also  an  increase  in  ramp-building,  which  has  encouraged  Veith's  emphasis  on 
the  constructional  expertise  of  the  Romans.  He  draws  a  fundamental  distinction  bet- 
ween  the  Greek  method  of  "simply  heaping  up  eartW'  (1928,443:  "primitive  Erdauf- 
schfittunn  and  the  Roman  method  of  driving  forward  a  mighty  wooden  terrace  (ibld.: 
"mdchtige  HoWerrasse"),  which  he  identifies  as  a  Caesarian  trait.  But  neither  the  ramp 
nor  the  wooden-framed  design  were  Roman,  far  less  Caesarian,  innovations  (see  below, 
p.  142),  and  the  siege  embankment  had  already  appeared  in  a  Roman  context  during 
Scipio  Africanus's  siege  of  Utica  in  204  B.  C.  (no.  64),  to  facilitate  the  advance  of  bat- 
tering-rams.  No  doubt  unduly  influenced  by  Caesarian  strategy,  Rice  Holmes  has  con- 
sidered  the  embankment  (for  which  he  prefers  the  French  term,  'terrace')  to  be  "usual  in 
regular  siegee".  explaining  that  "as  soon  as  the  terrace  approached  the  wall,  a  battering- 
ram  should  be  employed  to  effect  a  breacW'  (Hohnes  1911,81).  It  is  noteworthy  that,  at 
Avaricurn  and  the  Venetian  oppida,  the  embankments  were  intended  to  carry  not  ma- 
chinery,  but  infantry:  if  not  exactly  a  Caesarian  innovation,  then  certainly  a  tactic  given 
a  new  emphasis  by  Caesar.  Finally,  his  embankment  at  Uxellodunurn  did  not  even  de- 
liver  a  direct  assault,  but  was  conceived  in  a  supporting  role. 
Heavy  machinery  was  used  on  occasion,  but  seldom  played  a  decisive  role  in  the  sieges 
which  form  our  sample  group,  presumably  in  part  because  of  the  nature  of  the  Gallic 
defences,  in  part  because  of  Caesar's  unorthodox  methods.  Various  protective  devices 
were  still  required,  wherever  construction  was  carried  out,  as  well  as  siege-towers, 
whose  primary  purpose  was  to  provide  a  vantage  point  for  covering  fire,  and,  although 
52 wall-battering  and  mining  techniques  were  inappropriate  tactics  to  use  against  the  Gallic 
oppida,  Caesar  threatened  the  Atuatuci  with  a  battering-ram  and  apparently  had  several 
with  him  in  Alexandria. 
10.4  Roman  Siegecraft  in  the  Caesarian  12eriod:  Conclusion 
A  high  proportion  of  sieges,  twelve  out  of  a  sample  grouping  of  twenty-six,  involved  a 
circurnvallation  (46%),  but  only  seven  of  these  were  prosecuted  as  blockades;  in  total, 
only  nine  of  the  twenty-six  sieges  (including  the  uncertain  case  of  Utica)  followed  a 
blockading  strategy  (35%).  Of  these,  only  three  (nos.  134,135,  and  147)  culminated 
successffilly  with  the  surrender  of  the  town;  another  two  were  specifically  intended  to 
confine  Pompey  (nos.  138  and  143),  but  fidled;  and  the  remaining  four  were  abandoned 
(nos.  140,141,146,  and  148).  (See  Diagram  1;  Table  8,  p.  55.  ) 
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Diagram  1:  Roman  sieges  of  the  Caesarian  Period 
By  contrast,  a  strategy  of  active  assault  can  be  demonstrated,  without  doubt,  at  the  nine 
sieges  involving  embankments  (35%),  and  with  some  likelihood  at  fourteen  sieges  (add- 
ing  the  five  assaults  without  embankments),  and  was  probably  intended  at  all  seventeen 
non-blockades  (65%).  Interestingly,  five  of  these  featured  circurnvallations,  three  of 
53 which  brought  the  surrender  of  the  town  (nos.  130,136,  and  149);  one  other  was  handed 
over  by  treachery  (no.  137,  assuming  Caesar's  strategy  at  Corfinium.  to  have  been 
broadly  one  of  assault),  and  the  last  (no.  126)  was  successfully  assaulted.  Of  the  re- 
maining  twelve,  non-encirclement  sieges,  two  were  abandoned  (nos.  125  and  133),  four 
led  to  a  surrender  (nos.  124,127,128,  and  139),  and  six  culminated  in  a  successful  as- 
sault  (nos.  129,131,132,142,144,  and  145).  (These  complicated  permutations  are 
clarified  in  Diagram  1.  ) 
In  total,  eight  sieges  were  abandoned  (3  1  0/c),  a  similar  proportion  to  that  found  during 
the  Spanish  and  Jugurthine  Wars  (Tables  5-6,  pp.  40,42).  Ten  resulted  in  the  town's 
surrender  (38%),  one  town  was  delivered  by  treachery  (40/o),  and  seven  were  success- 
fully  stornied  (27Vo),  at  least  two  by  escalade  and  two  by  breaking  open  the  gates.  Only 
at  one  she  is  there  a  hint  of  a  wall  breach,  and  apparently  no  attempt  was  made  to  enter 
it. 
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55 11.  The  Late  Republic  (Catalogue,  nos.  150-166;  Table 
11.1  Sources 
Siegecraft  of  the  period  from  the  death  of  Julius  Caesar  down  to  the  death  of  Augustus 
is  illuminated  chiefly  by  books  three  to  five  of  Appian's  Bella  Ovilia.  As  before,  de- 
tails  can  be  gleaned  from  Cassius  Dio  and  Plutarch.  However,  the  works  of  Josephus, 
who  wrote  under  the  patronage  of  the  emperor  Vespasian  and  his  sons,  become  increas- 
ingly  important  for  operations  mounted  in  the  Near  East. 
-11.2 
Roman  Siegecraft-in  the  Late  Republic:  Commentaly 
From  experience  of  siegecraft  in  the  Caesarian  period  (§10,  pp.  47ff.  ),  the  widespread 
use  of  circumvallatory  siege-works  might  be  anticipated.  But,  contrary  to  expectation, 
circumvallation  figures  in  only  five  of  the  seventeen  sieges  in  this  section,  with  a  further 
two  involving  the  use  of  cross-walls:  Antony's  ditch-and-palisade  barrier  across  the 
Brundisium  promontory  (no.  156),  and  Cassius's  cross-wall  on  the  Laodicea  promon- 
tory  (no.  152)  (see  Table  9,  p.  60).  In  44  B.  C.,  Antony  encircled  Mutina  (no.  150),  but 
was  increasingly  threatened  by  successive  relieving  forces,  and  departed  in  the  follow- 
ing  year.  Octavian  perhaps  drew  a  lesson  from  Antony's  failure,  for,  when  he  trapped 
the  latter's  brother,  L.  Antonius,  in  Perusia  (no.  155)  late  in  41  B.  C.,  he  built  an  elabo- 
rate  system  which  apparently  also  faced  outwards  in  the  manner  of  Connolly's  "bicir- 
cumvallatioW'  (above,  p.  36);  Antonius's  attempts  to  break  out  were  foiled  and  he  suc- 
cumbcd  early  the  next  year. 
Interestingly,  the  other  three  examples  of  investment  were  also  conceived  by  Octavian. 
At  Promona  (no.  164),  he  was  in  the  process  of  encircling  the  hill-top  town  and  two 
neighbouring  hills,  when  his  troops  seized  the  opportunity  of  entering  through  an  open 
gate  to  capture  the  place.  It  is  doubtful  whether  a  blockade  was  originally  intended, 
though.  In  the  previous  year,  he  had  encircled  Segesta  (no.  162),  but  proceeded  to  raise 
embankments,  and  captured  the  town,  it  is  assumed,  by  storm  On  the  other  hand,  a 
blockade  was  probably  intended  at  Mons  Medullius  (no.  166),  where  the  rebellious 
Cantabrians  chose  suicide  over  captivity. 
56 Besides  Perusia,  Mutina,  and  Mons  Medullius,  two  further  sieges  bear  the  hallmarks  of 
a  blockade:  Samosata  (no.  157)  and  Aradus  (no.  158)  in  38  B.  C.  Unfortunately,  our 
knowledge  of  these  is  sketchy.  At  the  former,  Antony  was  able  to  extort  payment  from 
Antiochus  (though  not  as  much  as  his  lieutenant,  Ventidius;  Bassus,  had  previously  ne- 
gotiated),  which  suggests  that  the  city  had  been  blockaded.  There  is  no  question  of 
siege-works,  and  the  entire  incident  displays  an  opportunistic  quality.  At  the  latter,  the 
island  town  had  apparently  been  under  siege  for  some  time;  certainly,  by  the  time 
Sosius  captured  it,  the  townsfolk  were  suffering  from  starvation  and  disease.  Again,  no 
siege-works  are  evident,  and  the  method  of  capture  is  uncertain,  but  it  seems  likely  that 
the  town  capitulated. 
As  a  rule,  a  blockading  strategy  will  result  in  one  of  only  two  possible  outcomes:  fail- 
ure,  whereby  the  operation  is  abandoned,  as  happened  at  Mutina;  or  success,  whereby 
the  defenders  agree  to  come  to  terms,  as  at  Perusia,  Samosata,  and  (it  is  assumed) 
Aradus.  Mons  Medullius  demonstrates  a  third,  if  somewhat  extreme,  alternative:  sui- 
cide. 
Four  sieges  took  the  form  of  a  mechanised  assault,  three  of  them  in  combination  with 
embankments.  At  the  fourth,  Xanthus  (no.  154),  rather  than  piling  up  an  embankment, 
the  attackers  levelled  the  ground  for  the  advance  of  machinery.  The  wall  was  apparent- 
ly  breached,  but  Brutus  failed  to  capitalise  on  his  success,  giving  the  Xanthians  time  to 
repair  their  wall;  the  Romans  subsequently  concentrated  on  breaking  the  gates  open.  At 
Laodicea  (no.  152),  Dolabella  was  trapped  on  the  peninsula  by  Cassius's  entrench- 
ments,  and  a  naval  defeat  denied  him  an  escape  like  that  of  Pompey  at  Brundisium;  an 
embankment  was  raised  to  carry  battering-rams  up  to  the  wall,  but,  in  the  event,  the 
town  was  delivered  by  treachery.  Embankments  were  raised  at  Jerusalem  (no.  159), 
too,  for  the  advance  of  towers  and  battering-rams,  which  breached  two  walls  on  the  way 
to  the  Temple;  the  Temple  itself  was  taken  by  escalade.  Octavian  raised  embankments 
for  battering-rams  at  Metulum  (no.  161;  fig.  20),  but  resorted  to  storming  the  town  by 
boarding-bridge;  the  assault  was  unsuccessful,  but  the  townsfolk  surrendered  when  they 
saw  the  Romans  preparing  for  another  attempt.  Surrender  also  occurred  at  Siscia  (no. 
57 163;  fig.  21),  where  Octavian  drew  the  defenders  into  the  open  for  a  river  combat,  and 
defeated  therm 
It  seems  that  Antony  had  no  machinery  at  Praaspa  (no.  160),  for  his  siege-train  had 
lagged  behind  and,  lacking  adequate  protection,  had  been  destroyed  by  the  Part1iians. 
Nevertheless,  his  strategy  hinged  on  the  raising  of  embankments,  but  he  could  achieve 
nothing  decisive  with  limited  numbers  and  was  forced  into  an  ignominious  withdrawal. 
Here,  the  embankments  were  perhaps  originally  intended  for  the  lost  machinery,  but,  as 
Antony  continued  with  their  construction,  he  perhaps  envisaged  using  them  to  carry  an 
infantry  assault  up  to  the  level  of  the  town  battlements,  like  Caesar's  embankment  at 
Avaricum  (no.  132);  the  "machinery"  which  Dio  (49.28.1)  alleges  to  have  been  aban- 
doned  on  Antony's  departure  will  have  been  shelters  and  the  like. 
Other  operations  were  based  on  simple  assault.  Smyrna  (no.  IS  1)  was  taken  in  a  classic 
coup  de  main  by  escalade,  but  there  are  no  details  of  the  siege  of  Genucla  (no.  165),  ex- 
cept  that  it  fell  to  an  assault.  And,  having  crushed  the  Rhodian  navy,  Cassius  began  to 
attack  Rhodes  town  (no.  153)  by  land  and  sea;  in  the  event,  it  was  taken  by  treachery. 
11.3  Roman  Siegccmft  in  the  Late  Republic:  Discussion 
In  contrast  to  Caesarian  siegecraft,  no  emphasis  on  circumvallation  can  be  discerned, 
and,  although  embankments  certainly  figure  in  several  sieges,  they  are  by  no  means 
universal.  A  blockading  strategy  was  followed  at  a  mere  five  sites,  only  three  of  which 
also  had  a  circumvallation.  This,  along  with  examples  from  earlier  periods,  demon- 
strates  the  error  of  equating  a  blockading  strategy  with  the  physical  infrastructure  of  a 
circumvallation.  Liebenam.  makes  this  mistake  when,  dividing  Roman  sieges  into  three 
categories,  he  labels  the  first  "encirclement,  blockade"  (1909,2236:  "die  EinschlieBung, 
Blockade),  as  if  the  two  terms  are  synonymous.  Although  he  admits  the  possibility  of 
combining  an  encirclement  with  a  mechanised  assault  (1909,2239,  claiming  very  few 
examples),  he  fails  to  recognise  a  further  permutation;  namely,  the  blockade  without  cn- 
circlement. 
Of  course,  Liebenarn  is  not  alone  in  this;  he  has  simply  made  explicit  an  assumption 
58 that  remains  tacit  with  other  scholars.  Veith,  for  example,  has  stated  that,  "with  land- 
fortifications  [i.  e.,  as  opposed  to  maritime  fortifications],  the  full  encirclement  was  not 
always  possible"  (1928,448:  "Auch  bei  Landfestungen  war  aber  die  volle  Zernierung 
nicht  immer  m6glich").  He  might  equally  have  said  that  the  full  encirclement  was  not 
always  desired. 
Besides  an  emphasis  on  entrenching,  Veith  has  also  claimed  that  the  Romans  followed 
in  the  tradition  of  Greek  poliorcetics,  though  apparently  applying  Greek  methods  in  a 
more  regimented  manner  (Veith  1928,443).  For  this  statement,  he  cites  "the  great  Cae- 
sarian  siegee'  and  Sulla's  siege  of  Athens,  but  we  have  seen  that  the  former  are  quite 
distinctively  Caesarian  Q10,  pp.  47ff.  ),  diverging  sharply  from  any  Greek  antecedents, 
and  the  latter  (Veith  has  surely  confused  the  siege  of  Athens  with  that  of  Piraeus)  be- 
longs  with  a  discussion  of  pre-Caesarian  siegecraft  (see  above,  p.  45). 
Nevertheless,  the  joint  Hcrodian  and  Roman  siege  of  Jerusalem  in  37  B.  C.  (no.  159) 
certainly  follows  in  the  Hellenistic  tradition  of  Sulla's  siege  of  Piraeus,  and  Antony 
would  probably  have  mounted  a  similar  operation  at  Praaspa  (no.  160),  had  he  not  been 
thwarted  by  the  loss  of  his  siege-train.  There  is  little  evidence  of  Veith's  imagined 
regimentation,  although,  in  comparison  with  Hellenistic  strategy,  a  more  conservative 
attitude  can  perhaps  be  detected.  The  operations  at  Laodicea  (no.  152),  Xanthus  (no. 
154),  and  Metulum,  (no.  161),  for  instance,  suggest  that  Roman  armies  were  content  to 
employ  a  limited  range  of  machinery  to  achieve  their  objective. 
11  .4  Roman  Siegecraft  in  the  Late  Reloublic:  Conclusion 
Of  the  seventeen  sieges  in  this  section,  only  seven  involved  entrenchments  (41%),  five 
in  the  form  of  a  circurnvallation  and  two  in  the  form  of  a  barrier  wall.  Two  of  these, 
plus  another  three,  saw  the  erection  of  embanlanents  (29%),  a  clear  indicator  of  an  as- 
saulting  strategy.  In  fact,  a  blockading  strategy  is  apparent  at  just  five  sites  (291/o),  only 
three  of  which  also  had  a  circumvallation.  By  contrast,  successful  assaults  were 
launched  at  six  sites  (35%)  and  intended  at  another  six,  two  of  which  were  delivered  by 
treachery,  two  were  abandoned  and  two  surrendered.  In  a  five  sieges  ended  in  surren- 
der,  including  the  uncertain  case  of  Aradus  (29%)  (Table  9,  p.  60). 
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Our  view  of  siegecraft  in  the  early  Principate,  from  the  last  years  of  Augustus  down  to 
the  death  of  Nero,  stems  almost  entirely  from  the  Annales  of  Tacitus,  written  around 
A.  D.  120  and  based  on  impeccable  sources  including  the  Senate's  archives.  Additional 
details  can  be  gleaned  from  Cassius  Dio's  History,  which  survives  virtually  intact  for 
the  period  from  Augustus  down  to  A.  D.  46,  and,  as  before,  operations  in  the  East,  par- 
ticularly  in  Judaea,  are  illuminated  by  the  Jewish  historian,  Josephus.  Again,  only  those 
operations  for  which  we  have  reasonable  detail  are  included;  so,  for  example,  Germani- 
cus's  assault  on  Raetinum  in  A.  D.  9,  during  which  the  defenders  fired  their  own  town 
(Cass.  Dio  56.11-34),  and  the  two  strongholds  stormed  in  A.  D.  58  (Tac.,  Ann.  13.39), 
on  the  same  day  as  Volandurn  (no.  173),  are  omitted,  because  we  can  form  no  clear  idea 
of  their  conduct. 
60 12.2  Roman  Siegecraft  in  the  Ear-ly  Empire:  Commentary 
There  is  a  noticeable  preponderance  of  storming  assaults  amongst  the  ten  examples 
assembled  in  this  section  (see  Table  10,  p.  63).  Both  Celenderis  (no.  169)  and  Uspe  (no. 
172)  were  taken  by  escalade,  the  former  in  a  coup  de  main,  the  latter  after  the  townsfolk 
had  been  subjected  to  missile-fire  from  siege-towers.  Corbulo's  attack  on  the  town  of 
Volandura  (no.  173)  in  A.  D.  58  took  the  form  of  an  escalade,  coordinated  with  the  at- 
tempt  of  a  legionary  testudo-formation  to  undermine  the  wall;  in  fact,  while  troops  as- 
saulted  the  walls,  a  gate  was  broken  open,  which  may  have  been  the  real  objective  of  the 
testudo-formation.  Finally,  in  A.  D.  66,  when  Cestius  Gallus  failed  to  overawe  the  in- 
surgents  in  Jerusalem  (no.  176)  with  a  show  of  strength,  he  ordered  repeated  escalades 
of  the  Temple  platform,  while  a  legionary  testudo-formation  attempted  to  undermine  the 
wall  and  assault  the  gate;  after  five  days,  he  abandoned  the  attempt  and  was  harried  out 
ofJudaea. 
The  action  at  Legerda  (no.  175)  in  A.  D.  59  probably  took  the  form  of  an  escalade,  too. 
Having  chased  the  garrison  inside  their  walls,  Corbulo,  "burst  in!  '  and  captured  the  place. 
Tacitus's  report  is  concise  in  the  extreme,  but  he  appears  to  suggest  the  use  of  an  em- 
bankment,  probably  to  carry  the  troops  up  and  over  the  town  walls.  In  A.  D.  9,  Ger- 
manicus  reportedly  attacked  Splonum  (no.  167)  using  "machines",  but  made  no  head- 
way  until  a  dislodged  parapet  created  panic  in  the  town;  Dio's  "machines"  could  con- 
ccivably  have  been  ladders,  and  Germanicus's  entry  into  the  town  to  receive  the  surren- 
der  of  the  citadel  may  have  been  by  escalade. 
The  future  emperor  Tiberius's  attack  on  Andetriurn  (no.  168)  took  a  different  form 
Unable  to  make  any  impression  on  the  town's  defences,  he  launched  a  desperate  uphill 
assault,  which  the  defenders  issued  out  to  meet.  Unable  to  match  the  legionaries  in 
number  or  in  skill,  despite  their  range  of  improvised  countermeasures,  which  included 
wagonloads  of  rocks,  the  townsfolk  were  worsted  and  forced  to  surrender. 
In  a  variation  of  a  strategy  not  seen  since  the  Spanish  Wars  (above,  p.  35),  Corbulo 
threw  a  cordon  of  fight-armed  troops  around  Artaxata  (no.  174),  while  subjecting  the 
town  to  a  long-range  barrage,  presumably  of  archer-fire  and  sling-shot;  the  town 
61 promptly  surrendered.  The  only  comparable  incident  occurred  in  A.  D.  26  at  the 
Tliracian  stronghold  on  Mons  Haemus  (no.  170);  Poppaeus  Sabinus  encircled  the  place 
with  a  ditch  and  palisade  and  a  series  of  guard-posts,  before  erecting  an  embankment 
from  which  the  townsfolk  were  bombarded  with  missile-fire.  Sabinus's  alleged  strategy 
of  starvation  sits  uneasily  with  the  presence  of  an  embankment,  but  he  perhaps  hoped  to 
cover  all  eventualities.  On  the  other  hand,  Trebellius  (possibly  the  future  governor  of 
Britain,  L.  Trebellius,  Maximus)  relied  only  on  starvation  to  persuade  the  rebel  Cietae  to 
respect  his  authority;  he  surrounded  their  adopted  hill-top  position  at  Cadra  and  Davara 
(no.  171),  presumably  with  some  kind  of  circurnvallation,  and  awaited  their  surrender. 
12.3  Roman  Siegecraft  in  the  Ear-ly  Empire:  Discussion 
Commentators  traditionally  restrict  discussion  of  imperial  siegecraft  to  the  period  of  the 
Jewish  War  (e.  g.,  Connolly  1981,298;  Dobson  1989,207;  Goldsworthy  2000,144-145; 
Kem  1999,311-322;  Nischer  1928,564-566).  But  these  sieges  form  a  discrete  group, 
bounded  chronologically  and  geographically,  and  for  this  reason  they  have  been  re- 
moved  from  the  discussion  of  early  imperial  siegecraft  (see  §  13,  pp.  64ff.  ). 
Again,  the  emphasis  on  circumvallatory  siege-works,  evident  in  the  Caesarian  period 
(above,  pp.  47f.  ),  is  absent  from  our  sample  group  of  early  imperial  sieges.  Only  two  of 
the  ten  sieges  in  the  group  involved  the  construction  of  encircling  earthworks,  namely 
Cadra  and  Davara  (no.  171)  and  the  Thracian  hill.  -fort  on  Mons  Haemus  (no.  170).  At 
the  latter,  not  only  did  Sabinus  dig  a  circumvallation,  but  he  constructed  an  embank- 
ment  (agger),  which  commanded  the  interior.  An  embankment  appears  to  have  been 
used  at  Legerda  (no.  175)  to  carry  storm-troops  over  the  battlements,  in  the  manner  (if 
not  on  the  scale)  of  Avaricum. 
The  storming  assault  is  found  also  at  Celenderis  (no.  169),  Uspe  (no.  172)  and  Volan- 
dum  (no.  173),  all  of  which  took  the  form  of  an  escalade  under  cover  of  missile-fire. 
An  assault  would  perhaps  have  ensued  at  Artaxata.  (no.  174),  had  the  townsfolk  not  sur- 
rendered  so  promptly.  Three  of  these  assaults  were  conducted  by  Domitius  Corbulo,  the 
proponent  of  the  dolabra  as  a  means  of  vanquishing  the  enemy  (Front.,  Strat.  4.7.2).  It 
is  unfortunate  that  Le  Bohec  has  chosen  to  link  this  maxim  with  the  construction  of 
62 siege-works  (1989,146),  since  Corbulo  clearly  preferred  the  stonning  attack  to  the 
building  of  circumvaBatory  earthworks.  (The  maxim  is  usuaRy  taken  to  refer  to  the  dis- 
cipline  of  building  marching-camps:  e.  g.,  Davies  1968,104.  ) 
An  assaulting  strategy  was  also  followed  at  Splonurn  (no.  167)  and  Andetrium  (no. 
168),  though,  like  Artaxata,  both  ended  in  surrender,  the  latter  after  a  battle  outside  the 
walls.  Only  one  siege  from  our  sample  was  unsuccessful:  Cestius  Gallus's  poorly  or- 
ganised  attempt  on  the  Temple  enclosure  in  Jerusalem  (no.  176),  which  led  to  an  igno- 
minious  rout. 
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12.4  Roman  Siezecraft  in  the  EarIv  EMDire:  Conclusion 
Of  the  ten  sieges  in  this  section,  only  two  involved  a  circurnvallation  (20%),  and  these 
are  also  the  only  operations  to  have  followed  a  blockading  strategy.  One  of  these,  along 
with  one  other,  saw  the  erection  of  an  embankment  (20%),  though  not  for  the  use  of 
heavy  machinery.  Assault  was  the  dominant  strategy-,  employed  successfully  at  four 
63 sites  (40%)  and  unsuccessfiffly  at  one,  it  would  probably  have  been  used  at  three  others, 
if  surrender  had  not  been  so  prompt.  In  all,  five  towns  surrendered  (50%),  two  from  the 
effects  of  blockade,  three  from  fear  of  Ron=  attack,  and  one  operation  was  abandoned 
(100/0). 
13,  The  JeMjsh  War  period  (Catalogue,  nos.  177-19  1;  Table  11) 
13.1  Sources 
Sources  for  Roman  siegecraft  during  the  Jewish  War  period  are  almost  the  same  as 
those  for  the  early  Principate  (above,  §12.1).  The  extant  books  of  Tacitus's  Historide, 
written  around  A.  D.  105,  cover  the  years  A.  D.  68-70,  and  are  invaluable  for  events  in 
the  West,  less  so  for  events  in  the  East.  For  the  latter,  we  have  the  contemporary  wit- 
ness  of  Josephus,  who  was  personally  involved,  first  as  a  defender  and  subsequently  ac- 
companying  the  Roman  headquarters  staff. 
13.2  Roraan  Siegecruft  during  the  pcriod  of  the  Jewish  War:  Commen- 
IME 
At  Joppa  (no.  177),  Gabara  (no.  179)  and  Gerasa  (no.  185),  the  town  was  stormed  in  a 
coup  de  main  and  the  inhabitants  slaughtered  (see  Table  11,  p.  67).  At  the  double- 
walled  town  of  Japha  (no.  181),  the  Romans  entered  the  first  enceinte  on  the  heels  of  the 
fleeing  defenders  and  crossed  the  second  enceinte  by  escalade.  At  Cremona  (no.  187), 
the  Flavians  threw  a  cordon  around  the  Vitellian  camp  and  broke  down  the  gate,  where- 
upon  the  defenders  made  a  dash  for  the  nearby  town,  which  was  burned  and  looted  in 
the  aftermath.  And,  in  their  attack  on  the  Flavians  sheltering  on  the  Capitol  in  Rome 
(no.  188),  the  Vitellian  Praetorians  simply  set  fire  to  the  place. 
At  Jotapata  (no.  180),  Josephus's  first-hand  report  describes  how,  having  failed  in  his 
attempts  to  storm  the  walls,  Vespasian  constructed  an  embankment,  apparently  to  en- 
able  infantry  to  cross  the  battlements,  as  Caesar  had  done  at  Avaricum.  When  the  de- 
fenders  foiled  his  plan  by  raising  the  town  wall,  he  resorted  to  a  battering  attack  and  at- 
tempted  to  storm  the  town  through  the  breach.  When  this  was  also  thwarted,  the  em- 
64 bankment  was  raised  again,  under  the  protection  of  siege  towers,  and  the  infantry  attack 
was  finally  launched. 
Embankments  figured  at  five  other  sites.  At  Gamala  (no.  183),  Vespasian  constructed 
embankments  to  bring  up  battering-rams,  but  the  assault  troops,  entering  the  breach, 
were  thrown  back;  a  second  attack,  after  one  of  the  towers  on  the  town  wall  was  under- 
mined,  succeeded.  At  Masada  (no.  191),  archaeology  confirms  that  the  fortress  was  en- 
circled  with  a  circurnvallation  and  guard-posts,  and  an  embankment  was  constructed  to 
carry  a  battering-ram  up  to  the  wall;  the  defenders  committed  mass  suicide  rather  than 
be  captured.  At  Jerusalem  (no.  189;  fig.  22),  Titus  orchestrated  a  major  mechanised 
siege;  three  embankments  carried  rams  up  to  the  outer  ("third")  wall and  made  a  breach; 
the  second  wall  was  breached  and  taken;  then,  when  two  pairs  of  embankments  raised 
against  the  Antonia  fortress  and  the  Temple  platform  were  destroyed  by  the  Jews,  a  cir- 
curnvallation  was  thrown  around  the  city  and  a  new  embankment  carried  battering-rams 
up  to  the  Antonia  fortress;  rams  were  directed  at  the  Temple  platform  on  a  pair  of  em- 
bankments,  and,  when  the  Antonia  was  demolished,  another  pair  of  embankments  car- 
ried  the  Romans  up  onto  the  Temple  platform,  where  the  Temple  was  finally  destroyed. 
More  embankments  were  raised  against  the  palace  in  the  Upper  city,  and  the  whole  of 
Jerusalem  was  burned  and  looted.  Archaeology  proves  that  Machaerus  (no.  190)  was 
encircled  and  an  embankment  raised;  but  the  defenders  surrendered  in  return  for  the  life 
of  one  of  their  compatriots,  captured  during  a  sortie. 
Finally,  at  Placentia  (no.  186),  the  Vitellians  attempted  undermining,  gate-breaking  and 
the  construction  of  an  embankment,  but  soon  abandoned  the  attempt  in  the  face  of  a  de- 
termined  defence.  Only  one  other  siege  from  this  period  was  abandoned  incomplete:  at 
Belzedek  (no.  178),  the  Romans  were  unwilling  to  invest  effort  in  an  assault  of  the  forti- 
fled  tower,  so  they  set  fire  to  the  place  instead. 
Roman  entry  was  uncontested  at  two  towns:  at  lakeside  Tarichaeae,  (no.  182),  a  cavalry 
force  circumvented  the  defences  and  routed  the  rebel  elements  from  the  town;  and  at 
Mount  Tabor  (no.  184),  the  defenders  were  enticed  to  leave  the  safety  of  their  walls  and 
join  battle  on  the  plain,  where  they  were  defeated. 
65 13.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Jewish  War  period:  Discussion 
Commentators  on  Roman  imperial  siegecraft  usually  highlight  the  Jewish  War  period 
(cf.  p.  62,  above).  For  Webster,  Josephus's  narrative  of  the  siege  of  Jotapata  encapsu- 
lates  imperial  siegecraft  (1985,252-254);  others  use  Josephus  as  the  basis  for  a  more 
wide-ranging  discussion  (e.  g.,  Le  Bohec  1989,144-145;  Goldsworthy  2000,140-143). 
Connolly's  treatment  may  be  taken  as  typical:  "Roman  siege  technique  in  the  early 
principate  is  best  illustrated  by  the  sieges  of  Vespasian  and  Titus  during  the  Jewish  re- 
volt"  (1981,298).  He  characterises  the  standard  Roman  tactics  of  the  Principate,  first, 
by  the  use  of  artillery,  and,  second,  by  the  construction  of"mounds7'.  However,  we 
have  seen  that  embankments  played  a  part  in  only  six  of  the  fifteen  sieges  in  our  sample 
group,  and  artillery  was  prominent  in  even  fewer. 
Nischer  has  rightly  observed  that  the  siegecraft  practised  during  the  Principate  gener- 
ated  no  particularly  characteristic  innovations  (1928,564),  a  fact  which  he  put  down  to 
its  inherent  contingency.  The  individual  commander  could  inject  his  own  personality 
into  the  conduct  of  a  siege  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  could  the  battlefield  commander, 
but,  in  the  final  analysis,  the  besieging  methods  depended  largely  on  the  defensive 
measures  employed  by  the  besieged,  and  were  of  course  constrained  by  the  available 
technology. 
Nevertheless,  even  Nischer  uses  Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem  as  the  typical  "besieging  at- 
tackr  of  the  Principate  (1928,564-566),  although  we  have  seen  that  it  is  not  at  all  repre- 
sentative,  even  of  Jewish  War  sieges:  for  example,  it  represents  the  first  of  only  three 
occasions  on  which  a  circumvallation  was  used  in  the  period,  and  may  well  have  been 
the  direct  inspiration  for  the  subsequent  circumvallations  at  Machaerus  and  Masada. 
Neither  is  it  representative  of  the  early  Principate  as  a  whole:  for  the  earlier  period,  the 
storming  attack  appears  to  have  been  favoured  (above,  pp.  62f  ).  In  fact,  Jerusalem  has 
been  cast  in  the  same  role  for  imperial  siegecraft,  as  has  Alesia  for  the  siegccraft  of  the 
Republic:  a  spectacular  exception,  whose  unorthodox  progress  is  celebrated  as  a  high- 
water  mark,  and  thus  misinterpreted  as  the  logical  culmination,  of  the  besieger's  art. 
66 13.4  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  period  of  the  Jewish  War:  Conclusion 
Of  the  fifteen  sieges  in  this  section,  only  three  involved  a  circumvallation  (201/o),  and 
none  of  these  took  the  form  of  a  blockade.  These  three  were  among  the  six  sites  where 
embankments  were  constructed  (40%),  and  all  but  one  fell  to  assault.  In  all,  ten  sieges 
were  pursued  as  assaults  (67%);  of  the  remaining  five,  two  were  uncontested  (130/o), 
two  were  abandoned  (including  Belzedek,  where  the  objective  was  not  deemed  suffi- 
ciently  important  to  warrant  a  siege)  (13%),  and  one  town  surrendered  (7%). 
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67 14.  The  Second  Centuly  (Catalogue.  nos.  192-202;  Table  12) 
14.1  Sou  ces 
For  the  period  from  Trajan  to  Septimius  Severus,  the  sources  for  Roman  siegecraft  are 
less  detailed  than  for  previous  periods;  there  is  no  Polybius  or  Livy,  no  Caesar  or 
Josephus.  Instead,  our  information  comes  almost  exclusively  from  Cassius  Dio, 
through  the  filter  of  Mphilinus's  epitome.  There  are  two  other  major  sources,  each  with 
its  own  problems:  first,  Herodian's  history  of  the  years  180-238,  written  probably  in  the 
250s,  is  uneven  in  quality,  and  requires  the  controlling  influence  of  Dio's  parallel  ac- 
count,  wherever  possible;  and  second,  the  enigmatic  Historia  Augusta,  comprising  im- 
perial  biographies  down  to  A.  D.  284,  is  thought  to  be  generally  reliable  only  for  the 
second  century  emperors.  Both  provide  incidental  details  for  the  study  of  siegecraft. 
The  general  poverty  of  the  literary  sources  has  been  supplemented  from  contemporary 
sculptural  propaganda,  in  the  form  of  Trajan's  Column,  which  was  officially  unveiled  in 
A-D.  113.  The  events  depicted  on  the  Column  cannot,  of  course,  be  interpreted  literally 
(Coulston  1990,293),  so  the  scenes  of  Dacians  besieging  Roman  fortifications  (e.  g., 
XMI,  casts  77-79  =  fig.  39;  XCIV,  casts  249-251;  CXXMV,  casts  358-360)  are  omit- 
ted,  as  they  have  only  a  general  historical  context.  However,  it  may  reasonably  be  ar- 
gued  that  certain  scenes  of  Romans  besieging  Dacians  relate  to  catalogue  entries  190- 
191,  for  which  they  provide  additional  detail. 
14.2  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Second  Centuly:  Commentary 
Trajan's  sieges  of  the  Dacian  hillforts  (no.  192)  during  the  First  Dacian  War  probably 
took  the  form  of  storming  attacks;  the  related  scenes  on  the  Column  depict  fort- 
building,  the  establishing  of  an  artillery  position,  and  two  assaults  on  Dacian  palisades, 
one  by  the  use  of  a  testudo  shield-formation.  Ile  method  by  which  Sarmizegethusa 
(no.  193)  was  captured  in  the  Second  Dacian  War  is  not  stated  by  Cassius  Dio;  it  is  de- 
picted  on  the  Column  as  a  series  of  assaults,  involving  ladder-carrying  troops  and  the 
attempted  demolition  of  walls  using  dolabrae,  although  there  may  be  a  suggestion  of  a 
circumvallation  (see  below,  p.  70). 
68 The  period  saw  the  town  of  Hatra,  besieged  three  times  by  the  Romans,  unsuccessfiffly; 
first,  by  Trajan  in  A.  D.  117  (no.  196),  then  by  Severus,  in  A.  D.  198  (no.  201)  and  A.  D. 
199  (no.  202).  Both  emperors  reportedly  breached  the  walls,  but,  oddly,  neither  con- 
quered  the  city.  There  are  no  details  of  the  Tmjanic  sieges  of  Edessa  (no.  194)  and  Se- 
leucia  (no.  195),  or  of  Lucius  Verus's  siege  of  Ctesiphon  (no.  198),  except  that  the  cities 
were  sacked  and  burned.  Septimius  Severus  is  said  to  have  taken  Ctesiphon  by  a  coup 
de  main  (no.  200). 
A  blockade  was  employed  by  Hadrian's  general,  Julius  Severus,  at  Bettir  (no.  197), 
where  the  defenders  were  forced  to  surrender  from  thirst  and  starvation,  and  by  Sep- 
timius  Severus's  general,  Marius  Maximus,  at  Byzantium  (no.  199),  where  the  defend- 
ers  held  out  for  over  two  years.  Traces  of  a  circurnvallation  have  been  identified 
archaeologically  at  Bettir  (fig.  28),  but  there  is  no  mention  of  earthworks  at  Byzantium 
This  siege  demonstrates  incidentally  that  the  blockade  of  a  marithne  city  was  perfectly 
feasible,  given  the  and  resources. 
14.3  Roman  Sie=cmft  during  the  Second  CentulZy_:  D' 
Siegecraft  in  the  second  century  has  been  quietly  ignored  by  modem  scholars.  Webster 
(1985),  Connolly  (1981,298-300)  and  Kern  (1999)  do  not  go  beyond  the  Jewish  War, 
and  Nischer's  discussion  of  imperial  siegecraft  (1928,564-567)  centres  on  Josephus  and 
Tacitus,  with  only  a  brief  mention  of  TraJan's  Column.  Le  Bohec,  too,  concentrates  on 
Josephus  and  Tacitus,  but  he  attempts  to  integrate  the  evidence  of  Trajan's  Column, 
which  "shows  us  how  the  Romans  set  about  capturing  Sarmizegethusa!  '  (1989,143), 
with  reference  to  a  rather  poor  line-drawing  of  scenes  CXIII  and  CXIV  (casts  300-308). 
He  makes  some  general  use  of  the  sculptures,  interpreting  scene  CXVII  (casts  316-318 
=  fig.  44)  as  "fixed  defences,  screens  and  wooden  boarding  behind  which  the  soldiers 
take  cover"  (1989,145:  "Menses  fixes,  claies  et  panneaux  de  bois  derri&e  lesquels  les 
soldats  s'abritenf),  and  scene  CXIII  (casts  302-303  =  fig.  42)  as  evidence  of  assault 
ladders  (1989,148).  (The  subject  of  scene  CXVII  is  open  to  question,  but  appears  to  be 
more  substantial  than  a  defensive  screen;  see  ftirther  below.  ) 
The  historical  sources  for  this  period  carry  no  hint  of  a  circumallation.  Disjointed 
69 lengths  of  an  investing  wall  have  been  identified  at  Khirbet  el-Yahud,  modern  Bettir 
(below,  p.  121),  but  the  low  bank  surrounding  the  city  of  Hatm  is  unlikely  to  have  been 
a  Roman  circumvallation  (below,  p.  125);  it  is  difficult  to  justify  it  as  an  outwork  of  the 
city  (as  per  Al-SaliIii  1991,188),  and  it  perhaps  relates  to  the  successful  Sasanian  siege 
of  Shapur  I  in  ca.  A.  D.  240  (Codex  Manichaicus  Coloniensis  18.1-16). 
Richmond  (1982,41)  followed  Cichorius  (1900,223-224)  in  identifying  the  wall,  curv- 
ing  away  from  the  Roman  fort  in  scene  CXIII  (casts  300-301)  of  Trajan's  Column,  as  a 
circuravallation.  It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  the  timber  artillery  emplacement  in  scene 
LXVI  (casts  166-167  =  fig.  41)  also  represents  a  circurrivallation  (pace  Rossi  1971, 
164),  but  the  wall  behind  which  Trajan  and  his  comites  are  shown  in  scene  CXIV  (cast 
306  =  fig.  43)  perhaps  represents  a  siege  camp  in  front  of  Sarmizegethusa.  As  previ- 
ously  noted,  the  interpretation  of  the  timber  construction  in  scene  CXVII  (casts  316-318 
=  fig.  44)  is  uncertain;  Lepper  &  Frere  (1988,168)  do  not  attempt  to  identify  it,  Rossi 
(1971,194)  believes  that  it  represents  new  siege-machines,  and  Le  Bohec  (1989,145) 
temporary  shelters,  but  a  structure  of  some  sort  is  more  likely.  An  embankment  is  per- 
haps  the  most  appropriate  structure  for  the  Romans  to  be  engaged  upon  at  this  late  stage 
in  the  siege,  and  the  subsequent  scene  of  Dacians  begging  for  clemency  (CXVIII,  casts 
319-321)  becomes  quite  understandable,  if  they  have  seen  their  fate  sealed  by  the  munii- 
nent  storming  assault  which  an  embankment  heralded. 
Nischer's  argument  for  an  unchanging  siegecraft,  tailored  to  the  requirements  of  each 
individual  case,  yet  bound  by  the  general  constraints  of  technology  (1928,564),  finds  a 
faint  echo  in  Goldsworthy's  treatment  of  Roman  warfare  between  the  years  14  and  193: 
"the  Romans  did  relatively  little  to  develop  the  technical  side  of  siegecraft,  but  they 
brought  an  aggressive,  relentless  quality  to  this  type  of  warffire"  (2000,144).  Here, 
again,  is  the  myth  that,  once  committed  to  a  siege,  the  Roman  commander  would  not 
give  up  (cf  above,  p.  32).  Ironically,  with  three  examples  out  of  eleven,  the  evidence 
for  the  abandonment  of  sieges  prior  to  completion  is  strong  for  the  second  century  (see 
Table  12,  p.  71),  recalling  the  high  proportion  found  in  the  Spanish  and  Jugurthine  Wars 
and  in  the  Caesarian  period  (Tables  5-6,8,  pp.  40,42,55). 
70 . 
14.4  Roman  Sieg-ecraft  during  the  Second  Centuiy:  Conclusion 
Of  the  eleven  sieges  in  this  section,  there  is  clear  evidence  of  circumvallation  at  only 
one  site;  with  the  possibility  that  Sarmizegethusa,  may  also  have  been  encircled,  two 
sieges  out  of  eleven  involved  encirclement  (18%).  At  only  one  of  these  was  a  blockad- 
ing  strategy  pursued;  the  same  policy  was  followed  at  one  other  site,  though  without 
physical  encirclement,  making  a  total  of  two  blockades  out  of  eleven  examples  (18%). 
Both  resulted  in  surrender;  including  the  possible  case  of  Sannizegethusa  makes  three 
out  of  eleven  (27%).  The  three  attempts  on  Hatra  were  abandoned  (27%),  and  the  re- 
maining  five  sieges  were  pursued  as  assaults  (45%),  though  we  have  no  details  of  the 
methods  employed. 
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15.  :  Ehe  Third  Centujy  (Catalogue,  nos.  203-2  10;  Table  13) 
15.1  Sources 
For  the  third  century,  once  the  works  of  Cassius  Dio  and  Herodian  come  to  an  end,  we 
are  left  with  less  reliable  sources.  However,  the  Historia  Augusta,  the  de  Caesaribus  of 
Aurelius  Victor,  and  the  Breviarium  of  Eutropius,  which  all  appear  to  have  drawn  upon 
the  so-called  Kaisergeschichte  of  around  A.  D.  358,  can  happily  be  used  with  care. 
Amid  various  minor  Byzantine  sources,  the  first  two  books  of  the  Historia  nova  of 
Zosirnus,  covering  events  down  to  the  sons  of  Constantine,  are  useful  for  Roman  siege- 
craft  studies. 
15.2  Roman  Siegecraft  durintz  the  Third  CentujZE:  Commentaly- 
Oddly,  the  few  examples  of  Roman  siegecraft  from  this  period  include  no  clear  instance 
of  a  storming  attack  (see  Table  13,  p.  74).  This  must  have  been  intended  at  Cremna  (no. 
210),  where  an  incomplete  embankment  has  been  discovered  archaeologically,  but  the 
threat  of  assault  (and  the  assassination  of  the  ring-leader)  encouraged  surrender.  The 
archaeological  remains  of  a  double  barrier  wall,  cutting  off  the  western  approaches  to 
the  town,  are  the  only  hint  of  a  circumvallation  from  this  period,  but  it  is  salutary  to  re- 
flect  that  the  historical  sources  do  not  mention  any  siege-works  at  Cremna.  At  two 
other  sites,  Aquileia  (no.  203)  and  Palmyra  (no.  209),  a  cordon  of  troops  was  thrown 
around  the  town;  at  the  latter,  the  city  was  blockaded,  whereas  at  the  former,  the  con- 
struction  of  machinery  was  begun  for  a  mechanised  assault.  A  blockade  was  also  com- 
menced  at  Agrippina  (no.  206),  though  no  cordon  is  mentioned,  and  probably  only  a 
watch  on  the  gates  was  maintained. 
Cremna,  Palmyra  and  Agrippina  all  ended  in  the  surrender  of  the  besieged.  When  the 
Carpi  were  besieged  in  a  fortress  (no.  205)  by  Philip  the  Arab,  they  sortied  out  and  were 
defeated  in  the  field,  whereupon  they  immediately  surrendered.  The  siege  of  Aquileia 
(no.  203)  was  abandoned  when  the  disgruntled  besiegers,  having  run  short  of  supplies, 
assassinated  their  emperor,  Maximinus.  Similarly,  the  siege  of  Mediolanum  (no.  207) 
was  abandoned  when  the  emperor  Gallienus  fell  victim  to  a  plot;  he  must  have  intended 
to  assault  the  walls,  because  machinery  had  been  moved  up.  Finally,  the  town  of  Tyana 
72 (no.  208)  was  betrayed  to  Aurelian,  who  executed  the  traitor  and  held  his  troops  back 
from  plundering  the  town,  thus  advertising  his  clemency  and  winning  the  support  of  the 
townsfolk. 
When  the  Praetorians  were  besieged  in  their  camp  (no.  204)  by  the  Roman  mob  rein- 
forced  by  gladiators,  they  repulsed  their  attackers  using  missile  weapons,  and,  when 
their  water  supply  was  cut,  they  carried  the  conflict  onto  the  streets  of  Rome;  the  out- 
come  is  not  known. 
15.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  thelbird  Century:  Discussion 
If  siegecraft  in  the  second  century  lacks  modem  discussion  (see  above,  p.  69),  the  third 
century  has  fared  even  worse.  Of  course,  this  is  a  general  problem  for  third-century 
Roman  military  studies  (cf.  Campbell  1999,391-392).  In  his  discussion  of  siegecraft, 
Nischer  jumps  from  the  early  Principate  to  the  fourth-century  "Constantinische  Epoche' 
(1928,600),  and  treatments  of  "late  Roman  siegecraft"  routinely  begin  with  Ammianus 
Marcellinus  (e.  g.,  Southern  &  Dixon  1996,148;  Tomlin  1981,3  02). 
The  absence  of  storming  attacks  from  our  sample  group  is  surprising,  although  the  em- 
bankment  at  Cremna  was  probably  intended  for  this,  and  Gallienus  was  apparently  plan- 
ning  an  assault  at  Mediolanurn  when  he  was  assassinated.  However,  the  rarity  of 
mechanised  sieges  is  more  apparent  than  real.  Maximinus,  constructed  machinery  at 
Aquileia,  although  he  had  clearly  neglected  to  fire-proof  it;  Galfienus  had  machinery  at 
Mediolanum,  and,  besides  the  evidence  of  artillery  at  Cremna,  the  existence  of  an  em- 
bankment  suggests  the  intention  to  use  battering-rams.  On  the  other  hand,  neither  Pos- 
tumus  at  Agrippina,  nor  Valerian  at  Tyana,  was  accompanied  by  siege  equipment,  but 
equally  neither  had  need  of  it.  Perhaps  if  events  had  turned  out  differently,  they  would 
have  arranged  for  its  construction  on  the  spot. 
15.4  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the:  Ehird  Centujy:  Conclusion 
Of  the  eight  sieges  in  this  section,  there  is  evidence  of  circumvallation  at  only  one 
(13'Yo);  the  same  siege  provides  the  only  evidence  of  an  embankment.  At  two  sieges,  a 
cordon  was  thrown  around  the  town  (25%),  but  at  only  one  of  these,  and  at  one  other, 
73 was  a  blockading  strategy  pursued  (25%).  Four  sieges,  including  both  blockades,  re- 
sulted  in  surrender  (SOO/o);  three  sieges  were  abandoned  (38%);  and,  in  the  remaining 
siege,  the  objective  was  achieved  by  treachery  (13%). 
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16.  The  Fourth  Centuiy  (Catalogrue,  nos.  211.7-225;  Table  14) 
. 
16.1  Sourges 
For  the  fourth  century,  ecclesiastical  histories,  by  the  Ekes  of  Theodoret,  mention  sieges 
in  order  to  attnibute  divine  meaning  to  the  events.  Incidental  details  crop  up  in  the 
works  of  the  pagan  Libanius,  the  emperor  Julian,  and  the  panegyricists,  all  of  whom 
were  contemporary  with  the  events  they  described,  and  thus  well  placed  to  pass  on  ac- 
curate  information.  This  is less  often  the  case  with  later  authors,  such  as  the  generally 
unreliable  sixth-century  John  Malalas.  Although  written  in  the  fifth  century,  the  third 
74 book  of  Zosimus's  Historia  nova  has  much  of  value,  as  it  was  probably  based  upon  the 
work  of  fourth-century  Eunapius.  However,  the  rmjor  source  for  this  period  is  the  Res 
gestae  of  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  a  participant  in  the  military  affairs  of  the  day  and  a 
historian  of  the  first  rank. 
16.2  Rgman  Siegecraft  during  the  Fourth-Cenjuxy:  Cornmenta1y 
Full-scale  Roman  operations  are  evident  in  Constantine's  siege  of  Byzantium  (no.  214), 
Constantius's  attempt  to  recapture  Bezabde  (no.  217),  and  Julian's  attacks  on  Pirisabora 
(no.  222)  and  Maiozamalcha,  (no.  223).  All  three  saw  the  usual  preparations  for  bring- 
ing  heavy  machinery  forward,  with  troops  working  under  cover  of  artillery-fire,  and  the 
eventual  advance  of  a  battering-ram  (see  Table  14,  p.  79).  Embankments  were  con- 
structed  at  Byzantium,  Bezabde  and  Maiozamalcha.,  but  there  is  no  sign  of  circurnvalla- 
tory  earthworks,  unless  Libanius  was  alluding  to  this  when  he  likened  Constantius's 
capture  of  Nineveh  in  A.  D.  343  to  catching  the  city  in  a  net  (Orat.  59.83-85;  there  are 
no  details  of  the  siege). 
The  harbour  of  Gesoriacurn  (no.  211)  was  sealed  with  a  mole,  but  it  seems  that  the 
blockade  of  the  town  was  achieved  by  guarding  the  gates;  certainly,  there  is  no  mention 
of  earthworks.  Cordons  were  thrown  round  Aquileia  (no.  218),  Pirisabora  (no.  222)  and 
Maiozamalcha  (no.  223),  but  the  strategy  in  each  case  was  one  of  assault.  Similarly, 
although  Constantine  deployed  his  fleet  to  blockade  Byzantium  (no.  214),  the  siege  was 
pursued  as  a  mechanised  assault.  Diocletian's  eight-month  siege  of  Alexandria  (no. 
212)  was  surely  conceived  as  a  blockade,  but  unfortunately  details  are  lacking.  Con- 
stantine's  manoeuvring  before  Verona  (no.  213)  was  intended  to  set  up  a  blockade  of 
the  town,  but  in  the  event  the  garrison  sallied  out  and  the  fate  of  the  town  was  decided 
on  the  field  of  battle.  And  when  a  party  of  Franks  took  reffige  in  two  vacant  forts  on  the 
River  Meuse  (no.  216),  Julian  blockaded  them,  again  presumably  by  guarding  the  gates, 
until  they  surrendered  after  almost  two  months. 
When  the  Romans  breached  the  outer  defences  of  Pirisabora.  (no.  222)  and  began  the 
construction  of  a  siege  tower  for  the  final  capture  of  the  citadel,  the  townsfolk  capitu- 
lated.  At  Byzantium  (no.  214),  it  was  Constantine's  defeat  of  Licinius  elsewhere  that 
75 brought  the  surrender  of  the  town,  although  wall-battering  had  apparently  commenced. 
The  equally  large-scale  attempt  on  Aquileia  (no.  218)  was  less  well  managed,  however, 
with  a  poorly  conceived  assault  on  the  riverfront  by  shipboard  machines;  nevertheless, 
the  defenders  surrendered  on  realising  that  their  emperor  was  dead  and  the  besiegers 
now  represented  the  legitimate  government.  Other  surrenders  were  more  immediate:  in 
A.  D.  363,  the  Persian  garrison  of  Anatha  (no.  219)  was  intimidated  into  surrender  by 
the  sight  of  Julian's  siege  equipment,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Diacira.  and  Ozogardana 
(nos.  . 220-22  1)  fled  at  the  approach  of  the  Romans. 
Besides  Maiozamalcha  (no.  223),  where  the  Romans  famously  entered  the  town  through 
a  tunnel,  storming  assaults  were  staged  at  a  fort  near  Seleucia  (no.  224),  and  at  the  mari- 
time  city  of  Cyzicus  (no.  225).  The  former  was  captured,  despite  the  involvement  of  a 
Persian  relieving  force,  but  Ammianus,  preserves  no  details;  similarly,  at  Cyzicus,  we 
have  no  details  beyond  the  fact  that  the  assault  was  directed  from  the  harbour. 
Despite  the  scale  of  the  Roman  operation  at  Bezabde  (no.  217),  Constantius's  attempts 
were  fiustrated  by  the  incendiary  attacks  of  the  Persian  defenders,  and  he  failed  to  re- 
capture  the  town.  The  usurper  Magnentius's  attempt  to  capture  Mursa  (no.  215)  was 
doomed  from  the  start;  lacking  machinery,  he  pinned  his  hopes  on  burning  the  gates 
down,  a  tactic  easily  thwarted  by  water  from  above. 
16.3  Roman  Siegecraft  during  the  Fourth!  Qentuly:  Discussion 
After  the  absence  of  third-century  commentary,  the  flood  gates  open  with  modem 
treatments  of  fourth-century  siegecraft,  however  the  emphasis  is  squarely  on  Am- 
mianus.  Nischer's  discussion  is  nothing  more  than  a  narrative  of  Juliatfs  siege  of 
Maiozamalcha,  from  which  he  concludes  that  "the  decline  of  the  ancient  Roman  art  of 
war  was  not  as  bad  as  is  often  assumed"  (1928,601);  in  a  similar  vein,  TomUn  observes 
that  the  methods  used,  in  the  sieges  of  the  Persian  theatre  at  any  rate,  were  all  weU-tried 
(1981,303). 
The  aUeged  deterioration  of  the  late  army  is  also  questioned  by  Crump  (1975,113),  who 
devotes  a  chapter  of  his  study  of  Ammianus  Marceffinus  to  sieges.  However,  in  the 
76 main,  his  observations  are  pedestrian.  He  notes  that  "siege  warfare  in  the  fourth  century 
posed  major  military  difficultiee'  (1975,101),  but  the  same  difficulties  had  faced  the 
besiegers  of  previous  centuries,  and  largely  the  same  solutions  were  found. 
By  far  the  most  detailed  discussion  is  provided  by  Elton  (1996,258-260),  who  divides 
the  typical  late  Roman  siege  into  four  phases:  the  surrounding  of  the  site;  the  "domina- 
tioif'  of  the  walls  by  missile  fire;  the  breaching  of  the  walls  by  battering-ram  or  the  scal- 
ing  of  the  walls  using  siege  towers  or  ladders;  and  finally,  the  storming  of  the  town. 
This  is  very  much  a  composite  picture.  In  reality,  from  our  s=ple  group  of  fourteen 
sieges,  only  Maiozamalcha  (no.  223)  follows  this  scheme. 
Indeed,  our  swnple  grouping  suggests  that  the  surrounding  of  a  she  as  a  prelude  to  the 
siege  was  uncommon,  with  only  three  cases  involving  a  cordon  of  troops,  and  appar- 
ently  no  instances  of  earthworks  (although  see  above,  p.  75,  for  Constantius  at  Nine- 
veh).  (In  Table  14,  p.  79,  investing  works  are  indicated  at  Gesoriacum,  but  this  was  a 
harbour  mole,  like  Caesar's  at  Brundisium,  rather  than  a  full  circumvallation.  )  Of 
course,  the  absence  of  circumvallations  will  surprise  only  those  who  believe  that  this 
was  the  archetypal  Roman  style  of  besieging;  in  fact,  even  in  the  Cacsarian  period, 
where  we  find  the  technique  used  most  frequently,  it  accounted  for  less  than  half  of  the 
sample  grouping  (cf.  Table  8,  p.  55). 
Crurnp  mistakenly  believes,  not  only  that  "the  attackers  usually  built  a  temporary 
contravallation  outside  the  defenses  of  each  city",  but  also  that  the  rampart  of  this 
&contravallation'  was  sufficiently  high  to  overlook  the  enemy  walls  (1975,107-108). 
This  appears  to  be  a  misunderstanding  of  the  significance  of  embankments  (1975,107 
n.  45).  For  example,  in  the  case  of  Amida  (Amm.  Marc.  19.8),  he  believes  the  purpose 
of  the  defenders'  mound  at  the  back  of  the  town  wall  to  have  been  "to  retain  a  higher 
vantage"  (1975,108),  rather  than  to  bolster  the  wall  against  battering  attack,  as  is  more 
likely.  If  the  defenders  had  wished  a  higher  vantage,  they  would  have  increased  the 
height  of  the  town  wall,  as  demonstrated  by  examples  dating  back  to  Plataea  (Thuc. 
2.75;  cf.  Jotapata,  no.  180). 
77 It  has  been  suggested  that,  in  the  late  Empire,  the  blockade  was  the  preferred  besieging 
method.  Southern  and  Dixon  claim  that  it  "was  utilized  whenever  possible,  since  it  re- 
sulted  in  fewer  casualties  for  the  besieging  side  and  obviously  required  considerably 
less  effort"  (Southern  &  Dixon  1996,150);  Elton  concurs  that  "blockades  were  pre- 
ferred",  reasoning  that  there  would  be  "fewer  friendly  casualtiee'  (1996,258).  Ile 
logic  is  attractive,  however  Southern  and  Dixon  cite  no  specific  cases  in  defence  of  their 
proposition,  and,  for  a  fourth  century  blockade,  Elton  can  name  only  the  forts  on  the 
Meuse  (no.  216).  Oddly,  Southern  and  Dixon  go  on  to  explain  that  "it  was  rarely  possi- 
ble  for  the  besiegers  to  completely  prevent  the  besieged  from  leaving  or  re-entering 
their  city"  (1996,151).  Again,  no  supporting  evidence  is  quoted,  but  the  example  of  the 
River  Meuse  forts  illustrates  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  besieged  were  completely  pre- 
vented  from  leaving.  This  was,  after  all,  the  point  of  a  blockade. 
Elton  believes  that  "assaults  would  be  chosen  only  if  there  was  a  need  to  capture  the  site 
quickly",  for  example  because  of  the  proximity  of  an  enemy  relieving  force  (1996,258). 
Certainly,  the  example  of  Mursa  falls  into  this  category.  But,  in  practice,  the  assault 
will  always  have  been  preferred,  precisely  because  of  the  time  factor.  At  Bezabde, 
Constantius's  first  choice  was  an  hiffintry  assault,  followed  by  a  mechanised  assault,  but 
he  made  no  headway-,  by  then,  it  was  too  late  in  the  year  to  sit  out  a  blockade.  Simi- 
larly,  at  Aquileia,  Immo  first  tried  various  assaulting  strategies,  before  falling  back  on  a 
blockade,  which  also  failed  owing  to  the  town's  internal  water  supply.  Julian"s  chosen 
strategy  at  Anatha  appears  to  have  been  a  coup  de  main,  which  failed  when  the  garrison 
detected  the  approach  of  his  general,  Lucillian;  Julian's  next  reaction  was  to  deploy 
overwhelming  force,  whereupon  the  garrison  surrendered.  And  at  Pirisabora,  an 
assaulting  strategy  was  chosen  from  the  start,  again  resulting  in  surrender.  It  seems, 
then,  that  there  was  a  real  preference  for  the  direct  action  of  an  assault,  rather  than  the 
lengthy  inaction  of  a  blockade. 
In  this  context,  Diocletian's  eight-month  siege  of  Alexandria  appears  unusually  pro- 
tracted,  which  may  suggest  a  blockade  that  successfully  ended  in  surrender;  however,  an 
assault  is  perhaps  more  Skely,  since  the  town  was  subsequently  looted.  Unfortunately, 
our  sources  do  not  say. 
78 16.4  Roman  Sieg-ecmft  durinc!  the  Fourth  Centugy:  Con!  clusion 
There  is  no  clear  evidence  of  circumvallation  at  any  of  the  fifteen  sieges  in  this  section, 
although  a  harbour  mole  was  constructed  at  one  (7%).  Cordons  of  troops  were  thrown 
around  three  towns  (20%),  two  of  which  surrendered  while  the  third  was  taken  by 
storm.  Embankments  were  raised  at  the  latter,  plus  two  others  (20%).  A  blockading 
strategy  was  pursued  at  four  towns  (27%),  with  success.  In  all,  seven  towns  surrendered 
(47%),  or  eight  (54%)  if  Alexandria  is included.  More  probably,  Alexandria  fell  to  as- 
sault,  along  with  three  others  (27%).  In  two  cases,  the  townsfolk  fled  to  avoid  standing 
siege  (13%),  and  two  sieges  were  abandoned  (13%). 
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This  historical  survey  would  be  incomplete  without  a  summary  of  Roman  practice  from 
the  First  Punic  War  through  to  the  battle  of  Hadrianopolis.  Consequently,  the  details  of 
188  Roman  sieges  have  been  lifted  from  the  individual  group  tables  (Tables  2-14,  plus 
no.  45,  which  does  not  appear  in  any  tables)  and  collated  to  provide  an  overview  (see 
Table  15,  p.  82). 
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  a  sample  of  this  size  cannot  guarantee  irrefutable  precision. 
First,  there  is  the  statistical  flaw,  that  we  do  not  have  details  of  every  siege  that  ever  oc- 
curred.  Nor  can  we  know  what  proportion  of  the  total  number  of  sieges  is  represented 
by  our  sample.  And  second,  there  is  the  historical  flaw,  that  we  cannot  guarantee  the 
accuracy  of  data  which  has  been  transmitted  through  the  filter  of  intermediary  authori- 
ties,  most  of  whom  were  not  even  eye-witnesses  to  the  events  which  they  describe.  Of 
course,  this  second  point  highlights  a  problem  that  afflicts  all  historical  enquiry,  just  as 
the  first  point  highlights  a  general  problem  of  statistical  analysis.  Both  must  be  allowed 
for,  when  assessing  the  results. 
Forty-two  of  the  sieges,  which  is  rather  less  than  one-quarter,  involved  the  use  of  pe- 
rimeter  earthworks.  This  category  runs  the  entire  gamut  from  elaborate  systems,  such 
as  Caesar's  "bicircumvallatiore'  at  Alesia,  to  simple  encirclements,  like  Metellus's  ditch 
and  palisade  at  Thala,  and  obstructions,  like  Cassius's  blockading  wall  at  Laodicea.  It 
also  includes  four  putative  encirclements,  where,  because  of  the  vagueness  of  our 
sources,  it  is  not  certain  that  a  circumvaUation  existed  (nos.  42,68,115,  and  193),  and 
two  harbour  moles  (nos.  13  8  and  211).  Excluding  these  leaves  only  thirty-six  cases  of 
encirclement  (19%).  It  is  instructive  to  note  that  Caesar  and  his  associates  were  respon- 
sible  for  eleven  of  these,  which  is  a  massively  disproportionate  percentage  of  contempo- 
rary  sieges;  by  contrast,  the  use  of  circumvallation  during  the  period  of  the  Spanish 
Wars  (ironically,  the  era  of  Numantia)  falls  to  its  lowest  percentage. 
Forty  of  the  sieges,  or  a  little  over  one-fifth,  saw  the  erection  of  embankments.  This 
category  is  also  diverse,  including  under  the  same  rubric  operations  like  Titus's  assault 
on  Jerusalem,  which  involved  several  ramps  of  major  proportions,  and  others  like  Cor- 
80 bulo's  assault  on  Legerda,  which  was  on  a  far  smaller  scale.  It  also  includes  the  em- 
bankment  at  Uxellodunum,  which  was  never  intended  to  facilitate  a  direct  assault,  and 
the  timber  structure  depicted  at  Sarn-dzegethusa  on  Trajan's  Column,  which  I  have  ten- 
tatively  interpreted  as  an  embankment  (see  above,  p.  70).  Excluding  these  leaves  thirty- 
eight  operations  involving  embankments  (20%).  Although  the  largest  concentration, 
with  nine  embankments,  is  found  in  the  Caesarian  period,  this  represents  only  one-third 
of  that  grouping;  the  largest  proportion  of  contemporary  sieges  (six  out  of  fifteen,  40%) 
falls  in  the  Jewish  War  period. 
Of  all  the  statistical  analyses  that  could  be  performed,  one  is  particularly  relevant,  in 
testing  the  supposed  Roman  predilection  for  blockade  over  assault.  A  blockading  strat- 
egy  was  followed  in  forty-one,  over  one-fifth,  of  the  sieges  (although  five  are  uncertain 
-  nos.  79,81,115,140,  and  166  -,  and  two  ended  in  an  assault  -  nos.  87  and  91  -,  mak- 
ing  thirty-four  definite  cases),  whereas  a  storming  assault  was  successfully  carried  out 
in  seventy-two,  or  two-fifths.  In  addition,  only  half  of  the  sixty-four  surrenders  reflect  a 
successful  blockade,  the  remainder  resulting  from  assault,  or  fear  of  assault;  this  is  par- 
ticularly  noticeable  during  the  Spanish  Wars  (five  out  of  six  surrenders:  Table  5,  p.  40), 
but  is  also  apparent  during  the  Macedonian  Wars  (eight  out  of  ten  surrenders:  Table  4, 
p.  33)  and  during  the  Caesarian  period  (seven  out  of  ten  surrenders:  Table  8,  p.  55). 
This  conclusively  demonstrates  that,  on  the  whole,  the  Romans  preferred  to  pursue  a 
siege  actively,  rather  than  passively  waiting  for  surrender. 
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82 Part  2: 
Me  Archaeology  of  Roman  Siegecraft 
t  is  often  assumed  that  the  prosecution  of  a  siege  must  have  entailed  construction 
work  on  an  enormous  scale  and,  consequently,  will  have  left  abundant  archaeologi- 
cal  traces.  This  assumption  is  implicit  in  those  accounts  which  emphasize  siege-works 
as  a  necessary  component  of  siegecraft  (e.  g.,  Goldsworthy  2000,145-146),  but  is  fre- 
quently  stated  explicitly,  for  example  by  the  excavator  of  Narbata,  who  claimed  to  have 
found  "the  three  typical  elements  of  a  Roman  siege:  wall,  camps  and  embankment" 
(Zertal  1981,114). 
Although  I  have  demonstrated,  in  part  1,  that  ramps  and  circumvallations  were  by  no 
means  the  norm  (above,  pp.  80f.  ),  it  is  clear  that  siegecraft  often  entailed  construction 
work.  Indeed,  in  several  instances,  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  have  material  remains  of 
historically  attested  sieges,  thus  allowing  a  critical  comparison  of  the  literary  and  ar- 
chaeological  evidence.  In  the  following  three  chapters,  I  present  an  analysis  of  each  of 
Zertal's  "typical  elcments7%  integrating  the  archaeological  record  with  the  evidence  of 
the  ancient  sources. 
83 Chapter  2: 
The  Encampments 
t  was  commonplace  for  a  campaigning  army  to  fortify  a  camp  after  a  day's  march 
(e.  g.,  Frere  &  St,  Joseph  1983,19-20).  This  was  not  a  matter  of  choice,  but  of  rou- 
tine:  for  example,  in  the  vicinity  of  Cyzicus  in  74  B.  C.,  after  pursuing  Mithridates  well 
into  the  evening,  Lucullus  still  expected  his  troops  to  build  a  camp,  although  it  was  now 
dark  (Plut.,  Luc.  9.2).  Consequently,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  besieging  annies  provid- 
ing  themselves  with  similar  accommodation.  Camps  are  explicitly  mentioned  at  fifty- 
two  Roman  sieges  (see  Table  16,  p.  85),  and  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that,  in  most 
cases,  the  besieging  general's  first  act  was  to  provide  secure  accommodation  for  his 
army. 
With  this  in  mind,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Liebenam  defines  a  category  of  sieges 
which  he  calls  the  "violent  assault"  (1909,2236:  "gewaltsamen  Angriff),  or  repentina 
oppugnatio,  characterised  by  lack  of  preparation  (1909,2239:  "ohne  Mngere  Vorberei- 
tunn.  Veith,  in  fact,  had  already  utilised  this  category  in  his  discussion  of  Caesarian 
siegecraft,  prescribing  such  an  attack  against  weak  or  poorly  defended  sites  which 
might,  in  any  case,  be  intimidated  by  the  very  appearance  of  the  army  (1906,54-55);  in 
a  later  reworking  of  the  idea,  perhaps  influenced  by  Liebenam,  he  calls  particular  atten- 
tion  to  the  absence  of  apparatus  (1928,446:  "Wegfall  aller  jener  Angriffismitter).  De- 
i  scribed  in  those  terms,  it  is  tempting  to  assume  that  such  a  "sudden  assault",  mounted  ex 
itinere,  must  have  dispensed  with  the  formalities  of  entrenching. 
84 Cat.  No.  l  Comment 
Agrigenturn  381T  wo  camps  established. 
ummum  44  jT  wo  camps  established. 
Casilinurn  481 
Syracuse  50  Camp  to  north;  fled  on  eastern  seaboard. 
Arpi  51 
Capua  53  Three  camps  established. 
Cartagena  55,  Camp  commanding  narrow  approach. 
Orongis  571 
Castax/Castulo  59 
Utica  64 
Amphissa  81 
Ambracia  83  Two  camps  and  a  fort  established. 
Delminlurn  911  Romans  attacked  while  encarnping. 
Cauca  931 
Carthage  95'  Two  camps,  later  reduced  to  one. 
Zmantia  98  Romans  take  refuge  fmm  marauding  Numantines  In  the  Camp. 
Numantia  102  Two  camps  established. 
Suthul  103 
Zama  1041 
Heraclea  Pontica  1171 
Jerusalem  122  1  Camp  to  the  north  of  Temple,  second  camp  possibly  to  south-west. 
Soloniurn  123 
No,  Aodunum  124 
Cenaburn  131 
Avadcurn  132 
Gergovia  133  1 
Alesia  134  1 
Uxellodunurn  135  IThree  camps  established. 
Pindenissus  136  1  More  than  one  camp,  Plus  sb(forts. 
Corfiniurn  137  1Two  camps  established. 
wa--ssilia  138 
Utica  139 
Salonae  140  Fhe  camps  established. 
Dyrrachiurn  143  Caesar  encamps  between  Pompey  and  Pompeys  supply  base. 
Gomphl  144 
Ulia  146 
Thapsus  147 
Ategua  149 
Mutina  150  1 
Perusia  155  1 
Brundisiurn  15  61 
Jerusalem  1591  Camp  to  the  north  of  Temple. 
Mons  Haemus  170 
Jerusalem  176  Camp  on  Mount  Scopus. 
Jotapata  180 
Tarichae.  ae  182 
Gamala  183  1 
' Jerusalem  189  1  Camp  on  Mount  Scopus  replaced  by  three  camps  around  city. 
Masada  191  1 
Aquileia  203 
Bezabde  217 
1 
Maiozamalcha  223 
Table  16:  R=an  camps  explicitly  mentioneci  at  sieges 
85 Ironically,  the  term  repentina  oppygnatio  derives  from  Caesar's  siege  of  Gomphi, 
where  his  first  act  was  to  build  a  camp  before  the  town,  and  his  second  to  construct  lad- 
ders,  shelters  and  screens  (Cacs.,  Bell.  Ov.  3.80.5).  The  assault,  when  it  came,  may 
have  been  swift,  but  the  preparations  were  thorough.  Liebenarn  also  adduces  the  exam- 
ple  of  Noviodunum,  where  Caesar  decided  against  an  irnmediate  assault,  on  account  of 
the  scale  of  the  defences,  and  encamped  instead,  ordering  the  construction  of  siege  ap- 
paratus  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  2.12).  Crassus's  siege  of  the  Sotiates  is  cited  as  a  third  ex- 
ample,  but  here,  not  only  were  shelters  constructed,  but  siege-towers  and  an  embank- 
ment,  too;  it  is  unthinkable  that  such  preparations  would  have  been  under  way  while  the 
army  remained  unentrenched,  and  it  is  questionable  whether  such  an  operation  qualifies 
for  the  term  repentina,  in  any  case.  Perhaps  the  only  legitimate  contender  for  the  title  of 
"sudden  attack!  '  is  found  during  Caesar's  second  invasion  of  Britain,  when  his  legionar- 
ies  assaulted  a  locus  munitus,  before  entrenching  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  5.9;  the  site  is 
thought  to  be  Bigbury  in  Kent:  Todd  1981,21). 
In  many  cases,  the  army  was  initially  encamped  some  way  off,  no  doubt  to  maintain  se- 
crecy  and  security.  Thus,  in  262  B.  C.,  the  first  camp  at  Agrigentum  lay  a  Mae  (I  V2  km) 
from  the  town,  and,  in  213  B.  C.,  Marcellus  encamped  a  mile-and-a-half  (21/4km)  from 
Syracuse;  when  his  assaults  proved  unsuccessful,  he  withdrew  to  a  distance  of  five 
miles  (7V2  km)  for  the  winter.  Similarly,  at  Utica  in  204  B.  C.,  Scipio  Africanus  estab- 
lished  his  first  position  on  high  ground  a  mile  (I  V2km)  from  the  town,  and  withdrew  to 
the  more  distant  castra  Corneliana  for  winter.  Vespasian  initially  encamped  seven 
stades  (I  V4km)  from  Jotapata,  but  made  sure  he  could  be  seen  from  the  town,  in  order 
to  intimidate  the  inhabitants.  Roman  operations  at  Jerusalem  in  the  mid-first  century 
began  with  an  encampment  on  Mount  Scopus,  seven  stades  (1  1/4km)  to  the  north,  from 
where,  after  suitable  reconnaissance,  the  army  advanced  into  the  city,  along  a  route  dic- 
tated  by  the  topography  (cf  nos.  176,189);  it  may  reasonably  be  suggested  that  earlier 
operations  (e.  g.,  nos.  122,159)  followed  the  same  pattern.  Unfortunately,  we  have  no 
archaeological  evidence  for  any  of  these. 
Reconnaissance  was  vital  in  advance  of  any  military  action  (cf  Elton  1996,248-250; 
Goldsworthy  1996,125-131).  Both  Corbulo  and  Lucilius,  Bassus  are  said  to  have  re- 
86 connoitred,  respectively,  Volandurn  and  Machaerus,  before  planning  the  assault;  Tmjan 
was  almost  shot  while  doing  the  same  at  Hatra;  and  the  value  of  the  practice  was  still 
appreciated  in  later  times,  to  judge  from  the  reconnaissance  of  Bezabde  by  Constantius 
in  A.  D.  360,  and  of  Pirisabora,  Maiozamalcha,  and  the  fort  near  Seleucia  by  Julian  in 
A.  D.  363. 
En  route  to  Jerusalem  in  A.  D.  70,  Titus  halted  his  main  force  30  stades  (5V2km)  away, 
and  led  a  cavalry  reconnaissance  of  the  city.  In  the  previous  year,  Antonius  Primus  had 
explained  the  importance  of  such  a  precaution  to  his  over-eager  troops,  arriving  by  night 
at  Cremona.  The  point  of  his  lecture,  in  which  he  emphasized  forward-planning,  delib- 
eration  and  delay  (Tac.,  Hist.  3.20),  was  graphically  confirmed  when  his  cavalry  scouts 
brought  news  of  an  impending  nocturnal  counter-attack,  known  to  us  as  the  Second  Bat- 
tle  of  Cremona.  Caesar's  reconnoitring  of  Gergovia  had  less  dramatic  results,  but  was 
no  less  necessary:  having  obtained  a  clear  idea  of  the  town's  situation,  he  decided  that 
the  approaches  were  too  Mcult  for  an  immediate  attack,  and  encamped  the  troops 
about  2Y2  km  from  the  town,  while  he  turned  to  the  business  of  securing  his  supply 
fines.  And,  when  Postumius,  Megellus  approached  Feritrum  in  294  B.  C.,  he  sent  cavalry 
ahead,  admittedly  because  he  mistrusted  the  silence  of  the  town  and  feared  a  trap. 
Once  the  army  moved  up  to  begin  besieging  operations,  it  was  important  to  achieve 
maximum  visibility  of  the  entire  town  circuit.  In  the  case  of  large  towns,  this  will  have 
meant  establishing  two  or  more  camps,  ideally  maintaining  a  watch  on  opposite  sides. 
Two  camps  were  established  at  both  Agrigenturn  and  Lilybaeurn,  during  the  First  Punic 
War,  and  at  Numantia  in  133  B.  C.  Schulten  has  stated  emphatically  that  such  camps 
should  be  diametrically  opposite  each  other  (1927,23:  "die  beiden  Lager  wom6glich 
diametral  gegenfiberliegen7),  no  doubt  influenced  by  his  interpretation  of  Numantia  (see 
below,  p.  10  1);  but  there  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that  the  camps  at  Agrigenturn  were 
to  west  and  south  (Polybius,  1.18.2,  mentions  the  Heraclea  gate  and  the  Asclepium:  cf. 
fig.  1),  while  topography  would  suggest  north-east  and  south-east  at  Lilybaeum  (fig.  2). 
In  fact,  from  a  strategic  standpoint,  it  would  have  been  more  important  to  cover  the 
principal  gates  of  the  town,  than  to  ensure  symmetry  between  the  camps  (cf  Garlan 
1974,107). 
87 When  Caesar  encamped  before  Corfinium  in  49  B.  C.,  he  waited  for  reinforcements  to 
arrive,  in  order  to  establish  a  second  camp  on  the  other  side  of  the  town.  During  the 
Second  Punic  War,  Capua  was  surrounded  by  three  camps,  though  this  was  primarily 
because  three  army  groups  were  involved.  On  the  other  hand,  strategic  concerns  proba- 
bly  dictated  the  establishment  of  two  camps  and  a  castellum,  strung  out  along  the  only 
accessible  side  of  Ambracia  in  189  B.  C.  (fig.  7).  Maintaining  surveillance  was  certainly 
the  reason  for  the  three  camps  around  Uxellodunum  in  51  B.  C.  (fig.  15). 
At  Jerusalem,  both  Pompey  in  63  B.  C.  and  Sosius  in  37  B.  C.  (and  probably  Cestius  Gal- 
lus  in  A.  D.  66,  as  well)  encamped  within  the  city,  to  the  north  of  the  Temple  enclosure, 
which  was  always  the  centre  of  rebellion,  but  in  A.  D.  70,  Titus  was  more  cautious; 
while  his  main  force  encamped  in  the  northern  suburbs,  he  maintained  two  other  camps, 
on  the  Mount  of  Olives  to  the  east  and  on  the  level  ground  to  the  west  (cf.  fig.  22). 
However,  Octavius,  in  48  B.  C.,  must  have  felt  particularly  insecure  to  surround  Salome 
with  five  camps;  in  fact,  his  concerns  were  justified,  when  his  troops'  lack  of  vigilance 
cost  him  victory. 
In  some  cases,  where  a  town's  location  was  naturally  restricted,  only  one  camp  was  re- 
quired.  A  prime  example  is  Cartagena  (fig.  4),  where  salt  flats  flanking  the  town  cre- 
ated  a  virtual  promontory,  so  that  Scipio  needed  only  to  encamp  to  the  north-east  to 
command  the  access  route.  Similarly,  at  Utica  (fig.  5),  a  single  camp  was  sufficient  to 
watch  the  approaches  to  the  town,  and  at  Avaricurn  (fig.  11),  the  marshy  terrain  left  only 
one  suitable  site  for  Caesar's  camp.  The  case  of  Carthage  (fig.  8)  is  interesting,  where 
the  two  consuls  initially  established  their  camps  on  the  narrow  isthmus  facing  the  city. 
But,  in  a  clear  failure  of  reconnaissance  (and  a  violation  of  the  rule,  that  a  salubrious  site 
is  required  for  a  long  stay:  Vegetius,  de  re  mil.  1.22),  one  of  the  camps  was  sited  too 
near  the  stagnant  Lake  of  Tunis,  and  had  to  be  moved  up  to  the  sea  coast  when  the  men 
began  to  fa  M.  When  command  passed  to  Scipio  Aemilianus,  he  established  a  single 
camp  on  the  isthmus.  In  general,  at  smaller  towns,  the  army  appears  to  have  been  con- 
centrated  in  a  single  camp.  At  Arpi  in  213  B.  C.,  for  example,  this  was  located  half-a- 
mile  (%  km)  from  the  town,  to  enable  a  coup  de  main. 
88 We  are  reliant  on  topographical  study  to  suggest  the  likely  locations  for  most  of  these 
encampments  (e.  g.,  Veith  1913).  However,  archaeology  furnishes  two  particular  exam- 
ples  where  the  remains  of  camps  have  been  interpreted  as  relating  to  otherwise  unat- 
tested  siege  operations. 
1.  Nahal  Hever  (Ismen 
Aharoni  has  claimed  the  discovery  of  siege-camps  at  the  Nahal  Hever  gorge,  in  the 
Judean  desert  of  Israel,  where  rebels  of  the  Second  Jewish  War  period  (cf  Bettir,  no. 
197)  took  refuge  in  caves  cut  into  the  precipitous  cliff-sides  (Aharoni  1993,827-829). 
On  the  cliff-tops  above  were  sited  two  small  Roman  camps,  one  on  either  side,  so  that 
each  lay  directly  above  one  cave  and  opposite  another.  "It  is  thus  obvious7',  writes 
Aharoni  (1993,827)1,  "that  the  Roman  camps  were  established  in  order  to  lay  siege  to 
the  cave  below  them  and  at  the  same  time  to  observe  the  cave  opposite  ... 
(because)the 
caves-)  entrances  are  observable  only  from  the  opposite  cliff.  " 
Both  camps  were  protected  by  metre-thick  dry-stone  walls  on  three  sides,  and  open  to 
the  precipice  on  the  fourth.  The  north  camp  (fig.  30),  situated  above  the  so-called  Cave 
of  the  Letters  and  opposite  the  Cave  of  Horrors,  was  investigated  by  Yadin  (1963  oII- 
14).  The  tiny  enclosure  (c.  0.125  ha)  compares  favourably  with  the  class  of  Roman  for- 
tifications  known  as  fortlets,  and  could  have  accommodated  a  centuria  of  troops  (Yadin 
suggests  80-100  men).  Fortlets  are  known  to  have  been  linked  to  patrolling  (cf.  Frere  & 
St  Joseph  1983,135),  which  was  presumably  the  function  of  the  camps  at  Nahal  Hever, 
where  the  rebels  occupied  another  three  caves  besides  the  immediately  adjacent  exam- 
ples.  The  camp's  internal  buildings  (Structures  5  and  10)  form  a  jumble,  which  is  quite 
unlike  the  regular  barrack-blocks  found  in  fortlets  in  the  west  (cf.  Breeze  1977,2),  but 
Structure  I  may  well  have  been  the  headquarters. 
As  far  as  the  defences  are  concerned,  Yadin  considered  the  "bastion7'  in  the  north-east 
comer  to  have  been  "a  means  of  observation7'  (by  which  he  presumably  means  observa- 
tion  of  the  northern  hinterland),  and  further  suggested  its  involvement  in  the  provision 
of  'Tanking  fire  to  the  east  and  the  nortlf'  (1963,13).  This  may  safely  be  discounted, 
on  the  grounds  that  a  structure  positioned  here  does  not  command  a  clear  fine  of  sight 
89 along  either  adjacent  side.  But  Yadin's  description  of  the  single  clavicular  entrance 
(Structure  7),  midway  along  the  western  rampart,  as  "a  round  tower  ...  providing  an  ad- 
ditional  means  of  cross-fire  along  the  eastern  section  of  the  northern  walr'  (ibid.  ),  is  a 
curious  description  of  what  was  simply  a  gateway. 
Whether  the  military  operation  at  Nahal  Hever  falls  within  the  remit  of  siegecraft  is  de- 
bateable.  In  the  absence  of  literary  evidence,  we  do  not  know  how  the  Romans  viewed 
the  situation.  Yadin  noted  that  the  cmnps  were  situated  to  give  maximal  coverage  of  the 
paths  leading  to  and  from  the  caves  below,  and,  given  that  escape  to  the  wadi  floor  from 
the  caves  was  "virtually  impossibld"  (Yadin  1963,14),  he  plainly  viewed  the  deploy- 
ment  of  troops  here  as  a  type  of  blockade.  Of  course,  an  alternative  strategy  is  equally 
credible,  based  not  on  blocking  the  access  paths,  but  on  utilising  them  as  avenues  of  as- 
sault.  However,  the  fact  that  no  signs  of  violence  have  been  noticed  in  the  caves  must 
weigh  heavily  against  this  theory. 
2.  Burnswark  (Scotland) 
A  different  type  of  debate  has  raged  over  Burnswark,  where  the  native  hill-fort  is 
flanked  to  the  north  and  south  by  two  Roman  camps  (fig.  3  1).  The  camps'  involvement 
in  siegecraft  is  not  disputed;  however,  generations  of  scholars  have  argued  over  whether 
the  siege  was  genuine,  or  simply  a  practice  exercise.  The  debate  only  arises  through 
analogy  with  a  peculiar  class  of  fortifications  known  as  "practice  camps",  but  these  are 
so  designated  on  account  of  their  unsuitability  for  use  as  marching  camps  (Frere  &  St 
Joseph  1983,136-137;  cf.  Richmond  1955,302-303);  no  one  would  claim  that  the 
camps  at  Burnswark  were  unsuitable  for  siegecraft. 
Nevertheless,  the  provision  of  two  camps  has  been  thought  by  some  to  be  excessive  for 
the  reduction  of  a  hillfort  (PLC.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1920,97),  and  the  employment  of  "heavy 
siege-artillery",  suggested  by  the  recovery  of  eleven  ballista  balls  and  fragments  of  an- 
other  nine  (Christison  et  al.  1898/99,245-246),  attracted  criticism  as  "a  remarkably 
powerful  sledge-hammer  to  crush  a  nut"  (Davies  1972,106).  Finally,  excavation  of  the 
hillfort  defences,  opposite  the  western  gate  of  the  south  Roman  camp,  yielded  evidence 
that  the  timber-palisaded  rampart  had  already  collapsed  by  the  time  of  the  Roman  at- 
90 tack:  "a  number  of  Roman  sling-bullets  and  arrowheads  were  recovered  from  directly 
on  top  of  the  surface  of  the  rampart",,  whereas  "none  were  found  within  or  beneath  the 
forward  tumble"  (Jobey  1977/78,67).  Consequently,  the  camps  have  been  re- 
interpreted  as  "almost  certainly  constructed  by  the  army  on  manoeuvres" 
(R.  C.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1997,179). 
However,  the  evidence  from  the  hillfort  defences  is  fragile,  given  that  excavation  was 
limited  to  a  2-metre  trench  across  the  southern  rampart  and  a  re-investigation  of  the  19th 
century  trenches  at  the  West  and  Central  Gates  (the  plan  suggests  areas  of  around  16  x 
10  metres  and  10  x5  metres,  respectively).  The  original  gateways  were  buried  by  a  me- 
tre  of  rampart  collapse,  and  overlain  by  a  pavement  of  slabs;  as  the  slabs  were  undis- 
turbed  by  the  earlier  excavations  (cf  Christison  et  al.  1898/99,239-240),  Jobey  con- 
cluded  that  the  Roman  projectiles  recovered  in  1898  originated  from  this  later  phase 
(Jobey  1977/78,71).  Occupation  debris  from  within  the  hiflfort  includes  pottery  of  the 
first  half  of  the  second  century  (Jobey  1977/78,84-85),  but  a  sling-bullet  found  on  the 
cobbled  surface  of  a  domestic  floor  was  felt  to  be  "hardly  sufficiently  strong  evidence 
that  such  a  house  had  been  the  target  for  assault"  (Jobey  1977/78,78-79). 
Throughout  his  report,  the  excavator  is  at  pains  to  support  the  "practice  siege"  interpre- 
tation,  but,  in  the  final  analysis,  can  muster  only  the  weak  arguments  that  the  Roman 
camps  seem  excessively  large  for  the  capture  of  a  native  stronghold,  that  there  may  have 
been  "more  than  a  very  temporary  occupation7  of  the  south  camp,  and  that  the  Roman 
works  do  not  deny  the  inhabitants  access  to  a  water  supply  (Jobey  1977/78,98-99).  But 
previous  commentators  were  satisfied  that  a  siege  had  occurred  at  Burnswark.  Colling- 
wood,  for  example,  stated  that  "the  siege  theory  gives  the  only  possible  explanation  of 
the  camps  and  their  relation  to  the  hill-fort"  (1925/26,4748).  It  is  worth,  then,  examin- 
ing  the  evidence  of  the  camps  themselves. 
The  camp  lying  to  the  north  of  the  hillfort,  enclosing  2.5  ha,  has  been  declared  incom- 
plete  (e.  g.,  Birley  1939,316),  because  a  60-metre  length  of  the  north-west  rampart  re- 
mains  open.  For  Collingwood,  here  was  evidence  "that  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
designed  had  been  accomplished  before  it  was  more  than  half-finished"  (1925/26,57). 
91 He  also  attributed  its  irregular  shape  to  the  fact  that  "the  work  may  have  been  done  un- 
der  fire'  (ibid.  ),  while  acknowledging  that,  on  occasion,  the  Romans  were  capable  of 
remarkable  inaccuracy  in  hying  out  earthworks  (1925/26,51).  It  is  perhaps  relevant, 
however,  that  the  unfinished  stretch  lies  in  an  area  of  boggy  ground  (R.  C.  A.  H.  M.  S. 
1997,18  1),  and  perhaps  only  ever  existed  as  a  palisade  line. 
Most  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  southern  camp,  a5  ha  enclosure  incorporating  a  pre- 
existing  Antonine  fortlet  in  its  north  comer  (Jobey  1977n8,79-80).  The  camp's  peculi- 
arity  Hes  in  the  uneven  distribution  of  gates,  with  three  facing  the  hillfort  but  only  one 
on  each  of  the  remaining  sides,  and  on  the  singular  nature  of  the  northern  gate  defences. 
Whereas  the  other  three  gates  are  covered  by  traverses  of  more-or-less  traditional  form, 
the  northern  gates  are  fronted  by  the  so-called  "Iliree  Brethreif'.  mounds  of  such  impos- 
ing  scale  that  Barbour  called  them  "towers"  (Christison  et  al.  1898/99,227).  Excava- 
tion  showed  that  the  central  mound  was  broadly  circular,  with  a  base  diameter  of  over 
15  m,  and  stood  3.2  m  above  the  bottom  of  its  ditch,  whereas  the  eastern  mound,  which 
Barbour  claimed  to  be  "similar",  was  plainly  oval  (as  can  be  seen  on  Barbour's  plan). 
Eschewing  any  discussion  of  their  function,  he  simply  assumed  that they  had  been 
adapted  "to  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  situation7'  (ibid.  ). 
In  fact,  they  are  only  the  most  obvious  of  several  idiosyncrasies  in  the  construction  of 
this  camp.  For  example,  the  ramparts  are  unusually  massive,  but  this  has  been  ex- 
plained  by  reference  to  the  fact  that  they  were  intended  for  more  than  overnight  accom- 
modation  (Collingwood  1925/26,56,  comimig  the  term  'semi-permanent').  Jobey  noted 
the  presence  of  fragmentary  rock  in  the  upper  levels  of  the  rampart  (Jobey  1977/78,81), 
which  Barbour  had  previously  interpreted  as  a  deliberatelyo-laid  stone  capping  (Christi- 
son  et  al.  1898/99,224-225).  It  seems  that,  in  the  course  of  construction,  the  builders 
frequently  cut  into  the  rock  (cf  Christison  et  al.  1898/99,  plate  V,  fig.  1),  which  natu- 
rally  presented  itself  in  the  final  layers  of  upcast;  here,  then,  is  the  solution  to  Davies's 
problem  of  "why  the  Romans  used  so  much  stone  in  building  these  two  camps"  (Davies 
1972,102).  Clearly,  little  importance  can  be  attached  to  the  same  phenomenon  occur- 
ring  within  the  traverses  (pace  PC.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1920,99).  Nor  are  the  'Three  Brethren7 
the  only  peculiar  traverses.  The  south  gate  apparently  had  a  crescentic  traverse 
92 (Collingwood  1925/26,53  note),  while  that  covering  the  east  gate  was  15  m  long  (i.  e., 
the  same  as  the  central  and  eastem  "Brethreif)  and  rose  2.75  m  above  its  ditch  (i.  e.,  not 
much  lower  than  the  central  "Brother"). 
A  misinterpretation  of  Barbour's  reference  to  towers  is  perhaps  at  the  root  of  Schulten's 
theory  that  "these  mounds  supported  wooden  towers  from  which  an  enemy  storming  the 
camp  could  be  shot  most  effectively"  (Schulten  1914,613:  "diese  Hilgel  h6lzerne 
TUrme  getragen  haben  this  would  be  a  most  unorthodox,  and  unnecessary,  use  of 
this  standard  feature  of  camp  construction.  Collingwood  subsequently  pronounced 
them  "inexplicable  as  ordinary  travcrses",  on  the  basis  that  "their  shape  and  size  ren- 
der(ed)  them  quite  unsuitable  for  defensive  infantry  tactics"  (1925/26,52).  However, 
the  litulum,  lying  across  the  front  of  an  open  entrance,  is  usually  explained  as  an  obsta- 
cle  "intended  to  break  up  a  direct  charge"  (Frere  &  St.  Joseph  1983,19;  cf.  Le  Bohec: 
1989,140:  "situd 
.. 
de  fagon  A  briser  Nlan  d'un  assaut");  the  "I'liree  BrethreW'  are  per- 
fectly  suited  to  this  function. 
Whatever  "defensive  infantry  tactice'  Collingwood  envisaged  for  tituld,  he  decided  that 
the  'Three  Brethren7  were  "highly  suitable  as  emplacements  for  artillery",  devising  the 
mistaken  rule  that  "if  they  [viz.  the  platforms]  are  designed  for  bombarding  a  hostile  po- 
sition  it  is  desirable  to  push  them  forward  and  raise  them  up  as  far  as  possible" 
(1925/26,52);  the  same  logic  was  applied  to  the  clavicular  gateway  of  the  north  camp. 
This  theory  will  be  examined  below  (p.  183).  Here,  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  it  has 
achieved  general,  and  uncritical,  acceptance  (Birley  1939,316;  Davies  1972,100;  Frere 
&  St  Joseph  1983,33;  FLCA.  H.  M.  S.  1997,18  1). 
The  "practice  siege"  theory  is  underpinned  by  the  fact  that  the  south  camp  post-dates  the 
Antonine  fortlet  (confirmed  by  Jobey  1977/78,79-80),  and  thus  the  conjecture  that  the 
hillfort  must  by  then  have  been  derelict  (Davies  1972,106-107:  "a  police  post  as  small 
as  this  would  never  have  been  constructed  before  the  hill-fort  had  been  captured  and  put 
out  of  action7).  However,  this  objection  was  already  addressed  by  Birley,  postulating 
"a  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  townsmeif',  tentatively  linked  with  destruction  at 
the  nearby  fort  of  Birrens  around  A.  D.  158  (1939,316-317;  cf.  1946/47,148-149),  and 
93 Keppie  has  widened  the  chronological  possibilities  to  allow  for  "recalcitrant  elemente' 
retreatmg  to  their  former  stronghold  even  as  late  as  Severan  times  (1989,67). 
In  fact,  many  of  the  objections  to  a  genuine  siege  may  also  be  raised  against  the  theory 
of  a  long-standing  training  area.  The  rocky  upcast,  which  Davies  disingenuously  de- 
scribes  as  the  Romans'  having  "chosen  to  use  stone  extensively"  (1972,102-103),  has 
been  mentioned  above;  but,  in  a  facility  intended  to  be  visited  and  revisited  over  the 
course  of  decades,  one  might  have  expected  traces  of  buildings,  rather  than  the  single 
"area  of  paving"  near  the  centre  of  the  south  camp  (Jobey  1977/78,82).  Davies  consid- 
ers  it  "extremely  doubtful  if  the  Romans  would  have  needed  to  build  any  camp  at  all  to 
capture  the  fort"  (1972,106);  by  the  same  token,  it  is  more  than  a  little  odd  that  accom- 
modation  was  provided  for  such  a  large  contingent  of  troops,  if  the  sole  purpose  of  their 
visit  was  to  practise  with  four  ballistae.  And  Jobey  has  made  the  perceptive  point  that, 
if  it  were  an  "artillery  schoor,  one  night  have  expected  spent  ammunition  to  be  col- 
lected  after  use  (Jobey  1977/78,99). 
On  balance,  it  seems  legitimate  to  enrol  Burnswark  amongst  those  sites  besieged  by  a 
pair  of  camps,  like  Agrigentum,  Lilybaeum,  Corfinium,  and  the  primary  phase  of  Nu- 
mantia  (discussed  further  below,  p.  101),  though  the  dating  remains  elusive.  Other  sites 
have  yielded  evidence  of  camps  in  conjunction  with  a  circumvallation,  and  these  will  be 
considered  in  the  following  chapter. 
94 Chapter  3: 
The  Circumvallation 
W  hen  M.  Licinius  Crassus  had  run  the  remnants  of  Spartacus's  slave  army  to 
ground  in  Bruttiurn  in  71  B.  C.,  he  thought  nothing  of  confining  them  there  by 
walling  off  the  Rhegium  peninsula.  His  soldiers  cut  a  15-foot  (4.6  rn)  ditch,  three  hun- 
dred  stades  (55V2  Ian)  long,  from  one  coast  to  the  other,  backed  by  a  wall  and  palisade 
(Plut.,  Crassus  10.7-8;  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  1.118-119).  Plutarch  says  that  Crassus  did 
this  "in  order  to  keep  the  soldiers  busy  and  deprive  the  enemy  of  supplies";  at  any  rate, 
it  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  Roman  soldier's  capacity  for  work,  and  a  reminder  that, 
in  the  hands  of  an  imaginative  commander,  standard  entrenching  techniques  could  be 
adapted  to  meet  the  demands  of  a  particular  situation. 
The  confining  of  an  opponent  behind  a  fortified  barrier  is  often  found  in  the  field  of 
siegecraft.  In  many  cases,  the  encampments  accommodating  the  besieging  force  were 
supplemented  by  intermediate  guard  posts,  which  in  turn  were  linked  by  a  continuous 
barrier  of  some  kind  (see  Table  17,  p.  96).  Vegetius  describes  the  barrier  in  the  follow- 
ing  terms:  "The  besiegers  make  a  ditch  (fossa),  beyond  the  range  of  missiles,  and  fur- 
nish  it  not  only  with  a  rampart  (vallum)  and  palisade  (sudes)  but  also  with  turrets  (tur- 
ricules),  so  that  they  can  withstand  sorties  from  the  town;  they  call  such  a  work  (opus)  a 
loriculd"  (Veg.,  Epit.  rei  mil.  4.28).  (Loriculd  is  found  elsewhere  specifying  the 
breastwork  on  top  of  a  vallum:  Bell.  Gall.  8.9.  ) 
95 Cat.  No.  Comment 
Ag  1gent  um um  38  Two  Ones  of  ditches  linking  two  camps 
ormu  Panormus  s  42  PossIble  ditch  and  palisade 
UV4ýaaeurn  44  Ditch  and  palisade 
Capua  53  Double  ditch  and  palisade  with  forts:  "bicircurrivallation" 
Lo  cri  56  Possible  (opera):  cf.  p.  98  i 
-  Orongis 
ý 
57  Double  ditch  and  palisade 
Cire  us  68  Probable  (opera):  cf.  p.  98 
Ambracia  83  Ditch  and  palisade  with  two  camps  and  a  fort  (munimenta) 
Carthage  951  Double  ditch,  palisade  and  wall:  cf.  p.  100 
Numantia  102  1  Stonewall  with  seven  forts 
Thala  106  Ditch  and  palisade 
Athens  112  Ditch 
Praeneste  113  Wall  and  ditches 
Isaura  Vetus  115,  Possible  (munitio):  cf.  p.  44 
Tigranocerta  1201  13itch 
Atuatuci  126  Palisade  and  forts 
Vellaunodunurn  130  Unspecified 
Alesia  134  Double  ditch  and  palisade  with  forts  (munitio):  "bicircurrivallation" 
ýxellodunum  135  Palisade  and  forts  (munitiones) 
Pindenissus  1361  Ditch  and  palisade  with  camps  and  forts 
Corfiniurn  1371  Palisade  and  forts  (opera) 
Brundisium  1381  Harbour  barrier 
Utica  140I  Parisade 
Dyrrachiurn  143  1  Ditch  and  palisade  with  forts  (munitio) 
Ulia  1461  Unspecified  barrier  (opera)  with  forts  (munitio) 
Thapsus  147  1  Unspecifed  barrier  (opera)  with  garrisons  and  a  fort 
Ategua  1491  Palisadefearthworks  (bracchia)  with  a  camp  and  forts 
Mutina  150  Ditches  and  walls 
Laodicea  152  Barrier  wall 
Perusia  155  Dftch  and  rampart  wfth  towers:  "bicircumvallation" 
Brundisium  156  Barrier  ditch  and  palisade 
Segesta  162  Ditch  and  palisade 
Pmmona  164  Unspecified  barrier 
Mons  Medullius  16G  IDitch 
Mons  Haernus  170  Ditch  and  palisade  with  garrisons 
Cadra/Davara  171  Unspecified  barrier  (opera) 
Jerusalem  189  Wall  with  forts 
Machaerus  190  (Archaeological  evidence  of  wall  with  forts:  pp.  112ff.  ) 
ýasada  191  lWall  with  forts 
Sarmizegethusa  193  1  Possible  (sculptural  evidence):  cf.  p.  70 
Bettir  197  1(Archaedogical  evidence  of  wall  with  camps:  pp.  121f.  ) 
Cremna  210  1  (Archaeological  evidence  of  barrier  wall:  pp.  122ff.  ) 
Gesoriacum 
_211 
1  arbourbarrier 
Table  17:  Roman  Investing  works  explicitly  merdioned  at  sieges 
96 Gilfiver  has  claimed  (1999,149)  that  Apollodorus  of  Damascus,  Trajan's  engineer,  in- 
cluded  a  discussion  of  circumvallation  in  his  Poliorkitika,  but  the  passage  which  she 
cites  is  expressly  devoted  to  dealing  with  defenders  who  roll  large  objects  downhill  to- 
wards  the  besiegers.  Apollodorus  recommends  "digging  oblique  ditches,  with  a  depth 
of  5  feet  (1.48  m),  whose  spoil  forms  a  vertical  wall,  against  which  the  rolling  objects 
crash,  in  order  to  hold  them  off,  and  those  coming  up  (from  behind?  )  stand  firm  behind 
the  shield  (i.  e.,  the  rampart).  Those  digging  are  fim-dshed  with  protection  in  front  of  the 
ditch,  in  which  palings  are  set  fast,  lying  at  the  same  (oblique)  angle,  and  boards  are  fas- 
tened  (to  them)  and  woven  branches  are  wrapped  around  (them),  so  that  it  becomes  an 
outwork  (protelchisma)  against  the  (objects)  thrown  against  (it)"  (Apoll.  W  140).  This 
is  a  peculiar  arrangement,  designed  to  meet  a  particular  circumstance,  and  can  in  no  way 
be  interpreted  as  a  circurnvallation. 
Fortunately,  there  are  many  other  examples.  Cicero  describes  how  he  surrounded  Pin- 
denissus  with  a  ditch  and  palisade  (vallum  etfossa),  incorporating  six  forts  (castella) 
and  several  "large  camps"  (castra  maxima).  The  Roman  works  at  Ambracia  comprised 
two  camps  (castra)  and  a  fort  (castellum),  all  three  linked  by  a  palisade  and  ditch 
(vallum  alquefossa)  which,  judging  by  the  topography,  ran  in  a  straight  line,  cutting  off 
the  only  accessible  side  of  the  town  (fig.  7);  Livy  refers  to  the  entire  system  as  muni- 
menta,  "fortifications7'.  The  siege-works  (opera)  around  Uxellodunum  comprised  three 
camps  (castra)  (fig.  15),  supplemented  by  an  unspecified  number  of  forts  (castella),  all 
of  which  were  linked  by  an  encircling  palisade  (vallum).  A  similar  system  was  estab- 
lished  at  Capua,  comprising  three  camps  (castra)  supplemented  by  forts  (castella) 
evenly  spaced  around  the  town,  all  linked  by  a  ditch  and  palisade  (fossa  vallumque); 
Appian  implies  that  the  same  arrangement  also  faced  outwards,  but  it  was  probably  just 
the  barrier  that  was  doubled  (Livy's  duplex  fossa  vallumque).  Again,  at  Corfinium, 
once  the  two  camps  (castra)  had  been  established,  Caesar  encircled  the  town  with  a  cir- 
cummunitio,  "surrounding  fortificatiotf',  comprising  forts  (castella)  and  a  palisade 
(vallum);  the  system  was  collectively  termed  an  opus,  "work!  '. 
It  is  often  assumed,  in  the  context  of  siegecraft,  that  the  term  "worW  (opera,  and  its 
Greek  equivalent  erga)  will  refer  to  "siege-worl&'.  This  is  certain  in  the  case  of  Uxel- 
97 lodunum,  just  mentioned,  where,  once  Caninius  asserted  Roman  dominance,  he  pro- 
ceeded  with  construction  of  opera  around  the  town  (Bell.  Gall.  8.37);  the  entire  passage 
uses  the  terms  opera  and  munitiones  interchangeably  (cf  Bell.  Gall.  8.34).  Other  cases 
are  less  certain.  Ambracia.  presents  an  interesting  combination  of  munimenta  quibus 
saepienda  urbs  erat  (i.  e.,  the  siege-works)  and  opera  quae  (consul)  admovere  murls 
parabat  (i.  e.,  the  siege  machinery)  (Livy  38.5.1).  Livy  goes  on  to  explain  where  the 
individual  opera  were  deployed,  and  the  corresponding  passage  of  Polybius  refers  to 
advancing  erga  (Polyb.  21.27.2);  both  clearly  indicate  machinery  in  this  context,  and 
not  earthworks,  proving  that  caution  should  be  exercised  in  interpreting  these  terms  (cf. 
Walsh  1993,128). 
Doubt  remains  about  the  situation  at  Locri  (above,  p.  24),  which  Cincius  Alimentus,  be- 
sieged  operibus  formentorumque  omni  genere  (Livy  27.28.13);  juxtaposed  with  artil- 
lery,  the  opera  may  well  have  been  siege-machinery.  The  opera  which  Flamininus 
burned  before  withdrawing  from  Corinth  are  likely  to  have  been  the  embankments 
which  he  had  raised,  though  the  passage  also  mentions  battering-rams,  and  we  have 
seen  that  opera  could  embrace  machinery.  Sometimes,  the  context  betrays  the  meaning. 
The  troops  left  at  Orcus  ad  opera  perficienda  (Livy  31.46.12)  arc  likely  to  have  been 
digging  the  siege-works  which  are  later  stated  to  He  circa  Oreum  (Livy  31.46.14). 
However,  the  walls  of  Eretria  were  destroyed  by  opera,  newly  constructed  from  timber 
felled  in  the  neighbourhood  (Livy  32.16.10-11);  these,  and  the  opera  ad  oppugnationem 
at  Meliboea,  are  likely  to  have  been  siege-machines  (above,  p.  30).  Similarly,  when 
Sempronius  Gracchus  opera  admoveret  against  Certima  (above,  p.  34),  we  should  en- 
visage  machines  of  some  kind. 
Turning  to  a  different  element  of  terminology,  Schulten  considered  it  likely  that  the 
term  castrum  (or  its  Greek  equivalent,  stratopedon)  was  applied  to  the  primary  fortifica- 
tion  (or  fortifications)  on  the  site,  emphasizing  either  the  camp's  independence  or  its 
importance  as  the  fulcrum  around  which  any  subsequent  system  would  operate.  If  there 
were  any  secondary  encampments,  established  in  support  of  the  main  c=p  or  camps, 
these  would  then  be  termed  castella  (or  phrouria,  in  Greek),  in  view  of  their  subordi- 
nate  function,  and  not  necessarily  on  account  of  smaller  size.  The  important  point  was 
98 that  these  "castra  minora"  were  not  independent,  but  relied  on  a  lateral  barrier  to  link 
them  into  a  system  (Schulten  1927,20). 
The  ditch-and-palisade  is  undoubtedly  the  most  common  form  of  barrier  encountered  in 
Roman  investing  works  (cf  Table  17,  p.  96).  Occasionally,  a  solitary  ditch  is  men- 
tioned,  as  at  Athens  or  Tigranocerta,  but  the  excavated  material  was  no  doubt  piled  up 
to  form  a  rampart,  which  we  may  expect  to  have  been  crowned  by  a  palisade;  a  ditch  on 
its  own,  even  a  substantial  one,  would  not  have  formed  a  particularly  secure  barrier,  al- 
though  it  would  have  served  to  apply  the  psychological  pressure  of  containment  (as 
suggested  above,  pp.  23f.,  30L,  49).  Besides  the  camps  and  forts,  the  he  could  be  fur- 
ther  strengthened  by  a  system  of  closely-spaced  turrets.  This  high  degree  of  security  is 
found  at  Perusia,  where  the  56-stade  (10Y2  km)  ditch  and  palisade  was  studded  with 
towers  every  60  feet  (18.5  rn);  however,  even  if  we  assume  that  the  width  of  each  tower 
was  included  in  the  60-foot  space  allowance,  there  would  have  been  room  for  fewer 
than  600  towers,  a  far  cry  from  Appian's  reported  1,500  (App.,  Bell.  Civ.  5.33).  The 
system  was  further  elaborated  to  face  outwards,  thus  qualifying  it  as  one  of  Connolly's 
"bicircuravallations"  (above,  p.  36),  and  was  connected  with  the  Tiber  by  off-shoots, 
which  Appian  calls  "lege'  (skele-)  and  explains  as  a  measure  to  prevent  supplies  from 
getting  through  to  the  town;  however,  it  seems  more  likely  that  they  were  designed  to 
safeguard  Octavian's  own  supply-lines  to  the  river. 
Schulten  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  individual  lengths  of  barrier  were  termed  bracchia, 
or  "arrns"  (Schulten  1927,15-16:  'Vie  Stücke  der  Circumvallation,  welche  die  Lager 
verbinden,  heiBen  bracchla";  cf.  Liebenam  1909,2236:  "ZwischenwMle").  But  this  is 
more  problematic.  In  fact,  bracchium  (and  its  Greek  equivalent,  skelos,  a  "leg"),  indi- 
cates  any  length  of  wall,  and  is  not  specifically  linked  to  siegecraft;  the  two  words  are 
used,  for  example,  to  describe  the  Long  Walls  of  Athens  (Livy  31.26.8;  Diod.  Sic. 
13.107). 
In  a  military  context,  bracchia  usually  serve  as  independent  walls  of  confinement.  For 
example,  in  85  B.  C.,  Fimbria  lured  the  Pontic  cavalry  between  a  pair  of  "arms",  and 
slaughtered  them  while  they  were  trapped  there  (Front.,  Strat.  3.17.5);  or  again,  in  216 
99 B.  C.,  Hanni'bal  denied  a  small  beleaguered  Roman  camp  access  to  the  nearby  river  by 
constructing  a  lateral  "arnP  (Livy  22.52.1).  The  same  sense  of  confinement  is  con- 
veyed  by  Caesar's  parallel  bracchia  at  Uzitta  in  46  B.  C.,  except  that  it  was  his  own 
troops  who  were  hemmed  in,  in  order  to  protect  their  flanks  (Bell.  Afr.  5  1;  5  6);  the  word 
is  used  earlier  by  the  same  author  to  describe  a  linear  fortification,  gradually  linking  a 
progression  of  turrets  and  forts  (Bell.  Afr.  38;  49).  In  45  B.  C.,  near  Ategua,  both  Cn. 
Pompeius  and  Caesar  built  single  bracchia  to  link  their  respective  camps  to  the  nearby 
River  Salsum.  (Bell.  Hisp.  13;  23);  but,  only  at  Ategua  itself,  do  we  find  the  word  used 
to  describe  the  siege-works  (munitiones),  when  Caesar  "bracchia  circumducere  coepit" 
(Bell.  Hisp.  6). 
Such  bracchia  were  no  doubt  earthen  ramparts,  probably  with  a  palisade;  at  any  rate, 
Dio  refers  to  a  palisade  at  Ategua  (43.33.2;  34.3).  A  finiher  variation  in  circumvallation 
design  saw  the  palisade  replaced  by  a  dry-stone  construction.  The  isthmus  at  Laodicaea 
was  apparently  sealed  off  by  a  stone  wall,  two  stades  (370  m)  in  length,  and  the  circum- 
vallation  which  Titus  threw  around  Jerusalem  took  the  form  of  a  wall,  39  stades  (7V4 
km)  long,  connecting  thirteen  forts  (phrouria).  As  we  shall  see,  the  barriers  at  Numan- 
tia,  Machaerus,  Masada,  Narbata,  Bettir  and  Cremna  all  took  the  form  of  a  stone  wall. 
Carthage  presents  an  unusual  scheme  of  siege-works.  According  to  Appian  (Pun.  119), 
Scipio  Aemilianus  cut  off  the  town  with  two  25-stade  (4V2km)  ditches,  running  across 
the  isthmus  (fig.  8),  one  at  missile-range  from  the  town  and  the  other  not  far  behind  it, 
and  connected  at  the  ends;  he  fenced  all  of  them  with  sharpened  stakes  and,  in  addition, 
he  built  a  12-foot  wall  facing  the  town,  and  again  palisaded  the  other  ditches.  (It  is  of- 
ten  stated  that  the  ditches  werefilled  with  stakes,  e.  g.,  Kern  1999,293,  but  Appian  only 
says  that,  "in  addition  to  the  stakes  [or,  perhaps,  "behind  the  stakee],  he  fenced  the 
other  ditches  with  a  palisade";  i.  e.,  the  ditches  other  than  the  one  in  front,  which  had  the 
stone  wall.  )  Interval  towers  were  added  to  the  wall,  and  the  halfway  tower  was  height- 
ened  by  a  four-storey  observation  platform.  Schulten  was  in  no  doubt  that  this  construc- 
tion  should  be  considered  as  "a  double  fine  of  investment",  on  analogy  with  Alesia  and 
Perusia  (1933,182-183:  "eine  doppelte  EinschlieBungslinie"). 
100 1.  Numantia  (Spalmj 
Scipio's  later  siege  of  Numantia  (no.  102)  betrays  a  number  of  similarities  to  his  works 
at  Carthage.  Appian  records  that  Scipio  first  established  a  camp  in  the  vicinity  of  Nu- 
mantia.  (Hisp.  87),  before  he  and  his  brother,  Fabius  Maximus,  moved  up  to  the  town. 
T'his  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  usual  strategy,  noted,  for  instance,  at  Jerusalem  in 
A.  D.  70  (above,  p.  86),  but  this  primary  encampment  has  failed  to  provoke  scholarly 
conjecture.  The  obvious  candidate  is  camp  IV  at  Renieblas,  six  kilometres  from  Nu- 
mantia,  which  Schulten  attributed  to  Pompeius's  activities  in  75  B.  C.  (1929,144;  cf. 
Keppie  1984,73  and  note  13,  for  reservations),  but  which  has  yielded  no  internal  struc- 
tures  or  dating  evidence  (cf.  Salvatore  1996,117).  Ironically,  Fabricius  had  already 
suggested  that  Scipio's  siege  headquarters  lay  at  Renieblas  (1911,379),  only  to  have 
SchuItcn  dismiss  this  idea  (1927,16-17:  "unm6glich!  ).  However,  at  approximately  58 
ha,  the  camp  covers  virtually  the  same  area  as  the  siege-camps  combined,  and  would 
comfortably  have  accommodated  Scipio's  forces,  prior  to  moving  up  to  the  town.  (In- 
terestingly,  a  long  outwork  extends  to  the  nearby  river  from  the  north-west  comer  of  the 
camp,  and  may  legitimately  be  termed  a  bracchium.  ) 
Having  rcconnoitred  from  afar,  Scipio  and  Maximus  then  established  two  camps  outside 
the  town.  Schultcn  conjectured,  partly  on  topographical  grounds  but  also  because  of  the 
plentiful  archaeological  remains,  that  Scipio  occupied  the  7.35  ha  camp  at  Castillejo, 
while  his  brother  occupied  the  11.2  ha  camp  at  Pefia  Redonda  (1927,21-22)  (fig.  9). 
The  Romans  clearly  appreciated  the  strategic  position  of  Castillejo,  as  two  previous 
camps  had  lain  there;  in  the  absence  of  compelling  evidence,  Schulten  suggested  that 
one  of  these  belonged  to  Q.  Pompeius,  in  141-140  B.  C.  (no.  98),  the  other  to  an  earlier 
visit  by  Claudius  Marcellus  (Schulten  1927,172).  Although  Castillejo  thus  has  a 
good  claim  to  be  the  headquarters,  there  is  no  particular  reason  to  place  Fabius  Maxi- 
mus  at  Pefla  Redonda,  and  it  must  be  suspected  that  it  was  the  better  preserved  re  * 
that  led  Schulten  to  emphasize  this  camp.  A  better  candidate  might  be  Dehesilla,  whose 
size,  at  14.6  ha,  recommended  it  to  Cheesman  (1911,181).  It  has  the  additional  advan- 
tage  that,  where  Pefta  Redon&s  location  is  confined  by  the  steep  gorge  of  the  Rio 
Merdancho,  Dehesilla  commands  an  altogether  easier  approach  to  Numantia,  and  is  bet- 
101 ter  placed  to  oversee  the  western  side  of  the  town,  whereas  both  Castillejo  and  Pefta  Re- 
donda  He  to  the  east. 
According  to  Appian,  Scipio  then  established  seven  forts  (phrouria),  a  total  that  is  cor- 
rect,  if  it  includes  the  two  main  bases;  Florus  (1.34)  counted  four  camps,  which  is  de- 
monstrably  wrong.  Besides  Castillejo,  Pefla  Redonda,  and  Dehesilla,  Schulten  discov- 
ered  another  four,  far  less  well-preserved  camps.  To  the  north-east  of  the  town,  the 
long,  gentle  slope,  ideal  for  sorties,  was  obstructed  at  the  north  end  by  Castillejo,  and  at 
the  south  end  by  Valdevorron,  a9  ha  camp  positioned  on  a  hill;  between  the  two,  on  flat 
open  ground,  lay  the  4  ha  camp  of  Travesadas.  Farther  south,  across  the  Merdancho, 
lay  Pefta  Redonda,  on  a  narrow  spur  projecting  to  within  500  metres  of  the  town,  but 
separated  from  it  by  the  steep-sided  river  valley.  The  she's  superior  level  of  preserva- 
tion  is  entirely  due  to  its  remoteness  and  inaccessibility,  which  suggests  that,  tactically, 
this  was  a  defensive  position,  rather  than  a  good  jumping-off  point;  Scipio  may  have 
preferred  to  select  a  more  accessible  site  for  his  brother's  camp.  At  the  southern  end  of 
Numantia  lay  the  6  ha  camp  of  Raza,  effectively  the  anchor  of  the  eastern  ring  of  camps. 
Across  the  Duero  lay  Dehesilla,  commanding  the  western  approaches  to  the  town  across 
the  wide  river  valley,  and  hence  arguably  a  more  important  position  than  Pefla  Redonda. 
Further  north,  a5  ha  camp  at  Alto  Real,  above  the  confluence  of  the  Duero  and  Tero, 
completed  the  ring  of  seven  camps.  An  eighth  camp  was  identified  at  Molino,  on  the 
basis  of  a  few  barrack-like  buildings;  these,  and  some  nondescript  remains  at  Vega, 
were  taken  as  evidence  of  controlled  river-crossing  points. 
After  the  establishment  of  the  camps,  Appian  records  that  the  town  was  surrounded  by  a 
ditch  and  palisade,  but  Schulten  was  unable  to  find  evidence  of  a  ditch,  and  conjectured 
that  the  rivers  fulfilled  that  role  (1927,27-28).  In  that  case,  there  remains  the  un- 
answered  problem  of  the  north-eastem  sector,  where  no  river  separated  the  camps  from 
the  town.  It  is  notable  that  Scipio  had  arranged  for  each  soldier  to  carry  seven  stakes 
(Livy,  per.  57),  no  doubt  so  that  the  exposed  sectors  could  immediately  be  palisaded, 
before  troops  had  to  be  sent  farther  afield  to  collect  more  timber.  After  the  erection  of 
the  palisade,  Scipio  then  proceeded  to  circumvallate  the  town  with  a  50-stade  (9V4km) 
stone  wall.  We  have  seen  that  the  ditch  and  palisade  was  the  most  common  form  of  cir- 
102 curnvallation  (above,  p.  99),  but  in  a  few  cases  it  was  only  a  preliminary  stage,  in  order 
to  protect  the  troops  building  the  final  stone  wall.  Scipio  himself  had  followed  this 
scheme  at  Carthage,  Hannibal  had  done  the  same  at  Tarenturn  (Livy  25.11.1-20),  and, 
perhaps  the  locus  classicus  for  ancient  siegecraft,  the  Spartan  siege  of  Plataea  in  429 
B.  C.  had  followed  the  same  procedure  (cf  Garlan  1974,114-117). 
In  tracing  the  circurnvallation  wall,  Schulten  found  that  it  followed  the  high  ground,  set 
back  between  100  and  200  metrcs  from  the  rivers;  but,  on  the  northern  and  eastern 
stretches,  where  no  river  fronted  the  wall,  it  lay  between  800  m  (Valdevorron)  and  11/2 
km  (Castillejo)  from  the  town.  Schulten's  claim  that  "the  wall  has  been  found  over  a 
large  part  of  the  circuit"  (1927,32:  "Die  Mauer  ist  auf  eincrn  groBen  Teile  ihres 
Umkreises  aufgefunden  wordeif')  is  overly  sanguine.  In  fact,  he  traced  only  a  short 
stretch  between  Castillejo  and  Travesadas  (1927,70-73),  another  running  up  to  Pefia 
Redonda  (1927,76-77),  and  a  more  substantial  length  on  either  side  of  Dehesilla  (1927, 
73-76),  in  total  approximately  1,680  metres  of  the  estimated  9  Ian  (1927,79).  It  is 
worth  noting  the  possibility  that  only  parts  of  the  circuit  were  built  in  stone,  but  this  has 
not  been  tested  archaeologically. 
The  individual  stretches  examined  by  Schulten  revealed  considerable  variation  in  de- 
sign.  Between  Dehesilla  and  Alto  Real,  the  wall  was  approximately  3.50  m  wide,  com- 
prising  two  faces  (inner,  towards  Numantia:  1.10-1.20  m  wide;  outer:  0.50  m  wide)  and 
a  rough,  stony  core  (1.90-2.0  m  wide)  (Schulten  1927,73).  At  one  place,  along  the  Cas- 
tillejo-Travesadas  stretch,  only  the  0.75  m  limestone  facing  and  a  metre  of  rubble  back- 
ing  was  found  (Schulten  1927,71);  at  another,  the  recovered  width  of  2.40  m  was  reck- 
oned  to  accurately  represent  its  original  state  (1927,72).  The  Pefla  Redonda  length  was 
found  to  be  of  unusual  construction:  instead  of  two  faces  enclosing  an  inner  core,  there 
was  an  intermediate  row  of  0.40  m  wide  blocks,  separating  two  lots  of  infill,  1.50-2.0  m 
wide;  the  entire  wall  was  thus  a  massive  four  or  five  metres  wide  (1927,77).  A  similar 
width  was  noted  on  the  Dehesiffa-Molino  stretch  (1927,74).  Surnmarising  his  findings, 
Schulten  stated  that  the  wall  was,  on  average,  four  metres  wide  (1927,82-83),  as  against 
Appian's  statement  that  "he  [viz.  Scipio]  built  a  wall,  the  width  of  which  was  eight  feet 
103 [=  2.47  m],  and  the  height  ten  feet  [3.10  m]  minus  the  battlements"  (Hisp.  90).  How- 
ever,  the  Castillejo  sector,  at  least,  may  be  said  to  conform  to  Appian's  dimensions. 
The  Dehesifla-Alto  Real  sector  provided  details  of  an  interval  tower,  which  was  found 
to  be  2.20  x  2.10  m,  with  walls  0.50  m  wide  (Schulten  1927,73).  Another  two,  set  back 
from  the  wall  on  the  Dehesifla-Mohno  sector,  were  approximately  5.0  x  4.0  m,  with 
walls  0.40  m  wide  (1927,74),  while  four  others  were  marked  by  post-holes,  the  front 
pair  sunk  into  the  core  of  the  wall,  the  rear  pair  around  5  metres  behind  (1927,75).  Fol- 
lowing  Appian's  description  (Hisp.  92),  Schulten  believed  that  artillery  would  have 
been  positioned  at  wall-walk  level,  allowing  two  catapults  per  tower,  while  an  upper 
storey  was  used  for  signalling  (1927,85;  cf  below,  p.  180).  However,  the  four  towers 
are  very  closely  spaced,  at  between  five  and  eight  metres,  not  the  plethron  (31  m)  which 
Appian  states  (Hisp.  90),  and  there  is  no  sign  of  a  regular  series  continuing  around  the 
circumvallation.  Nevertheless,  artillery  positioned  here  would  have  been  well-placed  to 
counter  any  sorties  across  the  flat  flood  plain.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  of  Appian's 
alleged  river-blocking  measures  (Hisp.  91),  although  at  least  the  towers  from  which  the 
spiked  booms  were  suspended  ought  to  have  left  some  traces. 
2. 
-Alesia 
(France) 
Quite  a  different  situation  obtained  at  Alesia  (no.  134),  where  Caesar's  elaborate"bicir- 
curnvallation7'  surrounded  the  plateau  of  Mont  Auxois  (fig.  13),  in  a  topographical  situa- 
tion  strikingly  similar  to  Numantia.  The  earliest  investigations,  sponsored  by  Napol6on 
III  (1866),  concentrated  on  faithfiffly  reconstructing  Caesar's  description  of  his  siege- 
works.  More  recent  archaeological  work  has  modified  the  image  of  regularity  and  uni- 
formity  which  Napol6on's  publication  suggests. 
After  reconnoitring,  Caesar's  first  priority  was  to  encamp  at  convenient  places  (Caes., 
Bell.  Gall.  7.69),  before  setting  about  the  construction  of  twenty-three  castella.  An 
emendation,  specifying  eight  camps  and  twenty-three  forts  (e.  g.,  Handford  1951,190), 
was  convincingly  rejected  by  Holmes  (1911,805  n.  2),  but  Napoldon  was  surely  under 
its  influence  when  he  established  a  sequence  of  eight  camps  (designated  A  to  D,  G  to  1, 
and  K)  and  twenty-three  (numbered)  redoubts.  Of  the  camps,  Camp  D  has  long  been 
104 doubted,  owing  to  the  absence  of  archaeological  remains  (Hamiand  1967b,  215-217), 
and  Carnp  I  has  been  proven  to  be  a  post-Roman  feature  (Redd6  et  aL  1995,123-124); 
of  the  forts,  only  five  were  based  on  traces  on  the  ground  (10,11,15,18,  and  22),  the 
other  eighteen  conjectured  entirely  from  topographical  likelihood.  However,  the  latest 
researches  favour  a  total  of  six  camps,  established  on  the  heights  of  the  Montagne  de 
Bussy  (C,  15,  and  18)  and  the  Montagne  de  Flavigny  (A,  B,  and  11),  in  order  to  com- 
mand  views  over  the  Gallic  oppidum  (Bdnard  1996,48-49).  Camps  G,  H,  and  K  are 
now  considered  doubtful  (ibld.:  "suspecte")  as  is  fort  10  (Le  Gall  1974,467  n.  5),  and 
fort  22  was  long  ago  recognised  as  a  prehistoric  enclosure  (Holmes  1911,804  n.  6). 
The  camps  are  irregularly  shaped,  following  the  contours  of  their  location,  and  vary 
widely  in  size.  For  example,  camp  A  covers  around  3  ha,  while  the  neighbouring  camp 
B  covers  7  ha.  Camp  C,  on  the  Montagne  de  Bussy,  is  probably  the  best  known,  enclos- 
ing  around  7.8  ha  within  a  single  ditch.  Excavations  here,  following  several  successful 
seasons  of  aerial  photographic  work  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,91-93),  have  clarified  the  de- 
fences  in  the  area  of  the  north-east  gateway  (fig.  l4a).  Here,  the  camp  ditch  was  fronted 
by  two  parallel  rows  of  50  cm-wide  slots,  interpreted  as  some  form  of  obstacle  (Redd6 
et  al.  1995,119);  it  is  not  clear  whether  these  surrounded  the  entire  camp,  or  only  the 
northern  exposure.  The  12  m-wide  gateway  was  covered  on  the  outside,  at  a  distance  of 
around  8.5  metres,  by  two  similar  slots,  almost  30  metres  long,  apparently  fiffiling  the 
function  of  a  titulum;  there  was  also  an  internal  claviculd  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,119-120). 
Military  operations  were  restricted  on  three  sides  of  the  oppidum  by  the  river  valleys  of 
the  Ose  and  Oserain,  but  the  open  meadow  of  the  Plaine  des  Laumes  to  the  west,  scene 
of  Vercingetorix's  ill-fated  cavalry  attack  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.70),  offered  a  likely 
route,  either  for  a  massed  eruption  from  the  town,  or  for  the  approach  of  a  relieving 
force.  So  Caesar  secured  it  with  a  ditch,  allegedly  twenty  feet  (6  m)  wide  with  perpen- 
dicular  sides  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.72).  In  fact,  the  results  of  a  section  cut  across  the  fea- 
ture  in  modem  times  show  that  the  ditch  was  just  over  3.0  m  wide  by  1.3  m  deep,  and 
flat-bottomed  with  a  "trough-Eke"  profile,  prompting  the  excavators  to  comment  that 
"one  should  not  take  Caesar's  description  strictly  literally"  (Schnurbein  &  Sievers  1996, 
362). 
105 Caesar  claims  to  have  laid  out  his  siege-lines  400  feet  (118  m)  farther  back  (Caes.,  Bell. 
Gall.  7.72),  but  in  fact  there  is  a  gap  of  up  to  900m;  the  emendation  to  400  paces  (e.  g., 
Edwards  1917,483;  Handford  1951,191:  "some  six  hundred  and  fifty  yards")  is  still 
around  300  m  short.  Harmand  suggested  that  Caesar  had  originally  planned  the  fine  to 
be  around  400  feet  to  the  rear,  but  subsequently  altered  the  scheme  (1967b,  128-131; 
1984,278);  clearly,  this  debate  cannot  easily  be  resolved. 
According  to  Caesar,  the  Roman  defences  consisted  of  two  ditches,  each  15  x  15  feet 
(4.5  m),  the  inner  of  which  was  filled  with  water,  followed  by  a  palisaded  rampart  (ag- 
ger  ac  vallum)  with  turrets  every  80  feet  (23.6  m).  Nothing  is  known  of  the  siege-lines 
in  the  valleys  of  the  Oze  and  Oserain  (B6nard  1996,54),  but  recent  excavations  on  the 
Plaine  des  Laurnes  have  confirmed  the  broad  outlines  of  Caesar's  scheme,  while  em- 
phasizing  differences  of  detail  (fig.  l4b).  The  inner  of  the  two  ditches  (Ditch  1)  was 
found  to  be  around  4m  wide  and  1.5  m  deep  at  one  point,  and  elsewhere  was  around  6.5 
m  wide  by  1.25  m  deep;  the  excavators  found  confirmation  that  the  ditch  had  been  filled 
with  water.  Five  metres  farther  back,  the  second  ditch  (Ditch  2)  was  consistently  2.7  m 
wide,  but  its  depth  varied  between  1.5  m  and  1.1  m  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,95-96).  The 
profile  of  both  ditches  fluctuated  between  v-shaped  and  flat-bottomed,  a  phenomenon 
already  noted  elsewhere  on  the  site  (Harmand  1967b,  157-158).  Surprisingly,  fifteen 
metres  behind  these  ditches,  a  third  ditch  (Ditch  3)  was  discovered,  again  varying  be- 
tween  v-shaped  and  flat-bottonled  profile,  and  measuring  from  1.1  m.  to  3.2  m  wide, 
with  a  depth  of  0.8-1.4  m  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,98;  Redd6  &  Schnurbein  1997,175). 
Along  the  turf  rampart,  which  lay  about  3  ni  behind  Ditch  3  on  the  Plaine  des  Laumes, 
ran  a  series  of  four-posted  turrets,  at  roughly  15  m  intervals,  of  which  ten  have  been 
identified.  The  spacing  of  the  post-holes  indicates  a  structure  approximately  three  me- 
tres  square.  The  excavators  postulated  that,  while  the  front  posts  were  sunk  into  the 
rampart,  the  back  posts  were  free-standing.  Although  their  reasoning  is  sound,  based  on 
the  fact  that  the  rear  timbers  were  generally  sunk  deeper  than  the  front  timbers,  this 
would  result  in  a  remarkably  narrow  turf  rampart.  There  is  no  sign  of  timber  revetmcnt 
at  the  front,  as  found  in  similarly  narrow  Augustan-Tiberian  fortifications  (Jones  1975, 
14-18),  and  the  excavators  concede  that  the  front  face  must  have  been  battered.  How- 
106 ever,  they  fail  to  note  that  a  narrow  turf  rampart  implies  a  low  rampart  (Jones  1975,69- 
70),  and  their  comparison  with  The  Lunt,  where  the  rampart  base  was  5.5  m  wide,  is 
inappropriate  (Reddd  et  al.  1995,99).  Consequently,  the  height  of  12  feet  (3.5  m), 
quoted  by  Caesar  (Bell.  Gall.  7.72),  must  have  included  the  lorica  and  pinnae,  erected 
on  top  to  protect  the  walk-way. 
Caesar  claims  to  have  added  further  obstacles:  rows  of  five  cippi,  or  tree-trunks  with 
sharpened  branches,  sunk  into  five-foot  (1.5  m)  ditches;  eight  rows  of  lilia,  or  sharpened 
stakes,  set  vertically  in  three-foot  (0.9  m)  pits  and  concealed  by  brushwood;  and  stimuli, 
barbed  spikes  fixed  in  foot-long  (0.3  m)  pieces  of  wood  and  buried  at  random.  Interest- 
ingly,  six  rows  of  small  post-holes,  roughly  20-30  cm.  in  diameter  and  some  showing 
evidence  of  a  4-5  cm  post-pipe,  were  found  in  the  intervallum  between  Ditches  2  and  3 
(Reddd  et  al.  1995,96-97);  set  at  regular  intervals,  but  staggered  from  row  to  row,  they 
immediately  evoke  the  quincunx  pattern  of  Caesar's  lilia,  although  on  a  smaller  scale. 
The  excavators  suggested  that  these  were  stimuli  (Bdnard  1996,54;  RedJ6  et  al.  1995, 
96),  but  the  wooden  component  was  a  fraction  of  Caesar's  reported  30  cm,  and  there 
were  no  signs  of  the  metal  spikes. 
Excavations  have  also  elucidated  the  situation  on  the  Plaine  de  Grdsigny,  to  the  south- 
east  of  Mont  Rda,  where  there  was  no  trace  of  Ditch  3.  However,  Ditches  I  and  2  were 
both  found  to  be  3.8  m  wide  (i.  e.,  still  narrower  than  Caesar's  15  feet)  by  1.3  rn  deep, 
and  set  7.5  m  apart;  traces  of  flooding  were  again  found  in  Ditch  I  (Reddd  et  al.  1995, 
103).  In  the  intervallum,  four  rows  of  small  post-holes,  20-30  cm.  in  diameter,  and  set 
3040  cm.  apart,  have  been  interpreted  as  evidence  of  a  wicker  fence,  although  they  may 
represent  another  obstacle  field,  similar  to  the  one  on  the  Plaine  des  Laumes.  (Note  that 
the  diameter  matches  Caesar's  description  of  stimuli.  )  Two  sets  of  Large  post-holes,  ap- 
proximately  5  metres  behind  Ditch  2  and  spaced  15  metres  apart,  would  appear  to  be- 
long  to  a  pair  of  turrets;  the  front  posts  must  indicate  the  position  of  the  rampart,  of 
which  no  traces  survive  here  (Reddd  et  al.  1995,103). 
In  the  area  where  the  fine  turns  around  Mont  Rda,  the  excavators  found  only  a  single 
ditch,  5.5  m  wide  by  2.2  m  deep;  they  declined  to  speculate  whether  this  was  a  con- 
107 tinuation  of  either  Ditch  1  or  2,  or  a  completely  new  feature.  At  any  rate,  it  was  fronted 
by  six  or  seven  parallel  rows  of  small  post-holes,  40-50  cm  in  diameter  and  20  cm  deep, 
staggered  to  form  a  quincunx  pattern  and  hence  probably  some  type  of  obstacle  (Redde 
et  al.  1995,104).  Further  west,  the  ditch  was  found  to  measure  between  3.4  m  and  3.6 
m  wide,  by  1.3  m  deep,  with  a  rounded  bottom;  it  was  fronted  by  two  rows  of  the  famil- 
iar  small  post-holes,  indicating  either  a  wicker  fence  or  an  obstacle  field  (Reddd  et  al. 
1995,104). 
These  findings  demonstrate  that  much  of  Caesar's  description  is  simply  wrong,  from  the 
number  of  ditches  and  their  respective  dimensions,  to  the  spacing  of  the  turrets.  It  has 
even  been  argued  that,  if  the  primary  armament  of  the  turrets  was  artillery  (cf  p.  182),  a 
spacing  of  80  feet  (23.6  m)  would  have  been  too  short,  and  that  Caesar's  pedes  should 
be  emended  topassus  (Holmes  1911,810),  to  give  an  interval  of  118  metres.  Withthe 
archaeological  discovery  of  the  turrets'  post-holes,  laid  out  roughly  every  50  Roman 
feet,  this  discussion  is  now  academic,  and  it  can  be  seen  that  neither  80  pedes  nor  80 
passus  is  accurate. 
Having  laid  out  one  fine  of  siege-works,  running  for  some  II  miles  (--  16  km;  Caes., 
Bell  Gall.  7.69),  Caesar  then  constructed  a  14-mile  he  (=  20  km)  of  "similar  fortifica- 
tions  of  the  same  kind,  facing  the  other  way  against  the  enemy  outside"  (Bell.  Gall. 
7.74).  The  actual  length  of  the  inner  line  is  only  around  12  km  (Harmand  1984,281), 
the  outer  nearer  15  km  (Harmand  1967b,  174). 
On  the  Plaine  des  Laumes,  about  a  hundred  metres  outside  the  first  siege  fine,  was  a 
compacted  gravel  surface,  presumably  corresponding  to  the  outer  rwnpart,  and  a  series 
of  three  towers,  about  17  metres  apart  and  similarly  sized  to  those  on  the  inner  fine 
(Redd6  et  al.  1995,110;  B6nard  1996,58).  Beyond  the  rampart  lay  a  3.5  rn-wide,  1.0 
m-deep,  v-shaped  ditch  (Ditch  2),  followed  by  an  8.0  rn  intervallum,  and  an  outer,  flat- 
bottomed  ditch  (Ditch  1),  thought  to  have  had  an  original  width  of  around  5.7  m  and 
showing  traces  of  flooding  (Reddd  et  al.  1995,107-110;  Bdnard  1996,58).  Obstacle 
fields,  similar  to  those  on  the  inner  line,  were  incorporated  in  the  system:  four  parallel 
rows  of  small  post-holes  were  discovered  in  the  intervallum,  and  again  interpreted  as 
108 stimuli  (Bdnard  1996,58);  a  different  feature  was  found  beyond  Ditch  1,  consisting  of  a 
five  or  six  metre  band  of  holes  in  a  quincunx  pattern,  each  one  tapering  from  its  mouth, 
30  cm  across,  to  a  subterranean  point  at  a  depth  of  30-37  cm.  These  have  been  inter- 
preted  as  Caesar's  lilia  in  miniature  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,106-107;  Benard  1996,58), 
though  it  should  be  noted  that  no  traces  of  a  central  stake  were  found. 
A  peculiar  phenomenon  was  noticed  to  the  south-east  of  Mont  Wa,  on  the  Miine  de 
Grdsigny,  where  the  outer  siege-line  betrayed  two  phases  of  development.  The  first 
phase  comprised  a  flat-bottomed  ditch  (Ditch  1),  3.3  m  wide  and  80  cm  deep,  and  origi- 
nally  filled  with  water;  three  rows  of  shallow  pits,  50  cm  wide  by  10  cm  deep;  and  an- 
other  flat-bottomed  ditch,  80  cm.  wide  and  20  cm  deep,  interpreted  as  the  foundation 
trench  for  a  palisade  line,  owing  to  the  presence  of  patches  of  charcoal  along  its  base 
(Redd6  et  al.  1995,111-112).  However,  a  second  phase,  lying  on  a  different  alignment, 
comprised  a  v-shaped  ditch  (Ditch  2),  3.85  m  wide  and  1.5  m  deep,  displaying  traces  of 
rampart  collapse  in  its  fill;  three  sets  of  post-holes,  2.5  m  and  5.5  m  to  the  rear,  repre- 
senting  turrets  built  into  the  thickness  of  the  rampart;  and,  in  front  of  the  ditch,  two  par- 
allel  slots,  1.5  m  apart,  interpreted  as  foundation  trenches  for  cippi  (Redd6  et  al.  1995, 
112).  This  is  the  clearest  evidence  that  changes  were  being  made  as  the  system  was  laid 
out,  and  that  it  was  not  laid  out  to  a  perfect  blueprint,  as  Caesar's  account  suggests. 
The  claim  to  have  discovered  evidence  of  cippi  is  significant,  because  it  has  always 
been  unclear  whether  Caesar  was  describing  five  rows  of  ditches,  or  a  variable  number 
of  ditches,  each  containing  five  rows  of  cippi.  Napoldon  favoured  the  first  interpreta- 
tion,  which  has  coloured  all  subsequent  reconstructions  (e.  g.,  Connolly  1981,292),  but 
the  latter,  championed  by  Holmes  (1911,811),  is  a  more  logical  interpretation  of  Cae- 
sar's  description  (cf.  Handford  1951,191-192:  "five  rows  in  each  trencW';  similarly, 
Keppie  1984,92).  However,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  two  archaeologically- 
recognised  ditches,  each  20-25  cm  wide  and  16-20  cm  deep,  are  too  small  to  have  ac- 
commodated  multiple  rows  of  tree-trunks.  Of  course,  if  the  recent  excavations  show 
anything,  it  is  that  the  physical  features  never  exactly  match  Caesar's  idealised  descrip- 
tion. 
109 The  outer  fine  of  the  circumvallation  incorporated  Camp  C  on  the  Montagne  de  Bussy 
and  Camps  A  and  B  on  the  Montagne  de  Flavigny.  At  the  former,  the  siege-works  con- 
sisted  of  a  single  ditch,  3.5  m.  wide  and  around  40  cm.  deep  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,115;  see 
fig.  l4a).  This  was  fronted  by  four  parallel  slots,  about  1.25  m.  apart,  marking  out  a 
zone  around  7  metres  deep.  Each  slot  contained  an  alternating  sequence  of  larger  and 
smaller  post-pipes  (approximately  10  cm  and  20  cm.  diameter),  spaced  every  50  cm, 
which  the  excavators  have  again  interpreted  as  cippi  (Reddd  et  al.  1995,113-115).  Cer- 
tainly,  some  form  of  obstacle  field  is  implied.  The  line  of  siege-works  halted  about  five 
metres  from  the  comer  of  Camp  C,  leaving  a  defacto  postem,  but  no  gate  structure  is 
evident  (Reddd  et  al.  1995,122-123).  Around  twelve  metres  back  along  the  line,  a  pair 
of  double  post-holes  was  found,  indicating  the  presence  of  a  turret  and  marking  the  po- 
sition  of  the  rampart,  now  disappeared  (Redd6  et  al.  1995,116-117). 
Agas  mentioned  above,  the  latest  scheme  favours  six  camps,  established  on  the  heights 
around  the  Gallic  oppidum  (Bdnard  1996,48-49).  Of  Caesar's  twenty-three  castella,  no 
sign  has  been  found.  However,  an  interesting  feature  on  the  Plaine  des  Laurnes  may 
have  some  relevance  (figs.  13  and  l4b).  Here,  in  the  space  between  the  inner  and  outer 
fines  of  defences,  a  120  m  compartment  (designated  "4  bis",  because  of  its  proximity  to 
Napoldon's  proposed  Redoubt  number  4)  was  defined  by  lines  of  rampart  and  ditch,  the 
north-westem  one  facing  north-west,  the  south-eastern  facing  south-cast;  the  ditches 
were  found  to  be  3.8  m  wide  and  1.1  m  deep  (Bdnard  1996,49-51;  Red&  &  von 
Schnurbein  1997,177;  Reddd  et  al.  1995,100-10  1). 
The  excavators  have  suggested  that,  if  an  assailant  succeeded  in  crossing  one  of  the 
lines  of  circumvallation,  this  feature  was  designed  to  prevent  them  overrunning  the 
heart  of  the  Roman  siege  system,  unopposed.  The  south-eastern  rampart  appears  to 
have  had  a  gate  structure,  adjacent  to  the  inner  line  of  circurnvallation,  while  the  north- 
western  rampart  displays  a  fitulus-like  offset  in  the  corresponding  position.  The  excava- 
tors  have  emphasized  the  constructional  sequence  (the  compartment  not  only  respects 
the  circumvallation,  but  utilises  it  for  its  north-eastern  and  south-western  ramparts,  and 
hence  post-dates  it),  along  with  the  fact  that  Caesar's  castella  were  allegedly  built  be- 
fore  the  circurnvallation  (cf.  Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.69).  However,  despite  their  reserva- 
110 tions,  the  "compartment"  surely  served  the  purpose  of  a  castellum.  In  any  case,  we  have 
seen  that  it  is  unwise  to  press  the  details  of  Caesar's  narrative,  and  the  compartment 
need  not  be  a  later  addition,  but  may  well  be  contemporaneous  with  the  entire  siege  sys- 
term  It  may  well  be  asked  how  many  more  of  these  compartments  he  undiscovered 
along  the  circumvallation. 
Throughout,  I  have  referred  to  the  inner  line  and  the  outer  line,  to  avoid  confusion  with 
terminology.  It  is  true  that,  for  most  scholars,  an  encircling  work  is  known  as  a  circurn- 
vallation  (e.  g.,  Veith  1906,54:  "Umwallung  (circumvallation)"),  and  on  the  few  occa- 
sions  where  a  "bicircumvallation!  '  is  in  evidence,  the  additional  outward-facing  barrier 
is  known  as  a  contravallation  (e.  g.,  Veith  1906,54:  "eine  AuBere  Kontravallationslinie'). 
However,  at  Alesia,  French  scholars  have  perversely  coined  the  term  "contrevallation7 
to  describe  the  phenomenon  which,  under  normal  circumstances,  is  called  a  circumval- 
lation  (cf  Harmand  1967b,  119  n.  3),  and  have  applied  the  term  "circonvallatioif'  to 
Caesar's  outward-facing  fine.  This  transposition  is  traditionally  retained  for  the  site  of 
Alesia,  though  even  there  the  convention  is  not  universally  observed  (cfi  Le  Bohec; 
1989,145).  At  any  rate,  it  certainly  does  not  reflect  "the  usual  conventions  of  military 
terminology"  (contra  Davies  2000,153)  and  should  be  discouraged  at  other  sites. 
In  the  final  analysis,  although  the  archaeological  findings  do  not  provide  an  exact  model 
of  Caesar's  description,  they  emphasize  the  peculiar  and  complex  nature  of  the  site. 
Bdnard  has  commented  that  Caesar  simply  presents  an  inventory  of  the  individual  ele- 
ments,  and  not  a  precise  description  (1996,59:  "un  inventaire  des  ouvrages  (fosse,  rem- 
part  et  pi6ges)  et  non  une  description  pointilleuse"),  but  the  important  point  is  that  he 
was  obliged  to  simplify  numerous  variations  for  reasons  of  clarity,  concision  and  stylis- 
tic  elegance  (cf.  Red&  &  von  Schnurbein  1997,178). 
3.  Atcgua  (SpaLmj 
The  situation  at  Ategua  (no.  149),  known  only  from  aerial  photography,  is  much  sim- 
plcr.  Caesar's  base  camp  remains  to  be  discovered,  but  Corzo  claims  to  have  identified 
the  circumvallation,  some  of  the  towers,  and  several  small  installations  (Corzo  1986, 
690).  Unfortunately,  the  published  photographs  are  not  at  all  clear,  and  Corzo  has  nei- 
III ther  transcnibed  nor  annotated  them.  The  rectangular  encampment  that  he  identified  on 
the  north  side  of  the  town  (1986,691)  would  repay  the  effort  of  excavation,  as  would 
the  circumallation  itself 
4.  Machaerus  (Jordan) 
A  circumvallation  has  been  discovered  at  Machaerus  (no.  190),  although  Josephus;  does 
not  mention  one  (fig.  25).  Besides  the  remains  of  tcn  or  eleven  encampments,  individ- 
ual  stretches  of  the  connecting  barrier  have  been  traced,  totalling  approximately  21/2km 
out  of  the  complete  3  km  circuit.  However,  the  main  carnp,  which  must  have  existed 
nearby,  has  not  yet  been  found.  Josephus  reports  that  the  stronghold,  one  of  Herod's 
fortresses,  lay  on  an  inaccessible  hill,  surrounded  by  deep  ravines  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud. 
7.166),  but  the  topography  is  far  less  severe  than  at  Masada. 
In  plan,  the  circumvallation  is  rhomboidal,  with  an  apex  at  each  point  of  the  compass 
(although  the  eastern  comer  can  no  longer  be  discerned).  The  north-westem  and  south- 
eastern  sides  each  comprise  two  stretches  on  slightly  different  allgmuents,  as  if  con- 
structed  by  separate  work-gangs  moving  inwards  from  the  comers.  It  seems  likely, 
then,  that  the  four  comer  camps  were  established  first,  assuming  that  one  existed  at  the 
eastern  comer.  The  wall  itself  is,  on  average,  1.9  m  wide  (Strobel  1974a,  120:  "between 
1,8  to  2  nf';  1974b,  144  n.  58:  "eine  Stdrke  von  1,8  bis  1,9  nf'),  though  apparently,  in 
the  south,  it  reaches  a  width  of  2.2  m.  in  places  (Strobel  1974b,  144). 
At  the  southern  apex,  sited  on  a  hill  equal  in  height  to  the  fortress  itselý  fies  Camp  B,  a 
parallelogram  (ca.  0.19  ha)  with  walls  around  2  metres  thick;  Strobel  has  suggested  that 
a  14.5  m,  x  12.0  m.  room  marked  out  by  heavier  stones  in  the  south-west  comer,  repre- 
sents  the  foundations  of  a  tower  (I  974b,  146;  not  mentioned  at  1974a,  117).  From  here, 
a  stretch  of  the  south-east  side  was  detected  as  far  as  the  Southern  Wadi  el-Mishnaqa. 
Far  better  preserved  is  the  south-west  side  of  the  circumvallation,  running  along  a 
gradually  diminishing  ridge  to  the  north-west.  Halfway  along,  around  350  metres  from 
B,  fies  the  small,  rectangular  Camp  C  (ca.  0.02  ha)  (Strobel  1974a,  117;  1974b,  147), 
and  at  the  western  apex  of  the  system  Res  Camp  D,  an  elongated  square  (ca.  0.125  ha), 
both  with  the  standard  2  m-thick  walls  (Strobel  1974a,  114;  1974b,  150). 
112 Interestingly,  Strobel  discovered  a  series  of  expansions  along  this  stretch  of  the  circurn- 
vallation,  and  took  their  presence  to  be  somehow  related  to  the  relatively  low  height  of 
the  ridge,  implying  a  strategic  weakness.  Eight  were  detected  on  the  stretch  between 
camps  C  and  D,  spaced  at  intervals  of  roughly  30  metres,  the  smallest  measuring  1.8  m 
x  3.0  m,  the  largest  2.5  mx4.0  m,  with  the  longer  dimension  extending  laterally  along 
the  barrier  (1974a,  117;  1974b,  148).  Another  two  larger  examples  were  found  on  the 
stretch  between  camps  C  and  B,  measuring  around  2m  deep  and  extending  4.0-4.7  me- 
tres  along  the  barrier  (1974a,  117;  1974b,  147).  Strobel  believed  that  they  resembled 
the  foundations  of  towers,  and  compared  them  with  the  towers  at  Masada  (below,  pp. 
11  U  ),  which  were  in  turn  linked  to  the  Numantia  examples  (above,  p.  104). 
From  Camp  D,  the  circumvallation  runs  due  north,  down  the  slope  of  the  Southern 
Wadi  el-Mishnaqa  for  about  150  m,  before  abutting  with  Camp  E  (ca.  0.025  ha),  which 
is  well  placed  to  control  any  movement  along  the  broad  valley  bottom,  some  30  m  be- 
low.  It  was  perhaps  intended  as  a  rectangle,  but  the  north  wall  extends  farther  from  the 
baftier  than  the  south  wall  (Strobel  1974a,  114;  1974b,  152).  Two  platforms  of  stones, 
one  towards  the  north  end  of  the  camp  (4.0  x  4.0  m),  the  other  towards  the  south  end 
(5.0  mx5.5  m),  have  been  interpreted  as  catapult-platforms  (Strobel  1974b,  153:  "Es  ist 
denkbar,  ja,  nicht  unwahrscheirdich,  daB  auf  diesen  relativ  mdchtigen  Sockeln 
Geschijtze  postiert  warefi").  Opposite  Camp  E,  on  the  other  side  of  the  valley,  Strobel 
postulated  a  counterpart,  Cwnp  F,  on  the  basis  of  stone  scatters  (1974a,  114;  1974b, 
153),  but  this  must  remain  unproven. 
In  crossing  the  Southern  Wadi  el-Mishnaqa,  the  circumvallation  changes  allgrunent, 
tracking  back  to  the  north-east,  and  incorporating  the  tiny  Camp  G  (ca.  0.012  ha)  on  the 
way  (Strobel  1974a,  114;  1974b,  155).  Ile  line  peters  out  as  it  reaches  the  high  saddle, 
linking  the  fortress  of  Machaerus  with  the  ground  to  the  west,  but  it  commences  again, 
to  head  down  the  side  of  the  Northern  Wadi  el-Mishnaqa  on  a  different  allgnnient.  Ap- 
proximately  50  m  above  the  valley  bottom  Res  Camp  I  (ca.  0.04  ha),  no  doubt  fifflilling 
the  same  function  as  its  southern  counterpart,  Camp  E.  Abutting  the  north  wall  of  the 
camp,  Strobel  detected  a  massive  concentration  of  stones,  6.0  rn  wide  by  8.0  rn  long, 
113 which  he  interpreted  as  an  observation  platform  (1974b,  159;  not  mentioned  at  1974a, 
109). 
The  wall  heads  back  up  the  other  side  of  the  Northern  Wadi  el-Mishnaqa  to  the  northern 
apex  of  the  system,  where  Strobel  interpreted  a  widespread  scatter  of  stones  as  Camp  K 
(1974a,  109;  1974b,  161).  He  postulated  the  presence  of  heavy  artillery  here,  on  the 
basis  of  a  limestone  ball  of  40  cm  diameter,  found  nearby  (1974a,  109;  1974b,  161-162; 
see  further,  p.  18  1,  below). 
From  the  north  apex,  the  circumvallation  turns  southeast  for  a  distance  of  around  175  m, 
before  kinking  northeast  to  correct  its  alignment  and  abut  Camp  L  (ca.  0.04  ha),  100  m 
farther  on.  Strobel  has  interpreted  the  kink  as  a  bastion,  commanding  views  of  the 
northern  valley  (1974b,  162),  but  it  may  just  be  the  result  of  a  correction  to  another 
poorly-aligned  stretch.  No  traces  of  the  northeastern  quadrant  of  the  system  were  re- 
covered,  although  a  new  length  of  circumvallation  has  been  suggested  on  the  basis  of 
aerial  photography  (Kennedy  &  Riley  1990,99). 
The  Roman  assault  was  launched  from  the  west,  along  the  ridge  of  high  ground  (see  be- 
low,  p.  151),  and  it  is  in  this  vicinity,  some  60  m  behind  the  circumvallation,  that 
Strobel  discovered  Camp  H  (ca.  0.18  ha).  With  walls  2.9  m  thick,  it  has  more  robust 
defences  than  the  other  camps,  and,  in  combination  with  its  commanding  position,  it  is 
probably  to  be  interpreted  as  the  headquarters  (Strobel  1974a,  109;  1974b,  157-158). 
5.  Masada  (IsraeD 
Josephus  records  that  when  Flavius;  Silva  advanced  against  Masada  (fig.  26),  "he  imme- 
diately  conquered  the  whole  vicinity,  planting  posts  (phrourai)  at  the  most  advanta- 
geous  points,  and  threw  a  wall  in  a  circuit  all  around  the  fortress,  so  that  none  of  the  be- 
sieged  could  easily  escape"  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  7.275-276).  Studying  the  site  from  aerial 
photographs,  Hawkes  believed  that  Silva  first  encamped  on  the  east  side  at  B,  but  then 
abandoned  the  site  and  transferred  to  F,  "the  second  position  of  X  Fretensis"  (1929, 
199);  his  reasoning  was  partly  based  on  the  interpretation  of  B  as  a  temporary  camp 
114 (1929,201),  but  also  on  his  reading  of  Josephus,  whom  he  took  to  imply  that  Silva  had 
moved  to  the  so-called  Leuka,  on  the  western  side,  from  an  earlier  position  elsewhere. 
On  the  contrary,  Camp  B  is  no  more  temporary  than  any  of  the  other  works,  despite  the 
absence  of  associated  canabae  (Hawkes  1929,201);  no-one  would  now  suggest  that  it 
belongs  to  a  different  phase  from  Camp  F.  Furthermore,  the  Leuka  was  not  the  site  of 
Silva's  camp  (whether  primary  or  secondary),  but  an  advanced  position  at  the  base  of 
the  western  crags;  Josephus  simply  says  that  "Silva,  having  moved  up  onto  it  [viz.  the 
Leuka]  and  taken  possession  of  it,  ordered  his  troops  to  build  up  a  mound"  (Jos.,  Bell. 
Jud.  7.306).  Hawkes  (in  collaboration  with  Richmond)  later  criticised  Schulten  for  as- 
suming  that  Camps  B  and  F  were  contemporary  (Hawkes  &  Richmond  1934,73),  but 
Richmond  later  modified  his  position  (1962,145:  "B  occupies  the  site  of  a  temporary 
work,  perhaps  belonging  to  the  initial  stage").  In  fact,  there  was  never  any  reason  to 
suspect  more  than  one  period  of  occupation  in  any  camp,  except  F  (below,  p.  116). 
Faint  traces  of  aI  ha  rectangular  camp  are  discernible  surrounding  Camp  C;  its  de- 
fences  had  perhaps  been  quarried  to  provide  material  for  the  latter  (fig.  52;  cf  Hawkes 
1929,201  and  plate  IV).  This  earlier  camp  has  escaped  scholarly  discussion  (Richmond 
makes  no  mention  of  it,  although  he  shows  it  on  his  plan:  1962,  fig.  5),  but  it  perhaps 
acconunodated  an  advanced  reconnaissance  party,  rather  than  belonging  to  an  altogether 
different  occasion.  (Hawkes,  ibid.,  suggests  an  unattested  expedition  by  Ventidius  Bas- 
sus  in  39  B.  C.  ) 
It  would  accord  well  with  standard  practice  (above,  p.  87),  if  Silva  had  established 
camps  at  B  and  F,  prior  to  commencing  the  other  siege-works.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  they  are  very  similar  in  layout  and  size  (1.99  ha  and  1.96  ha,  respectively),  and  each 
has  four  clavicular  gateways  (cf.  fig.  54),  whereas  the  other  camps  display  a  range  of 
styles  (cf.  Richmond  1962,146).  Silva  will  then  have  established  supplementary  en- 
campments,  prior  to  constructing  the  barrier  itself  (Schulten  1933,93;  Richmond  1962, 
153).  The  detached  camp  C  (fig.  52),  while  really  only  fortlet-sized  at  0.43  ha,  will 
have  supplied  manpower  to  patrol  the  eastern  sector;  the  others  in  the  vicinity,  A  and  D, 
at  0.24  ha,  are  little  more  than  half  as  large.  Similarly,  in  the  west,  the  0.43  ha  camp  E 
115 will  have  been  the  lynch-pin  (fig.  54),  with  much  smaller  outposts  at  G  (0.19  ha)  and  H 
(0.15  ha).  (The  later  reduction  of  Camp  F  to  F2  has  been  convincingly  explained  as  ac- 
commodation  for  a  garrison  left  behind  after  completion  of  the  siege:  Yadin  1966,218- 
219,  proving  the  conjectures  of  Hawkes  1929,211;  Hawkes  &  Richmond  1934,74; 
Richmond  1962,152;  and  disproving  Schulten  1933,156-162.  ) 
Richmond  believed  Camps  D  and  H  to  "He  far  outside  the  range  of  any  serious  sortie 
and  quite  off  the  line  of  practicable  escape-routes"  (1962,152),  however  Yadin  noted 
that,  while  H  was  obviously  sited  for  its  observational  role  (1966,223;  cf  Domaszewski 
1909,224  n.  1),  D  was  well  placed  to  guard  the  Wadi  Nimre  (1966,222;  cf  Schulten 
1933,152),  along  which  individuals  could  easily  have  made  a  surreptitious  exit,  Rich- 
mond  notwithstanding.  In  fact,  Richmond  believed  D  (and  H)  to  have  been  "designed 
solely  as  patrol  forte'  (1962,152),  but  the  existence  of  a  substantial  officer's  house  in  D 
(Schulten  1933,153)  perhaps  indicates  a  more  important  role  for  the  camp,  situated  at 
the  head  of  the  supply  route  to  En  Geddi. 
The  roles  of  B  and  F  are  doubled  by  A  and  E,  and  Camp  C  covers  a  gateway  through 
the  circumvallation  onto  the  broad,  level  expanse,  stretching  between  50  rn  and  250  rn 
up  to  the  foot  of  Masada;  it  is  significant  that  the  "Snake  PatW',  the  only  means  of  ac- 
cess  to  the  fortress  top  from  the  east,  came  down  onto  the  plain  opposite  C.  Finally,  the 
peculiar  Camp  G,  whose  keyv-hole  shaped  defences  narrow  as  they  ascend  the  western 
slope,  served  as  a  link  between  the  command  centre  in  the  north-west  and  Camp  H,  iso- 
lated  on  the  high  plateau  above,  as  well  as  affording  a  clear  he  of  sight  with  Camp  A. 
Yadin  also  observed  that,  in  desperate  circumstances,  the  southern  cliffs  of  Masada 
could  be  negotiated  in  mountaineering  fashion,  and  Camp  G  was  well placed  to  prevent 
this  (1966,223). 
The  circurnvallation  itself  measures  4Y2km,  but,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  does 
not  form  a  complete  circuit:  the  eastern  stretch  was  broken  at  D  by  the  Wadi  Nimre,  and 
between  A  and  C  by  the  Wadi  Sebbe;  the  western  stretch  was  halted  at  F  by  the  northern 
cliffs,  and  at  H  by  the  southern  cliffi.  Movement  was  still  possible  across  all  of  these 
obstructions,  except  the  vertiginous  southern  cliff-face  (cf.  Schulten  1933,94,  for  an 
116 attempt  by  his  Bedouin  guides  to  negotiate  this),  but  the  2  m-wide  zig-zag  road  travers- 
ing  the  cliffs  in  the  north  was  probably  usable  only  by  foot  and  by  mule,  owing  to  the 
steep  gradient. 
Schulten  was  conscious  of  this  separation  into  a  western  and  an  eastern  sector,  even 
stating  that,  while  Silva  arrived  on  the  east  side,  a  separate  army  corps  arrived  on  the 
west  from  Hebron  (1933,92).  However,  as  he  acknowledges,  the  construction  of  the 
zig-zag  road,  linking  the  two  sectors  in  the  nortk  will  have  been  a  priority  (ibid.  ),  and 
there  is  thus  no  reason  to  separate  the  operations  into  two  distinct  theatres  (pace 
Hawkes  &  Richmond  1934,73).  Although  their  idiosyncratic  scheme  of  an  eastern 
phase,  "the  cutting  off  a  retreat  (sic)  by  the  completion  of  the  eastern  worle',  followed 
by  a  later  western  phase,  "when  the  works  of  assault  were  made"  (ibid.  ),  was  quietly 
dropped  in  later  years  by  Richmond,  he  unfortunately  over-compensated  by  suggesting 
that  "Silva  slept  in  the  headquarters  at  B,  but  occupied  F  during  the  day"  (Richmond 
1962,151).  This  would  certainly  have  been  possible,  but  less  than  desirable,  if  he 
wished  to  maintain  effective  supervision  of  the  developing  assault. 
Schulten  thought  it  unlikely  that  a  palisade  preceded  the  dry-stone  wall  (1933,92),  and 
indeed,  besides  the  general  shortage  of  timber  in  this  waterless  zone,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  a  palisade  could  have  been  planted  in  the  rocky  terrain  (cf  Hawkes  1929,203: 
"unnecessary  as  well  as  impossible").  Nor  did  Silva  trouble  to  cut  a  ditch.  The  circurn- 
vallation  itself  incorporates  five  of  the  camps  (A,  D,  E,  G,  H),  of  which  only  D  fies  en- 
tirely  behind  the  line.  The  wall,  dry-built  with  vertical  rubble  faces,  varies  between  1.50 
m.  and  1.80  m  thick  (cf.  fig.  51),  and  is  estimated  to  have  been  three  metres  high 
(Schulten  1933,93;  cf.  Yadin  1966,215).  Hawkes  extrapolated  a  height  of  six  feet 
(1  .  80  m)  and  a  width  of  10  feet  (3.05  m)  from  the  rampart  spread  which  he  observed, 
but  he  postulated  the  use  of  the  soldiers'  standard  issue  palisade  stakes  to  support  a  tim- 
ber  sentry-walk  and  breastwork,  "for  piled  desert  stones  could  hardly  bear  them  alone" 
(1929,202). 
The  security  of  the  long,  exposed  eastern  stretch  between  Camps  A  and  D  was  tightened 
by  a  series  of  towers,  set  at  80-100  m  intervals  (Domaszewski  1909,224;  Hawkes  1929, 
117 197;  Schulten  1933,93;  Richmond  1962,153;  Yadin  1966,215).  Domaszewski  nwked 
fourteen  towers  on  his  plan  (1909,  fig.  1101),  but  admitted  that  he  had  spent  less  than  a 
day  at  the  site  (1909,221  n.  4).  Hawkes's  map,  on  the  other  hand,  drawn  from  aerial 
photographs,  shows  twelve  towers  (plus  two  south  of  A  and  two  west  of  D),  all  strad- 
dling  the  line,  but  one  of  these  is  actually  the  gateway  through  the  circumvallation  at 
Camp  C  (cf.  fig.  52).  One  tower  had  evidently  disappeared  by  the  time  of  Schulten's 
visit,  as  he  found  only  ten,  and  a  single  tower  to  the  south  of  A  (1933,93  and  Plan  I). 
However,  Richmond  claimed  to  have  discerned  both  towers  south  of  A,  and  a  new  one 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Wadi  Sebbe,  making  the  total  back  up  to  fifteen  (1962,153  and 
fig.  5).  (During  a  visit  lasting  several  days  in  October  1985,1  could  only  discern  those 
towers  indicated  by  Schulten.  ) 
Hawkes  believed  the  towers  to  have  been  "timber  framed,  and  timber  walled  above, 
with  a  solid  stone  lower  storey  at  least  as  high  as  the  wall  they  bestrode",  somewhat  re- 
scmbling  those  at  Numantia,  but  more  in  the  manner  of  the  turrets  on  Hadrian's  Wall 
(1929,202).  This  reconstruction  was  not  well  received,  and  Schulten's  theory,  that  the 
towers  were,  on  the  contrary,  stone-built,  projecting  2-3  m  forward  of  the  line,  with  an 
upper  storey  for  signalling  (1933,93),  was  accepted  by  Hawkes  and  Richmond  (1934, 
72).  Although  Richmond  later  side-stepped  the  issue  of  design,  he  questioned 
Schulten's  statement  that  the  towers  projected  only  towards  Masada,  restating  Hawkes's 
observation  that  they  straddled  the  circumvallation  (1962,153).  Schulten's  proposed 
tower  dimensions  of  approximately  5  m.  deep  by  4  rn  wide  have  not  been  challenged. 
Finally,  Roth  has  made  the  surprising  comment  that  "the  circumvallation  may  have  been 
constructed  primarily  as  'busy  work'  for  the  army"  (1995,101),  based  on  his  calculation 
that  there  were  so  many  soldiers  present  that  a  dense  system  of  pickets  could  easily  have 
been  established.  It  is  more  likely  that,  following  Titus's  experience  at  Jerusalem,  the 
circumvallation  was  adopted  as  a  standard  preliminary  measure,  as  it  was  apparently 
viewed  during  the  Caesarian  period. 
118 6.  Narbata  (Israel) 
A  Roman  circumvallation  has  been  recognised  at  Khirbet  el-Hamam  (fig.  32),  where  a 
settlement,  thought  to  be  ancient  Narbata,  crowns  a  steep-sided,  conical  hill,  and  spreads 
across  a  low  saddle  to  a  second,  southern  hill  (Zertal  1981,112;  1995,71-73).  Curi- 
ously,  the  circumvallation  consists  of  a  U-shaped  barrier,  open  to  the  south-east,  which 
the  excavator  latterly  attributed  to  a  speedy  surrender  by  the  town  (Zertal  1995,77;  92); 
earlier,  he  had  postulated  wholesale  stone-robbing  for  the  construction  of  a  large  medie- 
val  building  on  the  south  hill,  thought  to  be  a  Maniluk  khan  (Zertal  1981,114-115).  A 
third  possibility,  that  the  south-eastern  side  was  deliberately  left  open,  the  gap  being 
filled  by  soldiers  (Zertal  1984b,  25),  makes  no  military  sense,  is  found  nowhere  else  in 
Roman  siegecraft,  and  may  safely  be  discounted.  The  stone-robbing  explanation  seems 
most  likely,  given  that  a  small  stretch  was  apparently  found  on  the  western  flank  of  the 
southern  hill  (Zertal  1981,114:  "on  the  southern  side,  only  a  small  section  of  it  sur- 
vives";  not  mentioned  in  the  1995  publication). 
The  overall  length  of  the  surviving  barrier  has  been  calculated  as  1.5  km;  the  complete 
circumvallation  will  have  measured  somewhat  over  2  krn.  Like  Machaerus,  the  plan  is 
rhomboidal,  but  no  camps  anchor  the  comers.  Along  the  south-western  stretch  Ca-b!  ' 
on  fig.  32),  the  wall  measured  2.2  m  in  width  (Zertal  1981,113);  the  excavation  of  a  10 
m-long  section  on  the  north-eastem  stretch  Ce-f'  on  fig.  32)  revealed  that  the  2.15-2.20 
m-wide  wall  stood  in  a  rock-cut  foundation  trench,  and  comprised  an  inner  and  an  outer 
face  of  large  stones  (approximately  40  x  50  x  60  cm.  ),  enclosing  a  rubble  core.  A  puta- 
tive  reconstruction  of  the  wall  attained  1.7  metres  in  height,  which  the  excavator  con- 
sidered  to  be  "about  70  per  cent  of  its  original  height"  (Zertal  1984a,  52;  cf  1984b,  25: 
"2.20  metres  ...  was  apparently  also  its  height");  later,  the  original  height  was  estimated 
at  "no  less  than  2  m7'  (Zertal  1995,77). 
The  excavator  found  evidence  of  three  camps,  only  one  of  which  (Camp  B)  was  bonded 
into  the  circumvallation;  he  postulated  a  Camp  A,  sited  on  the  southern  hill  and  obliter- 
ated  by  medieval  building  work  (Zertal  1995,80),  but  there  is  no  real  evidence  for  this. 
Camp  B  fies  on  the  north-eastern  stretch,  slightly  to  the  north  of  the  mid-point,  on  the 
slope  of  el-Birkeh,  from  where  it  commands  views  over  the  north  and  east  of  Narbata. 
119 A  rectangle  of  less  than  0.05  ha,  it  compares  with  the  medium-sized  camps  L  and  I  at 
Machaerus  (above,  pp.  113  Q,  but  there  is  nothing  as  small  at  Masada.  It  is  defended  by 
a  2.2  m-thick  rampart,  which  survived  to  a  height  of  1.5  m,  but  appears  to  sit  on  a  raised 
stone  platform  which  projects  two  metres  beyond  the  camp  on  three  sides  (the  east  side 
was  not  excavated),  and  carries  the  circumvallation  wall  past  on  the  west  (Zertal  1995, 
80-83). 
The  remaining  camps  he  to  the  north-west.  Camp  C,  around  10  metres  outside  the  cir- 
cumvallation,  is  the  smallest  at  only  0.015  ha  (Zertal  1995,83);  in  size,  it  lies  midway 
between  Machaerus  camps  C  and  G,  which  were  designed  as  intermediate  points  be- 
tween  larger  forts.  However,  here,  it  is  solely  responsible  for  the  entire  north-west  sec- 
tor,  although  apparently  supported  from  the  rear  by  Camp  D.  Set  back  approximately 
150  metres,  this  camp  fies  on  higher  ground  below  the  summit  of  el-Kuleileh,  com- 
manding  a  view  over  the  western  side  of  Narbata.  Enclosed  in  poorly-preserved  2.5-3.0 
m-thick  waUs,  the  0.08  ha  carnp  is  the  largest,  but  still  cannot  match  the  main  forts,  B, 
D,  and  H,  at  Machaerus. 
Although,  on  different  occasions,  Zertal  has  mentioned  three  projecting  platforms 
(1981,114)  and  two  towers  (1984b,  25),  only  one  of  these  features  has  survived  into  the 
final  report  (Zertal  1995,77  and  fig.  10).  This  is  the  platform,  I  metre  wide  by  3  metres 
long,  projecting  towards  Narbata  on  the  south-westem  stretch  ("a-b"  on  fig.  32).  How- 
ever,  he  makes  no  further  mention  of  this,  and  does  not  venture  any  interpretation.  A 
buttress  in  this  position  would  seem  unnecessary,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  fea- 
ture  defies  explanation. 
Zertal  has  likened  Camp  B  to  Masada  camps  A,  D,  E,  G  and  H,  characterised  as  "small, 
operational  camps  ...  providing  a  base  for  patrols  and  other  military  activities"  (1984b, 
26),  and  "tactical  bases  rather  than  living-quarters"  (1995,91).  The  analogy  is inaccu- 
rate,  as  troops  undoubtedly  bivouacked  in  A,  D,  E,  G,  and  H  at  Masada,  but  Zertal's 
claim  that  they  did  not  at  Narbata  leaves  unanswered  the  question  of  living-quarters. 
Zertal  side-steps  this,  by  proposing  that  the  troops  involved  "did  not  have  sufficient 
time  and  manpower  to  build  a  sophisticated  and  larger  systefff'  (1995,91),  but  he  had 
120 earlier  postulated  a  work-force  of  5,000  men  supported  by  another  5,000  (1984,118). 
Regardless  of  the  army  size,  the  construction  of  a  base  camp  was  fundamental  (above, 
pp.  84ff.  ),  and  we  must  assume  that  such  a  camp  lies  undiscovered  in  the  vicinity  of 
Khirbet  el-Hamam. 
7.  Bettir  asraen 
The  ancient  site  known  variously  as  Bethar,  Beth-Ter  or  (as  here)  Bettir  is  located  on 
Khirbet  el-Yahud,  a  steep-sided  plateau,  connected  by  a  saddle  to  a  higher  hill  on  the 
south-cast  side.  It  is  enclosed  on  three  sides  by  barrier  walls,  which  probably  originally 
formed  a  circumvallation.  The  outlines  of  two  camps  have  been  noted  there  (Kennedy 
&  Riley  1990,103),  one  of  8.3  ha,  the  other  of  2.63  ha.;  other,  sknilarly  sized  or 
smaller,  camps  have  been  detected  farther  afield  (fig.  28). 
The  four  stretches  of  circurnvallation,  earlier  observed  by  Alt  (1927),  were  confirmed 
by  Schulten  (1933,181-183):  a  roughly  north-south  stretch,  lying  to  the  east  of  Bettir 
(shown  as  a  dotted  line  on  fig.  28);  a  sharp  comer  and  an  800  m  stretch  running  west 
(also  dotted);  a  doubled  stretch,  the  so-called  "ladder",  running  south-west  Ca7'  on  fig. 
28);  and,  following  a  30  rn  gap  caused  by  the  laying  of  a  railway,  a  straight  stretch  run- 
ning  south-east  ("b"),  with  a  short  length  apparently  doubled.  A  southern  loop,  com- 
pleting  the  circumvallation,  was  never  discovered  but  was  thought  likely.  The  entire 
circuit  would  have  measured  some  4  krn  (Schulten  1933,183).  The  remains  have  been 
extensively  disturbed  by  a  modem  forestry  plantation  and  cultivation  terraces,  and  a 
housing  estate  now  sits  where  the  southern  stretch  would  have  run  (cf.  Kennedy  &  Riley 
1990,102-103). 
No  excavation  has  ever  taken  place  along  the  circumvallation,  but  Alt  reported  that  the 
north-south  stretch  to  the  east  of  the  hill  comprised  two  parallel  walls  with  a  3.40  m  in- 
filling  (Alt  1927,12:  "zwei  parallelen  Laufen  mit  durchschnittlich  3,40  m  Zwischen- 
raum!  ').  Ussishkin's  tantalising  remark,  that  "at  places  along  the  siege  wall  remains  of 
structures  can  be  discerned  which  probably  served  the  guards  on  the  wall"  (Ussisbkin 
1993,96),  remains  unsubstantiated;  in  particular,  his  plan  (Wd.,  67)  includes  no  sub- 
stantial  differences  from  Schulten's,  and  he  has  perhaps  been  confused  by  the  modem 
121 cross-walls  which  Schulten  discemed  Unking  the  legs  of  the  Iaddee'  (Schulten  1933, 
182;  not  shown  on  fig.  28). 
Schulten  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  curious  doubling  of  the  wall  to  form  the  "ladder" 
("a7')  indicated  two  lines  of  circumvallation,  upon  which  he  declined  to  confer  a  techni- 
cal  term  (1933,182-183:  "eine  doppelte  EinschUeBungsMe').  Indeed,  he  took  the  op- 
portunity  to  criticise  Napol6on's  mistaken  use  of  the  terms  "contrevaRation7'  and  "cir- 
convallatiorf'  at  Alesia  (cf  above,  p.  I  11).  Nevertheless,  as  an  example  of  ConnoRy's 
"bicircumvaUatiorf',  it  is  not  persuasive.  First,  the  outer  line  diverges  sharply  from  the 
inner,  until  they  eventually  He  35  metres  apart.  And  second,  the  outer  line  continues  far 
beyond  the  point  where  the  inner  line  turns  to  join  the  south-west  stretch  of  circumvalla- 
tion  C'b").  If  both  lines  are  Roman,  the  peculiar  effect  is  perhaps  caused  by  the  corrcc- 
tion  of  a  misaligned  stretch,  in  order  to  shorten  the  overall  circuit. 
8.  Cremna  LTurkp 
The  town  of  Cremna  is  situated  on  a  spur,  surrounded  to  the  north,  east  and  south  by 
steep  valleys,  and  is  only  accessible  from  the  west,  where  a  well-built  Hellenistic  wall, 
equipped  with  a  series  of  twelve  towers,  defends  it  against  attack.  The  wall  is  fronted 
by  a  shallow  valley,  130-220  m  wide,  to  the  west  of  which  Res  the  first  of  two  barrier 
walls;  the  second  lies  180-280  rn  farther  west  (fig.  29). 
The  excavator  has  claimed  that  'Iwo  walls  of  circumvallation  were  built  facing  the  city" 
(Mitchell  1989,317;  1995,195),  of  which  the  eastern  ran  "along  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
which  looks  towards  Cremna  from  the  west"  (Mitchell  1995,201),  and  the  western  fol- 
lowed  a  second  north-south  ridge  (ibid.,  204).  The  eastern  barrier  incorporates  eight 
turrets,  either  on  or  slightly  to  the  west  of  the  wall,  with  a  ninth  CTurret  7")  set  back 
some  50  m  to  the  west;  the  western  barrier  incorporates  four  turrets,  either  on  or  slightly 
to  the  east  of  the  wall.  Schulten  would  have  had  no  hesitation  in  pronouncing  the  sys- 
tem  "eine  doppelte  EinschheBungslinid". 
Mitchell  goes  to  great  lengths  to  deny  this  interpretation,  claiming  that  "there  is  no  con- 
vincing  evidence  that  it  was  designed  to  protect  the  Roman  encampment  against  attacks 
122 from  the  wesf'  (Mitchell  1995,204).  On  the  contrary,  the  only  evidence  available, 
namely  the  siting  of  the  turrets,  strongly  suggests  that  the  western  wall  faced  west. 
Mitchell's  own  topographic  survey  (1995,197  fig.  52)  indicates  that  the  two  walls  de- 
marcate  a  wide  corridor,  at  the  edges  of  which  the  ground  slopes  away  to  east  and  west; 
just  as  the  eastern  wall  commands  the  ground  to  the  east  from  its  position  on  a  ridge,  so 
the  western  wall  dominates  the  terrain  to  the  west  (see  fig.  29). 
Strangely,  Mitchell  prefers  to  interpret  the  western.  wall  as  a  kind  of  second  line  of  de- 
fence  against  the  town,  although  he  is forced  thereby  to  admit  that  "militarily  ... 
it  may 
have  been  superfluous"  (Mitchell  1995,204).  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  "any 
military  planner  will  have  reckoned  that  two  investing  walls  were  securer  than  one' 
(ibid.,  205),  otherwise  many  more  circurnvallations;  would  have  been  doubled.  How- 
ever,  envisaging  both  walls  facing  east  in  this  manner,  with  a  forward  line  and  a  "fall 
back!  '  position,  is  anachronistic.  It  is  true  that  some  town  defences  were  laid  out  with 
proteichismata  screening  the  main  wall,  but  Mitchell's  scheme  bears  only  a  superficial 
resemblance  to  these. 
Both  walls  were  1.8-2.0  rn  thick  (Mitchell  1995,196;  201),  although  "much  of  [the 
outer,  western  he]  was  less  substantially  built"  (ibid.,  204).  The  quantity  of  tumbled 
stone  suggested  to  the  excavator  that  the  walls  had  originally  stood  2.0-2.5  rn  high 
(ibid.,  196;  201).  At  one  point,  the  inner,  eastern  wall  was  carefully  laid  in  a  foundation 
trench,  about  0.40  m  deep,  and  rubble  was  packed  between  two  faces  of  rough  quarried 
stone.  The  peculiar  double  wall  effect  around  Turret  13  recalls  a  similar  feature  at  Bet- 
tir  (above,  p.  122),  and  may  be  the  result  of  a  realignment  to  ensure  that  the  turret  was 
enclosed  behind  the  wall.  At  any  rate,  the  excavator's  proposed  interpretation  as  "a  nar- 
row  enclosure  for  the  animals  which  were  needed  for  transport  and  supply  purposes" 
(ibid.,  205)  seems  unlikely. 
The  turrets  are  irregularly  spaced,  and  no  information  is  available  regarding  intervisibil- 
ity.  Turret  2  is  approximately  160  m  north  of  Turret  1,  near  the  south  end  of  the  inner 
fine,  while  Turret  3  Hes  only  30  m  further  on  (Mtchefl  1995,202),  Here,  again,  a  dou- 
bled  stretch  of  waR  may  indicate  remodeffing.  Turret  4  lies  150  m  finiher  north,  set 
123 back  from  the  wall  which  loops  around  its  prominent  position.  As  the  turret  "may  have 
enclosed  a  tower  4-5  m  square'  (ibid.,  202),  and  as  the  facing  section  of  town  wall  dis- 
plays  an  unusual  degree  of  damage,  the  excavator  postulated  an  artillery  battery  here. 
The  next  turret,  Turret  5,  lies  100  m  Eirther  on,  and  Turret  6  another  65  metres  to  the 
north.  The  stretch  of  wall  between  the  two  apparently  exhibited  "stone  heaps  (which) 
could  represent  the  positions  of  siege  engines"  (ibid.,  203).  Turret  7's  position  65  m 
farther  on  is  vacant,  as  the  turret  is  set  on  a  hillock  50  m  behind  the  fine  of  the  wall. 
Accordingly,  there  is  a  gap  of  over  100  m  between  Turret  6  and  Turret  8,  and  another  50 
m  to  Turret  9,  sitting  at  the  northern  end  of  the  line.  No  dimensions  are  given  for  any  of 
these  structures. 
Turret  10  Hes  midway  between  the  two  barrier  walls,  and  was  perhaps  sited  to  provide 
communications  between  the  two.  The  twin  barrier  walls  at  Carthage  (above,  p.  100) 
were  closed  off  at  the  ends,  probably  to  prevent  the  kind  of  infiltration  which  Caesar  fell 
victim  to  at  Dyrrachiurn  (no.  143);  Turret  10  was  perhaps  sited  with  this  in  mind. 
Turret  II  sits  at  the  northern  end  of  the  outer  fine,  around  I  10  rn  west  of  Turret  10.  'Me 
spacing  on  the  outer  fine  is  far  greater  than  that  on  the  inner  line.  A  gap  of  about  175  rn 
Res  between  Turrets  II  and  12,  and  the  same  between  12  and  13.  Turret  14  is  360  m 
south  of  13,  but  an  intermediate  post  may  originally  have  lain  in  the  area  now  occupied 
by  a  putative  encampment.  This  0.17  ha  enclosure,  interpreted  by  the  excavator  as  a 
headquarters  building,  abuts  the  outside  of  the  western  wall;  this  is  certainly  a  curious 
position  for  the  main  camp,  and  we  would  expect  the  general  in  charge,  apparently  Ter- 
entius  Marcianus,  to  be  based  nearer  to  the  action.  Although  confidently  plotted  on  the 
plan,  the  remains  of  the  camp  are  very  fragmentary;  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  struc- 
ture  post-dates  the  siege  (Davies  2000,154). 
The  absence  of  any  camps  in  the  vicinity  is  peculiar,  although  it  seems  that  the  troops 
would  have  been  accommodated  in  the  area  between  the  two  barrier  walls.  The  situa- 
tion  here  is  strikingly  reminiscent  of  Scipio's  works  at  Carthage;  there,  Appian  (Pun. 
120)  records  that  the  space  between  the  earthworks  was  used  as  a  camp. 
124 9.  Hatra  (Iraq) 
The  circular  desert  city  of  Hatra  is  surrounded,  at  a  distance  of  300-500  m,  by  a  circum- 
vallation  approximately  9.6  km  in  length  (fig.  27a).  Andrae  found  it  still  standing  up  to 
2  metres  high  in  places,  and  up  to  4  metres  wide  (Andrae  1912,20).  In  several  places, 
he  revealed  a  rough  stone  foundation,  supporting  two  facing  walls  and  almost  2  metres, 
of  rubble  core  (fig.  27b);  at  metre  intervals,  the  wall  was  braced  internally  by  0.5  rn- 
thick  cross  walls,  dividing  the  rubble  core  into  compartments.  The  outer  face  was  0.50 
m  wide,  whereas  the  inner  face  was  1.50  m  wide,  suggesting  that  the  wall  was  oriented 
towards  the  city;  traces  of  a  shallow  ditch  inside  the  circuit  appear  to  confirm  this  in- 
ward-looking  orientation  (Andrae  1912,2  1). 
Bradford  contradicts  Andrae's  findings  when  he  records  that  the  wall  was  "a  low  earth- 
work  only  a  few  feet  high"  (1957,73).  Indeed,  the  barrier  is  sometimes  called  an  "earth 
waT'  (e.  g.,  Drijvers  1977,804:  "einem  AuBeren,  fast  kreisf6nnigen  Erdwalr'),  and  later 
investigations  have  allegedly  revealed  a  limestone  rubble  foundation,  piled  up  with 
earth  (Al-Salihi  1991,188);  judgement  must  be  reserved  pending  publication  of  the  de- 
taUs. 
Scholars  have  been  divided  as  to  the  origin  of  this  fortification.  Al-Salihi  considers  it  to 
have  been  an  outer  circuit  of  the  city  (1991'.  188:  "invading  soldiers  would  be  visible  to 
the  defending  Hatrenes  when  they  crossed  it"),  but  most  other  scholars  agree  that  it 
represents  an  investing  work.  There  remains  a  disagreement  regarding  the  identity  of 
the  besieging  force.  It  was  Crawford's  belief  that  the  circumvallation  was  Roman 
(1929,501-502;  followed  by  Bradford  1957,74),  although  the  absence  of  guard-posts 
around  its  circuit  might  have  given  him  pause  for  thought. 
Andrae,  on  the  other  hand,  preferred  a  Sasanian  origin,  on  the  grounds,  firstly,  that  the 
Hatrenes  would  surely  have  destroyed  a  Roman  work  after  the  army's  departure,  and 
secondly,  that  such  a  painstaking  enterprise  must  have  resulted  from  a  long  siege  opera- 
tion  (1912,21).  Others  have  accepted  the  logic  of  Andrae's  argument  (e.  g.,  Stein  1941, 
305-306:  "protracted  and  heavy  labours 
...  attnibution  to  the  prolonged  Sasanian  siege 
seems  justified";  no  particular  reason  is  stated  by  Gawlikowski  1994,49:  "siege  wall, 
125 most  probably  due  to  Sassanian  troops  investing  the  place  in  239  A.  D.  "),  but  the  length 
of  the  siege  really  has  no  bearing  on  the  problem.  A  siege-wall  was  just  as  likely  to 
originate  from  a  20-day  siege  as  from  a  2-year  siege,  as  Bradford  noted  (1957,74  n.  2: 
"it  is  important  to  note  that  large  earthworks  can  be  raised  very  quickly  by  men  under 
pressure'). 
Others  remain  undecided,  conscious  of  the  fact  that  there  still  may  be  elements  of  the 
circumvallation  which  have  not  yet  come  to  fight  (e.  g.,  Gregory  &  Kennedy  1985,398 
note  to  p.  67:  "we  need  not  doubt  that  this  circumvallation  could  belong  to  the  final 
siege  ...  (nevertheless)  Severus  could  have  constructed  this  circumvallatiolf').  Kennedy 
and  Riley  have  made  the  novel  proposition  that  a  Roman  circumvallation  was  re-used 
by  Sasanian  besiegers  (1990,107:  "[Roman  cwnps]  dismantled  by  the  Sasanian  be- 
siegers  to  repair  the  circumvallatioxf),  a  theory  which  has  the  advantage  of  being 
equally  as  difficult  to  disprove  as  it  is  to  prove. 
In  the  no-man's  land  outside  the  east  gate  of  the  city,  Andrae  noted  a  three-sided  build- 
ing  which  lacked  a  rear  wall;  this  he  considered  to  have  posed  a  threat  to  the  besiegers 
in  this  sector  (Andrae  1912,22).  Opposite  it,  behind  the  circumvallation,  he  detected  a 
6-metre  high  mound,  with  a  flat  top  measuring  25  x  45  m.  Although  there  were  Arab 
graves  associated  with  it,  Andrae  postulated  a  connection  with  the  siege-wall,  and  Brad- 
ford  has  gone  a  stage  ftirther,  suggesting  that  it  was  "perhaps  a  platform.  for  ballistae", 
or  the  vantage  point  from  where  Severus  watched  the  progress  of  the  siege  (1957,74). 
The  three-sided  structure  could  conceivably  be  some  kind  of  outwork  screening  the 
eastern  gateway,  but  the  mound  need  not  even  be  an  element  of  the  siege-works;  both  of 
these  hypotheses  require  to  be  tested  by  excavation. 
Whether  or  not  we  concede  that  a  failed  Roman  circumvallation  would  have  been  lev- 
elied  by  the  Hatrenes,  the  peculiar  construction  of  the  wall,  and  the  absence  of  associ- 
ated  structures,  are  surely  the  decisive  points  in  favour  of  a  non-Roman  origin.  It  seems 
that  the  Sasanians  occasionally  built  siege-walls  (e.  g.,  Theod.,  Hist.  relig.  1.11-  12),  and 
overall,  it  perhaps  makes  better  sense  to  interpret  the  circumvallation  at  Hatra  as 
Shapur's  work  (above,  p.  70). 
126 As  far  as  the  Roman  sieges  are  concerned,  presumably  marching  camps  associated  with 
the  attempts  of  Trajan  and  Septimius  Severus  remain  to  be  discovered  in  the  neighbour- 
hood,  also.  Gawlikowski  has  attempted  to  elucidate  the  sequence  of  city  defences,  con- 
cluding  that  the  walls  which  can  be  seen  nowadays  date  only  from  the  mid-second  cen- 
tury,  and  that  the  defences  which  Trajan  assaulted  will  have  been  mudbrick  walls  on  a 
different  alignment,  marking  a  smaller  city  area  (Gawlikowski  1994,53-55).  The  re- 
pairs  to  the  second  century  wall,  of  which  Gawlikowski  found  evidence,  will  have  been 
occasioned  by  the  damage  caused  by  Septimius  Severus  (ibid.,  52). 
10.  Burnswark  (Scotland) 
One  other  putative  circumvallation  remains  to  be  considered.  Visitors  to  Burnswark  in 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  noted  the  existence  of  such  a  feature,  curving 
around  the  eastern  end  of  the  hill  (fig.  31).  In  his  Itinerarium  Septentrionale  of  1727, 
the  antiquarian,  Alexander  Gordon,  describes  "a  huge  rampart  of  stone  and  earth  round 
by  the  end  of  the  hill  which  joins  [the  southern  camp]  with  the  other  square  to  the  north- 
east  [Le.,  the  northern  camp]"  (quoted  by  Christison  et  aL  1898/99,201-202).  Some- 
what  later  (though  prior  to  1777),  General  William  Roy,  founder  of  the  Ordnance  Sur- 
vey,  discerned  "some  imperfect  vestiges  of  two  lines 
...  surrounding  the  cast  end  of  the 
hill,  and  including  between  them  two  weaker  posts"  (quoted  by  Christison  et  al. 
1898/99,207).  A  generation  later,  "the  remains  of  a  line  of  circumvallation,  which  ap- 
pears  to  have  surrounded  the  hilr',  were  still  evident,  to  judge  by  Chalmers'  Caledonia 
of  1807  (quoted  by  Christison  et  al.  1898/99,210). 
One  of  Roy's  two  intermediate  posts,  dismissed  as  a  sheepfold  by  Collingwood 
(1925/26,54),  has  been  recognised  as  a  native  settlement  (R.  C.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1997,180  fig. 
192);  the  other  has  disappeared  entirely,  but  is  quite  likely  to  have  been  a  native  settle- 
ment  also,  given  the  existence  of  others  around  the  base  of  the  hill.  This  leaves  Roy's 
circurnvallation. 
Ile  fact  that  the  hill  was  not  completely  surrounded  was  taken  to  cast  doubt  upon  the 
identification  of  the  earthworks  as  a  Roman  circumvallation  (R.  C.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1920,95), 
although  the  evidence  of  Agrigenturn  should  have  served  as  a  corrective.  The  further 
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tion'  and  the  large  enclosures"  (ibid.  ),  was  already  apparent  from  Roy's  plan,  published 
in  1793  (Christison  et  al.  1898/99,206  fig.  3,  although  Barbour's  plan  is  less  accurate  at 
this  point,  whether  by  mistake  or  by  design). 
Schulten  enthusiastically  embraced  Burnswark  as  another  example  of  a  Roman  circum- 
vallation,  alongside  Numantia,  Alesia  and  Masada.  But,  for  his  assessment  of  the  cir- 
cumvallation,  he  relied  almost  entirely  on  Barbour's  report,  as  he  considered  the  re- 
mains,  viewed  during  a  daymtrip  in  August  1913,  to  have  been  almost  entirely  destroyed 
by  later  agriculture  (Schulten  1914,611).  It  is  unfair  to  accuse  him  of  "obtuseness  and 
dogmatisnP  (Richmond  1955,3  02),  when  he  was  guilty  only  of  credulity. 
Collingwood  believed  that  Roy's  circurnvallation  was  nothing  more  than  an  old  field- 
division,  declaring  that  "careful  inspection 
...  was  enough  to  cast  grave  doubt  on  its  an- 
tiquity"  (1925/26,53).  Birley  respected  Collingwood's  authority  on  this,  assuming  that 
"the  rebels  were  contained  within  their  stronghold  by  patrols  and  pickets,  rather  than  by 
a  ditch  or  palisade"  (1939,316),  and  Richmond  poured  scorn  on  the  whole  idea  (1955, 
300-302).  However,  it  must  remain  moot,  for  Collingwood  did  not  excavate  the  feature, 
and  Barbour's  trench  across  it  raises  more  problems  than  it  solves. 
Investigating  the  circumvallation  to  the  north-east  of  the  hill,  Barbour  found  "a  ditch  in 
front  with  a  rampart  in  the  rear"  (Christison  et  al.  1898/99,235  and  fig.  14),  by  which 
he  evidently  meant  that  the  earthwork  faced  east.  However,  he  identified  a  second  line, 
closer  to  the  hillfort,  which  he  identified  as  "a  road  which  has  evidently  joined  the  south 
and  north  carnpe'  (ibid.,  236).  Barbour's  trench,  investigating  the  feature  east-south- 
east  of  the  hillfort,  revealed  a  10-foot  pavement,  cut  into  the  slope,  with  a  ditch  and 
rampart  to  the  east  (ibid.,  fig.  15).  Curiously,  the  sequence  of  elements  appears  to  be  in 
reverse  for  a  genuine  circurnvallation;  the  roadway  is  unshielded  from  the  hillfort,  but 
appears  to  be  fortified  on  the  outside.  As  Schulten  noted,  the  roadway  presents  an  odd- 
ity  (Schulten  1914,611:  "eine  SingularitAt"),  but  one  which  critics  have  quietly  ignored; 
Collingwood  claimed  to  have  disproved  it,  but  his  trial  trenches  appear  to  have  lain  to 
the  west,  where  there  may  have  been  no  circurnvallation  (1925/26,55:  his  investigation 
128 of  the  circurnvallation  is  linked  with  the  so-calIed  "west  forV',  now  thought  to  be  a  na- 
tive  settlement:  PLC.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1997,179). 
The  most  recent  commentary  on  the  site  prefers  the  "field  boundary"  interpretation 
(Frere  &  St  Joseph  1983,33),  but  it  is  perhaps  unwise  simply  to  dismiss  a  feature  which 
General  Roy  evidently  thought  to  be  genuine.  Only  further  archaeological  work  can 
elucidate  its  true  nature.  In  the  meantime,  "the  possibility  that  the  two  camps  were 
linked  by  a  road  cannot  be  discounted"  (PLCA.  H.  M.  S.  1997,18  1). 
11.  Woden  Law  (Scotind) 
Finally,  in  this  section,  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  case  of  Woden  Law,  although  it  has 
only  ever  been  claimed  as  the  site  of  practice  siege-works.  In  summary,  several  lines  of 
earthworks  are  upstanding  along  the  gentle  southern  and  eastern  slopes  of  a  small,  mul- 
tivallate  hillfort;  the  fort  itself  faces  south-cast,  and  access  is  difficult  from  the  north  and 
north-west. 
The  earthworks  comprise  three  main  groups  (R.  C.  A.  H.  M.  S.  1956,171-172;  Richmond 
&  St  Joseph  1982).  An  outer  he  C'W')  runs  obliquely  (north-south)  and  intermittently 
(four  separate  sections)  along  the  lower  slope,  beginning  far  to  the  south  of  the  hillfort 
itself,  but  approaching  to  within  100  m  at  its  north  end.  It  consists  of  a  single,  v-shaped 
ditch,  fronted  by  a  rampart,  but  a  sizable  section  is  missing  as  it  draws  level  with  the 
hillfort.  A  central  line  comprises  two  parallel  ditches  with  a  rampart  in  between  ('X), 
running  from  south-west  to  north-east,  again  beginning  far  to  the  south  of  the  hillfort, 
and  changing  alignment  slightly,  to  accommodate  the  presence  of  the  outer  line  ("W). 
Associated  with  ",  V'  is  a  similar  arrangement,  again  south  of  the  hillfort,  running  per- 
pendicular  and  crossing  over  ")C'  to  within  15  metres  of  "W'.  Finally,  the  inner  group 
("V'),  comprising  three  ditches  and  two  ramparts,  actually  wraps  around  the  hillfort, 
approaching  to  within  around  40  metres  of  the  hillfort  ramparts  at  the  southern  comer. 
Only  group  "T'  was  sectioned,  and  the  excavators  contended  that  it  iflustrated  "system- 
atic  engineering"  (Richmond  &  St  Joseph  1982,282),  with  the  frequent  interruptions  in 
the  ditches  constituting  "strildng  evidence  of  soldiers'  gang-work7'  (Richmond  1955, 
129 303).  The  excavators  characterised  the  outermost  rampart  of  this  group  as  "a  flat- 
topped  mound  19  feet  wide  at  the  base  and  two  feet  high,  retained  by  turf  cheeks  at  back 
and  front  and  ballasted  throughout  upon  a  triple  layer  of  turfwork!  '  (ibid.,  281);  this, 
they  further  claimed,  was  evidence  that  the  rampart  served  as  "platforms  or  emplace- 
ments  to  carry  siege  engines"  (ibid.,  282).  The  peculiar  nature  of  the  two  other  groups 
was  explained  by  reference  to  "the  apparent  illogicality  with  which  one  unfinished  work 
is  abandoned  for  another"  during  field  exercises  (ibid.,  283),  and  the  whole  site  was  in- 
terpreted  as  a  practice  siege. 
This  conclusion  has  met  with  general  approval  (e.  g.,  Frere  &  St  Joseph  1983,34-36), 
despite  Halliday's  contention  that  groups  "W",  'W'  and  "Y"  are  better  interpreted  as 
native  works,  on  analogy  with  the  likes  of  White  Hill  (Halliday  1982,80-83).  Indeed, 
even  'V  could  be  an  outlying  ring  of  hillfort  defences.  The  absence  of  associated  en- 
campments  is  suspicious,  and  the  explanation,  that  the  hillside  was  too  cold  and  wind- 
swept  for  soldiers  to  have  bivouacked  there  (Richmond  1955,303;  Richmond  &  St  Jo- 
scph  1982,283),  is  at  odds  with  the  alleged  fortitude  and  discipline  of  the  Roman  army 
(cf.  Richmond  1955,315).  The  excavators'  theory  of  artillery  emplacements  along  the 
ramparts  is  forced,  and,  in  the  end,  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  see  Romans  at  work 
on  the  hill  top  at  all. 
Dismissing  Woden  Law  removes  the  last  piece  of  evidence  for  the  existence  of  practice 
siege-works,  a  category  already  reduced  by  the  elevation  of  Burnswark  to  the  ranks  of 
genuine  sieges.  While  Roman  troops  were  undoubtedly  drilled  in  various  aspects  of 
warfare  (cE  Davies  1968),  a  discreet  veil  should  now  be  drawn  across  the  questionable 
notion  that  Roman  troops  required  specialist  training  in  assaulting  hill-forts. 
The  preceding  archaeological  examples  of  Roman  circumvallations  support  few  general 
conclusions,  beyond  the  fact  that  a  besieged  site  might  be  enclosed  by  a  system  of 
ditches  and  ramparts  or  by  a  wall,  and  that  the  besieging  force  might  be  distributed 
around  the  perimeter  in  garrison  posts.  This  latter  element  provides  remarkably  limited 
accommodation  at  Machaerus  and  Narbata,  and  is  entirely  missing  at  Hatra,  and  at 
Woden  Law,  neither  of  which  (I  have  argued)  is  likely  to  have  been  the  scene  of  a  Ro- 
130 man  circumvallation.  However,  it  is  also  missing  from  Bettir,  whose  identification  as  a 
Roman  circumvallation  rests  on  toponymic  similarity  with  the  scene  of  a  known  siege 
(no.  197),  and  the  undoubted  presence  of  Roman  camps  in  the  vicinity.  Shilarly,  the 
siege-works  at  Cremna  are  presumed  Roman  by  association  with  an  inscription  found  in 
situ;  but  the  disposition  of  barrier  walls,  creating  a  'secure  zone'  for  the  accommodation 
of  troops,  recalls  the  example  of  Carthage,  or  even  Alesia,  with  its  newly  discovered 
&compartment'. 
We  are  used  to  the  clear-cut  examples  of  Numantia,  Alesia  and  Masada,  with  their  hier- 
archy  of  elements:  large  encampments,  smaller  guard  posts,  barrier  wall  with  turrets. 
Commentators  are  often  tempted  to  treat  these  as  typological  constants,  but  the  fact  that 
major  differences  occur,  not  only  from  one  site  to  another,  but  within  the  same  site, 
should  warn  against  such  rigid  classification. 
131 Chapter  4: 
The  Embankment 
T  hc  historian  Appian  records  that,  at  Utica  in  204  B.  C.,  Scipio  Africanus  raised 
embankments  (chimata)  and  battered  the  walls  with  rams;  the  implication  is  that 
the  embankments  took  the  form  of  runways  for  the  advance  of  the  wheeled  battering- 
rams.  This  is  the  earliest  recorded  use  of  such  structures  by  a  Roman  general.  To  be 
sure,  there  may  be  an  element  of  truth  to  Livy's  mention  of  embankments  (aggeres)  at 
Veii  in  402  B.  C.,  Satricurn  in  386  B.  C.,  and  Cales  in  335  B.  C.,  but  machinery  was 
surely  not  available  to  the  Romans  at  this  early  date  (above,  p.  14);  nevertheless, 
mounds  of  rubble  night  have  been  used  to  elevate  infantry  to  the  level  of  the  enemy 
battlements,  in  preparation  for  a  storming  assault.  The  balance  of  probability,  however, 
is  that  Livy  has  simply  introduced  elements  of  later  siegecraft  into  his  descriptions  of 
early  operations. 
Embankments,  denoted  by  the  terms  agger  and  ch5ma,  feature  in  forty  Roman  sieges 
(see  Table  18,  p.  134).  In  eighteen  cases,  and  probably  in  three  others,  their  purpose 
was  clearly  to  facilitate  the  advance  of  battering-rams.  Admittedly,  this  is  often  de- 
duced  by  implication,  where  a  battering  assault  on  the  wall  is  reported  following  the 
construction  of  embankments,  such  as  at  Corinth  and  Heraclea.  But,  at  Piraeus,  the  ma- 
chinery  pounding  the  walls  is  said  to  have  been  located  on  the  embankments,  and  there 
is  a  clear  association  between  the  embankments  and  the  battering-rams  at  Jotapata,  Ga- 
mala,  and  Jerusalem.  In  general,  the  fact  that  the  defenders'  incendiary  attacks  were 
132 habituaUy  targeted  on  the  embanlanent,  in  order  to  neutralise  the  battering  indicates  that 
the  two  went  hand  in  hand. 
In  addition,  embankments  are  associated  with  the  operation  of  siege-towers  at  sixteen 
sieges,  although  it  must  be  admitted  that  only  in  a  few  cases  can  an  unequivocal  link  be 
demonstrated.  For  example,  at  Themyscira,  Lucullus  is  alleged  to  have  used  embank- 
ments  and  towers,  and  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  one  facilitated  the  use  of 
the  other.  At  Metulum,  Octavian's  storming  assault  was  delivered  by  means  of  board- 
ing-bridges,  while  he  himself  is  said  to  have  observed  from  a  tower;  it  is  reasonable  to 
assume  that  the  boarding-bridges  were  extended  from  towers,  particularly  as  Octavian 
then  proceeded  to  use  one  of  them,  but  again  this  is  not  explicitly  stated.  But  the  situa- 
tion  is  clear-cut,  for  example,  at  Thala,  where  "towers  were  set  on  the  embankment  to 
provide  cover  for  the  work  (opus)  and  the  workers"  (Sall.,  Jug.  76.5),  and  at  Jotapata, 
where  three  towers  fulfilled  the  same  function  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.284-285).  These 
operations  illustrate  the  primary  purpose  of  siege-towers,  to  overlook  the  enemy  rana- 
parts  and  provide  covering  fire  from  an  elevated  position.  Additionally,  we  may  assume 
that,  on  many  occasions,  the  siege-towers  incorporated  a  boarding-bridge  and  a  batter- 
ing-ram,  as  prescribed  by  Vegetius  (below,  p.  203). 
In  a  handfid  of  cases,  the  embankments  appear  to  have  been  erected  for  purposes  other 
than  the  advance  of  machinery.  At  Carthage,  when  the  Carthaginians  fortified  their 
quay-side  with  timber  towers,  Scipio  constructed  embankments  from  which  to  throw 
incendiary  missiles;  there  is  no  mention  of  the  use  of  machinery  here.  Similarly,  at 
Mons  Haemus,  the  embankment  was  evidently  designed  as  a  vantage  point  "from  which 
stones,  spears  and  fire-brands  could  now  be  thrown  at  the  enemy"  (Tac.,  Ann.  4.49). 
Nor  is  there  any  mention  of  machinery  at  Suthul,  although  there  remains  the  possibility 
that  the  Romans  intended  to  construct  battering-rams  or  towers,  before  they  were 
wrong-footed  by  Jugurtha  and  forced  to  withdraw  (cf.  above,  p.  41).  By  contrast,  An- 
tony  continued  construction  of  the  embankment  at  Praaspa,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Par- 
thians  had  intercepted  and  destroyed  his  siege-train;  we  can  only  assume  that  the  em- 
bankment  could  still  be  put  to  use,  perhaps  to  carry  an  infantry  assault,  in  the  same  way 
that  Lucullus  re-used  the  embankments  at  Nisibis. 
133 Cat.  No.  Comment 
Utica  64  f  or  battering-rams 
Atrax  71  f  or  battering-rams  +  tower 
Corinth  73  f  or  battering-rarn 
Heraclea  78  f  or  battering-rams 
Nertobriga  92  f  or  unspecified  machinery 
Intercatia  94  f  or  battering-rams 
Carthage  95  f  or  infantry? 
Suthul  1031  for  infantry? 
Thala  106  I  for  tow  +  battering-rams 
Piraeus  111  for  battering-rams 
Themyscira  116  for  towers? 
Nisibis  121  for  machinery,  but  used  by  infantry 
Jerusalem  122  fortowers  +  battering-rams 
Noviodunum  1241  fortower 
Veneti  1  25  1  for  infanW 
Atuatuci  1261  for  tower  +  battering-rain 
Soliates  128  for  towers_____ 
__  Avancum  132  for  louvers  +infantry 
Uxellodunurn  135  for  tower 
Pindenissus  136  for  tower 
Massilia  139  1  for  towers 
Ategua  1491  fortowers 
Laodicea  152  for  battering-ram 
Jerusalem  159  for  towers  +  battering-rams 
Praaspa  160  for  battering-ram?  /  intended  re-use  by  Infantry? 
Metulum  161  for  battering-rarn  +  towers? 
Segesta  162  1  for  infantry? 
Mons  Hasmus  170  1  for  infantry? 
Legerda  175  1  for  infantry? 
Jotapata  180  1  for  infantry?  /  re-use  by  battering-rarn  I  re-buill:  for  infantry 
Gamala  183  for  battering-rams 
Placentia  186  for  infantry? 
Jerusalem  189  for  battering-rams  +  towers 
Machaerus,  190  for  battering-ram? 
Masada  191  1  for  battering-ram  +  tower 
Sarmiznethusa  193  1  Possible:  cf.  pp.  70  &  142 
Cremna  210  1for  battering-ram? 
Byzantium  214  1  for  towers  +  battering-ram 
Bezabde  2117  1forbattering-rarn 
Maiozamalcha  223  1  for  batteririg-ram? 
Table  18:  Roman  embankments  e)plicftly  mentioned  at  sieges 
134 The  armies  of  Macedon  were  certainly  familiar  with  the  use  of  embanlanents  at  this 
time,  but  they  cannot  be  said  to  have  occupied  a  prominent  position  in  Macedo  i 
strategy.  In  199  B.  C.,  Philip  built  embankments  at  ThaumacL  probably  to  facilitate  the 
passage  of  heavy  machinery  across  rough  and  broken  terrain  (Livy  32.4.1-7),  but  thirty 
years  passed  before  his  son,  Perseus,  used  an  embankment,  this  time  to  carry  an  infantry 
assault  over  the  walls  of  Oaeneum  (Livy  43.19.9). 
Indeed,  in  the  Hellenistic  tradition,  preparations  for  the  advance  of  heavy  machinery 
seem  mostly  to  have  taken  the  form,  not  of  piling  up  a  mound,  but  of  smoothing  the  ter- 
rain,  such  as  can  be  seen  prior  to  Antiochus's  siege  of  Syrinx  in  209  B.  C.  (Polyb. 
10.31.6-13)  or,  better,  Philip's  siege  of  Echinus  in  the  previous  year  (Polyb.  9.41.1- 
42.4).  A  similar  procedure  is  recommended  by  Philon,  in  his  work  on  siegecraft,  when 
he  refers  to  the  besieger  "making  a  road  for  the  advance  of  machinery"  (Pol.  3.64  =  Th. 
95;  cf.  4.17  =  TIL  98,  perhaps  referring  to  rolling  the  approach-road  to  make  it  level). 
Polybius  specifically  mentions  that  Antiochus  and  Philip  both  employed  special  vehi- 
cles,  the  so-called  "ditch-Mling  tortoises"  of  Athenaeus  and  Vitruvius,  to  protect  the 
men  engaged  in  levelling  the  ground  (cf.  below,  p.  *  196). 
Schramm  believed  that  the  great  Hellenistic  siege-towers  of  the  later  fourth  century,  the 
helepolds,  had  replaced  the  custom  of  piling  up  mounds  as  a  means  of  elevating  the  be- 
siegers  to  the  level  of  the  besieged  (Schramm  1928,226);  in  this,  he  was  clearly  think- 
ing  of  the  Spartan  ch6ma  at  Plataea,  but  this  was  very  much  an  isolated  incident 
(Schramm  1928,213-214;  see  below,  p.  142). 
For  Hellenistic  strategists,  it  appears  that  the  construction  of  embanlanents  was  only 
ever  occasioned  by  extraordinary  circumstances.  Whereas,  Alexander's  assault  on 
Halicarnassus  in  334  B.  C.  required  only  the  Oling  of  ditches  to  emble  the  towers  to  ad- 
vance  (Arrian,  Anab.  Alex.  1.20.8;  Diod.  Sic.  17.24.4),  two  years  later,  at  Gaza,  the 
sandy  terrain  impeded  the  wheels  of  the  siege-towers,  which  were  themselves  necessi- 
tated  by  the  elevated  position  of  the  town  (Curt.,  Hist.  Alex.  4.6.9,21-22).  Different  cir- 
cumstances  prevailed  at  Tyre,  where  Alexander  was  obliged  to  build  a  mole  to  carry  his 
siege-machinery  from  the  mainland  across  to  the  island  city;  the  ch6ma  mentioned  by 
135 the  Greek  authors  (Anian,  Anab.  Alex.  2.18.3,19.3;  Diod.  Sic.  17.40.5,42.1)  is  de- 
scribed  by  the  Latin  author  Quintus  Curtius  as  a  m5lis,  or  bulky  structure,  supporting  an 
agger,  by  which  he  evidently  means  the  level  runway  for  the  siege-towers  (Curt.,  Hist. 
Alex.  4.2.16,2  1;  4.3.2-3,6-8). 
Before  investigating  the  phenomenon  of  the  embankment  in  Roman  siegecraft,  an  en- 
quiry  into  the  terminology  will  be  instructive.  The  primary  meaning  of  agger  is  "things 
brought  to  a  place  in  order  to  form  an  elevation  above  a  surface  or  plain,  as  rubbish, 
stone,  earth,  sand,  brushwood,  materials  for  a  rampart,  etc.  "  (Lewis  &  Short  1879,70, 
s.  v.  agger,  cf.  O.  LD.,  "material  for  a  mound,  earthwork,  etc.  ").  In  the  context  of  siege 
warfare,  the  secondary  meaning  of  "the  pile  formed  by  masses  of  rubbish,  stone,  earth, 
brushwood,  etc.  "  (Lewis  &  Short,  ibid.  )  is  often  seized  upon,  without  ftirther  considera- 
tion.  Quintus  Curtius's  description  of  Alexander's  mole  at  Tyre  suggests  a  third  possi- 
bility,  namely  "a  military  or  public  road,  commonly  graded  by  embankments  of  eartW' 
(Lewis  &  Short  1879,  ibid.;  cf.  O.  L.  D.,  "a  road  or  causeway  raised  above  the  level  of 
the  surrounding  ground").  In  the  face  of  such  ambiguity,  we  should  proceed  with  cau- 
tion. 
The  siege  of  Celenderis  (no.  169)  provides  a  case  in  point.  Announcing  the  assault, 
Sentius  Saturninus  issued  the  following  sequence  of  orders  to  his  troops:  that  the  horns 
and  tnunpets  sound  the  attack;  "ped  aggerem";  that  ladders  be  erected;  that  the  most 
courageous  should  climb  them;  and  that  others  should  fire  spears,  stones  and  firebrands 
from  artillery  (Tac.,  . 4nn.  2.81.2).  It  would  be  most  logical  to  translate  Saturninus's 
second  command  as  "that  the  rampart  be  attacked",  however  Furneaux  objects  that 
"Tacitus  would  hardly  use  'agger'  of  the  wall of  a  strong  forf'(1884,343).  Admittedly, 
earlier  on,  Tacitus  uses  the  same  phrase,  'ýpetendus  agger"  (Ann.  1.65.7),  in  the  context 
of  collecting  materials  for  an  earthwork,  during  Caecina  Severus's  withdrawal  from  the 
Teutoburg.  He  further  notes  that  the  task  was  made  all  the  more  difficult  because  many 
of  the  men  had  lost  the  tools  for  digging  earth  and  cutting  turf.  Saturninus's  command 
at  Celenderis  will  then  have  been  to  collect  similar  material,  and  Furneaux's  opinion, 
that  "the  material  to  be  collected  is  here  intended  to  fill  the  ditch  or  make  the  wall easier 
to  scald"  (1884,343),  is  probably  correct;  Koestermann  (1963,403)  suggests  earth.  If 
136 there  was  a'ýmound",  such  as  Jackson  suggests  in  the  Loeb  edition  (Jackson  1931,509), 
it  need  not  have  been  a  large  one. 
Caesar  often  uses  the  same  phrase  in  situations  where  he  clearly  implies  the  gathering  of 
timber.  For  example,  in  57  B.  C.,  to  counter  a  surprise  attack  by  the  Nervii  during  camp- 
building,  he  writes  that  he  had  to  recall  the  soldiers  from  their  entrenching  work  (ab  op- 
ere)  and  summon  those  who  had  gone  out  a  little  ffirther  "aggeris  petendi  causa"  (Bell. 
Gall.  2.20).  Holmes  correctly  interprets  this  as  "fetching  wood"  (1914,87),  but  Ed- 
wards,  in  the  Loeb  edition,  misconstrues  the  meaning  and  introduces  an  unnecessary 
"ramp"  (1917,115f  :  "in  search  of  stuff  for  the  ramp"). 
During  Caesar's  second  invasion  of  Britain,  his  legionaries  assaulted  a  fortified  hill, 
thought  to  be  Bigbury  in  Kent  (above,  p.  86),  by  advancing  in  a  testudo  shield- 
formation  and  "aggere  ad  munitiones  adiecto"  (Bell.  Gall.  5.9.7).  Most  probably,  the 
agger  which  the  men  are  described  as  throwing  against  the  fortifications  is  brushwood 
to  fill  the  ditch  and  enable  a  concerted  assault  on  the  walls,  similar  to  Saturninus's  op- 
eration  at  Celenderis.  There  is  no  need  to  postulate  the  construction  of  an  embankment. 
Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  construction  work  of  any  kind  could  have  been  ac- 
complished  beneath  a  roof  of  shields.  Nevertheless,  in  A.  D.  58,  Domitius  Corbulo's 
men  are  reported  to  have  undermined  the  walls  of  Volandum.  (no.  173)  under  cover  of  a 
testudo  of  shields,  a  tactic  which  Josephus  explains  more  fully,  in  the  context  of  Cestius 
Gallus's  similar  attack  on  the  Jerusalem  Temple,  eight  years  later  (no.  176): 
"The  first  (row)  of  the  Romans  propped  their  shields  against  the  wall,  and,  upon 
these,  those  behind  (propped)  other  (shields),  and  the  rest  likewise,  fencing  them- 
selves  in  with  what  they  call  a  'tortoise',  which  the  Wling  missiles  slipped  off 
harmlessly,  and  not  even  one  of  the  soldiers  was  injured  undermining  the  wall  and 
preparing  to  set  fire  to  the  gate  of  the  Temple.  "  (Jos.,  Bell.  Iud.  2.537) 
It  seems  that  there  was  ample  room  beneath  the  testudo,  despite  its  cramped  appearance, 
for  the  front  rank,  at  least,  to  engage  in  digging.  Ditch-filling  will  then  have  presented 
137 no  problem,  and  probably  proceeded  in  the  mamer  described  by  Holmes:  "the  work  of 
piling  the  lumber  was  performed  by  men  who  advanced  between  the  files  under  protec- 
tion  of  their  comrades'  uplifted  shielde'  (1914,18  1). 
Such  ditch-filling  seems  often  to  have  accompanied  an  escalade,  as  at  Celenderis 
(above,  p.  136).  The  agger,  which  Pompey  instructed  his  men  to  collect  at  Dyrrachium 
in  48  B.  C.  (no.  143),  was  embarked  along  with  archers  and  light-armed  troops  on  fast 
boats  bound  for  the  unfinished  southern  sector  of  Caesar's  siege  lines  (fig.  17).  Arriv- 
ing  at  their  destination,  the  Pompeians  attacked  the  outer  palisade  with  missile  fire, 
while  the  ditches  were  filled  with  the  agger  which  they  brought  along  for  the  purpose, 
enabling  the  legionaries  to  mount  an  escalade  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  3.62-63).  It  is  unlikely 
that  they  would  have  transported  earth  in  this  way,  and  brushwood  again  fits  the  context 
best.  Something  similar  no  doubt  occurred  at  Legerda  (no.  175),  where,  in  what  seems 
to  be  a  quick-fire  encounter,  the  Romans  broke  into  the  town  by  using  "agge?  '.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  there  would  have  been  time  to  erect  anything  substantial,  despite  Fur- 
neaux's  opinion  (1891,420:  "an  offensive  work  to  command  the  walls"),  and  this  is 
perhaps  another  instance  of  ditch-fiffing. 
This  ambiguity  between  the  simple  filling  of  a  ditch  with  agger,  in  order  to  facilitate  an 
escalade,  and  the  accumulation  of  agger  into  a  full-scale  embankment  creates  a  problem 
of  interpretation.  Even  in  an  apparently  clear-cut  case,  such  as  Caesar's  assault  on  No- 
viodunum  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  2.12),  we  should  keep  an  open  mind.  The  Loeb  edition 
translates  Caesar's  ablative  absolute,  "aggere  iacto",  as  "(when)  a  ramp  (was)  cast  up" 
(Edwards  1917,107),  but  Hohnes  may  well  be  correct  to  fiLvour  the  primary  meaning  of 
agger  here.  "material 
...  shot  into  a  moat  with  the  object  of  filling  it  up"  (Hohnes  1914, 
81).  The  translation  offered  by  Handford  (1951,63)  in  the  Penguin  Classics  edition  - 
"earth  shovelled  into  the  moat"-  captures  the  spirit  of  Hohnes"s  interpretation,  whether 
or  not  this  is  Caesar's  precise  meaning.  (Notice  that  almost  the  same  grammatical  con- 
struction  is  used  of  material  hastily  scattered  over  a  makeshift  timber  bridge,  at  Bell. 
Alex.  29.4,  thus  supporting  the  ditch-filling  version  of  events  at  Noviodunum.  ) 
138 Despite  all  of  this,  it  is  clear  that,  in  Roman  siegecraft,  there  was  often  a  requirement  to 
pile  up  a  structure  of  wood,  stones  and  earth  against  an  enemy  wall,  occasionally  to  ele- 
vate  infantry  for  a  storming  attack  across  the  wall  (above,  p.  133),  but  in  most  cases  to 
enable  the  approach  of  heavy  machinery  (above,  pp.  132f).  The  Suda  entry  for 
'AYCOTa  (A  203)  reads  "device  (mUchanima)  of  war  erected  from  stones  and  timbers 
and  heaped-up  earth;  some  call  such  a  device  agesta".  There  is  an  obvious  connection 
with  the  Latin  aggestus,  "an  accumulatiorf',  and  thence  with  agger.  Indeed,  Vegetius 
conveys  more  or  less  the  same  idea  when  he  says,  "the  agger,  on  the  other  hand,  from 
which  missiles  are  thrown,  is  raised  up  against  the  wall,  out  of  earth  and  wood"  (Veg., 
Epit.  rei  mil.  4.15). 
The  classic  example  of  a  Roman  embankment  is  Caesar's  construction  at  Avaricum, 
where  the  "single,  narrow  approaclf  '  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.15:  "unus  perangustus  adi- 
tus")  was  defended  by  a  deep  gully,  necessitating  an  embankment  80  feet  (23.6m)  high 
(ibid.,  24).  The  town  wall  will  only  have  stood  four  or  five  metres  high,  so  the  bulk  of 
the  structure  must  have  been  necessitated  by  a  dip  in  the  terrain  (Wimmel  1974,7;  cf 
fig.  11,  where  the  town  appears  to  stand  some  20  metres  above  the  surrounding 
marshes).  Equally,  the  narrow  approach  comfortably  accommodated  an  embankment 
330  feet  (97.6  m)  wide. 
The  design  of  the  structure  proposed  by  General  de  Reffye  for  Napoldon  III  (fig.  33) 
received  Holmes's  endorsement,  and  has  found  wide  currency  in  popular  publications 
(Hohnes  1911,602-603;  1914,294  note;  cf.  Connolly  1975,31).  In  summary,  Na- 
pol6on's  design  incorporated  the  two  types  of  embankment  proposed  by  French  scholars 
of  the  time:  the  'lerrasse-viaduc"  and  the  "terrasse-cavaliee',  of  which  the  former  was 
visualised  as  a  runway,  perpendicular  to  the  enemy  wall,  whereas  the  latter  was  ar- 
ranged  parallel  to  the  enemy  wall.  As  there  were  two  siege-towers,  de  Reffye  proposed 
twin  viaducts,  aimed  at  the  foot  of  the  enemy  wall;  but,  to  give  Caesar's  infantry  access 
to  the  battlements,  he  added  an  intervening  platform  (the  "cavalier"),  only  about  15  me- 
tres  deep  but  with  a  50-metre  frontage,  incorporating  a  double  staircase  at  the  rear.  The 
entire  edifice  was  built  out  of  criss-crossing  layers  of  timber,  on  analogy  with  the  con- 
struction  principle  familiar  from  Trajan's  Column  (especially  scene  LXVI  =  fig.  41;  cf 
139 Saglio  1877,142).  Caesar's  account  gives  no  hint  of  such  a  complex  design,  but 
Holmes  gave  it  cautious  approval,  deeming  a  ramp  of  entirely  viaduct  design,  330  feet 
wide  by  around  250  feet  long,  to  have  been  too  much  work  (1911,603;  cf  1914,294 
note:  '%ve  may  be  sure  that  labour  was  saved  as  much  as  possible"). 
The  complex  design  was  criticised  in  1939  by  du  Mesnil,  fresh  from  his  investigation  of 
the  Persian  assault  ramp  at  Dura-Europos.  Ridiculing  a  system  which  resembled  a 
boulevard,  with  an  empty  central  reservation  and  twin  towers  rolling  backwards  and 
forwards  at  the  sides,  "as  if  in  a  game  of  chese',  he  proposed  that  Caesar  had  simply 
constructed  an  assault  ramp  (1939,64:  "non  un  boulevard  ou  un  cavalier,  mais  une 
rampe  d'assaut").  In  addition,  he  believed  it  impossible  for  the  Romans  to  have  built 
the  structure  entirely  of  wood  (ibid.,  62-63,  in  the  process  querying  the  relevance  of 
Trajan's  Column).  Referring  to  the  fire-extinguishing  episode  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.24), 
he  questioned  Caesar's  ability  to  cut  a  fire-break  across  such  a  structure,  indeed  his  abil- 
ity  to  extinguish  such  an  immense  "pyre"  at  all  (Mesnil  1939,63:  "cet  immense 
bficher');  and  he  doubted  whether  Caesar  would  have  said  that  the  embankment  "was 
almost  touching  the  enemy  wall",  if  the  main  central  section  was  in  fact  rising  parallel 
to  the  wall.  However,  du  Mesnil  did  not  stop  there:  he  proposed  that  the  dimensions 
recorded  by  Caesar  had  been  misunderstood,  and  that  the  figure  of  330  feet  was  not  the 
ramp's  width,  but  its  length;  he  proposed  a  width  of  only  10  metres  (ibid.,  64). 
Of  course,  du  MesnU  performed  a  significant  service  in  querying  Napol6on's  peculiar 
structure,  but  there  is  no  need  to  doubt  the  reported  dimensions.  A  runway  only  10  me- 
tres  wide  would  have  proven  unduly  restrictive  for  two  siege-towers  (cf  Vegetius"s  di- 
mensions,  p.  203),  and  impossibly  narrow,  when  the  massed  infantry  assault  is  taken 
into  account.  Wimmel  followed  du  Mesnil  in  proposing  a  dump-built  ramp,  similar  to 
the  familiar  example  at  Masada  (cf  fig.  55).  Such  a  structure  is  naturally  wider  at  the 
base,  as  the  material  settles;  however,  for  no  clear  reason,  Wimmel  proposed  that  it  was 
the  overall  width  of  this  base  that  Caesar  specifies,  and  not  the  actual  runway  along  the 
top  (Wimmel  1974,39).  His  diagram  suggests  a  runway  of  approximately  25  metres  at 
the  rear  which,  again  for  no  clear  reason,  widens  to  60  metres  at  the  enemy  wall  (ibid., 
25  fig.  10).  It  must  be  admitted,  though,  that  Caesar's  figure  of  almost  100  metres  is  not 
140 inherently  unlikely.  As  Holmes  stated,  in  a  different  connection,  "the  width  of  the  ag- 
ger  must  have  depended  upon  its  object"  (1911,604;  cf.  Veith  1928,443:  "die  Breite  in 
der  Regel  von  der  Zahl  der  vorzutriebenden  Wandeltürme"). 
As  far  as  the  nature  of  the  embankment  is  concerned,  the  criss-crossing  timber  construc- 
tion  from  Trajan's  Column  has  exerted  a  compelling  influence.  Rice  Holmes  quotes  a 
theory,  held  by  another  of  Napoldon's  associates,  Colonel  Stoffel,  that  "as  soon  as  the 
inequalities  of  the  surface  had  been  removed,  logs  were  passed  from  hand  to  hand  to  a 
group  of  workers,  who  arranged  them  in  layers,  descending  like  huge  steps,  those  of 
each  tier  being  laid  cross-wise  on  those  of  the  tier  immediately  undemeatlf'  (Holmes 
1911,604,  noting  that  "it  can  neither  be  disproved  nor  proved"). 
Du  Mesnil  was  correct  to  question  Napoldon's  wholly  timber  design,  as  our  limited  evi- 
dence  points  to  a  significant  proportion  of  earth  and  stones,  as  well  (d  above,  p.  139; 
Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.162,  for  "timber  ...  and  masses  of  stones!  ).  Unfortunately,  he  went  to 
the  other  extreme,  envisaging  a  structure  similar  to  the  Persian  ramp  at  Dura-Europos, 
with  lateral  walls  of  mud-brick,  1.40-1.90  m  thick,  retaining  an  earth  and  rubble  fill 
(Mesnil  1939,64:  "une  levee  de  terre").  Such  a  style  of  construction  is inappropriate 
for  western  Europe;  in  truth,  the  proportions  of  the  various  constituents  will  have  de- 
pended  upon  local  availability,  but,  as  will  become  apparent,  the  Roman  design  required 
a  timber  element,  no  matter  what  else  was  thrown  in. 
The  prevalence  of  wood  is  proven  by  the  many  occasions  on  which  defenders  attempted 
to  set  fire,  not  just  to  the  siege  equipment,  but  to  the  embankments  themselves:  viz., 
Heraclea,  Avaricum,  Uxellodunum,  Massilia,  Segesta,  Jotapata,  Jerusalem,  Bezabde. 
At  the  latter,  the  besieged  Persians  sabotaged  the  Roman  siege-works  by  inserting  live 
coals  "into  the  joints  of  one  embanlanent,  constructed  with  the  branches  of  various 
types  of  trees,  with  bulrushes,  and  with  arnifuls  of  reede'  (Amm.  Marc.  20.11.23);  of 
course,  these  are  surely  just  the  combustible  elements,  listed  by  Ammianus  to  make  his 
point.  In  addition,  the  collection  of  timber  to  build  embankments  is  specifically  men- 
tioned  at  Heraclea,  Piraeus,  Jerusalem,  Massilia,  and  Jotapata;  and  in  prodigious  quanti- 
141 ties  (e.  g.,  Plut.,  Sulla  12;  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.162),  though  some  of  this  will  certainly  have 
been  destined  for  the  dozens  of  shelters  required  by  the  workers. 
Lucan  preserves  an  interesting  description  of  Trebonius's  embankment  at  Massilia:  the 
bulk  of  the  structure  was  apparently  earth  and  brushwood,  compressed  by  a  timber 
fi-arnework  at  the  sides  (Lucan,  Bell.  Civ.  3.396-397:  cum  terra  levis  mediam  virgulta- 
que  molem  suspendant,  structa  laterum  compage  ligatam  artet  humum);  he  later  refers 
to  the  "plartks  arranged  lattice-wise"  (ibid.,  455:  stellatis  aribus  agger),  from  which  it 
appears  that  the  sides  of  the  mainly  earthen  embankment  were  retained  by  a  fi=ework, 
not  dissimilar  to  Napoldon's  criss-crossing  pile  of  logs.  But,  where  Napoldon's  struc- 
ture  represented  the  entire  embankment,  the  Massilia  timbers  represent  only  the  sides  of 
an  earthwork.  Carter,  in  his  edition  of  Caesar's  De  Bello  Civil!,  neatly  encapsulates  the 
design  as  "a  bank  made  of  earth  with  heavy  timber  shoring"  (Carter  1990,215),  and  it  is 
perhaps  the  latter  element  that  is  represented  on  scene  CXVII  of  Trajan's  Column  (fig. 
44;  see  above,  p.  70). 
Corroboration  for  this  style  of  construction  comes  from  an  unlikely  source.  Although 
there  is  some  limited  evidence  for  embankments  of  Hellenistic  date  (above,  p.  135), 
there  is  only  one  example  of  a  Classical  Greek  embankment:  the  ch5ma  erected  by  the 
Spartans  and  their  Tbeban  allies  at  Plataea  in  429  B.  C.  Our  source  of  information,  Thu- 
cydides,  gives  no  dimensions,  but  it  is  the  design  of  the  structure  that  is  of  interest: 
"So,  felling  timber  from  Cithaeron,  they  built  (it)  up  on  both  sides,  positioning 
(the  timbers)  crosswise  to  serve  as  walls,  so  that  the  mound  would  not  spread  out 
too  much.  They  carried  to  it  wood  and  stones  and  earth  and  whatever  else  might 
be  used  to  complete  it.  "  (Thuc.  2.75.2) 
It  is  clear  that  Thucydides  envisaged  a  mound  of  debris  with  two  retaining  walls,  one  on 
either  side,  to  give  the  structure  solidity  and  prevent  it  spreading  out.  The  walls  them- 
selves  must  have  been  built  up  as  a  robust  framework  of  timbers,  laid  in  a  horizontal 
lattice  pattern  (cf.  Connolly  1981,277;  pace  Gomme  1956,207:  "wickerwork  in  place 
of  walW';  Garlan  1974,142:  "intertwining  the  branches  in  the  manner  of  a  protective 
142 walr').  It  was  not  the  primary  purpose  of  the  mound  to  provide  an  elevated  action  sta- 
tion  for  the  battering-ram,  since  Thucydides  tells  us  that  rams  were  applied  elsewhere 
around  the  circuit,  so  it  seems  that  the  Spartans'  intention  was  to  overtop  the  town  wall 
for  a  massed  infantry  assault.  Quite  where  they  had  got  this  idea  from  remains  un- 
known,  although  it  may  be  relevant  that  the  Spartan  king,  Archidamus,  appears  to  have 
been  encouraging  intercourse  with  Persia  around  this  time,  and  the  Persians  are  known 
to  have  assaulted  towns  by  piling  up  mounds  of  rubble  (Kern  1999,58-61).  Equally,  a 
familiarity  with  the  work  of  Herodotus  might  have  implanted  the  idea  (specifically 
Herod.  1.162,  on  the  Ionian  Revolt). 
Liebenam  endorsed  the  timber-fi-amed  theory  (1909,2242:  "Baumstdmme,  kreuzweise 
ilbereinandergelegt,  die  Seiten  bilden  und  dem  Werke  Halt  geben,  Erde,  Steine,  Faschi- 
nen,  Strauchwerk!  '),  believing  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  agger  advanced,  layer  by  layer, 
until  it  reached  the  same  height  as  the  enemy  wall  (ibid.:  "Der  Damm  ... 
herangefWirt 
unter  schichtenweiser  Erh6hung,  bis  seine  obere  FlAche  mit  der  Mauerkrone  wenigstens 
in  gleicher  Me  liegt").  The  latter  point  is  disproven  by  the  example  of  Avaricum  (no. 
132),  where  the  troops  still  had  to  scale  the  wall  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.27:  murum  as- 
cendissent),  probably  using  ladders.  Admittedly,  there  is  a  difference  between  targeting 
an  embankment  on  the  wall  foot,  and  raising  it  to  the  proximity  of  the  battlements;  in 
the  former  case,  its  purpose  will  have  been  merely  to  level  the  approach  path,  whereas, 
in  the  latter  case,  it  must  have  been  to  enable  an  infantry  assault,  as  at  Oaeneum  (above, 
p.  135)  and  Jotapata. 
At  the  latter,  Josephus  makes  it  clear  that  Vespasian's  embankment  was  aiiing  for  the 
battlements  before  the  defenders  heightened  the  walls  (Bell.  Jud.  3.171).  After  briefly 
contemplating  a  blockade,  Vespasian  returned  to  the  assault  and,  "as  the  embankments 
were  by  this  time  drawing  near  to  the  walls,  he  decided  to  bring  up  the  battering-ram7' 
(Bell.  Jud.  3.213).  Although  the  wall  was  finally  breached,  the  Roman  attack  was  re- 
pulsed,  so  Vespasian  built  50-foot  (15  m)  siege-towers  to  overlook  the  20-cubit  (9  m) 
high  walls  (Bell.  Jud.  3.284).  Josephus  reports  that  the  Roman  embankment  was  again 
raised  to  overtop  the  walls  (Bell.  Jud.  3.316),  and  the  final  assault  proceeded  over  the 
top  (Bell.  Jud.  3.324). 
143 There  are  several  implications  arising  from  this  account.  First,  Josephus's  response  to 
the  approaching  embankment  was  to  heighten  the  wall,  not  to  reinforce  it,  proving  that 
he  anticipated  an  attempt  to  cross  over,  rather  than  to  break  through.  Second,  the  de- 
ployment  of  the  battering-ram  appears  to  be  something  of  an  afterthought,  as  if  to  sal- 
vage  the  time  and  energy  spent  on  the  failed  infantry-assault  ramp  by  converting  it  to  a 
runway  for  machinery.  Third,  the  embankment  was  again  raised,  indicating  that 
Vespasian's  original  strategy  was  deemed  preferable  to  the  dangers  of  entering  through 
the  breach.  And  fourth,  he  is  said  to  have  erected  siege-towers  on  the  embankment, 
which,  if  Josephus  is  correct  on  this  point,  implies  that  the  towers  were  gradually  ma- 
noeuvred  forwards  as  the  embankment  was  completed.  (Of  course,  Caesar  had  done  the 
same  at  Avaricum.  ) 
The  massive  north-western  defences  of  Jotapata  have  been  unearthed  (fig.  23),  standing 
at  the  top  of  a  fairly  steep  slope,  which  was  found  to  be  covered  with  three  to  four  me- 
tres  of  extraneous  rubble  mixed  with  arrow-licads  and  ballista  balls  (Adan-Bayewitz  et 
aL  1995,137  and  162;  Adan-Bayewitz  &  Aviam.  1997,194).  The  topography  of  the  site 
suggests  that  the  Romans  directed  their  assault  across  the  wide  ravine  separating  the  hill 
of  Yodefat  from  Khirbet  Shifat  to  the  north-west.  Consequently,  the  embankment  will 
have  been  intended  to  level  the  approach.  Prior  to  the  excavations,  Connolly  assumed 
that  there  was  a  deep  defensive  ditch  (1983,77),  but  there  is  no  sign  of  this.  Neverthe- 
less,  his  reconstruction  of  a  massive,  level  (as  opposed  to  inclined)  causeway  may  be 
deemed  substantially  correct,  for  the  first  phase  embankment.  The  second  phase  would 
most  easily  have  been  achieved  by  sloping  the  surface  up  to  the  level  of  the  new  battle- 
ments,  but,  given  the  presence  of  the  siege-towers,  it  would  perhaps  have  been  advisable 
to  maintain  as  horizontal  a  surface  as  possible  (cf.  below,  p.  204). 
Perseus's  embankment  at  Oaeneum  was  a  straightforward  means  of  storming  over  the 
battlements  (above,  p.  135),  with  no  particular  design  constraints,  but  two  other  exam- 
ples  present  a  puzzle.  According  to  Zosimus,  at  the  siege  of  Byzantium  in  A.  D.  324 
"Constantine  intended  to  capture  the  town,  having  constructed  an  embankment  (ch5ma) 
of  the  same  height  as  the  wall,  and  having  positioned  wooden  towers  on  the  embank- 
ment  (ch5ma),  higher  than  the  walls,  by  means  of  which  (Constantine's  troops)  shot 
144 down  those  guarding  the  walls,  so  that  he  could  safely  bring  up  rams  and  other  ma- 
chines  to  the  walr'  (Zos.  2.25.1).  And,  during  Constantius's  siege  of  Bezabde  in  A.  D. 
360,  Ammianus  Marcellinus  emphasizes  the  increasing  height  of  the  aggeres  (e.  g., 
Anun.  Marc.  20.11.13,16),  until  they  finally  "overtopped  the  walls"  (AmnL  Marc. 
20.11.20). 
Battering-rams  were  present  at  both  sieges,  but  in  neither  case  do  they  appear  to  have 
been  mounted  on  the  embankments.  Of  course,  it  would  surely  have  been  sufficient  to 
direct  battering-rams  at  the  lower  part  of  the  enemy  walL  as  Veith  proposed  as  a  general 
rule  (1906,56:  'Vas  Niveau  des  Dammes  mußte  daher  mit  dem  Fuße  der  Stadtmauer 
i1bereffistimmen!  ).  Nothing  precludes  this,  either  at  Bezabde,  where  the  battering  as- 
sault  had  commenced  even  before  the  embankments  were  begun,  or  at  Byzantium, 
where  Constantine's  attack  was  forestalled  by  the  town's  surrender.  In  both  cases,  the 
main  attack  simply  required  the  smoothing  of  the  ground,  the  levelling  of  forward  de- 
fences  and  outworks,  and  the  filling  of  defensive  ditches.  In  fact,  at  Gamala,  Josephus 
specifies  that  "the  filling  of  the  ditches  and  ravines  (was  accomplished  by)  the  tenth  (le- 
gion)"  (Bell.  Jud.  4.13).  Here,  there  was  a  definite  requirement  to  even  up  the  sloping 
ground  (fig.  24),  so  that  machinery  could  be  brought  up,  but  the  breach  appears  to  have 
been  made  at  ground  level  (cf  fig.  49). 
At  Byzantium  and  Bezabde,  it  seems  that  the  embankments  played  a  supporting  role,  if 
not  to  facilitate  an  infantry  assault,  as  at  Oaeneum  and  Jotapata,  then  at  least  to  provide 
covering  fire.  This  is  explicit  at  Byzantium,  where  siege-towers  were  mounted  on  the 
embankment  to  keep  the  enemy  from  the  battlements,  and  implied  at  Bezabde,  where 
Ammianus  indicates  that  artillery-fire  was  directed  from  the  embankments.  In  both 
cases,  if  the  battering  proved  successful,  there  would  have  been  the  option  to  launch  a 
diversionary  assault  over  the  battlements,  drawing  defenders  away  from  the  breach.  But 
events  took  a  different  turn  in  both  sieges. 
The  significance  of  Julian's  "high  platforrr&'  (ardui  suggeshis:  AmnL  Marc.  24.4.12)  at 
Maiozamalcha  is  not  apparent  from  Ammianus's  brief  account.  Hamflton  implies  a  dis- 
tinction  between  these  and  the  embankments  at  Bezabde,  rendering  the  former  as  "high 
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as  "mounds!  '  (ibid.,  204).  Crump,  on  the  other  hand,  determinedly  (but,  in  my  opinion, 
erroneously)  interprets  all  besieging  earthworks  as  the  ramparts  of  a  "temporary  contra- 
vallatioW'  (Crump  1975,107-108),  and  Nischer  ignores  the  issue  in  his  prdcis  of  the 
siege  (1928,600-601). 
However,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  structures  at  Byzantium,  Bezabde,  and 
Maiozamalcha  were  all  embankments,  similar  to  the  example  at  Jotapata.  In  particular, 
it  is  clear  that  they  sloped  gradually  upwards  as  they  reached  the  wall,  because  Am- 
mianus  glosses  those  at  Bezabde  as  "artificial  slopee'  (clivi  structiles:  20.11.22),  and  the 
Historia  Augusta  reports  that  the  emperor  Aurelian  threatened  to  capture  the  town  of 
Tyana  by  utilising  a  natural  feature,  which  sloped  up  to  the  walls  "in  the  form  of  a 
siege-embankmenf'  (specie  aggeris:  HA,  Div.  Aurel.  24.1).  Everything  points  to  their 
intended  use  as  infantry  ramps. 
Nevertheless,  in  many  cases  where  the  embankments  were  not  raised  to  battlement- 
level,  they  must  still  have  risen  to  an  appreciable  height.  This  is  proven  by  the  attempts 
of  the  defenders  to  undermine  the  structure,  for  example,  at  Utica,  Piraeus,  the  town  of 
the  Sotiates,  and  Jerusalem;  all  sites  where  the  embankment  was  associated,  not  with  the 
elevation  of  infantry,  but  with  the  advance  of  machinery.  Veith  believed  that  "the 
height  [was]  dependent  upon  the  unevenness  of  the  teffain7'  (1928,443:  "die  Me  von 
den  Unebenheiten  des  Gelandes,  abWgig"),  but  the  walls,  of  Piraeus  stood  on  a  2-Metre 
plinth  of  enormous  squared  blocks  (Lawrence  1979,216),  so  it  is  fair  to  assume  that 
Sulla's  embankment  was  intended  to  carry  the  battering-rams  above  this  layer.  Indeed, 
it  was  common  in  fortifications  of  Hellenistic  date  for  the  walls  to  sit  on  a  stone  footing 
(e.  g.,  Lawrence  1979,205-207)  and  the  towers  to  sit  on  solid  bases  (ibid.,  222-224).  It 
may  be  no  coincidence  that  the  first  Roman  embankments  appeared  outside  Greek  and 
Carthaginian  towns,  which  may  be  assumed  to  have  had  reasonably  sophisticated  de- 
fences. 
If  the  height  of  the  embankment  varied  with  its  intended  purpose,  so  too,  apparently,  did 
its  frontal  relationship  with  the  enemy  wall.  It  is  fairly  clear  that  the  embankment  at 
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prior  to  completion;  7.27),  or  at  any  rate  came  close  enough  to  permit  ladders  to  be 
planted  against  it;  here  is  another  reason  to  reject  Napoldon's  scheme,  which  shows  a 
20-metre  gap  (fig.  33).  The  final  embankment  at  Jotapata  will  have  been  similar,  as  Ti- 
tus  and  his  picked  assault-team  "set  foot  upon7'  the  walls  from  it  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.324). 
However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  an  assault  launched  along  the  previous  version  of  the 
embankment  required  the  use  of  gang-planks  (Wchanai  epibatirioi:  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud. 
3.260)  to  convey  the  troops  through  the  breach. 
This  neatly  highlights  a  peculiarity  of  embankments  designed  for  battering-rams.  It 
seems  likely  that  a  gap  was  deliberately  left  between  the  embankment  and  the  wall,  so 
that  the  debris  from  the  battering  did  not  accumulate  under  the  ram,  where  it  might 
eventually  interfere  with  the  free  operation  of  the  machine  and  would  certainly  obstruct 
the  passage  of  infantry  through  the  resulting  breach.  Josephus  preserves  an  interesting 
nugget  of  information  during  Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem,  when  he  records  that  the  engi- 
neers  (teklones;  cf  Apoll.,  PoL  W  138)  measured  the  gap  between  the  embankments 
and  the  wall  to  see  if  the  battering-rams  would  reach  (Bell.  Jud.  5.275);  the  battering 
commenced  without  any  more  ado. 
Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem,  with  its  artificial  and  natural  defences  (fig.  22),  will  have 
presented  problems  similar  to  those  at  Jotapata.  Titus  first  took  the  precaution  of  level- 
ling  the  ground  from  the  north  of  the  city  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.106-108),  perhaps  to  facili- 
tate  the  passage  of  heavy  machinery  in  the  Hellenistic  tradition  (above,  p.  135),  but  also 
to  ensure  the  unimpeded  advance  of  the  army.  He  then  erected  three  embankments 
against  the  so-called  "Third  WaT'  (Bell.  Jud.  5.263),  deployed  battering-rams  (ibid., 
275),  and  set  up  siege-towers  to  protect  the  workers  (ibid.,  292).  As  at  Piraeus,  the  em- 
bankments  were  perhaps  intended  to  elevate  the  rams  above  the  massive  foundations, 
which  were  said  to  be  ten  cubits  (4.6  m)  thick  (Bell.  Jud.  5.153-154). 
IM  -.  Inerc  is  no  mention  of  embankments  in  Titus's  assault  on  the  second  wall  (Bell.  Jud. 
5.317),  and  the  terrain  within  the  town  was  perhaps  level  enough  for  the  machinery. 
However,  when  he  turned  his  attention  to  the  Temple  platform,  it  was  clearly  necessary 
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platform,  on  bedrock  which  was  around  II  metres  thick,  rather  than  the  50  cubits  (23 
rn)  which  Josephus  claims  (ibid.  5.238),  but  still  tall  enough  to  require  the  construction 
of  two  embankments;  in  addition,  the  northern  approach  was  screened  by  the  Struthion 
pool,  which  a  besieger  was  obfiged  to  bridge.  The  approach  to  the  Temple  platform  was 
equally  difficult  from  the  west,  where  it  rose  up  above  the  deep  Tyropoeon  Valley 
(ibid.,  5.140),  necessitating  two  embankments  here,  also  (ibid.  5.356-357).  When  these 
were  destroyed  (ibid.,  5.469-470,490),  four  new  ones  were  erected  at  the  Antonia  (ibid., 
5.523),  and  finally  a  single  broad  approach-road  was  cleared  through  the  ruins  of  Anto- 
nia  and  up  into  the  Temple  enclosure  (ibid.,  6.93). 
Connolly  has  suggested  that,  in  referring  to  pairs  of  embankments  at  each  location, 
Josephus  means  the  two  sides  of  a  single  embankment  (Connolly  1983,88).  Josephus 
says  that  the  final  two  embankments  at  the  Temple  were  thirty  cubits  (13.9  m)  apart, 
and  those  at  Antonia  were  twenty  cubits  (9.24  m)  apart  (Bell.  Jud.  5.467).  Following 
Connolly's  hypothesis,  these  will  have  been  the  widths  of  two  embankments,  yet 
Josephus  pointedly  comments  that  they  were  immense  (ibid.  ).  Even  taking  these  di- 
mensions  as  referring  only  to  the  central  filling,  and  allowing  for  the  additional  widths 
of  the  side  structures,  they  still  seem  rather  narrow  compared  with  Caesar's  330-foot 
(97.6  m)  wide  embankment  at  Avaricum. 
A  similar  argument  was  long  ago  deployed  in  favour  of  a  single  embankment  at  Massi- 
lia  (Jullian  1900,337).  but  foundered  for  the  same  reason  as  Connolly's;  namely,  that 
the  two  sides  of  a  wide  embankment  are  not  themselves  separate  "mounds",  but  integral 
parts  of  the  same  structure.  Holmes  has  also  pointed  out,  in  refuting  the  argument  of 
Jullian,  that  one  wide  embankment  effectively  infflled  the  vacant  gap  between  two  sepa- 
rate  embankments,  hence  it  would  have  meant  more  work  (1911,605);  he  could  have 
added  the  objection,  that  it  would  have  required  more  raw  material,  too. 
Titus's  first  embankments  against  the  Temple  platform  were  destroyed  by  fire,  a  feat 
which  was  attempted  during  several  other  sieges  (above,  p.  141).  This  apparent  com- 
bustibility  has  encouraged  a  peculiar  theory  "based  on  the  fantastic  assumption  that  the 
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600).  Liebenam  was  cautious,  renwking  only  that  "its  structure  was  ...  not  entirely 
compact,  but  had  cavities  which  allowed  the  flow  of  air,  and  perhaps  even  formal  cov- 
ered  gallerie§"  (1909,2242:  "sein  Geffige  war  wohl  ...  nicht  vollkommen  dicht,  sondern 
hatte  H6hlungen,  die  einen  Luftzug  zulieBen,  vielleicht  auch  fdrmliche  gedeckte 
Galerien!  ).  Saglio  believed  that  such  a  gallery  was  in  evidence  on  scene  CXVII  (fig. 
44,  extreme  top  right)  of  Trajan's  Column  (1877,142:  `ýOn  remarque  une  sorte  de  vofite 
formde  de  pouters  disposes  en  arc-boutant  et  peut-8tre  destinde  A  protdger  un  de  ces 
chemins  couverts,  cuniculi,  par  lesquels  on  pouvait  faire  avancer  des  sapes  et  des  mines 
jusqu'aux  murs"),  but  the  'Iype  of  vault  formed  by  beams  laid  out  Eke  strute'  requires 
the  eye  of  faith  (cf  Lepper  &  Frere  1988,168,  where  the  figures  at  top-right  are  not 
even  mentioned;  however,  I  have  argued  above,  p.  70,  that  the  subject  of  the  main  scene 
is,  indeed,  the  fi-ame  of  an  embankment). 
Wimmel  believed  that  the  embankment  was  constructed  in  layers,  and  that  the  workers 
brought  forward  the  materials  for  the  current  layer  through  a  he  of  protective  sheds 
(1974,10-11).  He  then  invented  the  elaborate  scheme  that,  when  one  row  of  sheds  had 
fiffilled  its  purpose,  rather  than  withdrawing  them  for  re-use  on  the  next  layer,  they 
were  simply  buried  when  more  material  was  shovelled  on  top,  thus  creating  de  facto 
galleries  within  the  structure  (Wimmel  1974,20-30).  This  method  of  construction  is 
unlikely  (see  below),  but  Wimmel  was  influenced  by  a  desire  to  explain  Caesar's  enig- 
matic  "aperti  cuniculr'  (below,  p.  192)  as  tunnels  within  the  embankment.  It  is  suffi- 
cient  to  note,  with  Hohnes  (1911,601),  that  such  an  embankment  would  not  have  been 
strong  enough  to  carry  the  host  of  soldiers  and  machinery  normally  deployed  on  top. 
Liebenarn  also  appears  to  suggest  (above,  p.  143)  that  the  embankment  advanced  layer- 
by-layer;  if,  by  this,  he  means  that  the  lowest  stage  of  the  embankment  had  reached  the 
wall  before  the  next  layer  was  piled  on  top,  then  he  is  surely  wrong.  Such  a  scheme 
would  continually  have  exposed  men  to  danger  at  the  wall  foot,  as  they  gradually  built 
that  section  up.  Rather,  the  work  will  have  begun  out  of  missile-range  of  the  town,  and 
probably  proceeded  much  as  Colonel  Stoffel  envisaged,  with  the  front  always  sloping 
down  towards  the  enemy  (above,  p.  141),  except  that  the  timber-work  existed  only  at 
149 the  sides,  and  the  rubble  infill  was  thrown  on  in  basketfuls  (cf  Richmond  1982,23-25, 
for  earth-moving  by  Roman  troops.  )  Corroboration  of  the  gradual  advance  theory 
comes  from  Josephus's  description  of  Titus's  embankments  "progressing  forwards"  at 
Jerusalem  (Bell.  Jud.  5.446),  a  nuance  that  is  lost  in  Williamson's  translation  (1981, 
325:  "nearing  completioif').  (Cf  Appian,  Hisp.  48,  on  Nertobriga.  ) 
Holmes  proposed  more  or  less  this  scheme  at  Avaricurn  (1911,140),  although  with  Na- 
poldon's  timber-only  tripartite  structure  (fig.  33)  in  mind.  He  observed  that  "to  com- 
plete  the  final  section  of  the  work  was  always  a  difficult  and  troublesome  operation7', 
and  recommended  that  men  stationed  at  the  forward  edge  of  the  advancing  embank- 
ment,  and  suitably  protected,  "shot  earth,  timber,  and  fascines  into  the  vacant  space  until 
the  mass  reached  the  necessary  height"  (ibid.,  144).  Consequently,  an  unfinished  em- 
bankment  will  have  resembled  a  free-standing  platform,  some  distance  from  the  enemy 
wall.  Such  a  structure  has  been  identified  at  Cremna,  bridging  the  narrowest  point  of 
the  valley  which  fronted  the  city  walls  (Mitchell  1995,180;  cf  fig.  29).  The  surviving 
mound,  composed  of  earth  and  stones,  extends  some  120  m  from  west  to  east,  and  the 
base  spreads  to  a  width  of  140  m;  the  excessive  spread,  particularly  to  the  south,  may  be 
attributed  to  the  absence  of  timber,  as  a  properly  revetted  embankment  would  have  re- 
tained  a  narrower  basal  width  and  more  strictly  oblique  sides.  Sloping  up  at  an  angle  of 
18",  it  reaches  a  height  of  15  m  above  the  valley  floor,  but  halts  20  m  from  its  objective 
(ibid.,  182). 
Originally,  the  excavator  believed  that  "the  purpose  of  building  the  mound  was  to  pro- 
vide  a  firing  platform  for  the  attacking  force"  (Mitchell  1989,317),  an  interpretation 
perpetuated  in  a  later  re-examination  (Davies  2000,155:  "Mitchell  is  correct  to  stress 
the  role  of  this  mound  as  an  artillery  platfornf).  Of  course,  no  precedent  can  be  in- 
voked  for  such  a  theory,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  obvious  interpretation  of  the 
mound  is  as  an  embankment  under  construction,  as  the  excavator  later  conceded 
(Mitchell  1995,182:  "it  was  almost  ready  to  have  served  as  a  ramp,  from  which  an  in- 
fantry  assault  could  be  mounted  at  and  over  the  city  walr').  Indeed,  although  Mitchell 
has  not  published  a  section  through  the  mound,  his  description  nicely  illustrates  the  con- 
structional  sequence  presumed  by  Stoffel  and  Holmes:  the  work  will  have  proceeded 
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them;  the  accumulation  of  material  will  have  created  a  mound  whose  apex,  at  each 
stage,  moved  further  east,  and  whose  eastward  slope  was  steeper  than  its  western  ap- 
proach.  When  it  was  abandoned,  the  Cremna  embankment  had  probably  reached  its  in- 
tended  height,  at  wall-foot  level,  and  it  remained  only  to  fill  the  vacant  space  and  bring 
up  the  battering-ram. 
Davies  has  pronounced  the  20  m  gap  "inexplicable",  if  the  structure  was  intended  to  be 
an  assault-ramp:  "the  first  basal  stage  should  have  been  extended  much  closer  to  the 
foot  of  the  defencee',  he  writes  (2000,156),  "in  order  that  the  infilling  process  could 
have  been  swiftly  completed  once  the  wall  breach  had  been  effected  by  the  ram  encased 
within  the  tower  or  shed  on  top  of  the  mound".  It  is  unnecessary  to  refute  an  argurnent, 
based  on  the  mistaken  belief  that  a  battering-ram  could  have  operated  more  than  20  m 
away  from  its  target.  Additional  proof  that  a  ramming  attack  was  ultimately  intended  is 
provided  by  the  defenders'  counter-measure,  for  they  had  buttressed  the  town  wall  with 
a  "counter  mound"  of  their  own,  measuring  70  m  by  15  m  at  the  base  and  obviously  in- 
tended  to  reinforce  the  curtain  against  battering  (Mitchell  1995,182). 
Another  unfinished  embankment  was  identified  at  Machaerus,  where  Josephus  records 
that  the  valleys  surrounding  the  hill  "could  not  easily  be  crossed  and  were  entirely  im- 
possible  to  fill  hP  (Bell.  Jud.  7.167),  but  that  Lucilius  Bassus  "decided  to  make  the  ap- 
proach  by  filling  up  the  valley  from  the  east  and  commenced  the  works,  labouring  to 
raise  the  embankment  (ch6ma)  with  all  speed,  and  thus  make  the  siege  easier"  (ibid. 
190).  In  fact,  archaeology  proves  that  Bassus's  embankment  lay  to  the  west  of  the  for- 
tress,  where  the  approach  is  more  gentle  on  account  of  a  wide  saddle  linking  el- 
Mishnaqa  with  the  surrounding  heights  (fig.  25).  Here,  the  excavator  discovered  a 
structure,  consisting  of  rough  field-stones  bound  with  soil,  85  rn  long,  widening  from 
around  15  m  at  the  tail  end  to  around  35  rn  where  it  reached  the  lower  slopes  of  el- 
Mishnaqa  (fig.  34).  As  at  Cremna,  though  on  a  smaller  scale,  the  widening  is  largely 
due  to  the  spread  of  rubble  supporting  the  increased  elevation,  and  the  crest  of  the  em- 
bankment  will  have  remained  a  constant  width  of  10-12  m.  The  height  of  12-14  rn  is 
the  maximum,  measured  where  the  embankment  fills  the  ravine  (Strobel  1974b,  156;  cf. 
151 1974a,  107).  The  excavator  drew  particular  attention  to  the  apparent  absence  of  wood 
remains  (ibid.,  n.  94),  which  again  strikes  a  chord  with  Cremna. 
Strobel  has  estimated  that  Machaerus  stood  40  metres  higher  than  the  saddle;  the  Ro- 
man  embankment  reduced  this  difference  to  around  25  m,  but,  beginning  some  140  me- 
tres  away  from  the  town,  it  was  abandoned  while  still  50  m  short  of  its  goal  (Strobel 
1974b,  156-157).  There  is  a  bulge,  half  way  along  on  the  north  side  (less  so  on  the 
south),  which  perhaps  indicates  that  an  obstacle  was  negotiated  at  that  point;  the  excava- 
tor  suggests  that  there  may  originally  have  been  a  defensive  ditch  here,  now  filled  with 
eroded  material  from  the  hill  (1974b,  157).  Owing  to  the  unfinished  nature  of  the  struc- 
ture,  it  is  difficult  to  discem  its  intended  design,  and  we  cannot  say  whether  it  was  aim- 
ing  for  the  wall  base  or  the  battlements. 
Probably  the  best-known  embankment,  and  the  one  which  continues  to  influence  schol- 
ars'  ideas  about  construction  and  use,  is  at  Masada.  There,  Silva  earmarked  a  ridge 
known  as  the  Leuka  (usually  identified  as  a  bump  at  the  base  of  the  embankment;  cf 
figs.  35  and  55),  and  "ordered  the  troops  to  pile  up  rubble;  working  willingly  and  with 
many  hands,  a  solid  embankment  (ch5ma)  was  raised  to  (a  height  oo  two  hundred  cu- 
bits  (92.5  m)"  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  7.306).  At  this  location,  there  is  a  saddle  running  from 
the  west  up  to  Masada,  and  creating  a  natural  watershed  between  the  northern  Wadi 
Ninire  and  the  southern  Wadi  Sebbe;  indeed,  Josephus  says  that  the  ascent  was  easier 
here  than  by  the  Snake  Path  in  the  east  (Bell.  Jud.  7.281),  and  must  have  been  fairly  ac- 
cessible  for  Herod  to  have  taken  the  precaution  of  erecting  a  watch-tower  somewhere  to 
the  west  (Bell.  Jud.  7.293;  Hawkes  1929,199,  is  certainly  wrong  to  imagine  that  the 
tower  Hes  beneath  the  Roman  embankment;  cf  Lammerer  1933,167).  However,  the 
steep  gradient  surely  disallows  the  "carriage  road"  which  Richmond  envisaged  (1962, 
142),  and  probably  permitted  only  pedestrian  traffic. 
A  recent  geological  survey  has  proven  that  this  western  saddle  was  "an  elongated,  fun- 
nel-shaped  spur  ...  225  rn  long,  200  m  wide  at  its  widest  and  50  rn  wide  at  its  narrowest, 
lower  part"  (Gill  1993,570).  In  fact,  von  Lammerer  had  already  shown  that  the  saddle 
rose  from  the  Leuka  to  a  spot  some  20  m  below  the  fortress  wall  (fig.  35);  Gill  calcu- 
152 lates  the  shortfall  to  be  13  metres  (1993,570).  Von  Larnmerer  considered  that  the  Ro- 
mans  had  simply  piled  up  25  or  30  metres  of  material  to  create  the  required  slope 
(Lammerer  1933,168-169),  explaining  Josephus's  inflated  figures  as  being,  not  the 
height  of  the  Roman  construction,  but  the  height  of  the  entire  slope,  most  of  it  natural, 
above  the  Wadi  bottom  (!  bid.,  171).  It  was  he  who  noticed  wood  fragments  projecting 
from  the  sides,  and  concluded  that  there  had  been  a  tiniber  skeleton  supporting  the 
structure. 
Josephus  claims  that,  as  the  Romans  were  not  content  with  the  stability  of  the  200-cubit 
(92.5  m)  embankment,  "a  bima  was  built  on  top  of  it  fifty  cubits  (23  m)  wide  and  the 
same  high,  by  fitting  together  large  stonee'  (Bell.  Jud.  7.307).  This  structure  is  often 
misinterpreted  as  a  "platfornf',  which  is  admittedly  the  usual  meaning  of  the  word  (Lid- 
dell  et  at.  1940,314  s.  v.  0111ta),  but  Williamson's  "pier"  (1981,397)  cannot  be  right;  it 
is  true  that  bima,  "a  raised  place",  has  connotations  of  stepping  up,  but  an  embankment 
cannot  have  been  stepped  at  the  apex,  otherwise  Silva's  wheeled  tower  would  have  been 
obstructed  before  reaching  the  end.  The  "step"  must  have  extended  along  the  entire 
crest,  in  the  manner  of  cladding. 
Yadin  (wrongly,  in  my  opinion)  envisaged  a  "high  platform  which  was  bunt  at  the  top 
of  the  ramp"  (1966,226;  followed  by  Gill  1993,570;  cf.  Goldsworthy  2000,142: 
"originally,  the  top  was  surmounted  by  a  wooden  platform  which  allowed  the  battering 
ram,  mounted  in  a  siege  tower,  to  be  brought  against  the  waW),  but  Hawkes  correctly 
interpreted  Josephus's  "platform!  '  as  "a  stone  causeway,  75  feet  high  and  as  broad, 
erected  up  the  crest  of  the  agger  (1929,199).  It  is  not  clear  why  Richmond  proposed 
"a  crowning  width  of  50  fV'  (1962,154),  when  Josephus  (and  Hawkes)  specified  75 
feet.  No  trace  has  ever  been  found  of  this  stone  cladding,  which  von  Lammerer  took  to 
be  a  25  metre-thick  layer  coating  the  top  surface  (1933,169),  but  the  Mma  mayjust  be 
Josephus's  way  of  describing  the  agger  which  the  Romans  added  to  the  natural  spur  in 
order  to  create  a  usable  ramp.  Note  that  the  artificial  element  is  "25-30  m  high  in  the 
central  part  of  the  ramp"  (Gill  1993,569;  cf.  Lammerer  1933,169),  which  is  fairly  close 
to  Josephus's  50  cubits. 
153 No  ancient  authority  describes  the  trackway  along  the  top  of  an  embankment.  Rich- 
mond  prescribed  "some  kind  of  rack  or  corduroy"  (1962,154  n.  70)  at  Masada,  perhaps 
influenced  by  the  rampart-walks  on  Trajan's  Column  (Richmond  1982,22),  but  such  a 
bumpy  track  seems  an  inappropriate  runway  for  a  heavy  siege-tower.  The  surface  rec- 
ommended  by  Trajan's  engineer,  Apollodorus  of  Damascus,  in  his  Poliorkitika  will 
have  been  planked,  rather  than  logged:  "But  if  the  ground  beneath  (the  tower)  is  not 
level  but  has  hollows,  so  we  shall  make  a  base  (hypothima)  for  the  tower  with  the  same 
combination  (of  beams?  )  as  the  tower  itself,  adapted  to  the  slope  of  the  ground  and  flat- 
tening  the  ground  with  its  construction!  '  (Apoll.  W  173). 
Every  deviation  from  an  even  surface  would  make  the  task  of  advancing  the  tower  that 
much  more  difficult,  so  the  prime  requirement  would  have  been  for  a  level  runway  with 
a  smooth  gradient.  Josephus  records  that  the  bUma  at  Masada  was  made  of  large  stones 
fitted  together,  emphasizing  the  necessity  for  a  solid  running  surface.  This  was  the 
downfall  of  Flamininus's  embankment  at  Atrax,  which  must  have  been  one  of  Rome's 
earliest  experiments  with  this  kind  of  structure;  when  a  siege-tower  was  deployed,  its 
wheels  got  stuck  in  a  rut  in  the  loose  soil,  and  the  machine  listed  violently.  Clearly, 
Flamininus  had  not  even  rammed  the  surface,  far  less  laid  a  timber  runway. 
According  to  von  Lammerer,  the  gradient  of  the  Masada  ramp  was  19*  (1933,169;  cf 
fig.  35);  according  to  Gill,  17*  (1993,570).  Connolly's  schematic  plan  (1983,92)  is 
generally  reliable,  although  there  is  no  particular  reason  to  postulate  a  widened,  horizon- 
tal  working-area  at  the  top;  indeed,  it  was  probably  desirable  to  avoid  any  sudden 
changes  in  gradient,  such  as  he  shows  at  the  top  and  bottom  of  his  later  reconstruction 
(Dobson  1989,214-215;  note  that  Dobson's  commentary  incorrectly  implies  that  the 
siege  tower  was  not  mobile,  but  had  been  built  in  situ). 
No  other  archaeological  examples  are  known.  Yadin  (1971,192-193)  thought  he  had 
discerned  a  Roman  embankment  on  the  southern  side  of  Bettir,  however  examination  by 
Ussishkin  (1993,95)  has  disproved  this.  Equally,  the  embankment  claimed  for  Narbata 
by  Zertal  (1995,84-87)  is  highly  dubious.  First,  it  is  only  I  metre  in  height,  and  second, 
its  supposed  retaining  walls,  set  approximately  4.5  metres  apart,  are  neither  parallel  nor 
154 of  uniform  construction;  the  "ramp"  appears  to  comprise  two  separate  features  which 
may  be  boundary  waHs  of  some  kind  (Ussishkin  1993,95  n.  2). 
Finally,  mention  must  be  made  of  Davies's  attempt  to  divide  aggeres  into  assault  ramps 
("any  structure  raised  to  parallel  the  height  of  a  defensive  work  (or  at  least,  to  reach  its 
base),  enabling  the  passage  of  storming  parties  and/or  the  mounting  of  engines  capable 
of  effecting  a  breacIP;  2001,220)  and  siege  mounds  ("a  structure  raised  to  parallel  or 
overtop  a  defensive  work  allowing  oversight  of  the  defenders  and  the  advantageous  em- 
placement  of  artillery";  ibid.  ).  Although  the  ancient  sources  draw  no  such  distinction, 
Davies  believes  that  "the  different  tactical  functions  performed  by  these  two  structures 
should  encourage  us  to  adopt  a  stricter  semantic  approach  in  contrast  to  the  cavalier 
manner  in  which  'ramp'  and  'mound'  have  been  employed  hitherto"  (2001,220).  But 
the  examples  which  he  offers  are  forced  and  unconvincing:  the  aggeres  at  Massilia, 
which  "sound  like  assault  ramps,  but  the  fact  that  no  mention  is  made  of  any  rams,  that 
towers  are  raised  on  the  same  and  that  the  structures  do  not  seem  to  have  been  raised  to 
equal  the  height  of  the  enceinte,  does  seem  to  suggest  that  these  should  be  regarded  as 
siege  mounds  instead"  (2001,  B84);  or  the  deployment  of  towers  on  the  agger  at 
Jotapata,  which  "effectively  converted  the  assault  ramp  into  a  siege  mound"  (2001, 
B107). 
Of  course,  the  heaping  up  of  rubble  implies  no  uniformity  of  purpose:  the  differing  in- 
tentions  of  the  embankment-builders  at  Carthage  and  Cremna,  for  example,  should  warn 
against  making  sweeping  generalisations.  Equally,  the  way  in  which  an  embankment 
could  change  function,  as  at  Jotapata  and  Praaspa,  indicates  an  inherent  flexibility.  But 
it  is  the  physical  nature  of  the  embankment  that  remains  problematic  (cf  Noviodunum, 
p.  13  8),  not  whether  it  was  "the  direct  agent  of  reductiore'  or  simply  a  "supporting  toor, 
(Davies  2001,220).  It  is  true  to  say  that  the  nature  of  the  embankment  depended  as 
much  upon  the  nature  of  the  enemy  defences  as  upon  the  nature  of  the  proposed  attack. 
Veith  despaired  of  ever  formulating  "a  universally  applicable  constructional  moder, 
(1928,444:  "Bei  dieser  weitgehenden  Abhdngigkeit  vorn  Angriffsplan  und  Geldnde  IdBt 
sich  Uberhaupt  nicht  an  ein  allgemein  gUltiges  Konstruktionsschema  denkerf'),  but  such 
a  model  seems  inappropriate  in  any  case. 
155 Part  3: 
The  Machinery  of  Roman  Siegecraft 
S  iege  apparatus  could  take  many  forms,  depending  upon  its  purpose,  although  the 
historical  sources  often  refer  simply  to  "machinery".  We  hear  of  various  devices 
for  elevating  assault  troops  to  wall-height,  from  the  humble  ladder  and  its  variations,  to 
the  mobile  tower  with  draw-bridge,  and  various  battering  machines  for  breaching  walls. 
But,  for  detailed  descriptions  of  these,  we  are  indebted  to  a  handful  of  specialists. 
The  earliest  of  these  is  Philon  of  Byzantium,  whose  "Mechanical  CompendiuriP 
(MichaniAZ  syntaxis)  includes  sections  on  the  construction  of  artillery  (BelopoUka)  and 
on  siegecraft  (Poliorkitika),  drawing  upon  personal  experience  in  the  technologically 
advanced  cities  of  Rhodes  and  Alexandria  in  the  later  third  century  B.  C.  Hcron  of  Al- 
exandria  preserves  interesting  remarks  on  artillery  in  his  BelopoUka,  probably  written 
during  the  reign  of  Nero,  but  four  other  authors  are  of  prime  importance  for  siegecraft 
studies:  Vitruvius,  Athenaeus,  Apollodorus,  and  Vegetius. 
Vitruvius's  text  is  securely  dated  to  the  late  first  century  B.  C.  (e.  g.,  Rowland  &  Howe 
1999,5-6),  through  his  links  with  Julius  Caesar,  Octavian  and,  later,  Octavian's  sister, 
Octavia;  interestingly,  he  says  that,  along  with  three  colleagues,  he  was  charged  with 
"the  construction  of  ballistae  and  scorplones  and  the  repair  of  other  artillery"  (De  arch. 
I  -praef.  1-2).  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  such  certainty  with  Athenaeus.  Schneider  mud- 
died  the  waters  by  lending  his  (posthumous)  authority  to  a  Hadrianic  date,  on  stylistic 
grounds  (Schneider  1912,2),  but  the  identity  of  the  "most  revered  Marcellus"  to  whom 
156 Athenaeus  dedicated  his  treatise  (W  3)  is  the  key  to  the  dating.  The  main  contenders  are 
the  conqueror  of  Syracuse,  and  the  emperor  Augustus's  son-in-law;  the  argument  of 
Cichorius  (1922,276)  for  the  latter  is  attractive,  but  unfortunately  inconclusive. 
Curiously,  much  of  Athenaeus's  work  appears,  sometimes  abbreviated,  sometimes  sup- 
plemented,  in  the  tenth  book  of  Vitruvius's  De  architectura.  In  particular,  each  in- 
cludes  a  selection  of  wheeled  sheds,  the  so-called  testudines  (cheldnes),  introduced  by 
Vitruvius  as  "that  which  I  have  learned  from  my  teachers  and  which  appears  useful  to 
md"  (De  arch.  10.13.8).  Athenaeus  gives  no  attribution  for  the  materiaL  but  his  earlier 
statement,  that  "we  shall  run  through  what  we  have  read  on  our  subject  by  the  engineer 
Agesistratoe'  (W  7),  may  apply  particularly  to  this  section.  Agesistratos  was  certainly 
one  of  Vitruvius's  sources  (De  arch.  7.  praef.  14). 
We  are  on  more  secure  ground  with  Apollodorus  of  Damascus,  whose  name  is  inextri- 
cably  linked  with  the  emperor  Tmjan.  He  built  the  famous  Danube  bridge  which  Tra- 
jan's  armies  utilised  in  the  Second  Dacian  War  of  A.  D.  106  (Procop.,  De  aedif.  4.6.13), 
and  was  subsequently  responsible  for  Trajan's  Forum  and  probably  the  Column  itself 
(cf.  Lepper  &  Frere  1988,187-193).  His  treatise  on  siegecraft  (PoliorAztika)  is  ad- 
dressed  to  an  unnamed  emperor,  with  whom  he  had  previously  served  in  combat  (W 
138),  a  scenario  which  comfortably  fits  the  Dacian  Wars  of  Trajan;  the  theory  that  the 
work  was  dedicated  to  Hadrian,  often  accepted  uncritically  (e.  g.,  Gilliver  1999,176),  is 
at  best  unproven  (Ridley  1989,560). 
Finally,  the  Epitoma  rei  militaris,  compiled  by  Vegetius  at  some  point  in  the  later  fourth 
or  early  fifth  century,  is  relevant  for  its  section  on  siege  warfare  (4.1-30),  thought  to  de- 
rive  from  the  lost  Tactica  of  Frontinus  (Lammert  1938,399-401;  Lendle  1983,  xxi).  It 
is  interesting  that,  in  his  Strategemata,  Frontinus,  eschews  discussion  of  opera  and  ma- 
chinamenta,  on  the  grounds  that  their  development  has  long  since  peaked  (Strat. 
3-praef.  ),  but  this  need  not  preclude  him  from  having  discussed  the  subject  in  a  separate 
work. 
157 Chapter  5: 
Me  use  of  artillery  in  the  Roman  era 
W  hen  the  turncoat,  Labienus,  was  trying  to  dislodge  the  Caesarian  garrison  from 
the  town  of  Leptis  in  46  B.  C.,  one  of  his  decurions  was  pinned  to  his  horse  (or, 
according  to  a  variant  reading,  to  the  ground:  Harmand  1971,226)  by  a  scorpio  missile 
(Bell.  Afr.  29).  The  town  was  said  to  be  easily  defended,  on  account  of  the  quantity  of 
artillery  (tormenta)  which  it  possessed,  and  the  same  trend  can  be  discerned  in  towns 
elsewhere. 
Artillery,  as  with  other  elements  of  siege-machinery,  was  introduced  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean  world  during  the  Carthaginian  conflict  with  Syracuse  in  the  later  5th  century 
B.  C.  Initially  utilising  an  oversized  composite  bow  as  its  source  of  energy,  the  design 
of  the  catapult  was  transformed  by  the  discovery  of  the  torsion  principle,  and  torsion 
arrow-firers  and  stone-projectors  were  present  in  the  arsenals  of  major  towns  and  cities 
by  the  third  century  B.  C.  (cf.  Baatz  1999a,  340;  Marsden  1969,73-77). 
The  subject  as  a  whole  is  often  poorly  understood  in  the  modem  literature  (e.  g.,  South- 
em  &  Dixon  1996,152,  where  it  is  assumed  that  Vitruvius  is  of  relevance  to  the  later 
period;  Strobel  1974a,  109,  for  the  onager  in  Flavian  times),  and  areas  of  contention 
remah  so  that,  besides  exploring  the  place  of  artillery  in  siegecraft,  a  brief  technical 
overview  is  desirable. 
158 1.  The  construction  and  use  of  ancient  artillexy 
. 
1.1  The  3rd  centuly  B.  C. 
By  the  time  of  Philon  of  Byzantium,  Hellenistic  engineers  had  devised  a  set  of  construc- 
tional  principles  for  the  arrow-firing  catapult,  and  a  separate  set  for  the  stone-projector, 
on  account  of  differences  in  design.  These  constructional  rules  meant  that,  in  theory, 
catapults  of  any  size  could  be  constructed  (cf  Baatz  1999a,  341-342;  Marsden  1969, 
24-39).  Because  individual  machines  were  tailored  to  the  size  of  their  intended  ammu- 
nition,  arrow-firers  were  designated  according  to  the  length  of  the  arrow.  Thus,  a  "four- 
span7  (or  "two-cubit')  catapult  was  designed  to  fire  an  arrow  0.92  m  (i.  e.,  4x0.23  M, 
or  2x0.46  m)  in  length.  Similarly,  a  "ten-mina!  '  stone-projector  was  designed  for  shot 
weighing  around  4V2kg  (i.  e.,  10  x  0.4366  kg). 
In  torsion  weapons,  the  energy  for  propelling  the  missile  was  stored  in  two  torsion- 
springs,  held  upright  and  parallel  in  a  metal-reinforced  frame  (plinthion).  Both  springs 
required  a  distinctive  bronze  washer  (choinikis)  at  each  end,  through  which  the  spring- 
cord  was  stretched;  this  is  often  the  only  recognisable  vestige  of  a  catapult  (cf.  figs.  37- 
38).  The  washer  was  intended  to  turn  in  the  torsion-fi=e,  twisting  the  spring  to  add 
additional,  last-minute  torsion.  Because  the  spring-cord  was  so  sensitive,  the  springs 
would  only  have  been  tensioned  immediately  prior  to  use,  and  slackened  off  afterwards. 
(A  typical  arrow-firing  catapult  is  shown  in  fig.  36a). 
The  crucial  factor  in  catapult  design  was  the  energy  storage  capacity  of  the  torsion- 
spring  (i.  e.,  the  mathematical  volume  of  the  notional  cylinder  formed  by  the  torsion- 
spring).  Consequently,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that,  in  their  calibration  tables,  the 
Hellenistic  engineers  utilised  the  spring-diameter  (diametros,  defined  as  the  inner  di- 
ameter  of  the  washer)  as  the  basic  unit  of  measurement  for  any  given  catapult.  Thus,  for 
example,  Philon  (Bel.  12  =  W55)  records  that  the  arrow-firer's  torsion-fiwe  should  be 
6Y2  spring-diameters  wide  by  SY2  spring-diameters  tall.  The  bow-arms  should  be  7 
spring-diameters,  the  case  16  spring-diameters,  and  the  projectile  9  spring-diameters  in 
length.  For  our  two-cubit  catapult,  the  inner  diameter  of  the  washer  was  10.28  cm,  and 
159 all  of  the  other  components  were  sized  accordingly.  (Nine  times  10.28  cm.  gives  the 
missile-length  of  0.92  m,  or  two  cubits.  ) 
The  design  of  the  stone-projector  was  only  superficially  similar  (cf.  fig.  36b).  First,  the 
bow-string  was  replaced  by  a  band,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  projectile.  Second,  be- 
cause  of  the  weight  of  the  projectile,  the  machine  was  required  to  exert  greater  energy; 
this  was  achieved,  not  only  by  making  the  average  machine  larger  overalL  but  also  by 
redesigning  the  torsion-frame  to  offset  the  springs  and  allow  the  bow-arms  to  recoU  fur- 
ther.  The  technical  designation  for  the  arrow-firer  was  euthytonon,  or  "straight- 
springe',  while  the  stone-projector  was  known  as  a  palintonon,  or  "bent-springe',  be- 
cause  of  the  configuration  when  viewed  from  above  (cf.  Marsden  1969,22-23).  In  eve- 
ryday  parlance,  the  arrow-firer  was  simply  called  the  katapelas  oxybelis,  on  account  of 
the  "sharp  missile",  while  the  stone-projector  was  called  the  lithobolos  or  petrobolos. 
Besides  a  general  increase  in  size,  the  construction  of  the  stone-projector  was  rather 
more  complex.  In  simple  terms,  the  "stocle'  of  the  machine  was  proportionately  shorter 
and  wider,  to  accommodate  a  differently  sized  projectile,  and  the  larger  torsion-fi-ame 
was  manufactured  as  two  separate  springs  with  connecting  spars  and  rearward  bracing. 
In  keeping  with  this  increased  complexity,  a  more  involved  mathematical  formula  was 
used  to  calculate  the  sizes  of  all  the  individual  components.  Whereas  the  arrow-firer's 
spring-diameter  was  simply  one-ninth  of  the  intended  missile  length,  the  stone- 
projector's  spring-dimneter,  expressed  in  dactyls,  (Le.,  1/24  cubit),  was  1  -1  times  the  cube 
root  of  the  intended  missile  weight  in  minas  (i.  e.,  1/6o  talent)  multiplied  by  a  hundred. 
D=1.1 
34(loo  M) 
Thus,  for  our  ten-mina  stone-projector,  the  spring-diameter  was 
x 
3ý(100 
X  10)  =  1.1  X 
3ý(1,000) 
=  1.1  x  10  =  11  dactyls  =  21.2  cm 
Philon  supplies  a  list  equating  standard  projectile  weights  with  the  corresponding 
spring-diameters  (Philon,  Bel.  6=  W5  1;  cf.  Marsden  1971,15  8  n.  11),  which  would 
160 have  saved  contemporary  engineers  the  trouble  of  calculating  complicated  cube  roots. 
As  with  the  arrow-firer,  all  other  components  were  expressed  as  multiples  or  fractions 
of  the  spring-diameter;  for  example,  the  bow-arms  were  to  be  6  spring-diameters  long, 
the  ladder  19  spring-diameters  long,  and  the  torsion-frame  7V2spring-diameters  high. 
A  remarkable  discovery  was  made  at  Ephyra,  in  the  ruins  of  a  fortified  tower  destroyed 
by  the  Romans  in  167  B.  C.:  twenty-one  catapult  washers,  originating  from  seven  ma- 
chines  of  varying  antiquity  (Baatz  1982,213;  217).  The  largest  washers,  forming  a 
complete  set  of  four,  have  an  inner  diameter  of  13.6cm  (fig.  37.2),  indicating  a  missile- 
length  of  1.22  in,  or  four  Greek  feet  (ibid.  219-220).  A  four-footer  arrow-firer  would 
have  been  considered  a  fairly  heavy-duty  weapon.  Baatz  does  not  explore  the  possibil- 
ity  that  this  might  have  been  a  stone-projector,  stating  that  "even  the  smallest  stone- 
thrower  had  significantly  larger  washers"  (1982,223:  "selbst  die  kleinsten  Steinwerfer 
hatten  wesentlich  grNere  Spannbuchsen!  ),  but  it  is  worth  pursuing  this  further. 
The  stone-thrower  formula  requires  that  we  know  the  weight  of  the  missile  in 
However,  the  converse,  working  from  the  diametros  D  (i.  e.,  the  inner  diameter  of  the 
washer),  expressed  in  dactyls,  is: 
D3.  (1.1)  3=  100  M 
or,  put  another  way 
3.  (1.1)3)  100  M=  (D 
Thus,  for  our  13.6  cm  washer  (i.  e.,  D=7  dactyls),  the  n-Assile  weight  (in  minas)  was 
M=  (7  3+(1.1)3)  .  100  =  (343  +1  -33)  -  100  =  257.9  100  =  2.58 
So,  the  largest  Ephyra  washers  could,  in  theory,  have  come  from  a  stone-projector  de- 
signed  for  missiles  weighing  approximately  2Y2minas  (1.125  kg),  but  it  seems  peculiar 
to  have  specifically  designed  a  machine  for  such  small  projectiles.  Indeed,  as  Baatz  has 
161 pointed  out  (1982,223  n.  30),  Philon  begins  his  list  of  common  stone-projector  calibres 
at  10  minas  (Bel.  6=  Th.  5  1),  which  corresponds  to  a  diametros  of  21.2  cm;  this  is  a  far 
cry  from  the  13.6  cm  Ephyra  washer. 
However,  the  existence  of  a  katapaltes  petrobolos  kai  oxybelis  tetrapichus,  designed  by 
Bromius  and  stored  in  the  Erechtheium  at  Athens  in  307/6  B.  C.  (I  G.  II'  1487B),  sheds 
an  interesting  light  on  the  matter,  as  it  seems  to  indicate  a  four-cubit  arrow-firer  which 
was  also  capable  of  throwing  stones  (cf  Marsden  1969,70;  Garlan  1974,216).  A  four- 
cubit  arrow-firer  was  built  around  a  diametros  of  19/3dactyls  (20.6  cm),  which  is  only 
marginally  smaller  than  the  ten-mina  stone-projector.  Thus,  it  is  likely  that  Bromius's 
machine  was  a  palintonon  (above,  p.  160),  which  happened  to  be  the  correct  calibre  to 
fire  large  four-cubit  (1.85  m)  missiles;  it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  to  exchange 
the  bow-string,  and  the  wide  slider  need  not  have  presented  a  problem  (pace  Marsden). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  remaining  three  catapults  on  the  inscription,  two  three-cubit 
machines  and  a  three-span,  are  described  as  arrow-firers;  their  sliders  were  designed  for 
arrows  and,  at  2-4  cm.  wide,  will  have  been  too  narrow  to  take  stone-shot.  Thus,  the  fact 
that  they  are  not  credited  with  the  same  dual  capability  as  Bromius's  machine  is  entirely 
down  to  their  design.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  four-cubit  machine  repre- 
sented  the  smallest  possible  calibre  of  stone-projector  (pace  Baatz  1982,223  n.  30); 
only  that  this  was  the  smallest  one  in  the  Athenian  inventory  of  307/6  B.  C. 
It  is  theoretically  possible  for  a  four-foot  machine,  like  the  one  from  Ephyra,  to  have 
been  designed  as  a  palintonon,  with  a  wide  slider  for  Nmina  shot,  but  it  is  purely  con- 
jectural  that  such  a  machine  ever  existed.  Actual  finds  of  missiles  tend  to  suggest  that 
Greek  engineers  of  the  third  and  second  centuries  preferred  larger  calibres  of  stone-shot 
(cf  Table  19,  p.  185).  Only  at  Tel  Dor  has  any  significant  proportion  of  small  shot  been 
recovered  (Shatzman  1995,61),  and  the  absence  of  anything  remotely  similar  from  the 
great  arsenals  at  Pergarnum  and  Rhodes  must  be  significant. 
Marsden  noted  that  "the  Romans  were  certainly  familiar  with  artillery  by  the  time  of  the 
first  Punic  War"  (1969,84),  but  familiarity  should  not  be  confused  with  expertise,  and 
162 certainly  does  not  imply  ownership.  He  cites  a  passage  of  Frontinus  (Strat.  1.4.1),  in 
which  the  consul  for  282  B.  C.,  Q.  Aemilius  Papus,  came  under  artillery-fire  from  the 
Tarentine  fleet.  Of  course,  Tarentum,  home  of  Pythagorean  mechanics,  was  at  the  fore- 
front  of  artillery  development,  whereas  there  is  no  question  of  Papus  possessing  artil- 
lery.  Marsden  also  cites  a  story,  current  in  Augustan  times,  that  M.  Atilius  Regulus  car- 
ried  artillery  in  his  African  expedition  of  256  B.  C.,,  but  this  is  historically  doubtful. 
We  can  be  quite  sure  that  the  Romans  were  not  yet  equipped  with  artillery  during  the 
First  Punic  War.  Besides  the  fact  that  it  figures  in  none  of  Polybius's  siege  narratives, 
there  was  an  occasion  when  a  Roman  flotilla,  intimidated  by  a  stronger  Carthaginian 
fleet,  beached  and  sought  the  protection  of  the  arrow-firers  and  stone-projectors  belong- 
ing  to  a  nearby  coastal  town  (Polyb.  1.53.10-11).  They  clearly  had  no  catapults  of  their 
own,  whereas  the  Sicilians  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  a  century  of  artillery  development.  In 
this  context,  Diodorus's  report  of  a  single  stone-projector  at  Lilybaeum.  in  the  240s  is 
more  than  a  little  suspicious  (Diod.  Sic.  24.1.2),  although  Hiero  of  Syracuse  could  have 
been  the  source  of  the  siege  equipment  which  the  Romans  used  here.  If  the  story  is  true, 
it  simply  demonstrates  the  ineptitude  with  which  the  Romans  handled  the  new  weapon 
at  this  early  date. 
Artillery  suddenly  appears  in  Roman  hands  around  210  B.  C.  as  a  naval  weapon,  first 
aboard  Laevinus's  ships  at  Anticyra,  then  possibly  in  support  of  Scipio  Africanus  at 
Cartagena;  it  is  found  some  years  later  with  the  relieving  flotilla  of  Fabius  Maximus  at 
Tarenturn,  and  finally  with  Scipio  at  Utica.  The  "artillery  and  machinery"  which  Cin- 
cius  Alimentus  requisitioned  from  Sicily  in  208  B.  C.  (above,  p.  23)  was  probably  cap- 
tured  Carthaginian  war  material.  Catapults  had  figured  in  the  ovation  of  Marcellus  in 
211  B.  C.  (Livy  26.21.7),  no  doubt  taken  from  Syracuse,  and  some  of  these,  along  with 
the  470-odd  catapults  captured  at  Cartagena,  win  have  found  their  way  onto  the  fleet. 
Roman  stores  of  artillery  will  have  been  further  replenished  with  the  booty  from  carn- 
paigning  in  Aetolia:  Fulvius's  triumph  in  187  B.  C.  apparently  included  the  parading  of 
catapultae,  ballistae,  and  tormenta  omnis  generis  (Livy  39.5.16). 
163 It  is  noteworthy  that,  when  the  Romans  finally  began  using  artillery,  it  was  requisitioned 
from  Syracusan  sources,  long  associated  with  artillery  manufacture,  or  confiscated  from 
Carthaginian  stores  and  Greek  towns.  This  is  not  surprising,  given  the  highly  complex 
manufacturing  process.  As  Marsden  has  noted,  "an  inexperienced  mechanic  had  little 
chance  of  producing  an  efficient  [machine]"  (1969,24).  It  is  also  of  interest  that  the 
weapon  first  appears  in  connection  with  the  fleet.  Garlan  has  observed,  in  the  context  of 
the  4th  century  Syracusan  catapults,  that  transport  of  such  cumbersome  machines  by 
road  would  have  been  troublesome;  consequently,  the  fact  that  reports  of  their  use  tend 
to  concentrate  on  coastal  sites  may  not  be  entirely  coincidental  (Garlan  1974,168). 
By  now,  mural  artillery  had  become  common  in  towns  of  the  Mediterranean  world.  The 
Capuans  were  able  to  repulse  a  Roman  attack  in  211  B.  C.,  using  ballistae  and  scor- 
piones  positioned  at  the  gates  (Livy  26.6.4),  and  while  assaulting  Locri  in  205  B.  C. 
Hannibal  narrowly  avoided  a  scorpio  missile  fired  from  the  walls  (Livy  29.7.6).  Fi- 
nally,  stone-projectors  were  particularly  prominent  in  200  B.  C.,  defending  the  walls  of 
Abydus  against  the  ship-borne  machinery  of  Philip  V  (Polyb.  16.30.4). 
1.2  The  2nd  &  early  1st  centuries  B.  C. 
At  Delminiurn  in  156  B.  C.,  Marcius  Figulus  had  two-cubit  catapults  (katapeltai),  which 
he  used  to  fire  incendiary  arrows  into  the  town.  The  use  of  artillery  to  fire  incendiary 
projectiles  was  common  in  Hellenistic  siegecraft,  though  usually  directed  at  the  besieger 
by  the  besieged,  as  recommended  by  Philon  (Pol.  3.41  =  Th.  94).  The  defenders  of 
Tyre  had  used  this  stratagem  against  Alexander  in  332  B.  C.  (Arrian,  Anab.  Alex. 
2.21.2),  and  similarly  the  Rhodians  against  Demetrius  in  304  B.  C.  (Diod.  Sic.  20.96.6- 
7),  to  quote  only  two  examples.  The  arrow-firers  and  stone-projectors  which  Scipio 
Aemilianus  allegedly  stationed  in  the  towers  along  the  circumvallation  at  Numantia  in 
133  B.  C.  were  not  loaded  with  incendiary  missiles,  as  far  as  we  know,  but  they  repre- 
sent  the  first  occasion,  after  Delminium,  that  artillery  is  found  in  Roman  bands.  And 
the  last,  until  the  Jugurthine  War,  thirty  years  later. 
A  complete  torsion-fi-ame  with  four  washers  was  discovered  in  1911  at  Ampurias 
(Spain)  and  dated  broadly  to  the  later  second  century  (Pitollet  1920,74;  Baatz  1980b, 
164 288).  This  first  ever  find  of  ancient  artillery  was  immediately  appreciated  by  Schramm, 
who  reconstructed  the  machine  (1918,75-76;  cf.  fig.  3  6a),  and  it  remains  a  mystery  why 
Marsden  hardly  mentioned  it  in  his  study  of  ancient  artillery.  The  wooden  fime  was 
reinforced  with  iron  fittings,  as  recommended  by  Philon  (Bel.  16  =  TIL  57),  primarily  to 
brace  the  timber  components,  but  also  to  afford  some  protection  against  enemy  fire. 
The  washers  (fig.  37.4)  have  an  inner  diameter  of  7.9  cm,  a  calibre  which  fies  midway 
between  2Y2  feet  and  3  spans.  Nevertheless,  Schramm  demonstrated  that  the  machine 
was  intended  to  be  a  three-span  (missile-length:  0.69  m),  but  was  "under-sprung"  (1918, 
43).  Vitruvius  gives  the  example  of  a  machine  whose  torsion-frame  is  not  as  high  as  it 
should  be,  an  effect  which  he  terms  catatonum,  and  recommends;  the  consequent  length- 
ening  of  the  bow-arms  to  compensate  (Vitr.,  de  arch.  10.10.6). 
Marsden  envisaged  the  Roman  commanders  of  the  period  employing  the  same  equip- 
ment  as  the  contemporary  Hellenistic  generals,  but  on  a  more  modest  scale  (Marsden 
1969,176);  however,  the  Macedonians  and  the  Seleucids  routinely  fielded  quantities  of 
artillery,  whereas  it  is  noticeably  absent  from  Roman  operations  of  the  second  century. 
This  cannot  have  been  for  want  of  artillery-pieces.  Even  if  the  five  hundred  catapults 
taken  from  Cartagena  in  209  B.  C.  were  no  longer  serviceable,  a  Roman  commission 
headed  by  Scipio  Nasica  and  Cornelius  Hispanus  had  confiscated  "roughly  two  thou- 
sand  arrow-firing  and  stone-projecting  catapults"  from  Carthage  in  149  B.  C.  (Appian, 
Pun.  80).  Marsden  (1969,110)  blithely  assumes  that  Scipio  employed  artillery  in  his 
assaults  on  Carthage  in  147  and  146  B.  C.,  but  Appian  makes  no  mention  of  it.  In  Mars- 
den's  scenario,  "[Scipio's]  artillery  gave  the  normal  covering  fire",  but,  as  we  have 
seen,  such  covering  fire,  at  least  from  artillery,  is  conspicuously  absent  from  Roman  op- 
erations  of  the  period. 
Metellus  had  found  the  walls  of  Zama  defended  by  artillery  in  109  B.  C.  (Sall.,  Jug. 
57.6),  and  Marius  had  employed  artillery  (ibid.,  94.3)  in  his  assault  on  the  fort  at  the 
Muluccha  River,  but  it  fades  into  the  background  again,  until  the  time  of  Sulla.  In  87 
B.  C.,  for  his  renewed  attempt  on  Piraeus,  Sulla  constructed  machinery  in  the  workshops 
of  Eleusis  and  Megara,  and  requisitioned  artillery  from  Thebes  (Appian,  Mithr.  30).  He 
165 is  not  known  to  have  used  artillery  previously,  but  we  have  seen  that  it  was  common  in 
the  town  defences  of  the  Greek  world  (above,  p.  164),  and  the  Thebans  would  have  been 
keen  to  cement  their  alliance  with  Rome.  It  is  not  surprising  to  see  Pompey  equipped 
with  artillery at  Jerusalem  in  63  B.  C.,  as  it  had  been  standard  equipment  in  the  Greek 
east  for  almost  three  hundred  years.  He  apparently  borrowed  the  machinery  from  Tyre 
(Jos.,  Ant.  Iud.  14.62;  BeIL  Iud.  1.147),  where  it  is  unlikely  to  have  been  Roman  equip- 
ment  stored  in  the  city  (pace  Shatzman  1989,465),  but  rather,  like  Sulla's  Theban  ma- 
chines,  a  gift  to  ingratiate  the  townsfolk  with  the  Romans.  It  is  possible  that  artillery 
was  frequently  loaned  in  the  Greek  world,  on  account  of  its  specialised  construction, 
though  there  is  no  clear  evidence  of  this  (pace  Marsden  1969,176);  but  few  towns 
would  dare  to  refuse  a  request  from  the  Roman  army. 
1.3  The  later  1  st  centuiy  B.  C. 
As  engineers  became  more  familiar  with  artillery  construction,  further  modifications 
were  introduced  between  the  time  of  Philon.  and  the  time  of  Vitruvius,  and  a  new  Latin 
vocabulary  appears  alongside  the  Greek:  the  term  modiolus  is  used  for  the  washer, 
capitulum  for  the  torsion-fi-ame,  andforamen  to  indicate  the  spring-hole  diameter  (dia- 
metros);  in  general,  stone-projectors  become  known  as  ballistae,  arrow-firers  as  cala- 
pultae,  and  smaller  examples  of  the  latter  as  scorpiones. 
One  of  the  most  important  developments  was  the  curving  of  the  arrow-firer's  bow-arms, 
which  effectively  increased  the  angle  of  recoil  from  35'  to  47".  Other  changes  were 
applied  to  the  torsion-frame,  which  became  narrower  and  taller  (viewed  from  the  front), 
and  thus  increased  the  power  of  the  springs  (Marsden  1969,200-201).  For  any  given 
washer-size,  the  Vitruvian  arrow-firer  must  have  been  substantially  more  powerful  than 
the  Hellenistic  version. 
Changes  were  made  to  the  stone-projector,  also.  Although  the  washers  must  still  have 
been  circular,  like  Philon's,  the  central  hole  appears  to  have  been  oval  (Vitr.,  De  arch. 
10.11.4;  cf  Marsden  1971,200  n.  26  and  fig.  8),  which  would  have  allowed  more 
spring-cord  to  be  inserted,  thus  resulting  in  a  more  powerful  machine.  Vitruvius  gives  a 
list  of  common  calibres  (De  arch.  10.11.3,  with  Marsden's  emendations:  1971,197-200 
166 n.  21),  ranging  from  2  11brae  (0.66  kg)  to  360  librae  (118  kg).  The  obvious  extension  of 
Philon's  fist  of  calibres  at  both  ends  has  never  drawn  comment,  but  weights  of  2  and  4 
librae,  roughly  corresponding  to  I  V2and  3  minas,  seem  to  have  been  a  Roman  innova- 
tion,  judging  by  the  presence  of  small  shot  at  Numantia  and  Masada  (see  Table  19,  p. 
185).  Unfortunately,  in  the  final  report  from  Masada,  Holley  never  states  the  criteria  by 
which  he  selected  his  study  sample  (Holley  1994,353-355);  he  presents  details  of  only 
50  ballista  balls  out  of  the  hundreds  reportedly  found  by  Yadin  (1966,156),  and  ex- 
cludes  stones  which  he  considers  "large  [and]  badly  shaped",  so  we  cannot  be  sure  of  a 
representative  sample. 
Archaeological  remains  again  emphasize  medium-heavy  arrow-firers.  The  remains  of 
two  catapults  were  found  at  Azaila  (Spain),  buried  in  the  destruction  of  the  Celtiberian 
town  in  the  70s  B.  C.  (Baatz  1994c,  281),  although  apparently  all  but  one  washer  is  now 
lost  (Vicente  et  al.  1997,181  and  197  n.  14).  The  washer  has  aforamen  of  9.4  cm,  in- 
dicating  that  the  machine  was  a  two-cubit,  or  four-span,  machine,  firing  an  arrow  of 
0.85  m.  The  torsion-frame  of  a  smaller  machine  from  the  same  era  was  discovered  at 
Caminreal  (Spain),  comprising  the  same  elements  as  the  Arnpurias  find  (Vicente  et  al. 
1997,169-181).  However,  although  the  washers  have  an  inner  diameter  of  8.4  cm,  the 
torsion-frame  was  constructed  using  aforamen  of  only  8  cm,  meaning  that  the  washers 
must  have  overlapped  the  frame  (Baatz  1988).  Baatz  attributes  this  to  human  error 
("technische  MurksereF'),  noting  that  it  may  have  been  the  result  of  an  emergency  re- 
pair.  Finally,  a  shipwreck  at  Mahdia,  off  the  Tunisian  coast,  dating  from  the  second 
quarter  of  the  first  century,  yielded  washers  from  three  different  catapults.  While  two  of 
the  sets  were  already  antiquated,  and  thus  probably  represent  scrap, 
'the 
remaining  pair 
of  washers  display  typological  characteristics  which  fall  between  the  S  hish  finds  and  PIM 
f 
the  Ephyra  finds;  the  inner  diameters  of  9.4cm  and  9.5cm  (fig.  37.5)  ifidicate  a  missile- 
length  of  0.85m,  and  the  machine  was  probably  a  two-cubit  arrow-firer  (technically 
0.92m)  (Baatz  1985,686-690),  which  was  perhaps  simply  poorly  made  4fid  under- 
powered. 
I 
It  is  only  with  Caesar's  operations  that  we  finally  gain  the  impression  of  artiUery  as 
standard  equipment.  Hitherto  used  in  a  piecemeal  fashion,  it  seems  that  arrow-firers,  at 
167 least,  regularly  accompanied  Caesar's  armies  (cf.  Marsden  1969,177;  Schambach  1883, 
6-7). 
Marsden  is  over-zealous  in  postulating  catapults  on  Caesar's  harbour  mole  at  Brun- 
disium,  where  none  are  attested  (Marsden  1969,170),  but  artillery  appears  in  Caesarian 
hands  elsewhere:  in  defence  of  castella  (Bell.  Gall.  2.8)  and  castra  (Bell.  Afr.  20;  31; 
56);  and  on  shipboard,  in  support  of  an  amphibious  landing  (ibid.  4.25).  But  chiefly  in 
siege  warfare:  at  Avaricum,  defending  a  beleaguered  siege-tower  (ibid.  7.25);  at  Alesia, 
in  defence  of  the  circumvallation  (ibid.  7.81);  at  Uxellodunum,  driving  the  townsfolk 
away  from  their  water  supply  (ibid.  8.4041);  at  Massilia,  for  clearing  the  battlements  of 
defenders  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.11;  also  2.9,14);  and  at  Ategua,  demolishing  a  wooden 
turret.  The  emergency  at  Gergovia,  when  artillery  was  used  in  defence  of  the  Roman 
camp  (Bell.  Gall.  7.41),  shows  that  it  was  readily  available  at  all  times. 
Yet  Caesar  had  to  requisition  artillery  for  use  in  Alexandria  in  48  B.  C.,  though  where 
the  machines  came  from  is  not  specified  (Bell.  Alex.  1;  cf.  Holmes  1911,583:  "he  was 
obliged  to  import  engines  from  Greece  or  Asia!  ');  in  the  sequel,  one  of  his  legions  ar- 
rived  with  artillery  (Bell.  Alex.  9).  Scipio  Nasica  had  similarly  requisitioned  artillery, 
amongst  other  things,  from  the  towns  of  Syria  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ. 3.32).  Of  course,  artil- 
lery  was  common  in  defence  of  towns  (cf  above,  p.  164),  and  is  expressly  mentioned  at 
Corfinium.  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  1.17),  Salonae  (ibid.,  3.9),  Alexandria  (Bell.  Alex.  2,21), 
Leptis  (Bell.  Afr.  29),  Ategua  (Bell.  Hisp.  19),  and,  of  course,  Massilia  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ., 
2.2,9,14,16),  whose  artillery  Caesar  confiscated  (ibid.,  2.22). 
Nor  was  Caesar  the  only  one  to  make  use  of  artillery  at  this  time.  Pompey  used  it  at 
Brundisiurn,  mounted  on  ship-borne  turrets  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  1.26),  and  had  stored  artil- 
lery-pieces  within  the  town  of  Dyrrachium,  some  of  which  he  deployed  to  hinder  Cae- 
sar's  siege-works  (ibid.,  3.44-45,63).  Even  Cicero  used  it  at  Pindenissus,  allegedly  in 
large  quantity  (Adfam.  15.4.10)  and  no  doubt  procured  from  his  province  (cf.  Scham- 
bach  1883,8).  Schambach  has  made  the  important  observation  that  most  of  the  artillery 
mentioned  will  have  been  lightweight  arrow-firers  (1883,10;  contra  Marsden  1969, 
168 175),  and  we  can  readily  envisage  the  likes  of  the  Azaila.  and  Caminreal  catapults 
(above,  p.  167)  being  carted  around  by  Caesar's  legions. 
1.4  The  early  Princil2ate 
The  most  intensively  studied  period  for  Roman  artillery  has  been  the  Principate.  It  is 
generally  accepted  that  catapults  were  now  allotted  to  the  legions  on  a  regular  basis 
(Marsden  1969,179;  Baatz  1994a,  128),  and  the  increasing  professionalism  of  the  Ro- 
man  army  under  Caesar  and  Octavian  made  it  possible  to  support  specialist  artificers 
like  Vitruvius  and  his  associates,  M.  Aurelius,  P.  Minidius  and  Cn.  Cornelius  (Vitr.,  de 
arch.  Lpraef  2)  (cf  Stoll  1998,230-240). 
The  construction  of  Roman  artillery  is  first  attested  at  a  military  workshop  on  the  Auer- 
berg  (Germany),  dating  to  roughly  A.  D.  20-40.  Here,  the  excavator  discovered  frag- 
ments  of  at  least  fifteen  casting-moulds,  which  would  have  produced  washers  with  inner 
diameters  ranging  from  8.8  cm.  to  11.2  cm.  (Baatz  1984,182).  It  is  thought  that  all  were 
intended  to  represent  the  same  foramen  of  4  unciae,  or  1/3Roman  foot  (9.84  cm).  The 
calibre  will  then  have  been  3  feet  (i.  e.,  89  cm),  corresponding  to  a  medium-heavy 
weapon,  like  the  two-cubit  Azaila  and  Mahdia  machines. 
A  cache  of  eight  washers  from  Cremona  divides  into  two  sets,  one  with  a  foramen  of 
7.4  cm  (fig.  37.7)  and  the  other  of  8.8  cm  (fig.  37.10);  the  smaller  certainly  represents  a 
three-span  arrow-firer  (Baatz  1980b,  295).  However,  far  more  exciting  were  the  two 
bronze  front-plates  associated  with  the  washers  (ibid.,  288-292).  These  were  intended 
to  protect  the  torsion-springs  from  the  front,  and  were  highly  decorative,  each  carrying 
an  honorific  inscription.  One,  belonging  to  the  smaller  washers,  records  that  the  cata- 
pult  was  put  into  commission  in  A.  D.  45;  the  other,  though  fragmentary,  may  record  the 
date  A.  D.  56.  Both  will  have  been  destroyed  in  the  fighting  in  A.  D.  69,  demonstrating 
that  twenty-year  old  machines  were  still  capable  of  giving  service  (ibid.,  296-297). 
The  only  other  archaeological  finds  of  catapults  dating  from  the  Principate  are  the  tiny 
washers  from  Elginhaugh  (Scotland)  and  Bath  (England)  (Baatz  1994c,  282);  both,  on 
169 account  of  their  size  (the  Bath  washer  has  aforamen  of  4.0  cm:  Baatz  1999b,  18  n.  54), 
are  likely  to  have  derived  from  hand-held  weapons  (Campbell  1986,130). 
Artillery  is  found  deployed  in  support  of  river  crossings  (Tac.,  Ann.  1.56;  15.9;  Hist. 
2.34),  in  assaults  against  obstacles  (Tac.,  Ann.  2.20),  even  in  defence  of  camp  (Tac., 
Hist.  4.23;  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.80;  Hyg.,  de  munit.  castr.  58),  but  chiefly  in  siege  warfare: 
at  Celenderis,  Mons  Haemus,  Volandum,  Jotapata,  Gamala,  Jerusalem,  and  Masada. 
During  the  Civil  War  of  A.  D.  69,  the  Vitellians  are  known  to  have  deployed  artillery  on 
the  roadway  outside  Cremona  (Tac.,  Hist.  3.23):  the  pair  of  arrow-firers  mentioned 
above  will  have  been  amongst  the  equipment  which  they  abandoned  in  their  retreat 
(ibid.  3.25);  and,  in  addition,  they  had  an  enormous  stone-projector  which  the  Flavians 
managed  to  disable  by  cutting  the  torsion-springs  (Tac.,  Hist.  3.23). 
It  is  noteworthy  that  only  this  one  baffista  is  mentioned,  suggesting  that,  otherwise,  the 
legions  had  brought  only  arrow-firers.  Vespasian  appears  to  have  had  a  full  comple- 
ment  of  heavy  stone-projectors  at  Jotapata  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.166),  but  the  one-talent 
machines  of  the  Fifteenth  Legion  at  Jerusalem  were  apparently  larger  than  the  other  le- 
gions'  ballistae  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.269-270).  It  is  unfortunate  that  a  comprehensive 
study  of  the  ballista  balls  from  Masada  was  not  attempted,  as  the  Tenth  Legion  may 
well  have  used  heavier  calibres  than  Holley's  figures  suggest  (see  above,  p.  167).  The 
corpus  of  ballista  balls  from  Gamala  has  never  been  published,  but  during  a  visit  in 
1984  1  saw  only  relatively  fight  calibres  (cf  fig.  48);  similarly,  the  ballista  balls  from 
Hatra,  which  are  likely  to  be  of  Roman  origin,  seem  small,  on  the  whole  (cf  figs.  58- 
60). 
-1.5 
The  2nd  and  3rd  centuries 
Arrow-firing  artillery  evidently  underwent  a  remarkable  change  of  design  in  the  later 
first  century,  necessitating  a  fundamental  shift  in  terminology  that  has  often  given  rise 
to  confusion  (e.  g.,  Holmes  1911,583;  Harniand  1967a,  90-91;  Le  Bohec  1989,146- 
147).  In  short,  at  around  the  time  of  Trajan's  Dacian  Wars,  the  palintonon  design  prin- 
ciples,  hitherto  restricted  to  the  stone-throwing  ballista,  were  applied  to  a  new  kind  of 
arrow-firer,  which  naturally  attracted  the  same  narne.  Instead  of  a  narrow,  wooden  tor- 
170 sion-frame,  hke  the  catapulta  (fig.  36a),  the  new  affow-firer  had  a  wide,  open,  all-metal 
torsion-frame  (cf.  Baatz  1999a,  342;  Marsden  1969,189). 
This  new  design,  as  Marsden  realised.  (1971,209),  is  described  in  the  enigmatic  Chei- 
roballistra  text,  attributed  to  the  first  century  writer  Heron,  but  clearly  of  much  later 
date  (cf.  Baatz  1978,14).  Although  the  text  specifies  a  small,  hand-held  weapon,  the 
components  can  be  scaled  up  to  produce  a  machine  resembling  those  on  Trajan's  Col- 
umn  (fig.  41).  The  torsion-springs  are  separate,  like  those  of  a  stone-projector,  but  in- 
stead  of  a  heavy  wooden  frame,  the  washers  of  each  spring  sit  in  an  iron  frame  (kambe- 
strion),  and  the  woodwork  required  to  hold  the  stone-projector's  springs  in  position  is 
replaced  by  two  horizontal  iron  struts,  connecting  the  tops  and  bottoms  of  the  kambe- 
stria.  Ile  upper  strut  (kamarion)  has  a  distinctive  arch  halfway  along,  which  Marsden 
interpreted  as  an  aid  to  aiming  the  machine  (1971,227-228). 
Apart  from  overall,  benefits  accruing  from  its  lightweight  yet  robust  fi-dine  (cf.  Baatz 
1978,13),  the  palintone  arrangement  of  the  springs,  defining  the  machine  as  a  ballista, 
will  have  increased  its  power,  and  setting  the  arms  further  apart  allowed  them  to  be 
drawn  further  back,  thus  storing  more  energy  in  the  springs  (Marsden  1971,230,  calcu- 
lates  59*).  The  upper  "arched  strut"  (kamarion),  greatly  assisting  in  targeting,  betrays 
the  identity  of  the  artillery  on  Trajan's  Column  (e.  g.,  scene  LXVI;  fig.  41),  where  the 
springs  seem,  in  addition,  to  be  enclosed  in  weatherproof  cylinders.  A  single  kambe- 
strion,  with  associated  washers  (fig.  38.1),  was  discovered  in  Lyon,  and  it  is  an  attrac- 
tive  hypothesis,  advanced  by  Feug&e  (Baatz  &  Feug6re  1981,209),  that  it  dates  from 
the  Battle  of  Lugdunum  in  A.  D.  197;  unfortunately,  its  context  remains  unknown  and  it 
could  in  fact  be  much  later  (below,  p.  173). 
At  some  point  prior  to  A.  D.  240,  the  stone-thrower  was  similarly  redesigned,  to  judge 
from  the  example  discovered  at  Hatra.  The  machine  had  been  positioned  on  a  tower  on 
the  wall  circuit  and  was  buried,  face  down,  when  the  tower  collapsed,  presumably  dur- 
ing  the  final  Sasanian  siege  (above,  p.  70).  Only  the  bronze-sheathing  of  the  torsion- 
fi=e,  complete  with  three  of  the  four  washers,  was  preserved,  showing  it  to  have  been 
171 much  wider  and  lower  than  the  Vitruvian  model,  and  apparently  built  as  a  single  com- 
ponent,  m  contrast  to  the  latter's  separate  springs  (Baatz  1978,7). 
Hassall  appears  to  favour  a  different  design  for  the  new-style  catapults  (2000,339:  "it 
seems  likely  that  [the  wide  fi=e]  reflects  a  Merent,  mode  of  operation!  ),  but  he  does 
not  elaborate.  It  is  possible  that  he  envisages  the  in-swinging  arms  suggested  long  ago 
by  Victor  Prou  (cf.  Hall  1956,711),  but  this  theory  has  never  been  demonstrated.  (Note 
that  Mai's  reconstruction  appears  to  show  in-swinging  arms,  but  he  does  not  mention 
this  in  the  text:  Baatz  1978,3  fig.  2;  8  fig.  7.  ) 
The  Hatra  washers  (fig.  38.2)  have  an  inner  diameter  of  16  crn,  but  the  shorter  torsion- 
springs  necessitated  by  the  lower  field-frame  mean  that  the  Hellenistic  calibration  for- 
mula  cannot  be  employed.  Instead,  Baatz  calculated  the  mathematical  volume  of  each 
Hatra,  torsion-spring  to  be  21.7  litres.  He  equated  this  with  Vitruvius's  I  O-pound  stone- 
projector:  taking  theforamen  as  8  digits  (14.8  cm),  Vitruvius's  spring  height  of  811A6 
foramina  (i.  e.,  8.7  x  14.8  =  128.8  cm.  )  then  gives  a  spring-volume  of  22.2  litres  (Baatz 
1978,7).  However,  an  8-mina  (roughly  10  Roman  librae)  stone-projector  of  Hellenistic 
manufacture  would  have  had  a  diametros  of  roughly  10  dactyls,  or  19.3  cm,  and  a 
spring-height  of  8x  19.3  =  154.4  cm,  giving  a  spring-volume  of  45.2  litres.  A  similar 
realisation.  led  to  Marsden's  theory  (1971,197-200  n.  21)  that  Vitruvius's  foramina 
should  be  understood  as  unclae  (1/12  Roman  foot)  rather  than  digits  (1/16  Roman  foot), 
which  gives  the  10-pounder  aforamen  of  19.7  cm,  a  spring-height  of  171.4  cm,  and  a 
spring  volume  of  52.2  litres. 
This  is  clearly  a  larger  spring  than  the  Hatm  ballista,  which  ought  to  suggest  that  the 
latter  was  of  far  smaller  cahibre.  But  the  crux  of  the  matter  rests  with  Vitruvius's  meas- 
urements.  Baatz  has  argued  that  Marsden's  interference  with  Vitruvius's  text  is  "hard  to 
accept"  (1978,16  n.  57),  but  there  are  wide-ranging  implications:  if  Vitruvius's  10- 
pounder  was  based  on  aforamen  of  14.8  cm,  and  not  on  Marsden's  emended  19.7  cm, 
then,  for  some  reason,  the  Roman  machines  were  far  more  powerful  than  their  Hellenis- 
tic  predecessors.  Ile  Hatra  ballista  did  not  incorporate  Vitruvius's  oval  washer  hole 
(above,  p.  166),  so  improved  performance  cannot  be  attributed  to  this;  is  it  possible  that 
172 in-swinging  arms  lent  the  machine  the  extra  power?  Without  experimentation,  we  can- 
not  be  certain. 
1.6  The  4th  centu 
In  the  later  period,  a  series  of  compound  terrns  appear  in  the  written  sources,  based  on 
ballista,  and  its  Greek  equivalent,  ballistra:  carroballista,  arcuballista,  manuballista 
and  cheiroballistra  (e.  g.,  Veg.,  Epit.  rei  mil.  2.10;  3.3;  4.9-10;  4.18;  4.22;  4.29;  4.44). 
Exactly  what  these  variants  denote  is  not  known:  the  carroballista  has  been  equated,  on 
etymological  grounds,  with  the  cart-mounted  catapult  on  Trajan's  Column  (Marsden 
1969,180;  Baatz  1999b,  6;  cf  fig.  40);  the  manuballista  may  have  been  another  name 
for  the  cheiroballistra,  probably  a  hand-held  torsion  weapon  (Campbell  1986,130);  and 
the  arcuballista  may  have  been  a  proto-crossbow  (Campbell  1986,131-132;  Baatz 
1999b,  14).  Of  course,  the  standard  arrow-firer  was  still  called  a  ballista. 
Fourth-century  finds  have  come  to  light  from  several  sites,  including  a  bronze  washer 
from  Pityus  (fig.  38.3);  the  iron  kambestrion  and  washers  from  Lyon  (above,  p.  171) 
could  be  of  similar  date.  It  is  not  easy  to  calculate  the  calibre  of  the  new-style  ballista, 
as  it  does  not  conform  to  the  Hellenistic  construction  principles.  However,  the  archaeo- 
logical  finds  indicate  springs  of  ca.  6-8  cm  in  diameter  and  ca.  50  cm  in  height,  which 
compare  favourably  with  those  of  the  Ampurias  catapult  (above,  pp.  164Q.  Accord- 
ingly,  it  has  been  suggested  that  these  iron-framed  machines  were  light  weapons,  and  it 
is  possible  that  heavy-duty  arrow-firers  continued  to  be  manufactured  with  wooden  tor- 
sion-frames,  similar  to  that  of  the  Hatra  ballista  (cf  Baatz  1999b,  7). 
The  new-style  ballista  appears  to  have  used  a  different  type  of  missile,  properly  desig- 
nated  as  a  "bolt";  this  proposition  is  based  on  evidence  from  Dura-Europos,  where  an 
evil-looking  projectile,  about  half  as  long  as  the  Vitruvian  catapult  arrow,  with  a  thick, 
tapering  shaft  and  three  large  wooden  flights,  was  found  (cf  Baatz  &  Feugere  1981,208 
fig.  13;  Baatz  1999b,  II  fig.  9). 
There  is  no  sign  of  the  stone-projecting  ballista  in  the  fourth  century.  Instead,  Am- 
mianus  Marcellinus  refers  only  to  the  one-armed  scorpio  (e.  g.,  19.2.7;  19.7.6-7; 
173 20.7.10;  24.4.16;  24.4.28;  31.15.12),  which  the  troops  called  the  onager  (23.4.4,7; 
31.15.12;  also  apparently  designated  as  calapulta:  24.2.13).  No  archaeological  remains 
have  been  identified,  and  Ammianus  provides  our  only  description  (23.4.4-7),  which  is 
sufficiently  vague  to  permit  several  dif[erent  interpretations  (e.  g.,  Schramm  1918,70- 
74;  Marsden  1971,249-265).  In  short,  a  single  torsion-spring  was  mounted  transversely 
in  a  wooden  fi-ame,  lying  on  the  ground,  and  a  single,  wooden  arm  was  inserted  into  the 
spring,  so  that  it  stood  upright.  The  key  component  was  the  sling,  located  at  the  arm7s 
extremity,  with  one  end  attached  and  the  other  end  hooked  over  a  pin,  projecting  from 
the  tip  of  the  arm.  The  arm  was  pulled  back  by  a  windlass  and  a  stone  was  loaded  into 
the  sling.  On  release,  the  arm  swung  forwards  in  an  arc  to  meet  a  padded  buffer;  in  the 
process,  the  end  of  the  sling  slipped  off  the  pin  and  fired  the  stone. 
Schramm  considered  that  the  buffer  should  incline  to  the  rear,  stopping  the  arm  at  60* 
from  the  horizontal  (Schrarnm  1918,71),  while  Payne-Gallwey  (1958,283-285;  fol- 
lowed  by  Marsden,  1971,263)  advocated  a  900  buffer.  More  recently,  Lewis  has  sug- 
gested  that  the  buffer  is  best  positioned  sloping  forwards  at  1350  (Hart  &  Lewis  1986, 
359).  Lewis's  experiments  have  also  demonstrated  that  the  length  of  the  sling  has  an 
important  bearing  on  the  range  of  the  machine,  and  that  the  angle  of  the  pin  with  the 
arm  governs  the  trajectory.  Thus,  with  the  pin  bent  backwards,  the  stone  was  released 
on  a  steep  trajectory  and  achieved  maximum  range,  whereas,  with  the  pin  bent  forwards, 
the  stone  was  released  on  a  flat  trajectory  (Hart  &  Lewis  1986,359  and  fig.  8). 
Crump  claims  that  the  onager  (or,  as  Ammianus  calls  it,  the  scorpio)  "was  historically 
employed  in  some  cases  to  break  down  the  towers  and  walls  of  citiee'  (1975,103),  but 
immediately  points  out  that  Ammianus  nowhere  mentions  such  an  achievement.  This 
should  have  alerted  Crump  to  the  improbability  of  his  statement,  particularly  when  he 
later  acknowledges  that  "the  pieces  [viz.  onagri]  seem  to  have  accomplished  more 
against  flimsier  targets"  (ibid.  ).  But  he  persists  in  the  view  that  "apparently,  the  utiliza- 
tion  of  the  scorpion  as  a  battering  weapon  produced  less  interesting  and  less  important 
results,  for  the  historian  does  not  mention  its  use  for  that  purpose  often7'  (ibid.  ).  In  fact, 
in  Ammianus's  six  references  to  the  scorpio  (the  technical  digression  at  23.4.4-7  makes 
seven),  it  is  never  depicted  as  a  battering  weapon.  In  the  defence  of  Amida,  the  scor- 
174 piones  crush  the  heads  of  the  attacking  Persians  (19.2.7)  and  shatter  the  Persian  siege 
towers  (19.7.6-7);  at  Bezabde,  they  hurl  showers  of  stones  against  the  Persian  battering- 
rams  (20.7.10);  at  Maiozamalcha,  they  "hurled  round  stones  wherever  they  were  aimed 
by  expert  hands!  '  (24.4.16),  and  one  scorpio  famously  misfired,  crushing  an  architectus 
(24.4.28);  and,  in  the  defence  of  Hadrianopolis,  a  scorpio  hurled  a  huge  stone  at  a  group 
of  Goths,  failing  to  hit  any  of  them  but  intimidating  them  nonetheless  (31.15.12). 
It  is  often  thought  that  the  introduction  of  the  onager  represented  a  simplification  of  an- 
cient  artillery  (e.  g.,  Marsden  1969,195),  but  it  seems  to  have  been  a  reasonably  efficient 
machine  which  could  work  with  a  range  of  missile  weights  and  did  not  require  the  fine 
tuning  of  two-armed  catapults. 
2.  The  effectiveness  of  ancient  artille1y 
The  study  of  ancient  artillery  has  been  dogged  by  anachronistic  comparisons  with  mod- 
em  practices,  and  a  fascination  with  the  maximum  range  which  individual  machines 
could  achieve.  Marsden  concentrated  on  attaining  high  performance  (1969,86-94). 
Baatz,  on  the  other  hand,  has  rightly  emphasized  that,  in  combat,  the  gunner's  first  pri- 
ority  is  to  hit  the  target,  and  his  second  is  to  ensure  that  the  missile  has  an  effect  there 
(cf.  Baatz  1980a,  ix;  1994b,  138).  There  is  no  place  in  battle  for  experimentation  with 
maximum  ranges. 
As  a  general  rule,  the  shorter  the  range,  the  more  certain  the  hit,  not  only  because  of  dif- 
ficulties  in  sighting  far-off  objects,  nor  even  in  tracking  moving  targets,  but  also  be- 
cause  of  the  missile's  sensitivity  to  the  effects  of  wind  and  weather.  Agesistratos  is 
supposed  to  have  attained  ranges  of  3V2stades  (650  m)  with  a  specially  tuned  three-span 
machine,  and  4  stades  (740  m)  with  a  four-cubit  palintone  (Athen.  W  8),  but  Baatz  has 
pointed  out  that,  to  cover  these  distances,  the  respective  missiles  win  have  been  airborne 
for  around  12  seconds,  during  which  time  they  could  have  been  carried  adrift  by  several 
metres  (1980,  x;  1994b,  140).  It  is  doubtfid  whether,  in  battle,  arrow-firers  would  have 
been  used  much  beyond  100  metres  of  their  intended  target  (cf.  Baatz  1994b,  140). 
175 One  passage  is  continually  quoted  as  evidence  of  the  pin-point  accuracy  of  ancient  artil- 
lery.  Caesar  relates  the  story  of  how,  during  his  siege  of  Avaricum,  a  succession  of 
Gauls,  stepping  up  to  the  same  gate,  were  each  pierced  by  a  scorpio  missile  (Caes.,  Bell. 
Gall.  7.25).  In  Marsden's  view,  this  was  "an  excellent  piece  of  sharp-shooting"  (1969, 
93),  and  Schneider  even  believed  that  the  scorpio  in  question  must  have  been  similar  to 
Philon's  prototype  "repeating  catapulf'  (Bel.  51  =  Th.  73),  in  order  to  hit  the  same  spot 
time  and  again  (1910,1321;  followed  by  Lammert  1927,585).  But,  as  Drachmann  cor- 
rectly  pointed  out,  "we  do  not  know  whether  one  or  ten  catapults  were  aimed  at  the 
gate;  we  do  not  know  whether  it  took  one  or  ten  arrows  to  kill  each  Gaur  (1960,205); 
and,  he  could  have  added,  we  do  not  know  at  what  range  the  artillery  was  operating.  Of 
course,  the  sources  abound  with  stories  of  the  fortunate,  who  narrowly  avoided  catapult 
missiles,  and  of  the  less  fortunate,  such  as  the  Gauls  at  Avaricurn;  these  certainly  "af- 
ford  some  idea  of  what  artillery  could  do  against  personner,  (Marsden  1969,96),  but  we 
cannot  tell  whether  they  were  typical,  or  extraordinary,  occurrences. 
Modem  commentators  have  often  credited  stone-projectors  with  the  potential  to  demol- 
ish  fortifications  (cf  above,  p.  174).  This  is  largely  based  on  the  allegation  of  Diodorus 
Siculus  that,  at  Tyre  in  332  B.  C.,  Alexander  "shook  the  walls"  with  large  stones  fired 
from  stone-projectors  (17.42.7;  17.45.2).  Demetrius  is  said  to  have  done  the  same  at 
Rhodes  in  305/304  B.  C.  (Diod.  Sic.  20.88.2),  even  managing  to  demolish  a  newly- 
constructed  harbour  wall  which  was  "low  and  weak"  (Diod.  Sic.  20.86.2).  But  it  was 
only  battlements  that  Demetrius  smashed  at  Salamis  (Diod.  Sic.  20.48.4)  and  that 
Vespasian's  heavy  stone-projectors  demolished  at  Jotapata  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.243),  and 
it  is  worth  noting  that  Demetrius's  and  Vespasian's  stone-projectors  were  massive  "one- 
talent"  machines  (Diod.  Sic.  20.87.1;  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  3.167). 
When  dealing  with  defence  against  a  besieger,  Philon  shows  concern  with  the  effect  of 
stone-shot  hitting  a  wall  directly,  and  recommends  that  town  walls  be  10  cubits  (4.6  M) 
thick  to  withstand  such  blows  (Pol.  1.19  =  Th.  81).  Marsden  has  made  much  of  this 
(1969,97:  "blows  [of  stone  throwers]  were  not  to  be  despised";  113:  "stone  throwers 
undoubtedly  provided  a  certain  amount  of  purely  destructive  fire  which  could,  on  its 
own,  beat  down  walls,  especially  weak  ones"),  although  he  admitted  that  "their  effect  on 
176 properly  constructed  walls  is  highly  questionable"  (ibid.,  146).  It  should  be  noted  that 
nowhere  do  our  sources  mention  artillery  creating  a  breach,  and  there  is  a  considerable 
gulf  between  shaking  a  wall,  and  causing  structural  damage.  When  Titus  threatened  the 
defenders  of  Gischala  in  A.  D.  67,  saying  that  "soon  they  would  know  that  their  wall 
was  a  plaything  for  the  Roman  machinery"  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  4.96),  it  was  surely  the  bat- 
tering-rams  he  meant,  and  not  artillery. 
Another  misconception  involves  the  supposed  traJectory  of  artillery  balls.  Schramm 
followed  accepted  wisdom  in  classifying  stone-projectors  as  "Steilfeuergeschiltzen",  or 
"steep-trajectory  guns",  while  only  arrow-firers,  were  'Tlachbahngeschiltzerf',  that  is, 
artillery  that  fires  straight  ahead  (Schramm  1918,14  n.  1).  This  myth  persists,  despite 
Baatz's  observation  that  "there  is  no  ancient  authority  from  which  to  conclude  that 
stone-projectors  were  'high-trajectory  artillery"'  (1980a,  x;  1994b,  143).  Furthermore, 
such  indirect  targeting  presupposes  the  ability  to  accurately  gauge,  and  rapidly  alter,  the 
range.  And  finally,  high  trajectory  shooting  is  of  limited  value  in  an  era  without  explo- 
sives.  In  sunm1W,  it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  the  crew  of  a  stone-projector  to  achieve 
a  direct  hit  on  an  unseen,  distant  target,  and  such  a  shot  would  be  of  questionable  mili- 
tary  value. 
Nevertheless,  Schramm  specified  that,  "depending  upon  the  desired  range,  the  inclina- 
tion  of  the  ladder  [i.  e.,  the  "stock!  '  of  the  stone-projector]  was  usually  set  at  either  30*  or 
450"  (1928,233),  an  opinion  endorsed  by  Marsden  (1969,92:  "the  normal  angle  of  pro- 
jection  tended  to  exceed  30  degrees");  reconstructions  of  the  machines  habitually  show 
them  set  at  an  angle  of  around  45*  (e.  g.,  Marsden  1969,  fig.  1.22;  197  1,  diagram  11; 
Connolly  1981,282;  1983,81).  Schramm  evidently  envisaged  the  machine  operating 
with  the  end  resting  at  ground-level  (cf.  Schramm  1928,233),  so  his  two  angles  of  ele- 
vation  must  relate  to  alterations  in  the  height  of  the  machine's  base. 
Neither  Heron  nor  Philon  describe  the  base  of  a  stone-projector.  The  base  which  Heron 
desenibes  is  for  an  arrow-firer  (Bel.  13-14  =W  88-90),  and  is  rightly  adopted  for  mod- 
ern  reconstructions  of  that  machine.  Philon's  sole  description  of  a  base  accompanies  his 
polybolos  or  "repeating  catapult"  (Bel.  52  =  Th  74).  Only  Vitruvius  gives  a  description 
177 (albeit  an  abbreviated  one)  of  a  base  specifically  designed  for  the  ballista;  flustratingly, 
he  states  that  the  height  bears  no  relation  to  theforamen  (the  module  for  all  other  com- 
ponents),  but  should  be  whatever  is  necessary  in  practice.  This  was  no  doubt  to  ensure 
that  the  more  massive  machines  were  still  low  enough  for  loading  purposes.  interest- 
ingly,  all  three  versions  incorporate  a  horizontal  element  lying  along  the  ground,  so  that 
the  machine  could  not  be  positioned  on  an  uneven  surface.  Unfortunately,  Vitruvius 
does  not  explain  how  the  ballista  was  attached  to  the  base  (De  arch.  10.11.9).  Marsden 
regretted  the  absence  of  a  "universal  joint",  the  tilt-and-swivel  mechanism  that  Heron 
describes  in  connection  with  the  arrow-firer  (1971,204-205  n.  38);  but,  predictably,  he 
saw  a  problem  only  with  traversing  the  gun,  envisaging  the  insertion  of  blocks  of  wood 
under  the  rear  end  to  alter  "the  elevation  (i.  e.  range)"  (ibid.  ). 
This  begs  two  questions.  First,  that  the  larger  versions  of  such  a  complex  machine  did 
not  have  a  dedicated  system  of  raising  and  lowering  the  end,  perhaps  by  the  use  of  pul- 
leys.  And  second,  that  the  proper  functioning  of  a  stone-projector  involved  firing  at  dif- 
ferent  ranges,  and  hence  along  different  trajectories.  In  fact,  it  would  make  better  sense 
for  the  machine  to  be  set  at  3045*  for  tensioning  and  loading,  and  then  raised  to  a  hori- 
zontal  position  for  firing.  There  was  surely  no  question  of  selecting  a  particular  range. 
Enemy  objects  would  either  be  too  far  away,  or  would  form  a  viable  target  for  arrow- 
firers  and  stone-projectors  alike.  Baatz  has  emphasized  the  desirability  of  short  range  to 
ensure  accurate  targeting,  and  flat  tmjectory  to  maxinuse  forward  thrust  and  the  resul- 
tant  damage  (I  994b,  142). 
In  fact,  there  is  good  reason  to  think  that  the  maximum  operational  range  for  the  giant 
one-talent  stone-projectors  was  around  150  metres,  rather  than  the  theoretical  400  yards 
(365  m)  suggested  by  Marsden  (1969,91).  In  his  ideal  defensive  scheme,  Philon  (Pol. 
1.69-73  =  Th  84-85)  specifies  a  succession  of  three  ditches,  covering  a  total  distance  of 
535  feet  (165  m),  in  order  to  keep  these  machines  out  of  range.  Armed  with  this  knowl- 
edge,  Marsden  still  maintained  that  "stone-throwing  catapults  could  operate  normally  up 
to  400  yardr  (!  bid.  ),  whereas  the  logical  conclusion  is  that  potential  targets  were  safe, 
provided  they  remained  at  least  165  metres  away  from  the  largest  catapults  (cf  Baatz 
1994b,  141). 
178 3.  The  positioning  of  ancient  artille1y 
It  is  often  forgotten  that  artillery-pieces  required  room  to  operate.  Greek  scholars  have 
been  quick  to  appreciate  this,  Roman  scholars  less  so  (with  the  honourable  exception  of 
Baatz;  e.  g.  1966,199).  In  his  study  of  Greek  fortifications,  Ober  has  tabulated  the 
minimum  tower-chamber  sizes  required  to  accommodate  machines  of  particular  cali- 
bres.  For  a  two-cubit  arrow-firer  (cf.  above,  p.  159),  admittedly  on  the  large  size  but  by 
no  means  the  largest,  he  allocates  a  space  3.10  m  long  (which  includes  around  0.5  m 
working  room  at  the  rear;  totalling  the  case  and  the  windlass  gives  an  overall  machine 
length  of  23  spring-diameters,  or  approximately  2Y2metres)  and  a  width,  from  one  arm- 
tip  to  the  other,  of  1.40  m  (Ober  1987,600).  Winter  (1997,250)  is  more  generous  with 
his  zone  of  free  space,  prescribing  an  area  of  3.52  rn  by  2.40  m. 
Ober's  table  of  stone-projectors  shows  that  a  ten-mina  machine  (above,  p.  160),  a  rela- 
tively  fight-calibre  weapon,  required  a  working  area  of  6.40  metres  by  2.50  metres 
(Ober  1987,601).  Winter  recommends  more  free  space  at  the  sides,  suggesting  an  area 
of  6.36  rn  by  3.18  rn  (1997,249).  These  dimensions  assume  that  the  machines  were 
more  or  less  static,  firing  through  a  designated  tower  window,  and  thus  swivelling 
through  a  fairly  limited  arc. 
Excavators  have  always  been  keen  to  find  evidence  of  artillery  along  Roman  circumval- 
lations,  largely  following  Schultcn's  work  at  Numantia  (see  above,  p.  104).  Although 
the  tower  which  he  discovered  on  the  Dehesilla-Alto  Real  sector,  at  only  2.20  m.  x  2.10 
m,  was  too  small  for  artillery,  he  suggested  that  those  on  the  Dehesilla-Molino  sector, 
measuring  approximately  5.0  x  4.0  in,  could  have  accommodated  two  catapults  at  wall- 
walk  level,  leaving  the  putative  upper  storey  for  signalling.  Schulten  seized  upon  Ap- 
pian's  statement,  that  towers  were  built  every  30  metres,  to  postulate  three  hundred 
towers  around  the  entire  circuit.  Although  he  had  discovered  only  a  fraction  of  that 
number,  which,  in  any  case,  did  not  conform  to  a  uniform  30  m  spacing,  nevertheless  he 
proposed  a  theoretical  complement  C'Geschiltzpark!  )  of  six  hundred  artillery-pieces, 
which  he  then  arbitrarily  halved  (1927,44,  mistakenly  citing  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.359,  as 
evidence  of  300  Roman  catapults  at  Jerusalem,  but  these  300  oxybeleis  are  in  Jewish 
hands). 
179 Appian  records  that  Scipio  positioned  "arrow-shooting  and  stone-projecting  catapultsr 
(katapeltai  oxybeleis  kai  lithoboloi)  on  the  towers,  and  gathered  "stones  and  missiles 
and  javelins7'  (lithoi  kai  beM  kai  akontia)  on  the  battlements  (App.,  Hisp.  92).  Schulten 
reasonably  proposed  small-calibre  stone-projectors  (1927,44),  although  the  example 
which  he  cites  as  a  parallel  case  -  the  100-cubit  (46  m)  timber  tower,  built  by  the  de- 
fenders  of  Halicarnassus  and  equipped  with  arrow-firers  to  counter  Alexander  the  Great 
(Diod.  Sic.  17.26.6)  -  is  irrelevant  to  a  discussion  of  stone-projectors. 
It  seems  that  Schulten  envisaged  a  calibre  of  one  or  two  minas  (i.  e.,  440  g  and  880  g) 
for  his  tower-mountcd  "light"  stone-projectors  (Schulten  1927,45  and  264-265),  judg- 
ing  from  his  designation  of  the  ten-mina  lithobolos  as  "heavy  artillery"  (ibid.,  44: 
"schwere  Geschiltze";  this  calibre  is  usually  considered  fairly  fight).  Certainly,  five 
small  stone  balls  were  found  in  the  three  camps  of  Castillejo,  Pefia  Redonda,  and  Val- 
devorron,  and  a  finther  eight  within  Numantia  itself  (see  Table  19,  p.  185),  which 
Schulten  took  to  have  been  shot  there  by  the  Romans  (ibid.,  264-265),  and  Vitruvius 
indicates  that  there  were  small  stone-projectors  designed  for  these  calibres  (above,  pp. 
166f.  ).  Nevertheless,  caution  is  advisable  when  dealing  with  stones  that  could  com- 
fortably  be  hurled  by  hand  (cf.  Baatz  1983,136;  Griffiths  1992,2-6). 
A  K  as  Appian  says,  stone-projectors  were  deployed  in  the  towers,  it  seems  rather  more 
likely  that  a4mx5m  tower  would  have  been  equipped  with  a  single  small  stone- 
projector,  perhaps  the  rarely-mentioned  five-mina  (2.2  kg)  machine,  for  which  Marsden 
gives  a  case-length  of  3.20  m  (1969,151:  10  feet  6  inches").  Unfortunately,  this  cali- 
bre  does  not  figure  among  the  few  ballista-bails  from  Numantia,  but  the  ten-mina  ma- 
chine  would  simply  have  been  too  large  (see  above,  p.  179). 
Numantia  notwithstanding,  the  most  obvious  role  for  the  towers  at  Masada  (above,  p. 
118;  fig.  26)  was  signalling  and  observation,  as  Schulten  appreciated.  His  experience  of 
Numantia  led  him  casually  to  suggest  that  artillery  may  have  been  involved  (1933,93), 
"I  but  it  was  Hawkes  who  pointed  up  the  parallel  most  enthusiastically  (1929,202:  "the 
towers  ...  [had]  a  solid  stone  lower  storey  ...  which  could  serve  as  a  platform  for  artil- 
lerY').  Reviewing  Schulten's  work,  Hawkes  and  Richmond  claimed  that  the  towers' 
180 spacing  suggested  artillery  (1934,72),  but  Richmond  later  managed  to  combine  all  pre- 
vious  theories,  stating  that  "their  purpose  is  presumably  to  accommodate  bowmen  or 
light  artillery  and  signals  and  to  give  height  for  look-out"  (1962,153).  However,  he  is 
mistaken  to  cite  Josephus  for  corroboration  of  artillery  along  the  investing  works  at  Je- 
rusalem  (ibid.,  153  n.  61,  citing  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  6.21,  which  actually  mentions  artillery  in 
defence  of  embankments),  and  it  must  be  said  that  the  most  obvious  function  for  a  chain 
of  towers  in  this  location  was  for  surveillance. 
At  Machaerus  (fig.  25),  Strobel  interpreted  a  series  of  approximately  2  rn-deep  plat- 
forms  as  the  foundations  for  artillery  towers,  claiming  a  spurious  parallel  with  Masada 
(above,  p.  113).  However,  he  himself  acknowledged  that  a  fight  arrow-shooter  was 
around  2.5  m  long,  and  would  thus  require  clearance  of  3x3.5  m  (1974b,  150  n.  75). 
(In  fact,  even  a  three-span  like  the  Ampurias  machine,  at  about  1.78  m  long,  would  be  a 
tight  fit.  )  The  two  platforms  of  stones  in  Camp  E  are  larger,  and  thus  better  suited  to 
Strobel's  interpretation  as  catapult  stations  (1974b,  153;  cf  p.  113,  above),  while  their 
location  could  conceivably  be  linked  to  controlling  the  exit  from  the  wadi.  Unfortu- 
nately,  Strobel  does  not  indicate  the  weight  of  the  40  cm  stone  ball  recovered  from  the 
site  (above,  p.  114);  two  similarly-sized  balls  from  Pergarnum.  weighed  three  talents  (ca. 
75  kg),  but  no  other  assemblage  can  offer  anything  comparable  (Table  19,  p.  185), 
which  inevitably  casts  doubt  on  its  interpretation  as  a  hallista  ball. 
At  Cremna  (fig.  29),  the  excavator  suggested  that  two  turrets  on  the  eastern  barrier  waU, 
facing  the  town  at  a  distance  of  130  m,  "seem  to  have  contained  a  solid  central  platform 
...  and  were  surely  designed  as  platforms  for  onagers"  (Mitchell  1995,196).  He  does 
not  state  which  turrets  he  had  in  mind,  but  earlier  specifies  Turret  4,  alone,  as  a  position 
where  onagri  would  have  been  placed  (ibid.,  195).  Such  weapons  are  unlikely  at  this 
early  date  (pace  Mitchell  1995,183),  and  the  dimensions  of  Turret  4  are,  in  any  case, 
unclear,  which  precludes  any  assessment  of  artillery  accommodation.  (Mitchell  states 
that  it  'ýmay  have  enclosed  a  tower  4-5  m  square".  ibid.,  202.  )  The  position  of  Turret  4 
is  interesting,  as  artillery  deployed  here  would  have  been  well-placed  to  assist  those 
working  on  the  embankment  with  covering-fire.  A  similar  role  was  suggested  for  the 
181 hummock  at  Masada  (Richmond  1962,154);  artillery  situated  here,  behind  and  to  the 
right  of  the  embankment,  would  be  ideally  located  to  protect  the  workers  (ef  fig.  53). 
Curiously,  the  turrets  at  Alesia  never  figure  in  this  argument  (above,  p.  108).  Marsden 
never  mentions  the  site,  and  Harmand  was  reluctant  to  commit  himself  (1967b,  152), 
but  Fuller  assumed  that  artillery  was  deployed,  not  only  in  the  turrets,  but  along  the 
rampart  as  well  (1965,155);  the  latest  reconstruction  of  the  site  depicts  artillery  only  on 
the  former  (Bdnard  1996,56).  In  fact,  Caesar  never  explicitly  indicates  the  purpose  of 
the  turrets,  and  mentions  catapults  only  on  the  occasion  of  the  Gallic  night  attack,  when 
complura  tormentis  tela  coniciuntur  (BelL  Gall.  7.81).  But  turrets  designed  with  cata- 
pults  in  mind  would  surely  have  been  larger  than  3x3m  (above,  p.  106),  a  floor-space 
suitable  for  only  a  single  lightweight  arrow-firer. 
Most  recently,  Davies  has  flatly  contradicted  this  evidence  with  his  general  rule  that  cir- 
curnvallations  were  equipped  with  artillery:  "Generally,  a  timber  turret  or  tower  em- 
placed  directly  on  top  of  the  rampart  line  would  have  provided  adequate  support  for 
light,  anti-personnel  engines  for  defensive  fire,  and  the  provision  of  a  reinforced  plat- 
form  (usually  immediately  behind  the  fine),  might  suggest  more  aggressive  intent,  with 
the  use  of  heavier  machines  capable  of  clearing  the  enemy  parapets  or  even  of  inflicting 
direct  structural  damage"  (2001,202).  Unfortunately,  this  theory  flies  in  the  face  of 
everything  we  know  about  artillery  and  about  circurnvallation  turrets. 
Where  artillery  was  deemed  necessary  for  town  or  camp  defence,  it  seems  usual  to  have 
sited  it  on  ramparts  or  towers,  provided  these  were  deep  enough.  But  in  the  Numantia 
camps,  Schulten  interpreted  a  selection  of  buildings,  united  only  in  their  fragmentary 
condition  and  the  presence  of  the  odd  ballista  ball  in  their  vicinity,  as  artillery  positions 
("Geschiltzstdnde").  Behind  the  west  rampart  of  Pefia  Redonda,  Schulten  restored  a3x 
5m  floor-space  to  accommodate  a  10-mina  stone-projector,  and  a  neighbouring  1.4  x 
5.0  m  floor-space  to  accommodate  a  2-mina  stone-projector  (1927,102-103).  Against 
the  north  rampart  of  Castillejo,  he  identified  a  group  of  four  robustly-built,  double- 
roomed  structures,  each  approximately  5.9  x  5.9  m  with  a  large  door  on  the  south  wall, 
as  double  batteries  for  I  0-mina  stone-projectors  (ibid.,  211).  And  at  Valdevorron,  four 
182 long,  narrow  buildings,  divided  lengthwise  into  two  rooms,  each  approximately  3  rn 
wide,  were  assigned  to  I  0-mina  stone-projectors  (ibid.,  218-219). 
It  should  be  noted  that  a  room  5  metres  long,  as  at  Pefla  Redonda,  would  not  have  ac- 
commodated  a  ten-mina  machine  (above,  p.  179);  nor  would  a  room  1.4  metres  wide 
have  accommodated  a  two-mina  machine.  Schulten's  dimensions  for  the  latter,  appar- 
ently  supplied  by  Schramm,  are  too  small  at  2.5  x  1.30  m  (1927,44  n.  3);  Marsden's 
rule  of  thumb,  whereby  a  stone-projector's  length  totalled  30  diametroi  (Marsden  1969, 
34),  gives  3.73  metres  (30  x  6V2  =  193  dactyls),  and  twice  the  affn-length  as  a  rough 
guide  to  width  gives  1.5  metres  (2  x6x  6V2=  78  dactyls). 
Later,  Schulten  subtly  altered  his  theory  of  artillery-positions,  speciBymg  that  they  were 
"massive  artillery-platforms,  in  which  the  interior  was  filled  with  eartw'  (1929,55).  In 
this  regard,  Ammianus  Marcelfinus's  reference  to  the  late-Roman,  one-anned  onager, 
sitting  on  a  bed  of  "turf  or  bricks!  '  (Amm.  Marc.  23.4.5),  has  cast  a  long  shadow  over 
artillery  research.  Already  in  1899,  it  was  cited  as  an  explanation  of  turf  expansions  on 
the  Antonine  Wall  (Glasgow  Archaeological  Society  1899,146-147),  but  Ammianus's 
story  has  been  consistently  misunderstood.  First,  it  applies  only  to  one  particular  artil- 
lery-piece,  the  onager  (above,  pp.  173ff.  ),  which  had  an  entirely  different  design  from 
the  usual  torsion  catapults;  in  particular,  where  two-anned  machines  transfer  virtually 
all  of  the  torsion  energy  to  the  projectile,  making  any  recoil  negligible,  the  single  arm  of 
the  onager  was  designed  to  crash  against  a  buffer,  creating  a  concussio  violenta  which 
must  have  shifted  the  machine  forwards  and  downwards  (Campbell  1984,79-80).  Sec- 
ondly,  it  seems  only  to  have  applied  to  large  onagri,  as  there  is  no  mention  of  special 
arrangements  being  made  for  the  machines  which  Ammianus,  and  his  colleagues  rede- 
ployed  during  the  defence  of  Amida  (19.7.6-7). 
Shilarly,  Ammianus's  congesti  caespites  have  probably  influenced  the  ahnost  univer- 
sal  acceptance  of  the  south  camp  gate  traverses  at  Burnswark  (the  "Three  Brethreif)  as 
"baffista  platforms"  (above,  p.  93).  However,  when  he  proposed  the  idea,  Collingwood 
appended  the  proviso  that,  "before  regarding  this  identification  as  certain,  paraRel  cases 
ought  to  be  cited;  and  the  writer  regrets  that  he  is  at  present  unable  to  do  this"  (1925/26, 
183 56  note).  Jobey's  observation  that  "the  unusual  rounded  lifuli  ...  could  have  served  as 
platforms  for  spring-gui&'  (Jobey  1977/78,57),  betrays  an  ignorance  of  catapult  bases, 
which  above  all  required  a  level  and  firm  surface  to  ensure  the  weapon's  effective  op- 
eration  (above,  p.  178).  The  filula  may  well  be  "admirably  located  to  allow  artillery  to 
play  upon  the  ramparts  and  gateways  of  the  hill-fort"  (ibid.,  91),  but  no  thought  has 
been  given  as  to  how  the  machines  were  positioned  there. 
Certainly,  the  site  yielded  unequivocal  evidence  of  stone-projectors,  in  the  form  of  four- 
teen  sandstone  balls,  and  fragments  from  a  further  nine.  The  three  most  recently  found 
examples  were  "comparatively  smaIr',  two  weighing  0.60  kg,  the  other  0.50  kg  (no  di- 
mensions  were  recorded:  Jobey  1977/78,90).  The  nine  earlier  finds  were  said  to  repre- 
sent  four  sizes:  1.10  kg,  0.70  kg,  340  g,  and  170  g.  Jobey  commented  that  "it  may  be 
doubted  if  the  fighter  specimens  were  ever  intended  for  spring-guns"  (ibid.  ),  and  he  is 
probably  correct  as  regards  the  170  g  ball.  Catapults  are  not  unexpected  in  the  context 
of  a  siege  (cf  Table  20,  pp.  205f  ),  but  their  positioning  on  the  "Three  Brethren7'  re- 
mains  very  much  to  be  proven. 
Collingwood  was  perhaps  subconsciously  influenced  by  the  three  belostaseis  litho- 
bolois,  "positions  for  stone-projectore'  (Polyb.  9.41.8),  which  Philip  V  set  up  in  front  of 
Echinus  in  210  B.  C.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  these  were  some  form  of  platform 
(e.  g.,  Marsden  1969,53,110;  Garlan  1974,350-351  n.  21  a),  although  it  is  unlikely  that 
resiliency  was  a  primary  concern  (Campbell  1989).  Rather,  it  was  more  important  to 
ensure  the  stability  of  the  weapon  on  a  firm  surface  (cf  Lawrence  1979,78  ad  Philon 
1.32  =  Th.  82:  "these  emplacements  ...  were  open-air  platforms  or  pavements"),  and 
perhaps  add  a  roof  to  provide  protection  against  the  elements  and  enemy  fire  (Campbell 
1984,82;  cf  Carter  1989,  though  the  shed  which  he  envisages  appears  to  be  for  stor- 
age).  Above  all,  the  nature  of  the  catapult  base  appears  to  have  required  a  flat  surface 
(above,  p.  178),  such  as  can  clearly  be  seen  on  Trajan's  Column  (fig.  41)  where  the  ar- 
tillery-piece  is  sited  on  a  wooden  platform. 
In  conclusion,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  heavily-restored  structures  which  Schulten 
interpreted  as  "massive  artUlery-platform§"  (above,  p.  182)  are  very  dubious;  if  they 
184 were,  in  fact,  buildings,  their  function  surely  lies  elsewhere.  Shnilarly,  it  is difficult  to 
see  how  the  -Ilree  Brethren!  '  could  have  acconnnodated  ballistae,  without  some  sort  of 
timber  framework;  but  such  a  structure  would  have  had  no  need  of  the  massive  titula. 
The  testimony  of  Appian  leads  us  to  believe  that  Scipio  had  tower-mounted  artillery  at 
Numantia,  although  the  archacologically  attested  accommodation  is  cramped.  The  same 
situation  obtains  at  Alesia,  and  is  even  worse  at  Machaerus  and  Masada,  where,  in  any 
case,  the  towers  were  probably  only  for  observation. 
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50.0  7  (2.0%)  12  (5.5%)  5  (33.3%)  l1  (2.0%)  65.0  21.8 
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185 Chapter  6: 
Ladders,  shelters,  rams  and  towers 
P  lutarch  tells  the  story  of  how,  during  the  Roman  siege  of  Syracuse  in  211  B.  C., 
"the  Romans  became  so  fearfid  that,  if  they  saw  so  much  as  a  length  of  rope  or  a 
piece  of  timber  appear  over  the  top  of  the  wall,  it  was  enough  to  make  them  cry  out, 
'Look,  Archimedes  is  aiming  one  of  his  machines  at  us',  and  turn  their  backs  and  ruxP 
(Plut.,  Marcellus  17.3). 
For  the  ancients,  the  term  machina  (in  Greek,  Wchane-)  came  to  be  applied  to  any  in- 
strument  or  device.  Its  implications  of  ingenuity  meant  that  it  could  equally  be  applied 
to  a  stratagem  or  ruse,  so  that  the  remark  of  the  Roman  soldiers  quoted  by  Plutarch 
neatly  incorporates  a  double  entendre. 
1.  Scalin  Ladders 
There  were  many  unorthodox  and  ad  hoc  methods  of  scaling  town  walls.  In  one  of  sev- 
eral  assaults  on  Carthage  in  146  B.  C.,  Laefius's  troops  used  'limbers,  machinery  and 
planking",  perhaps  arranged  in  some  form  of  scaffolding,  to  capture  the  wall  of  the 
Cothon  district  (Appian,  Pun.  127).  ne  troops  of  Popillius  Laenas,  assaulting  Hera- 
cleum  in  169  B.  C.,  made  a  novel  use  of  the  testudo  shield-formation,  by  climbing  on  top 
of  it,  and  thence  onto  the  town  wall  (Livy  44.9.6-9),  and  Brutus's  forces  resorted  to 
leaning  tree-trunks  against  the  walls  of  Xanthus  in  42  B.  C.  (Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  4.78). 
Far  less  ingenious  but  just  as  effective  was  the  stratagem  of  the  centurion,  Fabius,  who 
186 wished  to  be  first  over  the  wall  at  Gergovia  in  52  B.  C.,  and  accordingly  had  three  com- 
rades  lift  him  up  there  (Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.47). 
However,  for  a  properly  coordinated  escalade  in  force,  ladders  were  required.  It  was 
obviously  more  convenient  to  construct  such  a  simple  device  on  the  spot,  as  and  when 
the  requirement  arose;  for  example,  at  Carthage  in  149  B.  C.,  Censorinus  sent  troops  out 
to  cut  wood  to  make  'ýmachines  and  ladde&'  (Appian,  Pun.  97).  It  was  obviously  of 
crucial  importance  that  the  ladders  be  long  enough  to  achieve  their  objective.  Vegetius 
offers  two  pieces  of  advice,  the  second  rather  more  practical  than  the  first: 
"The  measurement  is  acquired  in  two  ways;  for  either  a  thin  and  fight  thread  is 
tied  at  one  end  to  an  arrow,  and,  having  been  directed  at  the  highest  point  of  the 
wall,  when  it  arrives,  the  height  of  the  wall  is  inferred  from  the  length  of  the 
thread;  or  else,  when  the  slanting  sun  casts  a  shadow  of  the  towers  and  walls  on 
the  ground,  then,  without  the  enemy  knowing,  the  length  of  this  shadow  is  meas- 
ured,  and  likewise  a  ten-foot  rod  is  fixed  up  and  its  shadow  likewise  measured. 
Drawing  these  together,  nobody  doubts  that  the  height  of  the  town  is  found  out 
from  the  shadow  of  the  ten-foot  rod,  when  it  is  known  what  height  casts  what 
length  of  shadow.  "  (Veg.,  de  re  mil.  4.30) 
Of  course,  Vegetius's  method  only  estimates  the  height  of  the  town  wall.  Polybius 
gives  rather  more  detailed  instructions,  incorporating  a  method  for  gauging  the  appro- 
priate  length  of  the  required  ladders: 
"rhe  method  of  calculating  the  proportions  for  ladders  is  as  follows.  If  the  height 
of  the  wall  has  been  supplied  by  one  of  our  collaborators,  the  ladder's  proportions 
are  self-evident;  for,  if  the  height  of  the  wall  is  ten  of  a  given  unit,  the  ladder  must 
be  fully  twelve.  The  offset  of  the  ladder,  so  as  to  suit  those  climbing  it,  must  be 
half  the  length  of  the  ladder,  in  case  either  by  standing  further  off  it  shatters  with 
the  number  of  those  mounting,  or  conversely  by  propping  up  straight  it  is  too  in- 
secure  for  the  climbers.  If  it  is  impossible  either  to  measure  or  to  approach  the 
wall,  the  height  of  any  object  standing  upright  on  the  ground  can  be  taken  from  a 
187 distance.  The  method  of  determining  it  is  both  possible  and  easy  for  those  who 
become  involved  in  mathematics.  "  (Polyb.  9.19.5-9) 
Plutarch  presents  Marcellus  as  calculating,  from  personal  observation,  the  required  lad- 
der  length  at  Syracuse  (Plut.,  Marc.  18.3).  No  doubt,  he  employed  a  similar  technique 
to  the  besieged  Plataeans  in  428  B.  C.,  who  judged  the  height  of  the  Spartan  siege  wall 
which  encircled  them  (Thuc.  3.20.3-4)  by  the  simple  arithmetic  of  counting  the  courses 
of  bricks,  then  estimating  the  size  of  an  individual  brick.  Thucydides  emphasizes  that 
many  observers  were  involved,  to  safeguard  against  one  man  calculating  incorrectly. 
Something  of  the  sort  may  have  happened  during  Scipio  Africanus's  initial  assault  on 
Cartagena  in  210  B.  C.,  when,  according  to  Livy  (26.45.2),  few  of  the  ladders  were  long 
enough  to  reach  the  top.  Ladder-length  was  not  the  problem  for  Count  Immo,  sent  by 
Julian  in  A.  D.  361  to  recapture  Aquileia  from  its  mutinous  garrison:  "many  carried  lad- 
ders  adjusted  to  the  height  of  the  walls,  but  when  they  were  almost  touching  the  wall, 
some  (men)  were  dashed  down  by  rolled  stones,  others  were  transfixed  by  whistling 
missiles!  '  (Amm.  Marc.  21.12.6).  This  tactic  is  illustrated  on  Trajan's  Column  (scene 
CXIII,  cast  302;  fig.  42,  top-left),  where  a  Dacian  defender  looms  over  a  Roman  ladder, 
brandishing  a  boulder  above  his  head.  However,  rather  than  beating  back  the  assailants, 
it  was  perhaps  more  effective  to  get  rid  of  the  ladders  altogether.  In  Philon's  recom- 
mendations  for  standing  siege,  he  writes:  "hooked  sticks  and  clawed  cleavers  are  useful 
for  warding  off  and  throwing  down  erected  laddere'  (Pol.  1.79  =  Th.  85).  His  later  ad- 
vice,  that  "their  screens  (dokides)  and  the  ladders  which  they  set  up  can  easily  be  shat- 
tered  and  thrown  back  from  the  wall  if  they  are  hit  sideways  by  stone-projectors"  (Pol. 
3.39  =  Th.  94),  surely  springs  from  his  preoccupation  with  artillery;  the  passage  contin- 
ues,  "or  (the  screens  and  ladders  can  easily  be)  burned  by  sprinkling  naphtha,  if  you 
have  some,  and  throwing  torches  from  above". 
Assaulting  a  town  by  escalade  was  clearly  a  dangerous  proposition.  In  his  description 
of  a  Roman  attempt  to  scale  the  north  portico  of  the  Jerusalem  Temple  in  A.  D.  70, 
Josephus  (Bell.  Jud.  6.223-225)  gives  a  flavour  of  the  hazards  involved: 
188 "The  Jews  did  not  move  quickly  to  prevent  [the  escalade],  but  violently  met  the 
climbers,  throwing  down  those  whom  they  pushed  backwards,  and  destroying 
those  whom  they  encountered;  many,  stepping  off  the  ladder,  they  struck  with 
their  swords,  before  they  could  protect  themselves  with  their  shields,  and  they 
threw  down  some  ladders,  full  of  soldiers,  from  above,  by  tilting  them  sideways; 
but  not  a  few  of  them  were  themselves  killed.  Those  who  brought  up  the  stan- 
dards  fought  around  them,  believing  their  capture  to  be  a  terrible  dishonour.  " 
The  soldier  depicted  in  the  process  of  escalade  on  Trajan's  Column  (scene  CXIII;  fig. 
42,  left  of  centre)  has  apparently  beheaded  a  Dacian  defender.  Ideally,  the  officer  in 
charge  of  an  escalade  would  have  attempted  to  disperse  the  opposition,  immediately 
prior  to  his  soldiers  ascending.  Often,  a  feint  at  a  different  sector  was  intended  to  draw 
the  defenders  away.  At  Cartagena,  it  was  the  main,  unsuccessful  escalade  which  pro- 
vided  the  diversion  for  Scipio  Africanus's  successful  assault  across  the  lagoon  (Livy 
26.46.2).  A  similar  strategy  lay  behind  Scipio  Aemilianus's  nocturnal  assault,  soon  af- 
ter  his  arrival  at  Carthage  in  147  B.  C.;  he  sent  men  armed  with  axes,  crowbars  and  lad- 
ders  against  two  separate  sectors,  hoping  to  surprise  the  defenders,  but  the  move  was 
spotted  and  the  alarm  raised  (Appian,  Pun.  117).  At  Elataea  and  Phocaea,  the  escalades 
were  apparently  planned  to  draw  defenders  away  from  breaches  in  the  walls,  while  the 
reverse  tactic,  as  recommended  by  Onasander  (Stral.  42.5),  was  applied  at  Haliartus. 
As  an  alternative,  an  escalade  might  be  mounted  at  an  unguarded  sector  of  the  town  cir- 
cuit.  At  Carthage  again,  the  fleet  commander,  Mancinus,  targeted  a  length  of  curtain 
left  unpatrolled  because  it  ran  along  a  sheer  cliff-edge,  accessible  only  by  sea.  When  a 
few  men  had  scaled  the  wall,  a  Carthaginian  force  sallied  out  of  a  nearby  postern;  the 
rest  of  Mancinus's  task-force  routed  them  and  entered  the  gate  at  their  heels,  but  were 
immediately  trapped  and  outnumbered  within  the  city,  and  had  to  be  extnicated  by 
Scipio  on  the  following  day  (Appian,  Pun.  113-114). 
The  fear  of  escalade  often  drove  an  unprepared  town  to  surrender,  as  at  Locha.  in  204 
B.  C.,  which  hints  at  the  dreadful  ferocity  of  a  legionary  assault.  A  particularly  high 
189 proportion  of  escalades  occurred  during  the  Macedonian  Wars  (above,  pp.  32f.  ),  a  fact 
that  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  number  of  surrenders  from  the  same  period. 
2.  Shelters 
A  variety  of  shelters  are  mentioned  in  the  literary  sources;  in  Appendix  1,1  have  differ- 
entiated  between  vineae  (which  I  render  as  "shelters7),  plutei,  "screens",  portid7s,  "gal- 
lerics7',  and  testudines,  "sheds!  '  (see  Table  20,  pp.  205f).  The  bewildering  array  of 
translations  which  have  been  employed  for  these  terms  in  the  past  does  not  help  in  our 
understanding  of  the  individual  devices.  For  example,  Lewis  and  Short  translate  the 
term  vinea  as  "a  kind  of  penthouse,  shed,  or  mantlet"  (1879,  s.  v.  vinea),  and  pluteus, 
similarly,  as  "a  penthouse,  shed,  or  mantlet"  (1879,  s.  v.  pluteus).  The  defining  feature 
of  a  penthouse  is,  of  course,  the  sloping  roof  (cf.  O.  E.  D.,  s.  v.  ),  a  reasonable  assumption 
in  a  shelter  designed  to  deflect  missiles,  but  "mantlet"  probably  means  very  little  to 
modem  readers.  Fortunately,  there  are  several  technical  descriptions  of  the  different 
shelters  which  can  be  drawn  upon. 
2.1  The  Vinea 
By  far  the  most  commonly  mentioned  shelter,  the  vinea  is  often  associated  with  the  con- 
struction  of  embankments,  as  at  Heraclea,  Suthul,  Thala,  Noviodunum,  the  town  of  the 
AtuatucL  the  town  of  the  Sotiates,  Avaricum,  Uxellodunum,  Pindenissus,  Massilia, 
Ategua,  Placentia,  Bezabde,  and  Maiozamalcha.  So  much  so,  that  their  presence  at 
other  sieges  perhaps  hints  at  an  intention  to  undertake  construction  work,  as  at  Casfl- 
inum,  Nesactium,  and  the  fort  on  the  Muluccha  River,  while  their  presence  at  Leucas 
and  Ambracia  will  have  been  connected  with  underrminiing  work.  Only  Caesar,  the  great 
improviser,  is  known  to  have  utilised  vineae  as  temporary  defences,  at  Alexandria  in  48 
B.  C. 
Both  Apollodorus,  writing  under  Trajan,  and  Vegetius,  probably  drawing  upon  a 
Flavian  source  (above,  p.  157),  describe  a  device  which  they  call  "vinee',  on  account  of 
a  supposed  shilarity  to  vineyard  treHises.  ApoHodorus's  ampelol  (W  141-143)  are 
constructed  from  sets  of  five  poles,  stuck  into  the  ground  with  iron  spikes,  and  joined 
together  with  cross-pieces;  the  whole  thing  is  draped  loosely  with  two  layers  of  hides, 
190 which  absorb  the  impact  of  arrows  and  sling-stones,  and,  by  using  two  different  lengths 
of  pole,  the  shape  of  a  cheldni,  or  "tortoise",  is  created.  Some  poles  are  man-height, 
others  one-and-a-half  times  man-height,  and  the  structure  appears  to  have  taken  the 
form  of  a  large  ridge-tent.  There  are  obvious  ambiguities  in  the  description.  Lendle 
favoured  a  square  structure,  five  poles  by  five,  in  which  the  central  row  is  tallest,  the 
second  and  fourth  rows  less  so,  and  the  outer  rows  shortest  (1983,139  fig.  39),  but 
Neumann  took  the  figure  five  to  be  the  distance  in  feet  (1.48  rn)  between  individual 
poles  (1961,107). 
Vegetius's  vinea  (Epit.  rel  mil.  4.15)  is  slightly  different.  He  envisages  a  structure  of 
light  timbers,  with  wickerwork  sides  and  a  boarded  roof,  the  whole  thing  covered  with 
raw  hides  as  a  protection  against  fire.  Its  dimensions  are  quoted  as  eight  feet  (2.4  m) 
wide,  seven  feet  (2.1  m)  high,  and  sixteen  feet  (4.7  m)  long,  but  individual  structures  are 
joined  to  form  corridors.  Neumann  was  at  pains  to  reconcile  the  two  descriptions 
(1961,107-108),  pointing  out  that  both  had  doubled  roofs  (although  Apollodorus  men- 
tions  only  a  double  layer  of  raw  hide),  and  that  Vegetius's  seven-foot  height  could  well 
be  a  reference  to  Apollodorus's  man-sized  poles  (though  it  is  surely  more  likely  that  the 
seven-foot  height  refers  to  the  man-and-a-half  height  poles,  stuck  into  the  ground). 
Vegetius  does  not  mention  a  gabled  roof  (pace  Connolly  1981,297;  cf.  Liebenam  1909, 
2243;  Lendle  1983,140,  envisaging  a  flat  rooo,  although  such  would  certainly  be  ad- 
visable  in  repelling  stones  and  missiles.  Indeed,  if  we  assume  that  Vegetius  intended 
this  design,  once  his  vinea  was  clad  in  raw-hide,  it  could  well  have  resembled  Apollo- 
dorus's  ampelos. 
Rice  Holmes  wrestled  with  the  question  of  how  vineae  were  used  in  constructing  an 
embankment  (Holmes  1914,96).  He  realised  that  the  shelters  described  by  Vegetius,  if 
placed  end  to  end,  would  have  enabled  men  to  bring  up  materials  in  the  same  way  as  the 
porticfis  at  Massilia  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.2).  However,  "whether  vineae  were  used  by  the 
men  who  actually  reared  the  fabric,  we  are  not  told  ... 
inside  vineae  they  could  not  have 
worked",  and  he  proposed  that  "they  were  screened  by  the  defences  called  pluter' 
(ibid.  ). 
191 2.2  Aperti  Cuniculi 
It  is  appropriate  to  comment  here  upon  the  aperti  cuniculi  which  were  prevented  from 
approaching  the  walls  of  Avaricurn  by  means  of  sharp  stakes,  molten  pitch  and  large 
boulders  (Caes.,  Bell.  Gall.  7.22).  These  enigmatic  "open  tunnels"  have  inspired  an 
elaborate  theory  of  passageways  within  embankments  (above,  p.  149),  but  Hohnes  in- 
terpreted  them  as  "the  galleries  by  which  [the  Romans]  were  approaching  to  undermine 
the  waW  (1911,144),  while  Mesnil  du  Buisson  (1939,66)  believed  them  to  be  mines 
which  the  Gauls  had  burst  open  (cf.  Liebenam.  1909,2252).  The  sensible  suggestion 
(Hough  1940),  that  they  were  simply  the  lines  of  shelters  under  which  those  engaged  on 
the  construction  of  the  embankment  moved  from  the  rear  to  its  front  face,  was  rejected 
by  Heubner,  obstinately  insisting  that  a  cuniculus  must  be  underground  (1959,508). 
Wmimel's  attempt  to  combine  both  theories  succeeded  only  in  producing  the  unlikely 
scenario  of  successive  layers  of  shelters,  each  buried  in  turn  by  the  increasing  mass  of 
the  embankment  (1974,20-30;  cf.  the  lukewarm  reception  of  Harmand  1974,386; 
1976).  The  most  likely  explanation  is  that  Caesar  saw  the  lines  of  vineae,  snaking  along 
the  embankment,  as  open-air  tunnels. 
2.3  The  Pluteus 
According  to  Vegetius  (Epit.  rei  mil.  4.15),  the  pluteus  was  a  convex  wicker  shield  with 
an  arched  rooý  which  ran  on  three  rollers.  Although  Vegetius  envisaged  these  specifi- 
cally  as  shelters  for  missile-troops  supporting  an  escalade,  Caesar  describes  their  use  in 
various  situations:  as  frontal  protection  for  workers  (Bell.  Civ.  2.15;  possibly  2.9);  as 
wicker  breastworks  (Bell.  Gall.  7.41.4;  72.4;  cf.  Bell.  Civ.  1.25;  3.24,  on  shipboard);  and 
as  panels  on  turrets  (Bell.  Gall.  7.25).  In  fact,  the  word  is  used  of  the  wicker  cladding 
on  other  military  structures  (e.  g.,  Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.15.1,5),  and  is  found  in  civilian 
contexts  denoting  screens  of  various  kinds  (Lambertz  1951,982-986). 
Again,  there  is  the  problem  of  Greek  terminology.  The  shelters  which  Vespasian  set  his 
men  to  construct,  in  preparation  for  the  siege  of  Jotapata,  may  have  been  plutei;  they  are 
described  as  follows: 
192 "some,  stretching  wicker  (gerra)  over  palings  as  a  shelter  from  missiles  thrown 
from  above,  heaped  up  (the  earthworks)  from  under  theie'  (Jos.,  Bell.  Iud.  3.163) 
Titus  adopted  the  same  arrangement  of  wickerwork  shelters  to  protect  the  workers  at 
Jerusalem  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.269).  Although  Liddell  and  Scott  took  gerra,  "Wicker- 
work7,  to  be  cognate  with  the  Latin  vinea  (Liddell  el  al.  1940,  s.  v.  ytppov),  Walbank 
believed  Polybian  usage  of  the  word,  in  the  context  of  the  Roman  siege  of  Syracuse,  to 
indicate  "wicker-work  screer&'  (1967,7  1);  in  other  words,  plutei. 
In  siegecraft,  plutei  are  occasionally  found  in  conjunction  with  vineae,  as  at  the  town  of 
the  AusetanL  Massilia,  and  Placentia;  in  these  cases,  one  can  easily  envisage  their  form- 
ing  the  frontal  protection  for  a  fine  of  vineae,  as  Holmes  prescribed  (above,  p.  191). 
Liebenam.  believed  that  plutei  would  have  run  around  the  perimeter  of  an  embankment 
under  construction  (1909,2243),  but  the  threat  to  the  workers  came  primarily  from  the 
front. 
Of  course,  a  general  screening  function  could  easily  have  been  fiflfilled  by  the  ubiqui- 
tous  crates,  those  miscellaneous  wicker  panels  which  are  often  found  in  conjunction 
with  plutei  (e.  g.,  Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.9,15).  However,  the  role  ofplutei  in  combat,  guar- 
anteeing  protection  at  Syracuse  (above)  and  Aquileia,  emphasizes  the  fact  that  these 
were  not  just  screens;  they  were,  in  fact,  apsidal  shelters  in  which  a  combatant  was  pro- 
tected  from  above  as  well  as  from  the  front. 
In  this  connection,  Athenaeus  preserves  an  interesting  device,  which  he  caUs  the  aretJ 
chelonj  (W  38).  Schneider  all  but  ignored  the  short  description,  clahning  it  to  be  an  in- 
terpolation,  and  suggesting,  in  fi-ustration,  that  aretj  was  a  Graecisation  of  the  Latin  ar- 
ies  (1912,66).  But  the  passage  may  conceal  a  reference  to  the  pluteus: 
"When  the  attacker  wishes  to  approach  the  wall,  he  sets  up  the  aretj  tortoise,  and 
with  its  help  brings  up  the  ladders.  This  aretJ  is  a  tortoise  which  is  wedge-shaped 
and  rounded  in  a  semi-circle  on  top,  so  that  whatever  falls  against  the  front  face 
easily  rolls  off.  "  (Athen.  W  38) 
193 This  "tortoise"  would  have  resembled  a  quarter  sphere,  except  that  the  ground-plan  is 
wedge-shaped,  giving  it  a  pointed  front  (cE  Schneider  1912,37:  "eine  Schildkr6te  die 
vorn  spitz  zuMuft").  It  could  easily  be  described  as  ad  similitudinem  absidis,  just  like 
Vegetius's  pluteus,  and  like  it,  it  was  probably  woven  from  wicker,  in  order  to  achieve 
its  rounded  shape  (cf.  Lendle  1983,146).  Of  course,  the  whole  device  would  need  pro- 
tection  against  fire,  probably  in  the  form  of  raw  hides. 
2A  The  Testudo 
Atheneaus's  description  of  the  pluteus  as  a  "tortoise"  is  typical  of  Greek  usage,  in  which 
cheldnal  can  take  various  different  forms.  Apollodorus  calls  his  version  of  the  vinea  a 
"fight  tortoise",  and  describes  it  as  "tortoise-shaped7'  (W  141).  Earlier,  he  recommends 
"the  tortoise  shaped  Eke  the  prow  of  a  ship  (embolon)"  (W  140)  as  protection  against 
objects  rolled  downhill,  in  conjunction  with  his  oblique  ditches  (above,  p.  97).  His  de- 
scription  of  this  device  is  worth  quoting  in  full,  not  least  because  something  similar  can 
be  discerned  on  TraJan's  Column  (below,  p.  195). 
"The  tortoise  which  has  the  shape  of  a  ship's  prow,  conveyed  by  the  heavy  infan- 
try,  is  brought  up  on  foot-thkk  (0.30  m)  beams,  its  form  being  smooth,  or  having 
iron  wheels  attached  to  the  base,  so  that,  when  it  is  set  in  position,  it  is  fixed  in  the 
ground  and  is  not  shifted  by  collision  (viz.  with  objects  rolled  downhill  against  it). 
It  will  also  have  a  slanting  beam  at  the  front,  propping  it  up  against  capsizing. 
Therefore,  heavy  objects  will  either  fall  into  the  diagonal  ditches  and  be  carried 
past,  or  will  strike  against  the  sloping  palisade  which  is  arranged  diagonally  and 
be  deflected,  or,  breaking  on  the  prow,  will  roll  down  on  either  side  and  safeguard 
the  space  in  the  middle  from  the  impact.  There  should  be  many  prows,  so  that 
they  can  be  small  and  easily  transported.  "  (Apoll.  W  140-141) 
It  is  clear  that  the  device  is  shaped  rather  Eke  a  snow-plough,  so  that  objects  hitting  the 
front  will  be  deflected  to  the  sides.  It  would  seem  reasonable  for  the  prow  itself  to  be 
iron-plated,  since  its  primary  purpose  was  to  intercept  heavy  objects.  The  men  deploy- 
ing  the  device  will  have  crowded  into  the  interior  space,  and,  while  it  is  conceivable  that 
194 no  roof  was  necessary,  since  they  were  operating  uphilL  one  can  weU  imagine  that  high 
sides  would  be  required. 
'Me  "smoothness"  of  the  device  was  perhaps  to  allow  it  to  be  slid  into  position  like  a 
sledge  (cf  Lendle  1983,134),  but  this  would  seem  unnecessary  in  light  of  its  "iron 
wheeW'.  However,  this  whole  clause  is  problematic,  and  is  customarily  obelized  to  in- 
dicate  the  possibility  of  textual  corruption.  Schneider  thought  that  Apollodorus  in- 
tended  the  device  to  have  iron  spikes  (1908,13),  which  would  be  a  more  practical 
method  of  anchoring  it  down,  but  Lendle  retains  the  received  text,  envisaging  small  iron 
wheels,  which  could  be  pressed  into  the  ground  (1983,134).  Of  course,  the  device  also 
has  a  "slanting  bearrf'  to  secure  it  in  position;  Apollodorus  states  that  the  beam  was  "at 
the  front",  and  probably  from  there  it  sloped  down,  within  the  triangular  interior,  and 
dug  into  the  ground  (cf.  Lendle  1983,135). 
Lendle  found  confirmation  for  his  interpretation  on  Trajan's  Column,  where  three  trian- 
gular  devices  are  shown,  deployed  on  a  hill-side  and  apparently  obstructing  some  bar- 
rels  and  tree-trunks  rolled  from  above  (scene  CXIV,  casts  307-308  =  fig.  43).  The  con- 
junction  of  these  objects  has  inspired  many  different  interpretations,  ranging  from  Tit- 
tel's  piston-operated  chariots,  remotely  controlled  from  concealment  (apud  Cichorius, 
1900,228-232;  cf  Cichorius  1927),  and  Richmond's  festucae,  or  "pounding  hammers", 
used  in  construction  work  (1982,42),  to  the  more  prosaic,  if  equally  unlikely,  ram- 
tortoise  of  Lepper  and  Frere  (1988,166-167).  All  of  these  assumed  the  Dacians'  im- 
provised  missiles  to  be  part  of  the  Roman  siege-machine,  but  once  these  are  separated 
the  true  form  of  the  device  can  be  seen. 
Lendle  was  keen  to  retain  ApoUodorus's  reference  to  "iron  wheele',  because  the  Tra- 
janic  devices  clearly  have  three,  very  large  wheels.  More  recently,  Blyth  has  suggested 
that  the  sculptor  misunderstood  the  device,  adding  wheels  where  none  should  be  (1992, 
153),  perhaps  influenced  by  an  already  corrupted  text  of  Apollodorus.  In  other  respects, 
the  devices  correspond  well  to  the  "ship's  prow  tortoise";  in  particular,  the  slanting 
beam  can  be  seen  inside  each  one,  perhaps  secured  at  the  base  by  three  stakes. 
195 This  was  a  unique  device,  designed  to  meet  a  particular  situation,  and  was  probably 
grouped  with  the  "tortoises"  for  want  of  a  better  home.  Vitruvius  and  Athenaeus  pre- 
serve  descriptions  of  the  more  familiar  shed-like  testudo,  which  may  properly  be  termed 
a  penthouse  on  account  of  its  heavy,  sloping  roof  (Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.14.1-15.1;  Athen. 
W  16-20;  cf.  Lendle  1975,6-25).  A  ground-fi-ame  of  cross-beams  (the  basis  or  es- 
charlon)  was  fitted  with  four  wheels,  which  could  be  pivoted  to  move  the  machine 
sideways;  vertical  walls,  rising  from  the  ground-fi-ame  on  all  four  sides,  supported  slop- 
ing  rafters  to  carry  the  pitched  roof  down  to  the  ground.  Lendle  has  suggested  that  a 
transverse  ridge  allowed  the  roof  to  slope  to  the  front  and  back,  with  hips  to  the  sides 
rather  than  gables  (Lendle  1975,13-15).  Two  types  of  shed  are  described:  a  "ditch- 
filling$1  version  (testudo  ad  congestionem  fossarum:  Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.14.1-3;  chelinj 
ch6stris:  Athen.  W  16-18),  and  a  "digging"  version  (testudo  adfodiendum:  Vitr.,  De 
arch.  10.15.1;  chelinff  oryktris:  Athen.  W  19-20),  designed  to  move  up  against  the  en- 
emy  wall  for  undermining  work. 
Surprisingly,  such  a  device,  identified  by  the  neutral  term  "shed"  in  Appendix  1,  is 
rarely  mentioned  in  accounts  of  sieges  (cf.  Table  20,  pp.  205f).  It  is  likely  that  batter- 
ing-rams  were  routinely  housed  in  wheeled  sheds  (below,  p.  198),  dispensing  with  the 
need  to  mention  both  elements  in  what  was  essentially  a  single  machine.  Both  sheds 
and  rams  are  mentioned  at  Oreus,  Gytheum,  and  Piraeus,  but  the  sheds  at  Gytheum  and 
Piraeus  seem  to  have  been  associated  with  undermining  work,  and  the  60-foot  (17.7  rn) 
testudo  at  Massilia  was  clearly  associated  with  ground-levelling  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.2). 
The  almost  complete  absence  of  the  latter  type  of  testudo  may  be  explained  by  the  fact 
that  the  Romans  preferred  to  construct  an  embankment  for  the  approach  of  troops  and 
machinery,  rather  than  levelling  the  ground  Eke  Hellenistic  armies  (above,  p.  135).  Lie- 
benam.  is  surely  wrong  to  suggest  that  the  ground  would  be  levelled  for  the  approach  of 
an  agger  (1909,2243),  the  function  of  whicl-4  after  all,  was  to  create  a  new  ground 
surface;  the  levelling  at  Massilia  is  better  seen  as  a  measure  to  facilitate  bringing  the 
musculus  forward  (see  below),  while  Titus's  levelling  of  the  terrain  at  Jerusalem  was  to 
ensure  the  army's  unimpeded  advance  to  the  outer  waRs  (above,  p.  147).  Garlan  has 
suggested  that  the  leveffing  work  of  these  tortoises  dispensed  with  the  need  for  an  ern- 
196 bankment  (1974,235),  but  he  has  surely  confused  the  order  of  events,  with  the  adoption 
of  the  embankment  making  the  "ditch-MUng  tortoises"  redundant. 
2.5  The  Musculus 
The  musculus  appears  only  in  the  corpus  Caesarlanum,  at  Alesia,  Massilia,  Gomphi, 
and  Alexandria.  Holmes  was  rightly  sceptical  about  its  occurrence  at  Alesia,  (Bell.  Gall. 
7.84),  commenting  that  "if  Vercingetorix  used  musculi,  we  can  only  say  that  they  were 
intended  to  protect  his  men  while  they  were  attempting  to  fill  up  Caesar's  trenches" 
(1914,100).  In  the  description  of  Caesar's  defensive  measures  in  Alexandria,  "all  parts 
of  the  town  which  appeared  to  be  less  strong  were  fitted  out  with  lestudines  and  mus- 
culr'  (Bell.  Alex.  1.2),  perhaps  as  makeshift  barriers. 
Carter  describes  Caesar's  musculi  at  Gomphi  (Bell.  Civ.  3.80)  as  "a  long,  narrow, 
moveable  shed  with  a  strong  roof,  under  which  men  could  shelter  while  undermining 
fortifications  or  preparing  other  forms  of  attack7  (Carter  1993,202),  no  doubt  thinking 
of  Massilia,  the  locus  classicus,  on  which  he  writes,  "the  purpose  of  this  [shed],  when 
placed  against  the  enemy  wall,  was  to  allow  a  rarn  to  be  used  in  safety,  or  saps  to  be 
driven  from  as  near  as  possible  to  their  goar'  (Carter  1990,22  1). 
In  fact,  Vegetius  describes  musculi  as  "smaller  machines,  by  which  attackers  are  pro- 
tected  while  undoing  the  palisade  of  a  city-,  they  not  only  fill  the  ditch  with  stones,  wood 
and  earth,  which  have  been  carried  forward,  but  they  also  make  it  solid,  so  that  mobile 
towers  can  be  moved  to  the  wall  without  difficulty"  (Epit.  rei  mil.  4.16).  This  sounds 
very  Eke  the  ditch-filling  tortoise  (above,  p.  196;  Southern  &  Dixon  1996,162,  wrongly 
equate  it  with  the  vinea).  However,  when  Veith  categorised  the  items  of  siege- 
machinery  according  to  whether  they  were  used  in  the  approach  phase  or  in  the  attack 
(1928,444),  he  classed  the  musculus  as  an  assault-machine,  Eke  mobile  towers  and  bat- 
tering-rams,  clearly  interpreting  it  as  a  "digging-tortoise";  he  classed  testudines  (i.  e.,  the 
ditch-filling  variety),  along  with  plutei  and  vineae,  as  approach-shelters  CAn- 
nMierungsdeckungeif'). 
197 The  musculus  at  Massilia  was  an  enormously  robust  device,  built  of  2-foot  (0.60  m) 
thick  tiniber  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.10);  it  was  wheeled  up  to  the  wall,  to  enable  workers  to 
undermine  a  tower  and  cause  substantial  collapse.  Thus,  Veith  is  correct  to  identify 
such  a  device  as  a  "digging  tortoise";  Vegetius  has  wrongly  assumed  the  musculus  to 
have  had  a  ditch-filling  role.  Musing  on  the  pitched  roof  of  the  Massilia  device,  Carter 
comments  that  "it  seems,  from  the  stress  laid  previously  on  this  feature  of  the  musculus' 
construction,  that  a  flat  roof  was  normar,  (1990,221),  however,  a  pitched  roof  was  a 
defining  trait  of  the  testudo,  in  order  to  deflect  missiles  (cf.  p.  196). 
3.  Batterina-rams 
A  pitched  roof  was  essential  in  the  specialised  ram-shed,  firstly,  because  of  its  exposed 
position  at  the  wall-face,  and  secondly,  to  provide  a  stable  fi-ame  from  which  to  suspend 
the  ranuning-beam.  Apollodorus  explains  both  points  in  his  instructions,  addressed  to 
Trajan: 
"If  we  wish  to  shake  a  tower  or  gate  or  wall  with  a  battering-rain,  we  shall  make 
tall  ram-carrying  sheds  on  wheels,  which  carry  the  suspension  of  the  battering- 
ran-4  so  that  the  impact  will  be  forceful;  for,  the  higher  the  suspension,  the  greater 
the  distance  which  the  battering-rarn  is  drawn  back,  and,  the  further  it  travels,  the 
harder  it  will  strike.  But  the  shed  should  only  be  tall  in  appearance,  and  not  mas- 
sive  (overall),  so  that  it  is  easily  moved;  it  should  be  twice  as  high  as  it  is  wide,  in 
order  to  have  a  sharp  ridge  and  almost  vertical  sides,  so  that  heavy  weights  thrown 
down  will  not  just  slide  off,  but  will  rebound;  and  it  should  have  a  projecting  roof, 
leaning  towards  the  wall,  in  order  to  receive  heavy  weights  thrown  down  onto  the 
ram,  and  divert  (them)  to  either  side.  "  (Apoll.  W  153-154) 
Having  described  the  shed  which  carries  the  ram-beam,  ApoRodorus  then  refers  to  "the 
one  behind,  of  lesser  height,  for  the  crew,  and  two  other  smaller  ones  behind,  necessary 
for  their  safe  passage"  (W  155).  The  functional  simplicity  of  this  arrangement  is  absent 
from  the  rarn-sheds  described  by  Vitruvius  and  Athenaeus.  One  machine  built  by 
Diades,  an  engineer  of  Alexander  the  Great,  was  30  cubits  (13.9  m)  wide,  40  cubits 
(18.5  m)  long  and  16  cubits  (7.4  m)  high,  and  incorporated  a  three-storey  turricula,  ac- 
198 commodating  arrow-firing  artillery  and,  on  the  lowest  floor,  a  water-supply  for  dousing 
the  machine  in  the  event  of  fire  (testudo  arietaria:  Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.13.6;  chel6ni  krio- 
phoros:  Athen.  W  12-14;  cf  Lendle  1975,33-47).  Philip  V  used  something  very  simi- 
lar  at  Echinus,  (Polyb.  41.1-6),  but  the  Romans  do  not  appear  to  have  used  such  mon- 
sters  (pace  Connolly  1983,79,  depicting  a  variant  of  Diades's  machine,  set  on  rollers, 
as  typical  of  a  first-century  Roman  machine). 
Siege-machinery  is  depicted  on  the  Arch  of  Septimius  Severus  in  Rome,  including  ram- 
sheds  on  Panel  2  (fig.  45a),  which  is  thought  to  depict  events  from  the  First  Parthian 
War  (Brilliant  1967,179-180).  The  machine  in  the  middle  of  the  top  half  is  badly 
eroded,  but  in  the  bottom-left  quadrant  a  battering-ram  can  be  seen,  protruding  from  a 
gable-ended  shed.  Interestingly,  there  appears  to  be  a  second  shed  behind  it,  suggesting 
the  passageway  which  Apollodorus  mentions.  The  ramming-bearn  is  clearly  tipped 
with  an  effigy  of  a  ram'  s  head,  which  corroborates  Josephus's  description  of  the  ma- 
chine. 
"It  [viz.  the  battering-ram]  is  an  immense  beam  resembling  the  mast  of  a  ship;  it  is 
capped  at  the  front  with  a  mass  of  iron,  modelled  like  a  rain's  head,  from  which  it 
takes  its  name.  It  is  hung  in  the  middle  by  ropes,  Eke  one  of  the  beams  in  balanc- 
ing  scales,  sustained  by  firmly  based  uprights  on  each  side.  Pushed  back  by  a 
crowd  of  men,  and  swung  forwards  by  them  in  a  mass,  it  strikes  the  wall  with  the 
projecting  iron.  "  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud  3.214-216) 
The  mention  of  uprights  is  often  misunderstood  as  implying  a  fixed  structure  (e.  g., 
Hengst  1999,33:  "the  arles  is  suspended  from  a  beam  that  rests  upon  two  posts  fixed  in 
the  groundj,  but  Josephus  has  simply  omitted  to  describe  the  wheeled  shed,  without 
which  the  machine  could  never  have  advanced  safely  to  the  wall.  In  fact,  he  appears  to 
draw  a  distinction  between  the  krios,  or  ram-beam  proper,  and  the  helepolis,  which  pre- 
sumably  encapsulates  the  ram  and  its  shed.  (Josephus  uses  the  latter  term  for  Titus's 
battering-machines  at  Jerusalenr.  Bell  Jud.  5.275,279,281  et  al.  )  That  there  was  some 
form  of  shed  is  clear  from  Josephus's  statement,  that  "others  brought  up  the  ram  (krios) 
(which  was)  hedged  around  with  continuous  wickerwork  (panels)  and,  on  top,  raw 
199 hides,  as  protection  for  them  and  for  the  machine  (mUchanimata)"  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud. 
3.220). 
Once  it  reached  its  action-station,  the  wheels  would  need  to  be  chocked  in  place  to  pre- 
vent  the  machine  from  rolling  back.  In  fact,  Apollodoros  appears  to  suggest  that,  once 
his  ram-shed  reached  the  wall,  the  entire  frame  was  raised  on  wedges: 
"Beside  the  wheels  that  carry  the  shed,  wedges  are  inserted  under  the  tirnbers,  to 
support  it  with  stability-,  for,  in  this  way,  the  pivots  of  the  wheels  [i.  e.,  the  axles] 
will  not  carry  the  machine  (ergon)  alone,  nor  will  it  [i.  e.,  the  shed]  be  prone  to  slip 
with  the  motion  of  the  ram;  whenever  it  is  necessary  (for  the  shed)  to  move,  you 
must  draw  away  the  wedges  from  underneath.  "  (Apoll.,  Pol.  W  157) 
Any  machinery  employed  in  proximity  to  the  enemy  had  to  be  proofed  against  incendi- 
ary  attack.  Although  the  timbers  will  often  have  been  green,  unseasoned  wood,  freshly 
felled  for  the  purpose  (Hanson  1978,  passim,  esp.  297),  and  hence  would  have  been  dif- 
ficult  to  fire  (cf  ibid.,  304,  for  the  feasibility  of  bun-dng),  nevertheless,  the  wickerwork 
cladding,  which  is  so  prevalent  in  all  siege-machinery,  would  have  been  inflammable. 
For  this  reason,  Athenaeus  recommends  that 
"all  roof  parts  are  covered  with  planking,  ideally  of  palm  wood,  but  if  not,  then 
whichever  of  the  other  (types  oo  wood  is  springy,  except  cedar,  pine  and  alder; 
for  these  are  inflammable  and  easily  broken.  The  planking  is  covered  on  top  with 
finely-  and  closely-woven,  freshly-cut  wicker;  on  top  of  this  are  laid  hides, 
stitched  together  like  cushions,  and  packed  preferably  with  marsh-grass,  or  the  so- 
called  sea-weed,  or  chaff  soaked  with  vinegar;  these  (measures)  are  useful  against 
the  blows  of  stone-projectors  and  against  burning.  "  (Athen.  W  17-18;  cf  Vitr.,  De 
arch.  10.14.3) 
The  fire-proofing  properties  of  seaweed  and  of  vinegar  were  well-known  in  the  ancient 
world.  Philon,  for  example,  recommends  that,  if  mkhanftata  and  chel6nai  are  not 
covered  with  iron  or  bronze  scales,  or  with  lead  tiles,  they  should  be  covered  with  a  net 
200 of  fresh  seaweed,  or  with  sponges  soaked  in  water,  or  with  fleeces  moistened  with  vine- 
gar  (Philon,  Pol.  4.34  =  TIL  99).  Another  technique  was  to  cover  the  timberwork  with  a 
mixture  of  clay  and  hair,  as  Apollodorus  recommends  (W  156),  or  with  tiles  and  clay, 
like  the  musculus  at  Massilia  (Caes.,  Bell.  Civ.  2.10);  the  latter  was  further  protected  by 
raw  hides  and  rags.  It  seems  that  such  measures  were  not  always  taken:  after  an  incen- 
diary  attack  on  the  Roman  siege-works  during  Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem,  Josephus  de- 
scribes  the  Romans  "dragging  the  battering-rams  out  of  the  fire,  the  wicker  (panels) 
over  them  ablaze"  (Jos.,  Bell.  Iud.  5.479). 
We  cannot  accurately  gauge  the  size  of  Roman  battering-rams.  The  monstrous,  eight- 
wheeled  machine  of  Hegetor,  with  a  base  of  42  by  28  cubits  (19.4  x  13.0  m),  allegedly 
carried  a  120-cubit  (55.5  m)  ram-beam  (Athen.  W  23-24),  although  Vitruvius  records 
that  it  measured  104  feet  (30.75  m)  (De  arch.  10.15.5).  Schramm  was  sceptical  that 
such  a  long  beam  could  work,  pronouncing  that,  if  it  were  suspended  in  the  middle,  the 
front  and  rear  would  drag  on  the  ground;  he  suggested  that  Athenaeus  had  meant  120 
feet  (35.5  m),  not  cubits  (1928,235),  but  Lendle  has  suggested  that  the  original  Greek 
may  have  stated  70  cubits  (32.4  m)  (1975,62).  Ammianus  describes  a  giant  ram  which 
the  Persians  used  at  Antioch,  probably  in  the  siege  of  A.  D.  260,  and  then  abandoned  at 
Carrhae,  on  their  way  home  (Amm.  Marc.  20.11.11).  It  was  retrieved  by  Constantius  II, 
a  hundred  years  later,  and  transported  in  pieces  for  use  during  the  siege  of  Bezabde,  but 
Ammianus  records  no  measurements. 
Ile  Persian  counter-measures  at  Bezabde  illustrate  the  customary  defence  against  ram- 
ming:  they  "skilffly  ensnared  the  projecting  iron  head  [i.  e.,  of  the  giant  Roman  batter- 
ing-ram] 
...  with  very  long  cords  on  both  sides,  so  that  it  could  not  gain  momentum  by 
drawing  back  to  strike  the  walls  with  frequent  blows,  and  also  poured  down  boiling  hot 
pitclf'  (Amm.  Marc.  20.11.15).  This  technique,  of  immobilising  the  ram-beam  by 
lassoing  it  with  several  ropes,  was  already  practiced  by  the  Greeks  (e.  g.,  during  the 
Spartan  siege  of  Plataea,  Thuc.  2.76.4;  cf.  Aeneas  Tacticus  32.4;  Philon,  Pol.  1.51  =  Th. 
83),  and  Livy  expresses  surprise  that  the  defenders  of  Heraclea  did  not  attempt  the  same 
tactic  (36.23.2).  At  Bezabde,  in  the  ensuing  m8l6e,  the  Persians  succeeded  in  burning 
the  Roman  machinery,  despite  its  fire-proofing  (cf  Amm.  Marc.  20.11.13);  only  the 
201 great  ram  was  salvaged,  when  the  Romans  managed  to  cut  the  cords  that  were  entan- 
gling  it,  and  drag  it  away  from  the  flames. 
4.  SieRe  towers 
After  an  isolated  mention  at  Lilybaeum,  mobile  towers  do  not  figure  in  Roman  siege- 
craft  for  another  fifty  years,  and,  as  with  the  alleged  stone-projector  (above,  p.  163),  one 
wonders  whether  the  equipment  used  by  the  Romans  on  Sicily  might  have  been  sup- 
plied  by  their  ally,  Hicro.  In  support  of  this,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  equipment  is  said 
to  have  been  old  and  inflammable,  hence  it  was  not  built  from  freshly-felled,  green  tim- 
ber  (above,  p.  200).  Towers  next  appear  at  Atrax,  Leucas,  and  Heraclea,  perhaps  under 
Macedonian  influence,  though  the  Romans  had  ample  opportunity  to  learn  from  the 
Carthaginians,  also.  Thereafter,  they  occur  frequently  in  Roman  operations  (cf  Table 
20,  pp.  205f). 
Zosimus  describes  the  contraption  (mikhanima),  which  Julian  built  in  A.  D.  363  at 
Pirisabora,  as  foUows: 
"Having  bound  four  very  large  timbers  to  one  another  with  iron,  and  having  pro- 
duced  from  these  the  shape  of  a  rectangular  tower,  and  having  set  it  over  against 
the  wall  of  the  citadel,  and,  by  the  gradual  addition  of  height,  finishing  up  at  the 
level  of  the  wall,  he  deployed  archers  on  it,  and  men  firing  stones  and  missiles 
from  machines.  "  (Zos.,  Hist.  nova  3.18.3) 
Telling  the  same  story,  Ammianus  Marcellinus  calls  the  machine  a  helepolis,  "by  the 
use  of  which  Demetrius  the  king,  in  vanquishing  many  cities,  became  known  as  Tolior- 
cetes"'  (24.2.18).  Marsden  understood  the  term  simply  to  be  "the  technical  designation 
for  large  mobile  siege-towers  designed  to  carry  other  smaller  enginee',,  but  excluding 
rams,  on  the  grounds  that  "these  were  usually  fitted  in  special  towers  -  chel5nai  krio- 
phoror'  (1971,85).  In  what  is  surely  an  instance  of  Homer  nodding,  he  seeks  to  prove 
that  the  enormous  Hellenistic  siege-towers  continued  in  use,  by  citing  Onasander's  list 
of  siege-machines  (Strat.  42.3:  "battering-rams,  helepoleis,  sambucae,,  wheeled  towers, 
ditch-filling  sheds,  catapults!  ),  Ammianus's  problematic  description  of  a  testudo 
202 "which  the  Greeks  caU  helepol&'  (23.4.10-13),  and  Josephus's  idiosyncratic  use  of  the 
term  (e.  g.,  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  2.553;  3.121;  cf.  above,  p.  199,  for  the  meaning  "ram-shed). 
Athenaeus  and  Vitruvius  mention  two  siege-towers  built  by  Diades  (cf.  above,  p.  198), 
one  60  cubits  (27.75  m)  high,  the  other  120  cubits  (55.5  m)  high,  designed  to  be  trans- 
ported  in  sections  (Athen.  W  11-12;  Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.13.4-5).  This  was  a  useful  fea- 
ture  for  armies  operating  in  unwooded  terrain.  Disassembled  equipment  was  probably 
always  carried,  for  example,  during  the  many  Parthian  and  Persian  expeditions;  cer- 
tainly,  according  to  Zosimus  (3.13.3),  Julian's  Euphrates  fleet  in  A.  D.  363  transported 
"wood  for  machines  (mkhanai)  ...  and  already-constructed  siege-machinery  (po- 
liorkRlka  mUchanimata)"  (cf.  Amm.  Marc.  23.3.9). 
Like  Diades's  towers,  the  purgos  described  by  Apollodorus  for  Trajan  is  principally  a 
protected  staircase  to  raise  troops  to  battlement  level,  where  they  can  cross  using  an  as- 
sault-bridge.  Apollodorus  describes  a  structure,  16  feet  (4.9  m.  )  square,  rising  to  40  feet 
(12  m)  in  the  first  instance,  but  able  to  be  gradually  heightened  by  using  combinations 
of  short  timbers  (Apoll.  W  164-167).  As  with  the  sheds  (above,  p.  201),  the  tower  is 
coated  with  clay,  then  draped  with  raw  hides  (W  173).  Furthermore,  Apollodorus  speci- 
fies  an  ingenious  system  of  ox  intestines  attached  to  water-skins,  in  order  to  spray  water 
wherever  the  machine  catches  fire  (W  174). 
Vegetius  (Epit.  rei  mil.  4.17)  describes  a  less  innovative,  more  workmanlike  structure, 
probably  reflecting  Flavian  practice  (above,  p.  157).  It  can  immediately  be  seen  that  his 
turris  ambulatoria  is  a  more  robust  machine,  designed  to  carry  a  battering-ram  at 
ground-level,  an  assault-bridge  at  battlement-level,  and  a  crowning  platform  for  archers 
to  provide  covering  fire.  He  envisages  different  base-dimensions,  30  feet  (9  m),  40  feet 
(12  rn),  and  50  feet  (15  m)  square,  depending  upon  the  required  height,  and  specifies  a 
covering  of  raw  hides  and  layers  of  padding.  He  appends  an  extraordinary  variation, 
whereby  a  supplementary  turricula  is  concealed  inside  the  tower,  and  suddenly  hoisted 
into  position,  if  the  defenders  try  to  heighten  their  walls  (Epit.  rel  mil.  4.19). 
203 A  Rornan  siege-tower  can  be  discerned  on  Panel  4  of  the  Arch  of  Septirnius  Severus  in 
Rome  (fig.  46a),  which  is  thought  to  depict  events  from  the  Second  Parthian  War  (Bril- 
fiant  1967,181-182).  The  machine  in  the  bottom-left  quadrant  clearly  incorporates  a 
battering-ram  (cf.  fig.  46b).  The  tower  built  by  Caesar  at  the  town  of  the  Atuatuci  per- 
haps  incorporated  a  battering-ram;  Silva's  tower  at  Masada  certainly  seems  to  have 
done. 
Unfortunately,  the  historians  record  little  which  relates  to  the  operation  of  these  ma- 
chines.  At  Uxellodunurn  and  Alexandria,  there  were  ten-storey  towers;  at  Jotapata  and 
Jerusalem,  there  were  three  50-foot  (15.4  m)  towers;  and  at  Masada,  the  tower  was  60 
cubits  high  (28  m).  One  of  Caesar's  towers  at  Ategua  was  burnt  up  to  the  third  storey, 
and  perhaps  had  not  been  properly  fire-proofed;  the  towers  at  Jotapata,  Jerusalem  and 
Masada  were  all  clad  in  iron,  which  must  have  added  considerably  to  their  weight,  but 
guaranteed  their  invulnerability.  In  fact,  one  of  the  towers  at  Jerusalem  collapsed  dur- 
ing  the  night,  and,  if  this  was  not  due  to  enemy  sabotage,  then  the  fi-amework  had  per- 
haps  been  badly  assembled. 
Nowhere  is  it  stated  how  these  machines  were  propelled  into  action.  It  is  unlikely  that 
they  were  dragged,  either  by  men  or  by  beasts,  as  this  would  have  exposed  the  dragging 
teams  to  enemy  fire  (cf.  Procop.,  Bell.  Goth.  5.21.4,22.7-9).  Equalty,  unlike  the  mon- 
strous  Hellenistic  machines  (e.  g.,  Diod.  Sic.  20.91.7-8,  on  the  helepolis  of  Epimachos), 
there  would  have  been  insufficient  room  within  the  ground-frame  to  accommodate  the 
numbers  of  men  required  to  push  the  machine  (cf.  Lendle  1983,51).  Perhaps  most 
likely  is  the  system  whereby  pulleys  were  anchored  in  a  forward  position,  under  cover 
of  one  type  of  shelter  or  another,  and  cables  were  run  from  the  siege-tower  through  the 
Pulleys  and  back  to  the  rear,  where  hauling  teams  could  pull  the  tower  up  to  the  forward 
position  (cf  Lendle  1983,51  n.  60).  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  an  alternative  method  of 
hauling  an  armoured  tower  up  the  19"  slope  at  Masada  (above,  p.  154).  In  general,  em- 
bankments  will  have  been  as  level  as  possible  for  this  reason  (cf.  above,  p.  144). 
204 Cat.  No.  Comment 
Panormus  42  Wering4am 
Ulybaeum  44  g  alleries  /  towers  I  battering-rams 
Ausetani  1  47  ý screens  I  shelters 
Casilinurn  48  shelters  I  miscellaneous 
Syracuse  50  screens  I  miscellaneous  (+  shipboard  towers  &  sambuca) 
Tarerdurn  52  shipboard  artiDery  (+  miscellaneous  machines) 
Anticyra  54  shipboard  artillery  (+  miscellaneous  machines) 
LOCH  56  artillery  /  miscellaneous 
Oreus  58  artillery  I  miscellaneous 
Utica  64  miscellaneous  I  battering-rams  /  artillery  (+  shipboard  tower) 
Oreus  68  sheds  I  shefters  i  battering-ram  I  artillery 
Eretria  70  shipboard  artillery  (+  miscellaneous  machines) 
Atrax  71  battering-rams  i  tower 
Corinth  73  bWerhxj-mm 
Elatea  74  batterirKj-w 
Leucas  75  shelters  i  towers  I  battering-ram  /  artillery 
Gytheum  76  sheds  /  battering-rams 
Heraclea  78  shelters  I  towers  /  battering-ram 
Amphissa  81  battering4arris 
Phocaea  82  batterirKj-ws 
Ambracia  83  shelters  I  battering-rams  /  miscellaneous 
Nesactlum  87  shelters 
Haliartus  88  battering4am 
Heracleurn  89  miscellaneous  machines 
Delminium  91  artillery 
Nertobriga  92  miscellaneous  machines 
Intercatia  94  battering-rams 
Carthage  95  battering-rams  /machinery  (=sheds?  ) 
Hippagreta  96  miscellaneous  machines 
Pallantia  101  miscellaneous  machines 
Numantia  102  artillery 
Suthul  103  shelters 
Thala  106  shelters  I  tower  i  battering-rams 
Muluccha  Rher  108  shelters  /  artilkwy 
Piraeus  III  sheds  I  battering-rams/  artillery 
Themyscira  116  towers 
Heraclea  Pontica  11  7  shed  I  battering-ram 
Tigranocerta  12  0  miscellaneous  machines 
Jerusalem  12  2  towers  /  artillery  I  machines  (a  battering-rams) 
ýoviodunum  124  shelters  /  towers 
Atuatuci  126  shelters  i  tower/  battering-ram 
Sotiates  128  shelters  I  towers 
Avadcum  132  shelters  /  towers  I  artillery 
Uxellodunum  135  shelters  I  tower  i  artillery 
Pindenissus;  136  shelters  /  tower  /  artillery 
Massilia  139  screens  /  shelters  /  galleries  I  towers  /  artillery  shed 
Gomphi  144  galleries 
Alexandria  145  shelters  I  sheds  /  galleries  /  battering-rams  /  artillery 
,  Ategua  149  shelters  /  towers  I  artillery 
contfnued  on  page  206 
Table  20:  Roman  machinery  explicitly  mentioned  at  sleges 
205 Cat.  No.  Comment 
Xanthus  154  towers  machinery 
Jerusalem  159  towers  machinery  (=  battering-rams) 
Praaspa  160  miscellaneous  (battering-ram  is  destroyed) 
Metulum  161  tower(s?  ) 
Uspe  172  towers 
Volandurn  173  artillery 
Jerusalem  176  battering-rams  (unused)  I  artillery  (unused?  ) 
Jotapata  180  screens  /  towers  /  battering-ram  /  artillery 
Gamala  183  battering-rams  I  artillery 
Placentia  186  screens  I  shelters 
Jerusalem  189  screens  /  battering-rams  I  towers  /  artillery 
Masada  191  tower  /  battering-ram 
Sarmizegethusa  193  shipýs  prow  sheds  (cf.  pp.  194f.  ) 
Hatra  201/202  miscellaneous  machinery 
Aquileia  203  miscellaneous  machinery 
Mediolanum  207  miscellaneous  machinery 
Byzantium  214  towers  I  battering-rams 
Bezabde  217  shelters  /  battering-rams  /  artillery 
Aquileia  218  screens  (+  shipboard  towers  &  battering-rams) 
Anatha  219  miscellaneous  machinery 
Pirisabora  222  shelters  /  battering-ram  /  artillery  I  tower  (unfinished) 
Maiozamalcha  223  shelters  /  battering-ram  /  artillery 
Fort  near  Seleucia  224  shelters  /  miscellaneous 
Table  20  (confd 
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Conclusions 
W  hen  the  writer,  Varro,  recommended  (tongue-in-cheek)  that  "Romanus  sedendo 
vincit"  (Res  rust.  1.2.2),  he  was  alluding  to  the  strategy  of  sedendo  et  cunc- 
tando,  adopted  by  Q.  Fabius  Maximus  in  his  campaign  against  Hannibal  in  216  B.  C. 
(Livy  22.24.10,39.15).  Unfortunately,  Schulten  decided  to  apply  the  maxim  to  the 
Roman  strategy  at  Numantia,  whence  it  has  given  rise  to  an  entirely  imaginary  policy  of 
"patient  obstinacy  and  thoroughness"  in  siegecraft  (e.  g.,  Webster  1985,239;  cf.  above, 
p.  32). 
This  is  only  one  of  several  myths  that  surround  Roman  siegecraft.  One  particularly  per- 
sistent  notion  involves  the  battering-ram  as  symbolic  initiator  of  the  siege.  To  cite  only 
the  most  recent  manifestations  of  this  theory,  Gilliver  has  stated  that  the  battering-rain 
"signalled  the  moment  that  the  siege  began  in  earnest,  and  there  was  no  turning  back" 
(1999,140);  Goldsworthy  embellishes  even  further,  asserting  that  "Roman  law  denied 
any  rights  to  defenders  who  failed  to  surrender  before  the  first  rain  touched  their  wall" 
(2000,145).  Two  pieces  of  evidence  are  usually  cited:  Caesar's  ultimatum  to  the  Atua- 
tucL  that  he  would  accept  their  surrender  if  they  saved  him  the  trouble  of  bringing  up 
his  battering-rarn  (Bell.  Gall.  2.32);  and  Cicero's  general  plea,  that  mercy  should  be 
shown,  not  only  to  those  who  have  been  conquered,  but  also  to  those  who  have  surren- 
dered  to  avoid  conquest,  "however  much  the  ram  struck  their  wall"  (De  off.  1.35).  The 
idea  that  this  was  not  only  standard  practice,  but  was  actually  regulated  by  law,  is  en- 
tirely  unwarranted.  In  fact,  it  is  clear  that  the  fate  of  a  besieged  town  was  entirely  in  the 
207 hands  of  the  Roman  commander,  and  even  his  authority  could  be  flouted  on  occasion 
(cf.  Locha,  204  B.  C.;  Phocaea,  190  B.  C.  ). 
There  is  another  common  belief,  that  "the  Romans  did  relatively  little  to  develop  the 
technical  side  of  siegecraft"  (Goldsworthy  2000,144).  This  opinion  pays  no  heed  to  the 
radical  advances  in  artillery  construction,  evident  from  Trajan's  Column  and  the 
archaeologically-attested  Hatra  ballista,  nor  does  it  take  account  of  Apollodorus's  inno- 
vative  machines,  such  as  the  "ship's  prow  shed".  Of  course,  developments  in  siege- 
machinery  were  subject  to  practical  constraints  that  would  only  be  removed  with  the 
invention  of  gunpowder  and  the  onset  of  industrialisation. 
However,  perhaps  the  most  prevalent  myth  is  the  idea  that  siegecraft  "declined"  under 
the  Romans.  It  was  no  coincidence  that  the  period  identified  by  Sander  as  the  high- 
water  mark  of  Roman  siegecraft  (1934,457)  was  the  period  for  which  we  have  most 
evidence,  encompassing  the  corpus  Caesarianum  and  Josephus's  Bellum  Judaicum. 
Sander's  argument  for  a  subsequent  decline  rests  upon  three  planks. 
First,  the  technical  texts.  The  fact  that  Apollodorus's  emperor  (in  Sander's  opinion, 
Hadrian)  requested  designs  for  siege-machinery  proved  that  there  were  no  competent 
engineers  in  Hadrian's  army-,  Apollodorus  was  even  obliged  to  send  drawings  and  a 
trained  apprentice  to  interpret  his  instructions  (Sander  1934,458).  However,  as  Larn- 
mert  noted,  we  know  nothing  of  the  circumstances  which  prompted  Trajan's  request 
(1938,393),  so  the  inference  that  it  sprang  from  desperation  is  unfounded.  Worse  still, 
Sander  misinterpreted  Apollodorus's  siege-tower  as  a  fixed,  wheel-less  structure,  con- 
demning  the  engineer  as  an  incompetent  and  lamenting  the  reduced  functionality  of  an 
important  element  in  the  siege-train  (1934,459460).  He  concluded  that,  if  Athenaeus 
(whom  he  took  to  be  Hadrianic,  too)  had  to  explain  the  construction  of  basic  machinery, 
then  contemporaries  must  have  been  ignorant  of  these  devices  (ibid.,  461).  This  spuri- 
ous  argument  would  have  far-ranging  consequences  for  all  didactic  texts,  if  it  were  true. 
Second,  the  historians.  The  fact  that  Dio  mentions  only  one  engineer  in  Severus's  army 
at  Hatra,  and  the  fact  that  the  Roman  machinery  is  vulnerable  to  fire,  demonstrated  the 
208 degenerate  state  of  Roman  siegecraft  (Sander  1934,465  and  468).  Of  course,  timber 
machinery  was  always  vulnerable  to  fire  (cf.  above,  pp.  141,200f).  Sander  cited  Am- 
mianus  as  proof  that  the  art  of  building  siege-machinery  had  finally  been  lost,  and  criti- 
cised  the  historian  for  lacking  knowledge  of  the  battering-rarn  (ibid.,  464):  he  misinter- 
preted  Ammianus's  ram  as  having  been  carried  by  soldiers,  not  suspended  from  the  roof 
of  a  shed.  However,  as  Lammert  noted  (1938,390),  Ammianus's  description  is  quite 
similar  to  Josephus's  description,  which  derived  from  Sander's  golden  age  of  siegecraft. 
Third,  the  sculptures.  Although  believing  that  the  sculptors  subordinated  historical  real- 
ity  to  artistic  invention,  Sander  singled  out  the  ram-beam  carried  by  soldiers  on  Trajan's 
Column,  and  the  apparently  static  siege-tower  on  the  Arch  of  Septminus  Severus  (1934, 
474).  However,  he  failed  to  note  that  the  Trajanic  battering-ram  is  depicted  as  a  Dacian, 
not  a  Roman,  weapon  (scene  XXXII  =  fig.  39),  and  the  base  of  the  Severan  tower  is  not 
visible  (fig.  46a  and  46b). 
Thus,  Sander's  thesis  can  be  seen  to  be  unfounded.  He  did  not  include  an  archaeologi- 
cal  argument,  but  modem  commentators  often  go  to  the  other  extreme,  placing  undue 
emphasis  on  the  material  remains.  This  can  lead  to  a  skewed  picture  of  siegecraft,  as  it 
highlights,  above  all,  the  circurnvallatory  operations,  and  encourages  a  belief  that  sites 
like  Alesia  or  Masada  are  somehow  representative  of  Roman  siegecraft.  This  flaw  fies 
at  the  heart  of  Davies's  archaeologically  based  study  (Davies  2001).  In  fact,  the  notion 
of  encirclement  with  siege-works  is  so  central  to  his  thesis,  that  any  deviations  from  this 
norm  are  consequently  classified  as  aberrant,  and  all  the  evidence  is  shoe-homed  into  an 
evolutionary  progression,  whereby  a  "blockade  camp"  strategy  was  gradually  refined 
into  a  "contralcircurnvallation!  '  strategy. 
It  is  worth  quoting  his  definition  of  the  "blockade  cwnp"  in  full,  as  it  is  crucial  to  his 
argument:  "a  fortified  position  (or  set  of  positions)  established  by  the  besieger,  with  or 
without  connecting  branches  or  spurs  (bracchia),  with  the  aim  of  preventing  the  re- 
supply  or  reinforcement  of  a  defended  ccntre  or  deterring  any  sortie  or  foraging  effort 
mounted  by  the  same,  and  which  could  also  serve  as  a  garrison  base  for  the  besieging 
force"  (2001,159).  The  specific  examples  which  he  cites  are  unconvincing:  Marcel- 
209 lus's  hiberna  at  Syracuse,  Scipio's  camp  at  Cartagena,  Caesar's  camps  at  Avaricurn  and 
Gergovia,  Vespasian's  camp  at  Garnala;  none  of  these  is  indicative  of  a  blockade. 
Most  scholars  would  agree  that  the  sieges  of  Agrigenturn  and  Lilybaeurn  provide  the 
earliest  definite  examples  of  Roman  circurnvallation  (cf  Table  17,  p.  96),  but  Davies 
categorises  them  as  "extended  blockade  camp  systems  [which]  were  subsequently  con- 
verted  into  full  circurnvallatory  wor&'  (2001,162).  He  claims  that  "the  first  real  en- 
dorsement  of  the  value  of  a  well-organised  (and  well-garrisoned)  circurnvallatory 
scheme"  only  appeared  fifty  years  later  at  Capua,  but  "following  the  Capuan  success, 
there  was  a  marked  increase  in  the  use  of  circumvallatioif  '  (2001,185). 
We  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  statistics  behind  these  sweeping  assertions:  two,  perhaps 
three,  circurnvallations  during  the  First  Punic  War  (cf  Table  2,  p.  21),  and  another  two 
during  the  Second  Punic  War  (cf  Table  3,  p.  27).  In  short,  in  the  space  of  sixty  years, 
Roman  an-nies  had  utilised  the  tactic  four  (perhaps  five)  times,  as  far  as  we  know, 
whereas  more  than  a  dozen  towns  were  taken  by  storm.  Far  from  a  "marked  increase" 
during  the  fifty  years  after  Capua,  circumvallation  seems  to  have  been  employed  only  at 
Orongis  and  Arnbracia,  and  probably  also  at  Oreus  (cf  p.  98).  Furthermore,  the  follow- 
ing  fifty  years,  which  separate  Ambracia.  from  Numantia,  witnessed  a  strategy  of  in- 
vestment  only  at  Carthage,  which  may  well  have  influenced  Scipio's  actions  at  Numan- 
tia.  (cf  above,  p.  3  8). 
Unfortunately,  Davies  is  unwilling  to  classify  Scipio's  siege-works  at  Carthage  as  a  cir- 
cumvallation:  "what  might  otherwise  have  been  thought  of  as  a  line  of  investment  was 
given  the  character  of  a  blockade  camp"  (2001,173;  cf  9  If  ).  However,  this  is  sophis- 
try.  Appian  characterises  the  work  as  an  epiteichisma,  a  word  which  simply  denotes  a 
post  established  in  enemy  territory,  with  no  possible  connotations  of  blockade;  but  the 
purpose  of  the  siege-works  was  to  close  off  the  isthmus,  and  as  such  fulfilled  the  role  of 
a  circumvallation  (cf  above,  p.  100).  On  the  other  hand,  Davies  does  include  several 
questionable  examples,  such  as  Intercatia,  which  seems  more  probably  to  have  involved 
a  cordon  of  troops  (cf  above,  p.  35),  and  Clunia,  where  Metellus  "sat  down7'  to  besiege 
Sertorius  (cf  above,  p.  44);  and  I  would  dispute  whether  a  HUI  near  Gades,  where  Lu- 
210 cuHus  rounded  up  some  raiding  Lusitanians  by  surrounding  them  with  a  ditch  (App., 
Hisp.  59),  really  qualifies  as  a  circtunvallatory  siege. 
Having  been  deployed  half-a-dozen  times  in  the  hundred  or  so  years  from  Capua  to 
Numantia,  circurnvallation  disappears  again  for  twenty-five  years.  This  is  despite  the 
fact  that  it  was  supposedly  the  "victory  at  Numantia  that  provided  circurnvallation  with 
its  most  ringing  endorsement"  (Davies  2001,94).  But  Davies  takes  Metellus's  ditch 
around  Thala  as  proof  that  "circurnvallation  now  began  to  be  seen  as  a  useful  precursor 
to  more  direct  approaches,  whereby  the  advantages  of  isolating  the  target  and,  simulta- 
neously,  of  providing  a  secure  baseline  from  which  further  offensive  measures  might  be 
initiated,  were  increasingly  appreciated"  (2001,186).  Apparently  not:  the  next  recorded 
instance  is  a  generation  later,  when  Sulla  used  the  tactic  (passively)  at  Athens  and  Prae- 
neste,  which  hardly  indicates  an  accelerating  trend.  Nevertheless,  the  circumvallation  is 
so  central  to  Davies's  thinking  that  he  criticises  Sulla  for  not  investing  Piraeus,  too 
(2001,93).  (Incidentally,  he  also  classifies  Fimbria's  incomplete  ditch  at  Pitane  as  a 
circuravallation,  playing  down  its  utter  failure;  cf.  above,  p.  43.  ) 
Davies  characterises  the  period  from  49  B.  C.  to  A.  D.  14  as  an  age  of  circumvallation 
C'fines  of  investment  (whether  single  or  double)  came  to  dominate  the  siege  landscape, 
as  Table  4  amply  demonstrates7';  2001,103).  An  explosion  of  interest  during  the  Cae- 
sarian  period  cannot  be  denied,  but  if,  "by  the  end  of  this  period,  the  use  of  cirumvalla- 
tion  had  come  to  be  thought  of  as  a  standard  procedure  of  siegecrafV'  (2001,98),  it  is 
only  by  Davies.  His  "standard  Caesarian  siege  approach,  whereby  assault  preparations 
were  put  in  hand  immediately  after  the  circumvallation  had  been  completed"  (2001, 
186),  is  not  even  true  of  those  sieges  which  actually  involved  a  circumvallation,  far  less 
Caesarian  sieges  in  general.  In  this  regard,  my  Diagram  I  (P.  53)  demonstrates  two  key 
points.  First,  more  than  half  of  the  sample  of  Caesarian  sieges  did  not  involve  a  cir- 
cumvallation  at  all  (54%),  so  Davies's  "standard  Caesarian  siege  approach"  is  mistaken. 
And  second,  out  of  twelve  circumvallations,  seven  were  pursued  as  blockades  (58%),  so 
Davies's  theory,  that  an  assault  habitually  accompanied  a  circumvallation,  is  also  mis- 
taken;  only  Caesar's  siege  of  the  town  of  the  Atuatuci  (representing  4%  of  the  sample) 
conforms  to  this  model. 
211 Following  the  Caesarian  flurry  of  activity,  Davies  alleges  "an  apparent  reluctance  to  en- 
gage  in  any  formal  circurnvallatiore'  thereafter;  similarly,  the  hiatus  following  the  Jew- 
ish  War  demonstrates  "the  apparent  rejection  of  circumvallation  by  later  commanders". 
Anxious  to  explain  this  decline,  he  proposes  an  "erosion  of  the  hard-won  experiences  of 
the  past"  (2001,188).  This  is  something  of  a  circular  argument.  Earlier,  he  laments  the 
shortage  of  "troops  intimately  familiar  with  the  necessary  construction  skills",  a  state  of 
affairs  which  he  blames  for  "the  rarity  of  circumvallation7'  (2001,120).  This  tactic  of 
choice  peters  out  with  fmal  examples  at  Cremna  and  Gesoriacurn  (the  latter,  inciden- 
tally,  entirely  unwarranted  by  the  evidence).  Its  disappearance  is  "symptomatic  of  a 
general  decline  in  Roman  siegecraft"  (2001,302),  and  brings  a  return  to  the  "blockade 
camp"  strategy. 
This  developmental  sequence  is  entirely  imaginary,  preserving  Sander's  notion  of  a 
"H6hepunkt"  under  a  different  guise.  If  the  unbiased  study  of  Roman  siegecraft  dem- 
onstrates  anything,  it  is  that,  once  Roman  armies  achieved  some  competence  during  the 
First  Punic  War,  their  performance  was  remarkably  even  thereafter  (as  demonstrated  in 
the  various  tables).  The  idiosyncracies  of  Caesarian  warfare  inevitably  create  a  blip,  but 
this  in  no  way  indicates  some  inherent  superiority. 
Ironically,  Davies  warns  that  "the  excavated  work  at  Alesia  and  Numantia  must  not 
blind  us  to  the  fact  that  these  were  systems  built  to  meet  the  challenge  of  exceptional 
circumstances  [whereas]  the  usual  siege  scenario  did  not  require  such  elaborate  provi- 
sion7.  This  statement  would  be  quite  correct  if,  by  "the  usual  siege  scenario",  Davies 
meant  the  dozens  of  sieges  which  employed  no  siege-works  at  all,  but  unfortunately  he 
is  drawing  a  distinction  with  "these  instances  [where]  the  works  of  containment  were 
built  to  a  far  more  modest  standard"  (2001,197). 
The  approaches  adopted  by  Sander  and  Davies  both  suffer  from  a  lack  of  perspective. 
Davies's  decision  to  concentrate  on  "one  particular  genre  of  technical  assistance,  that  of 
'siege  works...  (2001,13),  is  unfortunate,  given  that  the  ancients  themselves  made  no 
distinctions  between  the  task  of  erecting  an  embankment,  for  example,  and  that  of  con- 
structing  a  siege-tower;  both  were  opera,  "worl&'  (see  above,  pp.  97f  ),  carried  out  by 
212 the  same  men  under  the  direction  of  the  same  architecti,  "engineers".  Consequently, 
Davies  fails  to  grasp  the  subject  fully,  by  excluding  one  aspect  on  the  spurious  grounds 
that  "engines  and  machinery  were  assembled  rather  than  constructed"  (2001,14).  Some 
of  his  more  surprising  errors  involve  machinery,  such  as  the  peculiar  notion  of  "artil- 
lery-defivered  rubble"  (2001,87)  forming  the  harbour  mole  at  Lilybaeun-4  or  the  mis- 
guided  theory  that  the  siege-towers  at  the  same  site  were  "earthfast  rather  than  mobile 
structures"  (2001,172).  Both  of  these  derive  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Loeb 
translation  of  Polybius,  as  there  is  no  ambiguity  in  the  original  Greek. 
In  the  present  work,  I  have  attempted  to  avoid  such  imbalance  by  presenting  a  system- 
atic  and  integrated  study  of  Roman  siegecraft.  On  the  one  hand,  archaeology  provides  a 
valuable  corrective  to  the  literary  accounts,  demonstrating  subtle  variations,  not  only 
between  one  site  and  another,  but  also  within  a  given  site.  On  the  other  hand,  a  study  of 
the  literary  accounts  provides  a  context  for  the  archaeological  evidence,  and  places  it  in 
perspective.  A  proper  appraisal  of  all  the  evidence  reveals  a  number  of  common  mis- 
conceptions.  Circurnvallation  was  not  the  dominant  besieging  method;  blockade  played 
a  minor  role;  embankments  were  intended  to  convey  men  to  their  objective,  just  as  often 
as  machinery;  and,  although  generally  conceived  as  ramps,  they  varied  widely  in  size 
and  scale.  Artillery  did  not  play  a  critical  role  in  Roman  siege  operations;  the  material 
remains  of  turrets  demonstrate  that  the  siting  of  artillery  there  is  questionable;  stone- 
projectors  were  not  used  to  demolish  fortifications;  and  the  battering-ram  remained  the 
most  commonly  used  piece  of  machinery.  Finally,  if  we  seek  a  comprehensive  theory 
of  Roman  siegecraft,  Onasander  sums  it  up  best  when  he  states  that  "a  siege  requires  the 
courage  of  the  soldiers,  the  inventiveness  of  the  general,  and  the  preparation  of  machin- 
ery"  (Strat.  40.1). 
213 Epilogue: 
Mismeasurement  in  Davies's  Siege  Works 
C  oming  to  the  aid  of  Q.  Cicero  in  54  B.  C.,  Caesar  disguised  his  troops  in  a  particu- 
larly  small  camp,  in  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  (Bell.  Gall.  5.49).  Frontinus  re- 
cords  how,  in  207  B.  C.,  Claudius  Nero  utilised  precisely  the  opposite  stratagem,  leaving 
a  small  garrison  in  charge  of  a  large  camp,  to  conceal  from  Hannibal  the  fact  that  the 
bulk  of  his  army  had  moved  on  (Strat.  1.9).  Appearances  can  be  deceptive. 
So  it  is  with  the  graphs  accompanying  Davies's  "diachronic  overview  of  the  use  and 
development  of  Roman  siege  works",  which  purport  to  encapsulate  the  historical  data.  I 
have  already  alluded  to  his  n-dsrepresentation  of  the  data  to  support  a  case  for 
circuravallation  as  the  standard  Roman  besieging  technique  (above,  pp.  209ff.  ). 
However,  I  believe  a  more  fundamental  problem  must  be  highlighted. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Davies  has  assembled  an  appendix,  apparently  consisting  of  three- 
hundred  historically-attested  sieges  (they  are  listed,  unnumbered,  on  pages  BI-BI28), 
only  a  fraction  of  that  total  contributes  to  his  tables.  This  is  not  immediately  apparent, 
but  the  disparity  can  be  seen,  for  example,  in  his  Table  2  (395-200  B.  C.  ):  the  graphed 
figures  add  up  to  39,  whereas  Davies  claims  to  have  noted  69  sieges  for  the  relevant  pe- 
riod;  what  has  happened  to  the  other  thirty  sieges?  His  graph  (reproduced  as  Diagram  2 
below,  p.  217)  demonstrates  a  predilection  for  blockade  and  circurnvallation  (62%), 
thus  supporting  his  general  thesis.  However,  my  own  figures  (Diagram  3,  p.  217)  show 
that,  in  this  period,  the  vast  majority  of  sieges  (77%)  did  not  occasion  construction  work 
of  any  kind.  By  excluding  these  from  discussion,  the  percentages  for  the  remaining 
214 categories  (circumvaHation,  siege-ramps,  and  so  on)  become  artificiaUy  inflated. 
However,  this  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  problem.  Davies's  Table  5  indicates  a  further 
anomaly:  the  graphed  figures  add  up  to  23,  but  Davies  claims  to  have  noted  only  18 
sieges  for  the  relevant  period  (A.  D.  15-211).  In  fact,  he  has  (perhaps  unwittingly)  given 
certain  sieges  a  statistical  "weighting",  by  graphing  not  the  individual  operation  itself, 
but  each  type  of  constructional  element  that  he  has  identified  there. 
This  results  in  Sulla's  siege  of  Athens  appearing  twice  in  Table  3  (199-50  B.  C.  ),  once 
for  its  circuravallation,  and  again  as  an  example  of  "blockade  camps"  (a  mistaken  inter- 
pretation  of  Appian's  phrouria,  which  are  simply  guard-posts  on  the  circumvallation); 
the  siege  of  Piraeus  appears  four  times,  based  on  a  (non-existent)  circumvallation, 
(questionable)  "blockade  camps",  an  assault-ramp,  and  mines;  the  siege  of  Avaricum. 
appears  three  times,  based  on  the  ramp,  (questionable)  "blockade  camps",  and,  most 
bizarrely,  mines  (which  were  dug  by  the  defenders,  not  the  Romans);  and  the  siege  of 
Nisibis  appears  twice,  for  an  assault-rarnp  and  a  siege-mound  (a  duplication  which  Da- 
vies  justifies  by  reference  to  Dio's  plural  ch5mata). 
The  same  error  is  evident  in  the  other  tables.  Examples  of  triple  counting  include 
Ategua  (Table  4:  adding  Dio's  alleged  mine  to  Caesar's  circurnvallation  and  assault 
ramp),  Masada  (Table  5:  ramp,  circurnvallation,  and  "miscellaneous  engineering 
works"),  and  Maiozamalcha  (Table  6:  mound,  mine,  and  "blockade  camps").  Jotapata 
appears  four  times  in  Table  5  (an  assault  ramp,  a  siege  mound,  a  non-existent 
circurnvallation,  and  unspecified  "miscellaneous  engineering  works").  And  quintuple 
counting  occurs  twice,  for  Titus's  siege  of  Jerusalem  (Table  5:  ramps,  mounds, 
"blockade  camps",  circurnvallation,  and  unspecified  'ýmiscellaneous  engineering 
works")  and  the  siege  of  Lilybaeum  (Table  2:  ramps,  mines,  "blockade  camps", 
circurnvallation,  and  more  'ýmiscellaneous  engineering  works").  Unfortunately,  this 
makes  a  complete  nonsense  of  the  whole  exercise. 
Direct  comparison  of  Davies's  graphs  with  my  own  analytical  tables  is  inconvenient,  as 
his  chronological  divisions  cut  across  my  own;  in  addition,  his  classification  of  sieges 
215 according  to  their  "siege  works"  results  in  an  entirely  different  scheme  from  my  own 
strategy-based  analysis.  Nevertheless,  I  have  drawn  together  the  relevant  data  from  my 
own  tables,  and  present  it  in  parallel  to  Davies's  graphs  to  facilitate  comparison  (see 
Diagrams  2-11  below,  pp.  217-221).  (Note  that  I  omit  analysis  of  Davies's  period  I 
[620s  to  396  B.  C.  ],  on  the  grounds  that  the  reliability  of  these  early  siege  narratives  is 
suspect;  cf.  above,  pp.  I  Off.  )  The  results  provide  a  valuable  corrective  to  Davies's  mis- 
leading  thesis,  particularly  for  the  later  periods  (Davies's  Tables  5  and  6;  cf  Diagrams 
8-11  below,  pp.  220f  ),  by  placing  the  so-called  "siege  works"  into  their  proper  context. 
The  graphs  certainly  confirm  that  Davies's  period  4  (49  BC-AD  14)  represents  the 
high-water  mark  for  field-works,  but  Caesarian  sieges  exert  a  disproportionate  influence 
on  his  figures.  Even  so,  only  43%  of  the  relevant  siege-operations  involved  circunival- 
lations  (cf  Diagram  7,  p.  219);  and  it  is  salutary  to  note  that  44%  involved  no  earth- 
works  at  all. 
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233 Appendix  1: 
Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges 
1.  Ardea  (Italy),  510  B.  C. 
King  Tarquin  attacks  the  Rutulian  capital,  Ardea,  in  order  to  acquire  plunder.  The 
Romans  attempt  to  seize  Ardea  on  the  first  assault,  but  when  insufficient  progress  is 
made,  preparations  are  made  for  a  blockade  with  the  construction  of  fortifications.  The 
siege  is  later  abandoned. 
Sources:  Livy  1.57.3;  Zonaras  7.11 
2.  Pometia  (Italy),  502  B.  C. 
Opiter  Verginius  and  Spurius  Cassius  attempt  to  take  the  Auruncan  town  by  assault,  then 
by  the  use  of  siege  apparatus.  The  townsfolk  launch  sorties,  setting  fire  to  the  Roman 
shelters  and  causing  heavy  casualties  amongst  the  besieging  force.  The  Romans  are 
obliged  to  withdraw.  After  an  unspecified  interval,  the  Romans  return  with  more  troops, 
having  repaired  the  siege  equipment,  and  are  on  the  point  of  entering  the  town  when  the 
Pometians  offer  their  surrender.  They  are  treated  as  if  the  town  had  been  captured:  the 
leading  citizens  are  executed  and  the  others  sold  as  slaves,  the  town  is  gutted,  and  the 
land  is  sold. 
Sources:  Livy  2.17.1-3;  5-6 
3.  Cameria  (Italy),  502  B.  C. 
Opiter  Verginius  mounts  a  night  march  on  Carneria.  and,  arriving  unnoticed  at  dawn, 
immediately  brings  up  battering-rams  and  ladders.  Taking  advantage  of  the  confusion 
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within,  the  Romans  break  down  the  gates  and  scale  the  lowest  part  of  the  ramparts,  and 
capture  the  town.  The  soldiers  plunder  all  day  and  into  the  night,  the  townsfolk  are  sold 
as  slaves,  and  the  town  is  destroyed. 
Sources:  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  5.49.3-5 
4.  Corioli  (Italy),  493  B.  C. 
Postumus  Cominius  lays  siege  to  the  town  after  an  unsuccessful  storming  attack,  and 
prepares  battering-rams,  wicker  screens  and  ladders.  When  a  relieving  force  arrives  from 
Antium,  Cominius  defeats  it  with  half  of  his  army;  the  other  half  repulses  a  sortie, 
entering  the  town  hard  on  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Coriolans,  before  they  can  close  the 
gates.  In  the  ensuing  slaughter,  women  throw  stones  and  tiles  from  the  rooftops,  but  the 
Romans  set  fire  to  the  place,  and  the  townsfolk  are  enslaved. 
Sources:  Dionysius,  of  Halicarnassus  6.92.1-6;  Livy  2.33.6-9 
5.  Antium  (Italy),  459  B.  C. 
L.  Cornelius  encamps  near  the  town  and  devastates  the  countryside.  When  the  towns- 
folk  remain  behind  their  walls,  he  surrounds  the  place  with  a  ditch  and  palisade.  After  a 
sortie  from  the  town  is  repulsed,  Cornelius  breaks  down  the  gate  with  battering-rams  and 
mounts  an  escalade  of  the  walls.  The  town  is  plundered,  the  spoil  is  sold  by  the 
quaestor,  and  the  townsfolk  are  enslaved. 
Sources:  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  10.21.5-6 
6.  Fidenae  (Italy),  435  B.  C. 
A.  Servilius  surrounds  the  town  with  a  vallum  and,  because  it  is  apparently  impregnable 
to  escalade  and  too  well  stocked  to  be  starved  into  submission,  he  drives  a  tunnel  under  a 
poorly  guarded  section  of  the  town  wall  and  seizes  the  citadel  from  within. 
Sources:  Livy  4.22.2-6;  Florus  1.6.7 
7.  Labici  (Italy),  418  B.  C. 
Servilius  Priscus  surrounds  the  town,  which  is  entered  by  escalade  and  plundered. 
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Sources:  Livy  4.47.5;  Diod.  Sic.  13.7.8 
8.  Carventum  (Italy),  408  B.  C. 
When  the  fortified  town  is  captured  by  the  Aequians,  the  Romans  attempt  a  long  and 
fruitless  siege,  before  abandoning  their  claim.  The  disgruntled  troops  capture  the  nearby 
fortress  of  Verrugo  and  plunder  the  countryside. 
Sources:  Livy  4.55.8 
9.  Anxur  (Italy),  406  B.  C. 
Cn.  Fabius  Ambustus,  frontally  attacks  the  town,  while  a  small  force  is  detailed  to  make  a 
noisy  attack  on  an  undefended  sector,  in  order  to  draw  troops  away.  Fabius  is  then  able 
to  bring  up  scaling-ladders  and  enter  the  town.  The  ensuing  slaughter  of  the  inhabitants 
is  halted  by  Fabius,  and  2,500  prisoners  are  taken.  Plundering  is  postponed  until 
Fabius's  three  tribunal  colleagues  arrive  with  their  armies. 
Sources:  Livy4.59.4-10 
10.  Veii  (Italy),  405-396  B.  C. 
The  siege,  begun  in  405  B.  C.,  is  relaxed  in  the  following  year  to  allow  for  other 
campaigning.  In  the  third  season,  the  Romans  opt  for  a  blockade  rather  than  an  assault, 
and  take  the  precaution  of  building  earthworks  facing  both  the  town,  to  prevent  sorties, 
and  the  countryside,  to  block  any  external  assistance.  For  the  first  time,  a  Roman  army 
builds  winter-quarters.  Livy  refers  to  a  rampart  and  ditch,  towers,  shelters,  tortoises  and 
other  apparatus.  An  embankment  is  driven  forward  and  the  shelters  are  almost  at  the 
walls,  when  the  Veientes  make  a  sortie  and  set  fire  to  the  apparatus.  Reinforcements  are 
sent  to  repair  the  lost  works  and  build  new  ones. 
In  the  fourth  season,  a  relieving  force  from  Capenae  and  Falerii  attacks  one  of  the  two 
(previously  unmentioned)  Roman  camps,  sparking  a  simultaneous  break-out  from  Veii; 
Roman  strong-points  are  attacked  and  the  defences  overrun.  In  the  fifth  season,  the 
surrendered  camp  is  retaken  and  the  strong-points  strengthened.  There  are  no  details  of 
the  sixth  season. 
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The  seventh  season  sees  a  repeat  of  the  fourth,  but  this  time  the  smaller  camp  is  relieved 
by  a  force  from  the  larger  camp.  In  the  eighth  season,  the  Romans  concentrate  on 
devastating  the  countryside  around  Veii.  There  are  no  details  of  the  ninth  season. 
In  the  tenth  season,  M.  Furius,  Camillus  defeats  the  allies  of  Veii  in  battle,  builds  more 
strongpoints  around  the  town,  and  laboriously  digs  a  tunnel  up  to  the  citadel.  Picked 
troops  enter  the  city  through  the  tunnel  and  open  the  gates.  In  the  ensuing  slaughter, 
women  and  slaves  throw  stones  and  tiles  from  the  rooftops.  Camillus  orders  his  troops 
to  spare  the  unarmed  and  sack  the  town;  the  inhabitants  are  sold  into  slavery. 
Sources:  Livy  4.61.2,61.3;  5.1.9-2.1,7.2-3,8.7-12,12.4,13.9-13,14.6,19.9-11, 
21.10-17,22.1-8;  Plutarch,  Camillus  2.3-5,5.3-5;  Diod.  Sic.  14.16.5,43.5, 
93.2-3;  Zonaras  7.20-21 
11.  Artena  (Italy),  404  B.  C. 
In  the  course  of  a  blockade,  an  attempted  break-out  by  the  inhabitants  is  repulsed,  and 
the  Romans  enter  the  city  in  the  ensuing  confusion.  Many  VoIscians  are  killed  or 
captured,  but  some  find  safety  in  the  citadel,  which  is  too  strong  to  be  taken  by  assault, 
and  unlikely  to  offer  surrender  on  account  of  the  plentiful  provisions.  However,  a  slave 
betrays  the  citadel  to  the  Romans;  the  guards  are  slaughtered,  the  garrison  forced  to 
surrender,  and  the  town  and  citadel  destroyed. 
Sources:  Livy  4.61.6-9 
12.  Anxur  (Italy),  401-400  B.  C. 
An  assault  on  the  hill-town  of  Anxur  (retaken  by  the  VoIscians  in  402  B.  C.  )  is  deemed 
futile,  so  earthworks  are  constructed  for  a  blockade.  But  the  Romans  easily  re-take  the 
town  in  the  following  year  during  a  festival  when  the  guards  relax  their  vigilance. 
Sources:  Livy  5.12.6-13.1;  Diod.  Sic.  14.16.5 
13.  Falerii  (Italy),  394  B.  C. 
Camillus  blockades  the  town  with  fortifications  and  pickets,  but  the  besieged  are  well- 
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supplied.  When  a  schoolmaster  from  the  town  offers  his  pupils  to  Camillus  as  hostages, 
the  offer  is  refused  as  dishonourable.  The  siege  is  subsequently  lifted  and  the  town  laid 
under  tribute  to  Rome. 
Sources:  Livy  5.26.9-10,27.1-15;  Plutarch,  Camillus  9.2-10.7;  Dio  6.24.2-3 
14.  Sutrium  (Italy),  389  B.  C. 
The  townsfolk  of  Sutrium.  surrender  their  town  to  the  Etruscans,  but  Camillus  takes 
advantage  of  their  lax  discipline  to  recapture  it  on  the  same  day.  The  enemy  are  offered 
terms  if  they  will  throw  down  their  anus.  The  town  is  undamaged  because  it  was 
surrendered  under  terms. 
Sources:  Livy  6.3.1-10;  Plutarch,  Camillus  34.1-35.4;  Diod.  Sic.  14.117.4;  Zonaras 
7.23.9 
15.  Cortuosa  (Italy),  388  B.  C. 
The  Etruscan  town  is  taken  by  surprise  on  the  first  assault,  and  is  sacked  and  burned. 
Sources:  Livy  6.4.9-11 
16.  Contenebra  (Italy),  388  B.  C. 
After  a  few  days,  the  town  succumbs  to  the  six  relays  of  Roman  soldiers,  operating 
around  the  clock  on  six-hour  shifts.  While  the  tribunes  discuss  the  treatment  of  booty, 
the  soldiers  have  already  plundered  the  town,  so  they  are  permitted  to  keep  their  gains. 
Sources:  Livy  6.4.9-11 
17.  Satricum  (Italy),  386  B.  C. 
Camillus  surrounds  the  Volscian  town  of  Satricum  with  a  palisade  and  erects  an 
embankment  and  other  works  in  preparation  for  a  siege,  but  when  the  Volscians  fail  to 
resist  he  launches  an  escalade  and  the  VoIscians  surrender. 
Sources:  Livy  6.8.9-10 
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18.  Sutrium  (Italy),  386  B.  C. 
The  Etruscans  break  into  the  philo-Roman  town,  but  are  contained  within  one  half  by  the 
use  of  barricades.  Camillus  feints  at  the  section  of  walls  held  by  the  enemy,  to  draw 
them  away  from  skirmishing  with  the  townsfolk;  the  Romans  simultaneously  enter  the 
town  elsewhere.  The  Etruscans  panic  and  are  slaughtered  both  within  the  town  and  as 
they  flee  through  the  countryside. 
Because  the  object  of  the  siege  was  the  liberation  of  an  ally,  the  town  is  not  sacked. 
Sources:  Livy  6.9.7-11 
19.  Nepete  (Italy),  386  B.  C. 
The  Etruscans  are  admitted  by  the  treachery  of  some  townsfolk.  The  Romans  collect 
brushwood  and  bring  it  up  to  the  walls;  the  ditch  is  filled  in;  scaling-ladders  are  brought 
up;  and  the  town  is  taken  on  the  first  assault.  The  townsfolk  are  instructed  to  lay  down 
their  arms.  All  Etruscans,  and  the  Nepetene  traitors,  are  killed,  but,  because  the  object 
of  the  siege  was  the  liberation  of  an  ally,  the  town  is  not  sacked. 
Sources:  Livy  6.9.11,10.1-5 
20.  Antium  (Italy),  377  B.  C. 
The  Romans  cannot  contemplate  a  siege,  because  they  lack  the  apparatus,  so  they 
withdraw  after  devastating  the  countryside.  Livy  comments  earlier  (6.9.1-2)  that  such  a 
strong  city  could  only  be  captured  with  great  provision  of  artillery  and  machines. 
Sources:  Livy  6.32.10-11 
21.  Tusculum  (Italy),  377  B.  C. 
The  Latins  capture  Tusculum,  a  Roman  ally,  and  force  the  townsfolk  to  seek  refuge  in 
the  citadel.  A  relieving  force  of  Romans  takes  the  town  by  escalade,  simultaneously 
breaking  down  the  gate.  While  fending  off  the  Romans,  the  Latins  are  attacked  in  the 
rear  by  the  Tusculans  and  slaughtered. 
Sources:  Livy  6.33.7-12 
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22.  Privernum  (Italy),  358  B.  C. 
The  Romans  plunder  the  surrounding  countryside,  so  the  townsfolk  entrench  a  position 
in  advance  of  the  town  walls.  However,  they  flee  into  the  town  in  the  face  of  a  Roman 
attack  and,  when  the  Romans  bring  up  scaling-ladders,  they  surrender. 
Sources:  Livy  7.16.6 
23.  Satricurn  (Italy),  346  B.  C. 
The  town  is  encircled  by  the  Romans,  taken  by  escalade,  and  then  destroyed  and  burned; 
the  plunder  is  given  to  the  army.  Four  thousand  VoIscian  troops,  having  taken  refuge 
there,  are  sold  on  behalf  of  the  treasury. 
Sources:  Livy  7.27.6-7 
24.  Cales  (Italy),  335  B.  C. 
Although  his  soldiers  clamour  to  mount  an  escalade,  M.  Valerius  Corvus  is  more 
cautious;  he  orders  the  contruction  of  an  embankment  and  shelters  and  brings  up  towers. 
However,  a  Roman  prisoner  exploits  the  lax  discipline  of  a  feast  day  to  escape  from  the 
town  and  advises  Corvus  to  attack  at  once.  A  vast  amount  of  booty  is  taken  and  a 
garrison  posted  within  the  town. 
Sources:  Livy  8.16.6-10 
25.  Palaepolis  (Italy),  326  B.  C. 
On  the  pretext  of  aiding  the  townsfolk  against  the  Romans,  some  Samnites  enter,  but 
treat  their  hosts  as  captives.  A  leading  Palaepolitan  citizen  tricks  them  into  leaving  the 
town  by  night,  to  raid  Roman  territory,  and  another  citizen  allows  the  Romans  to  enter 
the  unguarded  town.  When  they  see  what  has  happened,  the  Samnites  depart. 
Sources:  Livy  8.25.5-26.5 
26.  Luceria  (Italy),  320  B.  C. 
L.  Papirius  Cursor  besieges  the  Samnite  town,  where  600  Roman  cavalrymen  are  held 
hostage,  but  his  Umited  supplies  are  strained  with  the  arrival  of  his  consular  colleague, 
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Publilius  Philo.  The  Sanuiites  are  also  poorly  supplied,  and  when  the  Romans  block  all 
supply  routes  they  seek  terms.  The  Roman  cavalrymen  are  freed,  7,000  Samnites  are 
sent  under  the  yoke  (emulating  the  Roman  humiliation  at  Caudium),  and  a  great  quantity 
of  booty  is  taken. 
Sources:  Livy  9.13.9-12,15.1-7;  Dio  8.36.23 
27.  Saticula  (Italy),  316-315  B.  C. 
L.  Aemilius  Mamercus  besieges  the  Samnite  town  of  Saticula,  pitching  camp  and 
arranging  his  troops  to  face  both  ways.  A  Samnite  relief  force  is  routed,  and  a 
simultaneous  break-out  from  the  town  is  driven  back.  In  the  following  year,  Q.  Fabius 
Maximus  Rullianus  takes  over  the  siege,  places  outposts  to  prevent  an  attack  on  the 
camp,  and  redoubles  the  attacks  on  the  town  walls.  A  Samnite  relief  force  provokes  a 
pitched  battle,  in  which  they  are  worsted;  a  few  days  later,  the  town  surrenders. 
Sources:  Livy  9.21.2-6,22.1  -11 
28.  Sora  (Italy),  314  B.  C. 
A  Poetelius  and  C.  Sulpicius  Longus  encamp  outside  the  town,  where  Roman  colonists 
have  been  slaughtered,  but  predict  that  capture  win  be  either  long  drawn-out  (by 
blockade),  or  dangerous  (by  assault)  because  of  the  difficult  terrain.  A  deserter  advises 
the  Romans  to  withdraw,  leaving  men  hidden  in  woodland  below  the  town.  He  guides 
ten  men  by  a  secret  route  up  to  the  citadel  and  spreads  panic  in  the  town,  whereupon  the 
men  concealed  outside  break  in  and  slaughter  the  townsfolk.  The  consuls  arrive  at  dawn 
to  take  the  town's  surrender,  and  a  garrison  is  left. 
Sources:  Livy  9.23.2,24.2-14 
29.  Nequinum  (Italy),  300-299  B.  C. 
The  site  is  too  steep  to  be  stormed  or  invested,  but  the  town  is  taken  in  the  following 
year,  when  two  townsfolk  dig  a  tunnel  under  the  walls  and  admit  a  party  of  Roman 
soldiers,  who  break  down  a  gate  and  allow  the  army  in.  The  town  is  plundered. 
Sources:  Livy  10.9.8,10.1-5 
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30.  Murgantia  (Italy),  296  B.  C. 
The  Romans  storm  the  Samnite  town  in  a  single  day,  encouraged  by  the  promise  of 
plunder:  2,100  Samnites  are  captured,  and  the  soldiers'  booty  is  sold  off  for  cash. 
Sources:  Livy  10.17.3-4 
31.  Romulea  (Italy),  296  B.  C. 
The  Romans  storm  the  Samnite  town  by  escalade,  capturing  and  sacking  it:  2,300  men 
are  killed,  6,000  are  taken  prisoner,  and  the  soldiers  sell  off  their  booty  for  cash.  Livy 
comments  that  no  siege-works  or  artillery  were  required. 
Sources:  Livy  10.17.7-9 
32.  Ferentinum  (Italy),  296  B.  C. 
The  troops  stonn  the  town,  protected  by  nature  and  by  waus,  Uling  3,000  of  the  enemy 
and  coHecting  more  booty. 
Sources:  Livy  10.17.9-  10 
33.  Feritrum  (Italy),  294  B.  C. 
The  townsfolk  prefer  to  depart  by  night,  with  everything  they  can  carry,  rather  than  stand 
siege.  L.  Postumius  Megellus  sends  cavalry  to  reconnoitre,  in  case  the  deserted  town  is 
a  trap,  and  the  few  remaining  goods  are  taken  as  plunder. 
Sources:  Livy  10.34.4-13 
34.  Milionia  (Italy),  294  B.  C. 
Megellus  fails  to  take  Milionia  by  stom-4  but  captures  the  town  once  the  siege-works  and 
shelters  are  at  the  wall.  Fighting  continues  for  four  hours;  3,200  Samnites  are  killed  and 
4,700  captured;  the  town  is  plundered. 
Sources:  Livy  10.34.1-3 
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35.  Aquilonia  (Italy),  293  B.  C. 
Samnites,  seeking  refuge  in  the  town,  throw  stones  at  the  Romans  from  the  walls.  The 
Romans  form  a  testudo  of  shields  and  break  through  the  gates,  but  so  small  a  unit  is  un- 
willing  to  advance  into  the  town.  When  night  falls,  the  Samnitcs  secretly  withdraw,  and 
the  town  is  sacked  and  burned. 
Sources:  Livy  IOAI.  12-14,42.4,44.2;  Valerius  Maximus  7.2.5 
36.  Cominium  (Italy),  293  B.  C. 
The  town  is  encircled  by  Sp.  Carvilius  Maximus,  who  then  orders  scaling-ladders  to  be 
brought  up  on  all  sides,  and  breaks  down  the  gate  under  cover  of  a  testudo  of  shields. 
The  Samnites;  promptly  abandon  the  walls  and  muster  in  the  town  forun-4  where  11,400 
men  surrender.  The  town  is  handed  over  to  the  soldiers  to  plunder  and  bum 
Sources:  Livy  10.43.1,43.5-8,44.2 
37.  Saepinum  (Italy),  293  B.  C. 
L.  Papirius  Cursor  forces  a  large  Samnite  army  to  take  refuge  in  the  town  and,  by  a 
combination  of  assaults  and  siege-works,  captures  the  place:  7,000  are  slaughtered, 
3,000  taken  prisoner,  and  the  town  is  handed  over  to  the  soldiers  to  plunder. 
Sourcess.  Livy  10.45.12-14 
38.  Agrigentum  (Sicily),  262-261  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  1) 
L.  Postumius,  Megellus  and  Q.  Mamilius,  Vitulus,  encamp  eight  stades  (I  1/2km)  from  the 
town,  which  is  occupied  by  the  Carthaginians.  The  foraging  Romans  are  attacked,  but 
repulse  the  Carthaginians  with  much  loss  of  fife.  The  Romans  now  establish  two  camps, 
one  to  the  south,  one  to  the  west,  linked  by  two  fines  of  ditches,  protecting  them  against 
attacks  from  the  town  and  from  the  hinterland,  as  well  as  denying  the  town  supplies  from 
outside.  This  circumvallation  is  patrolled  from  strongpoints,  and  the  army  supplied  from 
nearby  Hcrbesus.  The  blockade  is  maintained  for  five  months,  with  the  Agrigentines 
coming  close  to  starvation,  before  a  Carthaginian  relief  force  captures  the  Roman  supply 
base  and  arrives  at  Agrigentum.  After  a  two-month  stalemate,  during  which  the 
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besiegers  suffer  from  dysentery,  the  Romans  defeat  the  relief  force;  but  they  fail  to  keep 
adequate  watch  on  the  circurnvallation,  and  the  besieged  Carthaginians  are  able  to  fill  in 
the  Roman  ditches  with  baskets  of  straw  and  escape  under  cover  of  night.  Entering  the 
unguarded  city,  the  Romans  sack  the  place,  taking  much  plunder,  and  enslave  the  25,000 
inhabitants. 
Sources:  Polybius;  1.17.8-19.15;  Diod.  Sic.  23.9.1;  Zonaras  8.10;  Front.,  Strat.  2.1.4 
39.  Mytistratum  (Sicily),  258  B.  C. 
On  his  arrival  in  Sicily,  A.  Atilius  Caiatinus  finds  Mytistraturn  already  under  siege  by  his 
predecessor,  C.  Florus.  He  assaults  the  fortifications,  to  no  avail,  but,  when  the 
Carthaginian  garrison  departs  secretly  by  night,  the  townsfolk  open  the  gates  to  the 
Romans.  Unfortunately,  they  embark  on  wholesale  slaughter,  until  Caiatinus  promises 
that  each  man  can  keep  any  townsfolk  whom  he  captures,  whereupon  the  killing  ceases 
and  the  soldiers  concentrate  on  looting.  The  city  is  burned  to  the  ground. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.24.11;  Zonaras  8.11.10 
40.  Camarina  (Sicily),  258  B.  C. 
Caiatinus  assaults  Camarina,  which  had  defected  to  the  Carthaginian  side.  He  captures 
the  town  by  bringing  siege-works  (erga)  to  bear  and  throwing  down  the  wall. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.24.12 
41.  Aspis  (Sicily),  256  B.  C. 
M.  Atilius  Regulus  and  L.  Manlius  Vulso  approach  the  town  by  sea  and  entrench  a 
beachhead.  The  Carthaginian  garrison  refuses  to  surrender,  so  the  Romans  make 
preparations  for  a  siege.  However,  the  inhabitants  depart  secretly  by  night,  abandoning 
the  town,  which  the  Romans  occupy  as  a  base  of  operations. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.29.3-5;  Zonaras  8.12 
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42.  Panormus  (Sicily),  254  B.  C. 
A.  Atilius  Caiatinus  and  Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio  erect  siege-works  (erga)  at  two  separate 
points,  perhaps  including  a  palisade  and  ditch.  A  tower  by  the  sea  shore  is  demolished 
by  battering-ram  (krios)  and  the  Romans  force  their  way  through  the  breach  and  capture 
the  New  Town.  The  townsfolk  surrender  the  Old  Town;  14,000  inhabitants  are 
ransomed  at  2  minae  each,  and  the  remaining  13,000  are  sold  with  the  booty.  The 
Romans  post  a  garrison. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.38.8-10;  Diod.  Sic.  23.18.4-5;  Zonaras  8.14 
43.  Lipam  (Sicily),  253-252  B.  C. 
Cn.  Servilius  Caepio  leaves  the  tribune,  Cassius,  to  prosecute  the  siege,  with  orders  to 
avoid  battle.  Cassius  mounts  an  assault  with  much  loss  of  life.  In  the  following  year,  C. 
Aurelius  Cotta  captures  the  town,  and  slaughters  the  townsfolk. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.39.13;  Zonaras  8.14.7 
44.  Lilybaeum  (Sicily),  250-241  B.  C.  (cf  fig.  2) 
C.  Atilius  Regulus  and  L.  Manlius  Vulso  establish  two  camps,  probably  on  the  cast  and 
south  sides  of  the  town,  as  it  is  defended  by  sea  on  the  north  and  west  sides,  and  link  the 
camps  with  a  ditch,  a  palisade  and  a  wall.  They  advance  siege-works  (erga)  against  the 
south-west  tower  and  gradually  extend  eastwards,  demolishing  another  six  towers;  all  the 
other  towers  are  attacked  with  battering-rams.  As  the  Romans  push  their  siege-works 
further  into  the  city,  the  Carthaginians  dig  mines  underneath  and  erect  a  new  wall  in 
advance  of  the  Roman  works.  Sorties  are  launched  by  day  and  night,  in  an  attempt  to 
bum  the  siegc-engines.  Meanwhile,  the  besieging  force  is  apparently  reduced  by 
dysentery. 
The  Carthag*MianS  thwart  an  attempt  by  their  mercenaries  to  hand  over  the  city  to  the 
Romans,  and  a  relief  force  of  fifty  ships  (10,000  men)  arrives.  The  Romans  now  (if  not 
before)  block  the  harbour  with  fifteen  fight  vessels  loaded  with  stones;  a  ffirther  blockade 
of  the  harbour  with  stones,  jetties  and  anchored  booms  is  destroyed  in  a  storm.  All 
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attempts  to  block  the  harbour  fail  on  account  of  the  depth  and  current,  until  a  shallow 
sandbar  is  located  and  a  mound  (chJma)  piled  up. 
The  Carthaginians  launch  a  coordinated  series  of  dawn  sorties,  attempting  to  destroy  the 
Roman  siege  equipment,  but  are  forced  to  retreat.  (Diodorus  alleges  that  the  Romans 
used  a  stone-throwing  catapult,  petrobolon  organon,  against  the  inner  wall:  Diod.  Sic. 
24.1.2.  )  A  storm  shakes  the  Roman  galleries  (stoai)  and  blows  away  the  wooden  towers 
(purgoi),  lying  in  front  of  thern.  The  Carthaginians  are  able  to  set  fire  to  the  exposed 
timbers  -"the  whole  apparatus  was  so  old  that  it  was  highly  inflammable"  -  which  could 
not  be  extinguished  on  account  of  the  wind,  and  which  illuminated  the  besieging  force  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Carthaginian  marksmen. 
Since  only  the  bases  of  the  siege-towers  and  the  ram-beams  survive,  the  Romans  revert 
to  blockade,  encircling  the  city  with  a  ditch  and  palisade.  The  Roman  naval  victory  in 
241  B.  C.  ends  Carthaginian  resistance. 
Sources:  Polybius  1.41.4-48.11,52.5,53.1-7,55.4;  Diodorus;  Siculus  24.1.1-3; 
Zonaras  8.15;  Front.,  Strat.  3.10.9 
45.  Dimallurn  (Albania),  219  B.  C. 
When  the  erstwhile  Roman  ally,  Demetrius  of  Pharus,  seizes  the  impregnable  town,  L. 
Aemilius  Paulus  and  M.  Livius  Salinator  arrive,  erect  siege-works  (erga)  at  various  sites 
and  besiege  the  place.  After  seven  days,  the  town  is  stormed  and  received  back  into 
Roman  sovereignty. 
Sources:  Polybius  3.18.4 
46.  Atanagrum  (Spain),  218  B.  C. 
Cn.  Cornelius  Scipio  lays  siege  to  the  capital  town  of  the  rebellious  Ilergetes;  within  a 
few  days,  they  agree  to  terms  and  are  received  back  into  Roman  sovereignty. 
Sources:  Livy  21.61.6-7 
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47.  Town  of  the  Ausctani  (Spain),  218  B.  C. 
Cn.  Scipio  spends  thirty  days  blockading  a  pro-Carthaginian  town,  but  the  snow,  seldom 
lying  less  than  four  feet  deep,  buries  the  screens  and  shelters  (plutei  ac  vineae),  giving 
incidental  protection  from  fire.  The  towWs  surrender  is  accepted  on  payment  of  twenty 
silver  talents. 
Sourccs:  Livy  21.61.8-11 
48.  Casilinum  (Italy),  214  B.  C. 
Q.  Fabius  Maximus  (Cunctator)  and  M.  Claudius  MarccHus  encamp  before  the 
Carthaginian-occupied  town  and  suffer  casualties  when  they  approach  the  walls 
recklessly-,  Fabius  wishes  to  withdraw  but  is  persuaded  to  stay  by  Marcellus.  Shelters 
and  all  the  other  siege  equipment  are  brought  up  (vineae  inde  omnlaque  alia  operum 
machinationumque  genera),  whereupon  the  townsfolk  attempt  to  escape;  fifty  are 
relocated  to  Capua  by  Fabius,  but  many  more  are  slaughtered.  The  town  is  easily  taken 
and  all  prisoners  sent  to  Rome. 
Sources:  Livy24.19.1-11 
49.  Leontini  (Sicily),  214  B.  C. 
Claudius  Marcellus  and  Ap.  Claudius  Pulcher  converge  on  the  town,  which  is  harbouring 
anti-Roman,  anti-Syracusan  agitators,  and  take  it  at  the  first  assault  by  forcing  the  gate. 
The  Syracusans  receive  a  false  report  of  the  events:  the  indiscriminate  killing  of  soldiers 
and  civilians,  the  looting  of  the  town,  the  property  of  the  wealthy  given  to  the  troops, 
and  the  scourging  and  beheading  of  deserters.  In  fact,  nobody  is  killed  following  the 
capture  of  the  town,  and  all  property  is  restored  to  its  owners. 
5ources:  Livy  24.30.1-7;  Plutarch,  Marcellus  14.1-2 
50.  Syracuse  (Sicily),  213-212  D.  C.  (cf.  fig.  3) 
The  Romans  encamp  I  Vimiles  (21/4km)  from  the  city,  and  prepare  to  attack  by  land  from 
the  north  against  the  Hexapylon  gate,  and  by  sea  from  the  cast  against  the  Achradina 
wall.  Claudius  Pulcher  moves  the  siege  equipment  (omnis  apparatus  oppugnandarum 
247 Appendbc  1:  Catalogue  ofRoman  Sieges 
urbium)  up  to  the  wall,  but  Archimedes  has  constructed  every  sort  of  artillery  (genus 
omne  tormentorum),  and  the  Romans'  wicker  screens  (gerra)  are  crushed  by  stones  and 
beams  dropped  from  the  walls. 
Claudius  Marcellus  embarks  archers,  slingers  and  velites  on  sixty  quinqueremes,  lashing 
some  together  in  pairs  to  carry  towers  and  rams  (turres 
...  machinamentaque  alia 
quallendis  muris)  and  the  laddered  boarding-bridge  (sambuca),  and  assaults  the 
Achradina  wall.  But  Archimedes  has  arranged  loopholes  from  the  top  of  the  wan  to  the 
bottom,  through  which  archers  and  scorpiones  (skorpidia)  can  shoot  from  concealment, 
and  has  deployed  different  sizes  of  artillery  (uariae  magnitudinis  tormenta),  discharging 
very  heavy  stones  and  fighter,  more  numerous  missiles.  Finally,  he  deploys  a  crane 
(tolleno),  to  deal  with  ships  inside  the  range  of  the  artillery.  Marcellus  abandons  the 
seaborne  attack.  Since  the  land  walls  are  defended  by  every  sort  of  artillery,  and  the 
enemy's  steep  location  favours,  rolling  stones,  the  Romans  resort  to  blockade.  Marcellus 
establishes  a  winter  camp  five  miles  (7Y2km)  from  the  Hexapylon  gate. 
Finally,  in  the  spring  of  212  B.  C.,  a  stretch  of  wall  on  the  north  sector  is  found  to  be  low 
enough  for  ladders,  but  is  well  guarded,  so  the  Romans  mount  a  nocturnal  escalade 
during  a  festival.  Over  a  thousand  men  enter  by  ladder  and  a  postern  near  the  Hexapylon 
is  broken  open;  the  main  gate  is  forced  before  dawn,  allowing  Marceflus  to  bring  the 
entire  army  into  Syracuse  and  seize  the  Epipolae  district.  Hannibal's  general  in  charge  of 
the  city,  Epicydes,  withdraws  behind  the  walls  of  the  Achradina  district.  Marcellus 
encamps  his  troops  within  the  city,  regulates  controlled  looting,  and  agrees  with 
Syracusan  suppliants  that  no  free  men  will  be  harmed.  The  garrison  of  the  Euryalus 
fortress  surrender. 
Marcellus  then  settles  down  to  invest  the  Achradina  with  three  camps  and  pickets 
(stationes),  and  easily  repulses  the  counter-assaults,  launched  both  by  Epicydes  in  the 
Achradina,  and  by  the  Carthaginians,  newly-arrived  in  the  Great  Harbour.  An  outbreak 
of  plague  in  autumn  212  B.  C.  reduces  the  population  and  decimates  the  Carthaginian 
forces.  With  the  escape  of  Epicydes,  the  Achradina  falls  into  Marcellus'  hands.  The  city 
is  turned  over  to  the  troops  to  loot,  in  the  course  of  which  Archimedes  is  killed. 
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Sources:  Livy24.33.9-34-16,25.23.2-31.11;  Polybius  8.3.1-7.12;  Plutarch,  Marcellus 
14.2-3,15.1-17.3,18.3-19.3;  Frontinus,  Strat.  3.3.2;  Polyaenus,  Strat.  8.11 
51.  Arpi  (Italy),  213  B.  C. 
Q.  Fabius  Maximus  the  younger  encamps  half  a  mile  (3/4km)  from  the  town,  and  chooses 
to  attack  a  postern  on  the  strongest,  and  hence  least  carefully  guarded,  sector.  Under 
cover  of  darkness,  and  during  a  heavy  downpour,  six  hundred  men  enter  the  town  by 
means  of  ladders,  and  force  the  gate  open,  unheard  by  the  guards,  sheltering  from  the 
rain.  At  dawn,  the  main  Roman  force  enters  the  town  by  the  broken  gate;  the  houses 
nearest  the  gate  are  seized,  as  a  safeguard  against  missile-fire  from  the  rooftops.  The 
Arpini  turn  on  the  Carthaginian  garrison  and  eject  them  without  bloodshed. 
Sources:  Livy  24.46.147.9;  Appian,  Hann.  3  1;  Frontinus,  Strat.  3.9.2 
52.  Tarentum  (Italy),  209  B.  C. 
In  209  B.  C.,  Fabius  Maximus  (Cunctator)  arrives  by  sea  to  relieve  the  Roman  garrison, 
beleaguered  by  Hannibal  in  the  harbour-side  citadel.  He  equips  some  of  the  Roman 
vessels  with  machinery  (machinationes  apparalusque  moenium  oppugnandorum),  others 
with  artillery  (tormenta  et  saw  omneque  missilium  telorum  genus),  and  still  others  with 
ladders  (machinae  scalaeque). 
One  of  Hannibal's  mercenaries  betrays  the  section  of  town  wall  under  his  command.  Just 
before  dawn,  while  the  Roman  troops  at  the  harbour  and  in  the  citadel  create  a  diversion, 
that  section  of  wall  is  scaled  and  the  nearest  gate  opened.  Indiscriminate  slaughter  and 
looting  ensues,  and  thirty  thousand  slaves  are  taken. 
Sources:  Livy  27.15.4-16.7;  Appian,  Hann.  32-34,49 
53.  Capua  (Italy),  212-211  B.  C. 
Q.  Fulvius  Flaccus  and  Claudius  Pulcher,  along  with  C.  Claudius  Nero,  position  three 
camps  around  Capua  and  begin  construction  of  a  double  ditch-and-rampart  system  two 
stades  (c.  370  rn)  from  the  town. 
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The  Capuans  attempting  to  disrupt  the  work  are  driven  back  into  the  town,  but  request 
aid  from  Hannibal.  The  Romans  invite  them  to  leave  with  all  their  possessions  before  the 
circurnvallation  is  complete,  but  they  refuse. 
In  211  B.  C.,  with  the  town  close  to  starvation,  Hannibal's  arrival  in  force  is  coordinated 
with  multiple  sorties  from  the  city.  The  Romans  driving  the  Capuans  back  into  the  town 
come  under  fire  from  ballistae  and  scorpiones  at  the  gate;  but,  in  a  general  engagement 
outside  the  siege-works,  Hannibal  is  repulsed.  The  Capuans  surrender  in  desperation; 
the  magistrates  are  executed,  but  the  town  is  spared. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hann.  37-38,43;  Livy25.22.7-13;  26.4.1-7.8,12.1-14.9;  Polybius, 
9.3.1-5.9 
54.  Anticyra  (Greece),  210  B.  C. 
M.  Valerius  Laevinus  coordinates  his  attack  on  Anticyra  by  sea  with  a  land  attack  by  his 
Aetolian  alEes.  The  Rornan  fleet  is  equipped  with  artiHery  (tormenta  machinaeque 
omnis  generis).  The  town  surrenders;  the  Rornans  take  the  booty. 
Sources:  Livy  26.26.3;  Polybius  9.39.2 
55.  Cartagena  (Spain),  210  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  4) 
The  town  is  the  main  Carthaginian  base,  where  all  the  equipment,  including  artillery 
(tomenta),  is  stored.  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  (Africanus)  encamps  to  the  north-east,  where 
an  access  route,  250  feet  wide,  crosses  the  encircling  lagoon;  C.  Laelius  blocks  the 
harbour  with  the  fleet,  equipped  with"missiles  of  all  kinds"  (Plb.  10.12.1). 
The  Carthaginians  draw  up  for  pitched  battle,  but  are  driven  back  into  the  town  in  panic. 
Seeing  that  the  walls  are  undefended,  Scipio  orders  ladders  to  be  brought  up,  but  few  are 
long  enough,  giving  the  Carthaginians  time  to  re-man  the  walls.  Scipio  orders  "some  to 
attack  the  enemy  from  above,  others  to  push  the  machines  (michanai)  forward  from 
below"(App.,  Hisp.  20),  and  a  struggle  ensues  at  the  main  gate.  The  Carthaginians 
employ  "machinery  (michanimata)  and  stones  and  missiles  and  catapults  (katapeltal)". 
At  the  same  time,  the  ebbing  tide  lowers  the  level  of  the  lagoon,  allowing  five-hundred 
men  with  ladders  to  approach  where  the  wall  is  poorly  defended  and  enter  the  town. 
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They  force  the  gates  and  allow  their  colleagues  to  enter.  Seeing  the  wholesale  slaughter, 
the  Carthaginians  defending  the  citadel  surrender,  and  the  town  is  plundered. 
The  captured  goods  include  catapults  (120  large,  281  small),  ballistae  (twenty-three 
large,  fifty-two  small),  and  large  and  small  scorpiones.  Captured  citizens  are  freed,  two 
thousand  craftsmen  are  enslaved,  and  the  slaves  are  sent  to  the  fleet  as  oarsmen.  The 
operation  lasted  a  single  day. 
Sources:  Livy26.42.6-47.10;  Polybius  10.9.7,11.1-4,12.1-11,13.6-16.1;  Appian, 
Hisp.  20-23;  Front.,  Strat.  3.9.1 
56.  Locri  (Italy),  208  B.  C. 
Artillery  and  siege  equipment  (omne  genus  tormentorum  machinarumque)  is  re- 
quisitioned  from  Sicily,  and  L.  Cincius  Alimentus  brings  a  fleet  over  for  a  seaborne 
attack.  He  constructs  siege-works  (opera),  but  news  of  Hannibal's  approach  encourages 
the  besieged  Carthaginian  garrison  to  launch  a  sortie.  When  cavalry  reinforcements 
arrive  the  Romans  abandon  the  siege-works  (opera  machinaeque  quibus  muros 
quatiebant)  for  the  safety  of  their  ships. 
Sources:  Livy  27.25.11-12,26.3-4,28.13-17;  Frontinus,  Strat.  4.7.26 
57.  Orongis  (Spain),  207  B.  C. 
L.  Cornelius  Scipio  (Asiaticus)  encamps  nearby  and,  when  his  diplomacy  is  rejected, 
rings  the  town  with  a  double  ditch  and  rampart  (fossa  duplex  et  vallum).  He  attacks 
with  a  third  of  his  army,  but  makes  no  headway  because  the  walls  are  well  defended;  his 
ladders  are  pushed  away  by  forked  poles  (furcae)  or  caught  by  grappling  hooks  (lupi 
ferrei).  However,  an  attack  by  the  other  two-thirds  of  Scipio's  force  causes  panic  along 
the  walls,  and  some  townsfolk  rush  out  to  surrender,  but  are  cut  down  by  the  Romans  in 
the  heat  of  battle.  Gates  are  broken  open  with  hatchets  and  pick-axes  (secures 
dolabraeque)  and  the  town  is  seized.  No  looting  is  permitted,  but  the  Carthaginian 
garrison  is  captured. 
Sources:  Livy  28.3.2-16 
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58.  Orcus  (Greece),  207  B.  C. 
P.  Sulpicius  Galba  and  his  ally,  King  Attalus  I  of  Pergarnum,  attack  the  Macedonian 
garrison,  having  made  a  secret  pact  with  the  commander,  Plator.  The  Romans  land 
artillery  and  machinery  (tormenta  machinaeque)  on  the  shore  for  a  diversionary  assault 
on  the  five-storeyed  tower  there,  while  Plator  allows  a  second  Roman  force  into  the 
seaside  citadel.  The  townsfolk  are  killed  or  captured,  the  town  is  looted,  and  the 
Macedonian  garrison  departs. 
Sources:  Livy  28.5.19-6.7 
59.  Castax/Castulo  (Spain),  206  B.  C. 
Scipio  (Africanus)  sends  M.  Junius  SHanus  to  receive  the  submission  of  the  town,  but  the 
Carthaginian  garrison  refuses,  so  Silanus  encamps  outside  and  requests  siege  apparatus 
(paraskeuipoliorkids)  from  Scipio.  The  latter,  having  captured  Ilourgeia  (below,  60), 
arrives  and,  dividing  his  troops  into  three  sections,  places  a  watch  on  the  town.  At  this, 
the  townsfolk  hand  over  the  Carthaginian  garrison,  and  surrender. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  32;  Livy  28.19.9;  20.8 
60.  Hourgeia  (Spain),  206  B.  C. 
A  two-pronged  attack  with  scaling-ladders  is  repulsed  again  and  again,  until  Scipio 
(Africanus)  threatens  to  scale  the  wall  himself,  whereupon  his  men  succeed.  The 
operation  takes  four  hours.  Light-armed  mountaineering  troops  seize  the  supposedly 
impregnable  citadel.  Wholesale  slaughter  ensues,  and  the  town  is  burned. 
Sources:  Livy  28.19.9-20.7;  Appian,  Hisp.  32;  Zonaras  9.10.2 
61.  Astapa  (Spain),  206  B.  C. 
Realizing  that  their  town  is  poorly  defended,  and  fearing  the  wrath  of  the  Romans  if  they 
surrender,  the  Astapians  decide  to  die  fighting.  All  valuables  are  piled  in  the  town 
square,  with  the  women  and  children  on  top,  and  firewood  heaped  all  around.  All  the 
men  except  fifty  sally  out  for  a  fight  to  the  death;  the  fifty  kill  the  women  and  children, 
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and  ignite  the  fire,  before  committing  suicide.  When  the  Romans  finally  enter,  all  the 
townsfolk  are  dead  and  their  valuables  burnt. 
Sources:  Livy28.22.2-23.5;  Appian,  Hisp.  33;  Polybius,  11.24.11 
62.  Locri  (Italy),  205  B.  C. 
The  Romans  prepare  ladders  to  the  height  of  the  citadel  specified  by  Locrian  craftsmen, 
wishing  to  betray  the  Carthaginian  garrison.  They  let  down  ladders  for  the  Romans  to 
enter  the  town  by  night,  but,  although  the  Romans  seize  the  citadel,  the  Carthaginian 
garrison  takes  refuge  in  a  second  stronghold  within  the  town. 
Source  :  Livy  29.6.4-8.5 
63.  Locha  (Tunisia),  204  B.  C. 
After  a  long  siege,  Scipio  (Africanus)  assaults  the  town  with  ladders  (Idimakes),  where- 
upon  the  townsfolk  offer  their  surrender  and  Scipio  orders  a  withdrawal.  But  the 
Romans  scale  the  walls  and  run  amok,  slaughtering  indiscriminately.  Scipio  grants  the 
surviving  townsfolk  safe  conduct,  denies  his  men  any  booty,  and  punishes  three  cen- 
turions  with  death. 
Sources:  Appian,  Pun.  IS 
64.  Utica  (Tunisia),  204-203  B.  C  (cf.  fig.  5) 
Scipio  (Africanus)  encamps  about  a  mile  (I  V2km)  away,  while  his  ally,  Masinissa,  draws 
out  and  defeats  the  Carthaginian  cavalry.  Then  he  moves  up  to  besiege  the  town  with 
artillery  and  machinery  (tormenta  machinaeque),  requisitioning  more  from  Sicily,  and 
setting  up  an  armamentarium  with  many  craftsmen  to  make  even  more. 
Offshore,  a  tower  is  erected  on  two  lashed-together  quinqueremes,  from  which  three- 
cubit  (1.4  m)  missiles  and  large  stones  are  launched.  Fortifications  (munitiones)  are 
constructed,  embankments  (ch6mata)  raised,  and  battering-rams  (krioo  brought  up, 
while  the  hide  covering  is  stripped  from  the  walls  with  hooks  (drepanat).  The  defenders 
sally  out  with  firebrands,  undermine  the  embankments,  divert  the  hooks  by  means  of 
moses,  and  thwart  the  battering-rams  by  dropping  beams  on  them  cross-wise.  After 
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forty  days,  Hasdrubal  arrives  with  an  army  from  Carthage,  and  Scipio  withdraws  to  the 
castra  Corneliana,  a  winter  camp  on  a  coastal  promontory. 
In  the  following  spring,  a  token  force  is  left  to  watch  the  town,  feigning  a  seaborne 
assault  by  launching  ships  loaded  with  siege  equipment  (michanai,  machinae  tor- 
mentaque),  while  Scipio  engages  the  Carthaginian  army  elsewhere.  Some  of  the  beached 
Roman  ships  are  pulled  up  to  the  walls  to  serve  as  ramps  and  bridges  (ita  adpulsae  muris 
ut  pro  aggere  ac  pontibus  praebere;  prosagOgas  t6n  organ5n);  the  Carthaginian  fleet 
succeeds  in  towing  away  sixty. 
The  action  moves  elsewhere,  and  the  machinery  (michanimata)  is  transported  to  Hippo, 
where  it  is  burned  having  outlived  its  usefulness. 
Sources:  Appian,  Pun.  16,30;  Livy29.34.3,35.6-8;  30.4.10-12,8.1-2,10.2-21; 
Polybius  14.2.1,7.1,8.1,10.9-12 
65.  Chalcis  (Greece),  200  B.  C. 
C.  Claudius  Cento  mounts  a  dawn  raid  on  the  Macedonian  ally.  A  few  soldiers  with 
ladders  capture  a  tower  and  a  section  of  walL  break  down  the  gates,  and  admit  the  main 
Roman  force.  A  fire  is  started,  which  spreads  to  the  armamentarium,  destroying  a  huge 
quantity  of  war  equipment  (ingens  apparatus  machinarum  tormentorumque);  the  towns- 
folk  and  the  Macedonian  garrison  are  slaughtered,  and  the  town  is  looted  and  burned. 
Sources:  Livy  31.23.1-24.3;  Zonaras  9.15 
66.  Celetrum  (Greece),  199  B.  C. 
P.  Sulpicius  Galba's  request  for  surrender  is  rebuffed,  so  he  assaults  the  town,  which  is 
situated  on  a  lake  peninsula,  by  sending  a  testudo  fonnation  of  troops  along  the  narrow 
causeway.  The  townsfolk  surrender  in  panic. 
Sources:  Livy  31.40.1-3 
67.  Andros  (Greece),  199  B.  C. 
L.  Apustius  FuUo  and  his  ally,  Attalus  of  Pergamum,  anchor  in  the  harbour  of  Gaurion 
and  request  the  island's  surrender,  but  the  citadel  is  held  by  a  Macedonian  garrison,  so 
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they  disembark  siege  equipment  (apparatus  omnis  urbium  oppygnandarum),  whereupon 
the  islanders  abandon  the  town  and  flee  to  the  citadel.  The  Macedonian  garrison 
surrenders  on  the  third  day  on  the  promise  of  safe  conduct,  and  the  Romans  carry  off  the 
plunder,  leaving  the  town  to  Attalus. 
Sources:  Livy  31.45.3-8 
68.  Orcus  (Greece),  199  B.  C. 
Apustius  and  Attalus  attack  the  Macedonian  garrison  of  Oreus  from  different  directions. 
The  Romans  move  sheds,  shelters  and  a  battering-ram  (testudines  et  uineae  et  aries) 
against  the  seaward  citadel,  while  Attalus  attacks  the  wall  between  the  two  citadels  with 
mines,  under  cover  of  an  artillery  barrage  (ballistae  catapultaeque  et  alium  omne  genus 
tormentorum).  Little  progress  is  made,  so  Apustius  and  Attalus  withdraw,  leaving  a 
force  to  dig  siege-works  (opera),  trusting  that  more  can  be  accomplished  from  a  block- 
ade  (obsidio  et  opera)  than  from  an  assault  (oppygnatio).  The  battering  continues  and 
the  wall  is  breached  in  many  places,  allowing  the  Romans  to  capture  the  seaside  citadel; 
the  townsfolk  and  Macedonian  garrison  withdraw  to  the  other  citadel,  but  surrender  after 
two  days.  The  town  is  occupied  by  the  Pergamenes,  and  the  prisoners  are  taken  by  the 
Romans. 
Sources:  Livy  31.46.9-16 
69.  Carystus  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
L.  Quinctius  Flamininus'  fleet,  along  with  ships  from  Pergamurn  and  Rhodes,  devastates 
the  town's  territory,  but,  seeing  that  a  Macedonian  garrison  has  been  installed,  pass  on  to 
Eretria  (below,  70).  On  their  return,  they  disembark  troops  for  an  assault,  but  the 
townsfolk  surrender  unmolested,  and  the  Macedonian  garrison  is  ransomed. 
Sources:  Livy  32.17.1-2 
70.  Eretria  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
L.  Flamininus'  combined  allied  4eet  (69,  above)  assaults  the  coastal  town  of  Eretria  with 
artillery  and  machinery  (omnis  generis  tormenta  machinaeque  ad  urbium  excidia).  The 
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countryside  fimiishes  sufficient  timlýer  for  the  contruction  of  Roman  equipment  (opera), 
which  destroys  part  of  the  town  wall,  but  fear  of  the  Macedonian  garrison,  and  hope  that 
Philip  will  send  help,  keep  the  Eretrians  from  surrendering.  The  Romans  mount  a 
nocturnal  escalade  and  the  townsfolk  flee  to  the  citadel,  where  they  later  surrender.  The 
plunder  largely  comprises  some  works  of  art. 
Sources:  Livy  32.16.10-17;  Zonaras  9.16 
71.  Atrax  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
T.  Quinctius  Flamininus  breaches  the  town  wall  with  battering-rams  (arietes),  but  is 
repulsed  by  the  Macedonian  garrison.  He  orders  the  clearing  of  the  debris  and  moves  up 
a  large  siege-tower  (turris  ingentis  altitudinis  ...  multiplici  labulato),  but  the  breach  has 
been  plugged  by  a  phalanx.  The  Roman  embankment  (agger)  is  not  sufficiently 
compacted,  and  one  of  the  tower's  wheels  gets  stuck  in  a  deep  rut,  so  that  the  tower  lists 
to  one  side.  Flamininus  abandons  the  siege. 
Sources:  Livy  32.17.4-18.3 
72.  Daulis  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
The  town,  situated  on  a  hill-top,  could  not  be  taken  by  escalade  or  by  siege-works 
(opera),  but  the  defenders  are  enticed  out  to  skirmish,  and,  as  they  retreat,  the  Romans 
manage  to  rush  into  the  town  at  their  heels,  before  the  gates  are  closed. 
Sources:  Livy  32.18.7-8 
73.  Corinth  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
A  three-fold  assault  is  launched  by  Titus  Flamininus,  his  Achaean  allies,  and  the 
Pergamene  troops  of  King  Attalus.  Embankments  (aggeres)  are  constructed  on  all  sides, 
and,  when  the  Roman  battering-ram  (aries)  breaches  the  wall,  fierce  fighting  ensues.  At 
news  of  the  approach  of  Macedonian  reinforcements,  the  Romans  follow  Attalus'  sug- 
gestion  to  bum  the  siege-works  (opera)  and  withdraw. 
Sources:  Livy  3  2.23.4-13;  Pausanias  7.8.1;  Zonaras  9.16 
256 Appendix  1:  Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges 
74.  Elatea  (Greece),  198  B.  C. 
T.  Flamininus  tries  to  negotiate,  but  the  townsfolk  are  intimidated  by  the  Macedonian 
garrison,  so  he  besicges  the  town  using  equipment  (opera).  A  section  of  wan  is 
demolished  by  battering-ram  (aries)  and  a  Roman  cohort  enters;  other  sections  of  wan 
are  taken  by  escalade.  The  garrison  flee  to  the  citadel,  where  they  surrender  on  the 
promise  of  safe  conduct;  the  town  is  sacked. 
Sources:  Livy  32.24.1-7 
75.  Leucas  (Greece),  197  B.  C. 
T.  Flamininus  besieges  the  town  with  artillery  and  the  machinery  (omne  genus 
tormentorum  machinarumque  quae  expugnantur  urbes).  He  erects  shelters  and  towers 
(vineae  turresque),  and  the  walls  are  undermined  and  breached  by  battering-ram  (aries) 
in  many  places,  but  hastily  repaired  by  the  townsfolk.  Some  Romans  are  admitted  by 
Italian  traders  living  in  the  town.  The  townsfolk  abandon  the  defences,  allowing  the 
Romans  to  enter  at  many  points  by  escalade  and  through  the  breaches,  and  many  towns- 
folk  are  killed  before  the  formal  surrender. 
Sources:  Livy  33.17.3-4,9-14 
76.  Gytheum  (Greece),  195  B.  C. 
L.  Flamininus  besieges  the  coastal  arsenal,  with  fleet  support  from  King  Eumenes  of 
Pergamurn  and  the  Rhodians.  In  a  few  days,  the  seamen  have  constructed  equipment 
(opera)  for  assaulting  the  town.  The  wall  is  undermined  with  the  assistance  of  sheds 
(testudines),  and  battered  by  rams  (arietes).  A  tower  is  demolished  and  a  section  of  wall 
collapses.  The  Romans  feint  at  a  different  sector,  in  order  to  draw  attention  away  from 
the  breach,  but  the  town  surrenders  on  the  promise  of  safe  conduct  for  the  Spartan 
garrison. 
Sources:  Livy  34.29.5-13 
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77.  Sparta  (Greece),  195  B.  C. 
T.  Flamininus  throws  a  cordon  (corona)  around  the  town.  He  equips  some  of  his  forces 
with  ladders  and  others  with  fire,  and  launches  three  simultaneous  assaults  at  the  sectors 
which  are  unwalled  because  of  their  natural  defences.  Breaking  into  the  town,  the 
Romans  adopt  the  testudo  shield-formation  to  ward  off  missiles,  including  tiles  thrown 
from  roof-tops.  The  Spartans  fire  the  buildings  nearest  to  the  walls,  and  the  Romans 
withdraw.  Over  the  next  three  days,  the  Romans  launch  harassing  attacks,  sometimes 
using  siege  equipment  (opera)  to  block  any  avenues  of  escape.  The  Spartan  tyrant, 
Nabis,  agrees  to  the  peace  terms  already  offered  by  Rome. 
Sources:  Livy  34.38.1-40.4 
78.  Heraclea  (Greece),  191  B.  C. 
M'.  Acilius  Glabrio  requests  the  surrender  of  the  town's  Aetolian  garrison,  but  is  re- 
buffed.  The  countryside  offers  plentiful  timber  and  the  suburbs  provide  abundant 
building  materials;  the  siege  equipment  (turres  arietesque  et  alius  omnis  apparatus 
oppygnandarum  urbium)  is  contructed  in  a  few  days,  owing  to  the  rivalry  between  the 
four  assault  groups.  They  attack  with  an  embankment  and  shelters  (agger  et  vineae  et 
omnia  supra  terram  opera).  When  they  apply  the  rams,  the  townsfolk  sally  out  with 
firebrands  to  burn  the  embankments  (aggeres).  The  operations  continue  for  twenty-four 
days,  with  the  Aetolians  repairing  any  wall  breaches  which  the  Romans  make.  Then,  a 
night-time  assault  at  three  of  the  sectors  leaves  the  fourth  sector  undefended;  at  dawn, 
the  forces  at  the  fourth  sector  mount  an  escalade  and  the  townsfolk  flee  to  the  citadel. 
The  soldiers  sack  the  town  throughout  the  morning,  before  assaulting  the  citadel, 
whereupon  the  townsfolk  surrender. 
Sources:  Livy  36.22.4-24.11;  Zonaras  9.19;  Appian,  Syr.  21 
79.  Naupactus  (Greece),  191  B.  C. 
Acilius  establishes  a  fort  (castellum)  opposite  the  citadel  and  divides  his  forces  to  sur- 
round  the  rest  of  the  town.  The  siege  is  maintained  for  two  months,  by  which  time  the 
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town  is  near  to  destruction  (prope  excidium).  T.  Flamininus  arrives  and  persuades  the 
Aetolian  garrison  to  agree  to  a  truce,  so  the  siege  is  raised. 
Sources:  Livy  36.30.6,34.1-35.6;  Plutarch,  Flamininus  15.6-9;  Zonaras  9.19 
80.  Lamia  (Greece),  190  B.  C. 
Acilius  mounts  a  dawn  attack,  throwing  a  cordon  (corona)  around  the  town.  An  escalade 
is  attempted,  but  the  townsfolk  beat  it  back  with  stones  and  missiles.  The  attempt  is 
called  off  at  midday,  and  the  troops  are  rested.  Next  day,  another  dawn  attack  is 
mounted,  which  succeeds  within  a  few  hours  because  the  townsfolk  are  exhausted.  Half 
of  the  plunder  is  sold,  and  half  distributed  amongst  the  troops. 
Sources:  Livy  37.4.10-5.4 
81.  Amphissa  (Greece),  190  B.  C. 
Acilius  encamps  before  the  town  and  begins  to  attack  with  siege  equipment  (opera). 
Battering-rams  (arietes)  are  moved  up  simultaneously  in  several  places,  whereupon  the 
townsfolk  attack  the  pickets  (stationes)  and  disrupt  the  troops  working  the  machines 
(qui  circa  opera  et  machinationes  erant).  Discovering  that  Roman  reinforcements  are 
approaching,  the  townsfolk  take  refuge  in  the  citadel.  The  siege  is  lifted,  pending 
negotiations  between  Rome  and  Aetolia. 
Sources:  Livy  37.5.5-6.4,7.7;  Polyb.  21.4.9-14,5.13 
82.  Phocaea  (Turkey),  190  B.  C. 
L.  Aemilius  Regillus  seizes  the  harbours  and  tries  to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed.  He 
moves  up  battering-rams  (arietes)  at  two  points.  Advancing  through  the  breaches  or 
crossing  the  walls  on  ladders,  the  Romans  meet  fanatical  defence,  so  Regillus,  orders  a 
retreat.  The  Phocaeans  set  about  repairing  the  walls. 
The  Phocaeans,  having  fOed  to  obtain  help  from  Antiochus  111,  are  persuaded  to  sur- 
render,  whereupon  the  Romans  begin  sacking  the  town.  Regillus  tries  to  restrain  them, 
because  surrendered  towns  ought  not  to  be  plundered  (captas,  non  deditas  diripi  urbes) 
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and,  in  any  case,  the  decision  ought  to  be  the  commander's.  Regillus  restores  their  town 
to  the  Phocaeans  and  winters  the  fleet  there. 
Sources:  Livy  37.32.1-14 
83.  Ambracia  (Greece),  189  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  7) 
M.  Fulvius  Nobilior  establishes  two  camps  (castra)  and  a  fort  (castellum)  facing  the 
citadel,  and  connects  them  with  a  rampart  and  ditch  to  enclose  the  inhabitants  and  deny 
them  aid  from  outside.  Reinforcements  arrive  before  the  siege-works  (munimenta)  are 
complete.  Nobilior  moves  equipment  (opera,  erga)  against  five  sectors,  and  begins  to 
batter  the  walls  with  rams  (arietes,  krioi)  and  pull  at  the  battlements  with  long-handled 
hooks  (asseresfalcati,  dorydrepanai). 
But  the  defenders  use  cranes  (tollenones,  keralai)  to  drop  lead  and  stone  weights  and 
tree  trunks  onto  the  rams,  and  grappling  irons  (ancoraeferreae,  ankyral  sidirai)  to  pull 
the  hooks  over  the  wall  and  break  off  their  handles.  They  also  launch  sorties  by  day  and 
night,  using  tow  and  pitch  fire-arrows  (malleoh)  and  firebrands;  and  whenever  the  wall  is 
breached,  the  Ambracians  defend  the  gap  until  it  can  be  repaired.  So,  in  a  change  of 
tactics,  the  Romans  start  tunnelling  under  cover  of  shelters  (vineae,  gerra),  and  continue 
day  and  night,  but  the  increasing  heap  of  extracted  earth  alerts  the  townsfolk.  They  dig  a 
trench  parallel  to  the  town  wall  in  the  general  area  of  the  Roman  tunnel  and,  after 
hanging  bronze  sheets  on  the  wall  of  the  trench  to  detect  the  vibrations  of  the  Roman 
diggers,  dig  a  counter-mine.  When  they  intercept  the  Roman  tunnel,  an  underground 
battle  ensues.  (Nobilior  later  refers  to  fifteen  days  of  battle,  above  and  below  ground,  in 
a  speech  attributed  to  him:  Livy  39.4.9.  )  The  Ambracians  construct  a  device  to  fin  the 
Roman  tunnel  with  smoke,  and  put  an  end  to  the  mining  attempts.  Finally,  the 
Ambracians  are  persuaded  to  surrender,  and  the  siege  is  raised. 
Sources:  Livy3g.  4.1-5.5,6.1-9,7.4-13,9.6-14;  39.4.9;  Polybius2l.  27.1-28.18; 
Polyaenus,  Strat.  6.17;  Zonaras  9.21 
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84.  Munda  (Spain),  179  B.  C. 
Ti.  Sempronius  Gracchus  storms  the  town  in  a  night  attack,  takes  hostages,  and  instaUs  a 
garrison. 
Source  :  Livy  40.47.1 
85.  Certima  (Spain),  179  B.  C. 
Gracchus  advances  siege  equipment  (opera)  against  the  town,  and  a  deputation  of 
townsfolk  request  a  parley.  Gracchus  parades  his  troops  to  overawe  them,  whereupon 
they  surrender,  pay  a  fine  and  provide  hostages. 
Sources:  Livy  40.47.2-10 
86.  Alce  (Spain),  179  B.  C. 
The  town  withstands  the  first  assault  by  Gracchus,  but  when  he  advances  siege  equip- 
ment  (opera)  the  townsfolk  flee  to  their  citadel  and  surrender  shortly  afterwards.  The 
Romans  take  much  booty  and  many  prisoners. 
Sources:  Livy  40.49.2-4 
87.  Nesactium  (Yugoslavia),  177  B.  C. 
C.  Claudius  Pulcher  encircles  the  town  (circumsedere)  and  brings  up  shelters  (vineae). 
The  nearby  river  is  diverted  to  deny  the  townsfolk  water,  whereupon,  in  despair,  they 
begin  to  slaughter  their  women  and  children.  The  Romans  take  advantage  of  their  pre- 
occupation  to  scale  the  walls  and  capture  the  town.  The  survivors  are  taken  captive 
along  with  some  modest  booty. 
Sources:  Livy  41.11.1-6 
88.  Haliartus  (Greece),  171  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  6) 
C.  Lucretius  Gallus  encircles  the  town  (circunuedere)  in  preparation  for  an  assault.  The 
townsfolk  launch  sorties  to  attack  the  siege-works  (opera)  and,  when  the  rarn  (arles)  is 
brought  up,  they  sabotage  it  with  huge  stones  and  lead  weights.  A  section  of  wall  with 
two  towers  is  breached,  but  a  new  wall  is  thrown  up  inside. 
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Gallus  then  launches  an  escalade  all  around  the  town,  excluding  the  marshy  Kopais. 
Simultaneously,  two-thousand  troops  are  sent  up  to  the  breach,  to  distract  the  defenders. 
The  latter,  in  turn,  have  obstructed  it  with  dry  branches  which  they  threaten  to  ignite,  but 
a  sudden  downpour  removes  this  danger.  The  escalade  succeeds  and  there  is  wholesale 
slaughter;  many  flee  to  the  citadel,  but  surrender  next  day.  Booty  is  taken  and  the  town 
destroyed. 
Sources:  Livy  42.5  6.5,63.3  -11 
89.  Heracleum  (Greece),  169  B.  C. 
A  Popillius  Laenas  tries  to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed,  so  he  attacks  the  town  from  land 
and  sea  with  siege  equipment  (opera  machinaeque).  Some  soldiers  approach  the  pec- 
uliarly  low  town  wall  under  a  testudo  of  shields;  by  standing  on  top,  their  companions  are 
able  to  cross  over,  and  the  town  is  captured. 
Sources:  Livy44.9.1-10;  Polybius28.11.1-2 
90.  Meliboea  (Greece),  169  B.  C. 
When  Laenas  arrives  at  the  town  with  five  thousand  men,  the  townsfolk  defend  the 
walls,  dashing  his  hopes  of  a  storming  assault;  so  he  settles  down  for  a  blockade 
(obsidio)  and  prepares  equipment  (opera  ad  oppygnationem).  Hearing  that  the  town  is 
under  attack,  Perseus  sends  a  relieving  force  of  two  thousand  men,  so  the  Romans  set 
fire  to  their  equipment  and  withdraw. 
Sources:  Livy  44.13.4 
91.  Delminium  (Dalmatia),  156-155  B.  C. 
C.  Marcius,  Figulus  drives  the  Delmatae  into  their  main  stronghold,  but  he  can  neither 
take  the  place  by  assault,  nor  deploy  siege  equipment  (michanimata)  on  account  of  the 
terrain,  so  he  sets  fire  to  much  of  the  town  with  two-cubit  (0.9  m)  fire  arrows  shot  from 
catapults.  He  maintains  a  blockade  while  attacking  and  capturing  the  neighbouring 
towns,  which  are  undefended  because  the  Delmatae  are  mustered  at  Delminiun-L 
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In  the  following  year,  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica  oversees  the  final  capture  of  the  town. 
The  fortifications  are  destroyed  and  the  site  turned  over  to  sheep  pasture. 
Sources:  AppL%i,  Ill.  11;  Florus  2.25;  Strabo,  Geog.  7.5.5;  Frontinus,  Strat.  3.6.2; 
Zonaras  9.25 
92.  Nertobriga  (Spain),  152  B.  C. 
When  the  townsfolk  seek  terms,  M.  Claudius  Marcellus  demands  hostages  and  tribute. 
The  townsfolk  promise  good  behaviour,  but  continually  harass  the  Roman  supply  lines, 
so  Marcellus  devastates  the  neighbourhood.  When  the  townsfolk  see  "machinery 
(michanimata)  together  with  embankments  (ch5mata)  advancing",  they  petition  for 
peace. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  48 
93.  Cauca  (Spain),  151  B.  C. 
L.  Licinius  Lucullus  encamps  before  Cauca  and  requests  the  town's  surrender.  A 
skirmish  ensues,  in  which  the  townsfolk  are  worsted  and,  next  day,  they  sue  for  peace. 
Lucullus  makes  various  demands,  including  the  stationing  of  a  Roman  garrison  within  the 
walls.  Once  the  latter  are  in  place,  they  admit  their  comrades  and  slaughter  all  the  adult 
male  townsfolk;  the  town  is  sacked. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  51-52 
94.  Intercatia  (Spain),  151  B.  C. 
Lucullus's  attempt  at  negotiation  is  rebuffed,  so  he  devastates  the  countryside.  The 
town  is  encircled,  embankments  (ch5mata)  are  begun,  and  LucuHus  tries  to  provoke  a 
battle,  to  no  avail.  The  Romans  are  fatigued  from  maintaining  the  cordon,  there  is 
sickness  from  the  unusual  diet,  and  many  die  of  dysentery. 
Finally,  when  the  embankment  (ch5ma)  is  completed  and  the  wall  is  breached  by  rams 
(michanai),  the  Romans  are  repulsed  with  losses;  the  townsfolk  repair  the  wall. 
As  both  sides  are  now  suffering  from  famine,  a  treaty  is  arranged,  whereby  Lucullus  gets 
hostages,  cattle,  and  cloaks,  since  the  town  has  no  gold  or  silver. 
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Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  53-54;  Livy,  Per.  48 
95.  Carthage  (Tunisia),  149-146  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  8) 
The  consuls,  M'.  Manilius  and  L.  Marcius  Censorinus,  expecting  no  opposition  from  the 
supposedly  demilitarised  city,  assault  the  walls  with  ladders,  but  are  repulsed.  Men  sent 
to  fetch  timber  for  siege  equipment  (michanai)  are  attacked  by  Carthaginian  cavalry;  the 
Romans  construct  machines  and  ladders.  The  route  to  the  city,  situated  at  the  end  of  a 
wide  isthmus,  is  broadened  and  two  enormous  battering-rams  (duo  Wchanai  kriophoro! 
megalai)  are  brought  up,  one  of  them  allegedly  powered  by  six  thousand  infantrymen, 
but  the  breaches  in  the  wall  which  they  create  are  repaired  overnight.  The  Carthaghiuians 
sally  out  by  night  to  bum  the  Roman  engines  and  succeed  in  doing  some  damage. 
Sickness  breaks  out  in  Censorinus'  camp,  near  the  stagnant  lake  of  Tunis,  so  he  moves 
nearer  the  sea;  his  early  return  to  Rome  leaves  Manilius  dangerously  exposed. 
In  148,  no  move  is  made  against  Carthage,  which  continues  to  receive  supplies  by  land, 
in  the  face  of  the  continuing  maritime  blockade. 
Late  in  147,  the  admiral  Mancinus  mounts  an  escalade  and  breaks  into  the  city,  but  can 
make  no  headway.  P.  Cornelius  Scipio  Aemilianus,  arrives  in  time  to  extricate  him. 
Scipio  establishes  a  camp  before  Carthage  and  breaks  into  the  city  by  night,  but  with. 
draws  again  and  digs  two  ditches  with  palisades  across  the  25-stade  (4Y2km)  isthmus. 
In  addition,  facing  the  city,  he  builds  a  12-foot  (3.7  m)  wall  with  parapet  and  towers;  the 
central  tower  has  a  four-storey  timber  superstructure.  The  task  takes  twenty  days. 
Scipio  constructs  a  mole  to  close  off  the  harbour,  but  the  Carthaginiians  cut  a  new  chan- 
nel  to  the  sea,  so  he  attacks  the  eastern  quay  with  rams  and  machinery  (kriol 
... 
kal 
michanimata);  when  the  Carthaginians  fortify  it  with  towers,  he  builds  embankments 
(chimata)  from  which  to  throw  burning  sulphur  and  pitch,  and  thus  captures  the  quay. 
In  146,  C.  Laelius  captures  the  harbour  and  Scipio  breaks  into  the  Byrsa.  The  troops 
spend  six  days  firing  the  buildings  and  ravaging  the  city. 
Sources:  Appian,  Pun.  80-81,93,95-100,113-114,117,119,121,124-125,127-133; 
Zonaras  9.26-27,29-30;  Diodorus  Siculus.  32.14,24-25;  Florus  1.31.7-18; 
Livy,  Per.  49,51 
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96.  Hippagreta  Crunisia),  148  B.  C. 
Calpurnius  Piso  assaults  the  town,  which  has  been  intercepting  Roman  supply  ships 
bound  for  Carthage.  He  besieges  the  town  all  surnmer,  but  the  inhabitants  twice  burn  his 
siege  equipment  (michanai)  so  he  retires  to  winter  quarters  at  Utica. 
Sources:  Appian,  Pun.  110;  Zonaras9.29 
97.  Centob6ga  (Spain),  142  B.  C. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  attacks  the  town,  but,  when  he  brings  up  a  machine  (machina)  to 
demolish  the  only  accessible  part  of  the  walL  the  townsfolk  position  hostage  children  in 
its  path,  whereupon  Metellus  raises  the  siege. 
Sources:  Valerius  Maximus  5.15 
98.  Numantia  (Spain),  141-140  B.  C.  (cf  fig.  9) 
Q.  Pompeius  encamps  near  the  hill  town,  but  the  townsfolk  mount  a  sortie  and  destroy  a 
Roman  cavalry  force.  Pompeius  then  tries  to  alter  the  course  of  the  river  in  order  to 
deny  the  townsfolk  water,  but  his  activities  are  disrupted.  Foraging  troops  are  harassed 
by  the  Numantines,  and  new  recruits  arriving  from  Rome  fall  ill  with  dysentery,  some 
fatally.  Eventually,  both  sides  are  exhausted  by  the  siege,  and  the  Numantines  are  per- 
suaded  to  give  hostages  and  return  prisoners  and  deserters. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  76-79 
99.  Numantia  (Spain),  138  B.  C.  (cE  fig.  9) 
When  M.  Popillius  Laenas  besicges  the  town,  the  inhabitants  refuse  to  issue  out  for 
combat,  so  he  mounts  an  escalade  (scalis).  However,  seeing  that  the  townsfolk  still  offer 
no  resistance,  he  suspects  a  trap  and  recalls  the  ladder  parties,  whereupon  the 
Nurnantines  finally  sortie  out,  attacking  the  retreating  Romans  in  the  rear. 
Sources:  Front.,  Strat.  3.17.9 
100.  Lagni  (Spain),  136  B.  C. 
When  Pompeius  advances  against  the  town,  the  inhabitants  admit  four  hundred 
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Numantine  soldiers  by  night,  to  bolster  their  defence.  However,  becoming  alarmed  at 
the  situation,  the  townsfolk  decide  to  capitulate,  but  Pompeius  insists  that  they  surrender 
their  Numantine  allies,  who,  fearing  treachery,  turn  on  the  townsfolk.  Pompeius  takes 
advantage  of  the  confusion  to  mount  an  escalade  on  the  undefended  town.  He  kills  the 
noblemen,  but  releases  two  hundred  of  the  Numantines,  and  razes  the  town. 
Sourceý  Diod.  Sic.  33.17.1-3 
. 
101.  Pallantia  (Spain),  136  B.  C. 
L.  Aemilius  Lcpidus  makes  an  unprovoked  assault  on  the  town  of  Pallantia,  constructing 
siege  equipment  (michanai)  for  the  purpose.  The  siege  is  protracted,  causing  famine 
and  dysentery  amongst  the  Romans.  Finally,  Lepidus  raises  the  siege  and  departs  by 
night,  leaving  equipment  behind,  along  with  the  sick  and  wounded.  Next  day,  the  Pal- 
lantines  harrass  the  retreating  Roman  column. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  80-83 
102.  Numantia  (Spain),  133  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  9) 
Scipio  Aemilianus  and  his  brother,  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  establish  two  camps  near 
Numantia;  Scipio  refuses  to  risk  battle,  preferring  to  reduce  the  Numantines  by  famine.  A 
ditch  and  palisade  is  dug  to  protect  the  troops  while  they  dig  a  second  ditch  and  palisade 
behind  it,  and  finally  a  50-stade  (9  km)  wall,  eight  feet  (2.47  m)  wide  and  ten  feet  (3.1  m) 
high  to  the  wall-walk,  with  towers  everyplethron  (30.8  m);  in  a  marshy  area,  the  wall  is 
replaced  by  an  embankment  (ch6ma).  Catapults  (katapelta!  oxybeleis  kai  lithoboloi)  and 
ammunition  (fithoi  kai  beIJ  kai  akontia)  are  positioned  on  the  wall  towers.  Messengers 
and  signaling  procedures  are  arranged.  Appian  records  seven  forts  (phrouria)  around 
the  hill  town;  Florus  records  four  camps  (castra).  The  river  Douro,  flowing  past  the 
town,  cannot  be  spanned  by  the  circurnvallation,  so  a  tower  is  erected  on  either  bank, 
with  timber  obstacles  moored  floating  between. 
A  party  of  Numantincs,  using  a  folding  ladder,  crosses  the  wall  by  night,  to  seek  assist- 
ance  from  neighbouring,  peoples,  but  they  are  betrayed  to  Scipio.  The  Numantines  seek 
terms,  but  Scipio  requires  absolute  surrender,  which  they  are  unwilling  to  offer  until 
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famine  and  starvation  take  hold.  Some  commit  suicide,  and  the  remainder  are  sold;  the 
town  is  destroyed. 
Sources:  Appian,  Hisp.  90-98;  Florus  1.34;  Frontinus,  Strat.  2.8.7;  4.1.1,7.27 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  10  1-  104,  above. 
103.  Suthul  (Algeria),  109  B.  C. 
A.  Posturnius  Albinus  encamps  before  Jugurtha's  treasury  at  Suthul,  a  hill  town  sur- 
rounded  by  swamp,  and  prepares  for  an  assault,  despite  the  strong  defences  and  poor 
weather.  Albinus  advances  shelters  (vineae)  and  throws  up  an  embankment  (agger). 
Jugurtha  pretends  to  seek  terms  for  surrender,  while  subverting  some  of  Albinus's 
auxiliaries.  He  springs  a  night-time  attack  on  the  Roman  camp,  breaking  in  at  the  point 
defended  by  the  traitors,  and  the  Romans  flee  to  a  nearby  hill.  Albinus  agrees  to  an  un- 
conditional  withdrawal,  to  spare  his  army. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iug.  37.3-38.10 
104.  Zama  (Tunisia),  109  B.  C. 
Caecilius  Metellus  encamps  near  Zama  and  surrounds  the  town;  the  troops  raise  a  shout, 
but  the  townsfolk  are  resolute.  Attempts  are  made  to  undermine  and  to  scale  the  walls, 
under  cover  of  slingers,  but  the  townsfolk  roll  down  stones  and  throw  stakes  and 
javelins,  and  a  burning  mixture  of  pitch  and  sulphur;  their  walls  are  defended  by  artillery 
(tormenta). 
Next  day,  Metellus  renews  the  assault,  and  Jugurtha  arrives  to  attack  the  camp.  While 
the  townsfolk  are  watching  his  progress  from  the  walls,  Marius  launches  a  violent  esc- 
alade;  the  defenders  again  throw  stones,  firebrands  and  other  missiles,  and  the  ladders  are 
smashed.  On  the  third  day,  having  made  no  progress,  Metellus  raises  the  siege. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iug.  56.1,57.1-61.1 
105.  Vaga  (Tunisia),  109  B.  C. 
The  townsfolk  murder  the  Roman  garrison  and  declare  for  Jugurtha.  Metellus's  forces 
make  a  night  march,  arriving  behind  a  screen  of  allied  Numidian  cavalry  with  concealed 
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standards.  The  townsfolk  mistake  them  for  Jugurtha's  men  and  open  the  town  gates. 
The  Romans  immediately  seize  the  gates  and  slaughter  the  townsfolk.  The  town  is 
plundered  and  destroyed. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iqg.  66.2-69.4 
106.  Thala  (?  Algeria),  108  B.  C. 
By  forced  marches,  Metellus  surprises  Jugurtha  at  the  desert  town,  but  the  latter  escapes 
secretly  by  night.  Metellus  surrounds  the  town  with  a  ditch  and  palisade  (vallum 
fossaque),  and,  at  two  locations,  moves  up  shelters  (vineae),  builds  an  embankment 
(agger),  and  erects  a  tower  "to  protect  the  siege-works  (opus)  and  the  workers". 
Battering-rams  (arietes)  are  applied,  and,  in  the  sixth  week  of  the  siege,  the  walls  are 
breached  and  the  town  captured.  However,  when  they  realize  that  the  town  is  doomed, 
the  townsfolk  burn  their  valuables  before  throwing  themselves  onto  the  bonfire. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iug.  75.10-76.6 
107.  Capsa  (Tunisia),  107  B.  C. 
Marius  mounts  an  attack  on  the  desert  town,  arriving  by  surprise  at  daybreak  and  seizing 
the  gates.  He  enters  the  town  to  restrain  his  troops  from  plundering.  The  townsfolk 
surrender  immediately,  but  the  Romans  run  amok,  killing  and  burning.  The  survivors  are 
sold  and  the  booty  divided. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iug.  91.3-7 
108.  Fort  on  the  River  Muluccha  (Morocco),  106  B.  C. 
Marius  mounts  an  attack  on  the  isolated  fort,  situated  on  a  rocky  hill  which  is  unsuitable 
for  siege  apparatus  (aggeribus  turribusque  et  alfis  machinationibus  locus  importunus); 
the  only  approach  route  is  narrow,  precipitous  and  dangerous.  Marius  brings  up  shelters 
(vineae)  but,  before  they  have  advanced  far,  they  are  destroyed  by  fire  and  stones.  The 
defenders  continually  overturn  the  shelters  and  burn  them,  so  soldiers  can  neither  move 
between  the  shelters  without  danger,  nor  advance  their  apparatus  on  account  of  the 
uneven  terrain.  After  several  days,  a  hidden  access  route  is  found  on  the  far  side  of  the 
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hill.  Marius  sends  a  small,  lightly-equipped  party  (including  five  musicians  and  four 
centurions)  and  simultaneously  launches  a  fidl-scale  assault  under  a  testudo  of  shields, 
supported  by  catapults  (tormenta),  archers  and  slingers.  The  defenders  are  by  now  so 
audacious  that  they  are  operating  in  front  of  the  walls;  when  the  party  arrives  in  the  rear 
of  the  fort,  blasting  their  horns,  the  defenders  are  cut  down  as  they  retreat  to  the  fort. 
Sources:  Sallust,  Iug.  92.5-94.6 
109.  Asculum  (Italy),  90-89  B.  C. 
Cn.  Pompeius  Strabo  places  the  town  under  siege,  but  C.  Vidacilius's  relieving  force 
breaks  through  and  enters  the  town,  where  Vidacilius,  in  despair,  commits  ostentatious 
suicide.  The  siege  is  transferred  to  the  command  of  Sextus  Caesar,  who  pursues  it  for  a 
year,  before  Pompeius  returns  to  oversee  the  final  capture  of  the  town. 
Source,  :  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  1.48;  Florus  2.6.14;  Livy,  Per.  76;  Velleius  Paterculus 
2.21.1;  Orosius,  Contrapaganos  5.18.18;  ILLRP  1089-1102  (sfing  buflets) 
110.  Aeclanum  (Italy),  88  B.  C. 
On  Sulla's  arrival  before  the  town,  the  townsfolk  try  to  play  for  tkne,  hoping  for  help 
from  their  neighbours.  However,  Sulla  has  firewood  piled  around  the  walls  and,  when  it 
is  set  ablaze,  the  town  surrenders.  The  town  is  looted,  because  it  had  only  surrendered 
when  forced. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  1.51 
111.  Piraeus  (G  reece),  87-86  B.  C.  (cE  fig.  10) 
Sulla  launches  a  lightning  attack  on  Archaelaus,  Mithridates'  general  in  Piraeus.  He 
assaults  the  40-cubit  (19  m)  walls  with  ladders,  but  is  repelled  and  withdraws  to  Eleusis 
and  Megara  to  regroup.  The  town  of  Thebes  supplies  him  with  apparatus  including 
catapults  (katapeltai),  and  he  constructs  enormous  machines  using  wood  from  the  trees 
in  the  Academy.  An  embankment  (chi5ma)  is  built  using  materials  robbed  from  the  Long 
Walls;  Archelaus  erects  opposing  towers  equipped  with  engines  (organa).  He  makes  a 
nocturnal  sortie  and  bums  one  of  Sulla's  sheds  (chelineR)  and  some  equipment 
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(mkhanftata),  but  the  Romans  build  new  ones  in  ten  days.  When  Mithridates  sends 
reinforcements  by  sea,  Archelaus  joins  battle  with  Sulla,  but  his  forces  are  driven  back 
into  the  town.  Sulla  winters  at  Eleusis. 
In  86,  the  Romans  attempt  an  impromptu  escalade  using  ladders  brought  up  "through  the 
nearby  machines"  (App.,  Mithr.  34),  but  are  repulsed.  Archelaus  attempts  to  burn  one  of 
the  two  Roman  towers  without  success,  but  counters  it  with  a  tower  of  his  own.  Sulla's 
catapults  damage  Archelaus'  tower  so  badly  that  it  has  to  be  pulled  back.  Once  the 
embankment  is  finally  ready,  Sulla  advances  his  engines  (michanimata),  but  Archelaus 
has  managed  to  undermine  it,  so  that  it  suddenly  sinks.  While  the  embankment  is 
repaired,  a  Roman  force  tunnels  under  the  wall,  where  they  meet  the  enemy  tunnellers 
and  skirmish. 
Meanwhile,  several  machines  (michanftata)  on  the  embankments  (ch6mata)  pound  the 
town  wall  until  part  falls  down;  the  neighbouring  tower  is  set  on  fire  with  fire  arrows, 
and  an  escalade  is  attempted.  Another  section  of  wall  is  undermined  and  falls  down 
when  the  wooden  props  are  burned  using  sulphur,  hemp  and  pitch.  When  Archelaus 
repairs  the  walls,  the  Romans  renew  the  assault,  thinking  the  repairs  will  be  weak,  but 
they  are  well  protected,  so  Sulla  halts  the  operation  and  goes  to  Athens  (below,  112). 
When  he  returns,  he  brings  up  rams  (krioi);  a  large  force  digs  through  the  town  wall 
under  cover  of  sheds  (cheldnai),  and  a  newly  repaired  section  is  knocked  down. 
Although  he  finds  additional  walls  bolstering  the  damaged  section,  Sulla  perseveres  until 
Archelaus,  dumbfounded  by  his  persistence,  withdraws  by  sea  to  Thessaly;  the  town  is 
burned. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mithr.  30-37,40-41;  Plutarch,  Sulla  12.1-3,14.7;  Velleius 
Paterculus  2.23.3 
112.  Athens  (Greece),  87-86  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  10) 
Sulla  detaches  part  of  his  army  to  besiege  Aristion,  Mithridates'  general  in  Athens, 
before  proceeding  to  Piraeus  (above,  111).  By  the  winter,  the  city  is  suffering  from  star. 
vation,  so  Archelaus  attempts  to  send  in  supplies,  which  are  twice  intercepted  by  Sulla. 
270 Appendbc  1:  Catalogue  ofRoman  Sieges 
Sulla  encircles  the  city  with  a  ditch  and  associated  forts  (phrouria)  to  ensure  that  nobody 
escapes.  Acting  on  information  overheard,  he  launches  an  escalade  at  a  poorly-guarded 
sector;  the  Athenians  are  too  weak  to  repulse  the  Romans,  and  are  slaughtered 
indiscriminately.  A  section  of  wall  is  levelled  to  allow  the  whole  army  in,  and  they  run 
amok  killing  and  gathering  booty,  but  they  are  forbidden  to  bum  the  city. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mithr.  30,34-35,38-39;  Plutarch,  Sulla  12.1,13.1-14.7;  Velleius 
Paterculus  2.23.3-5 
113.  Praeneste  (Italy),  82  B.  C. 
Marius  the  Younger's  defeated  forces  take  refuge  in  Praeneste,  which  Sulla  encircles 
with  ditches  and  a  wall,  placing  Q.  Lucretius  Afella  in  charge.  Suffering  from  famine, 
after  Sulla  intercepts  various  relieving  forces,  Marius  constructs  a  camp  in  no-man's 
land,  from  which  he  assaults  Lucretius's  circurnvallation  over  several  days,  to  no  avail. 
Another  relieving  force  is  defeated  and  the  heads  of  the  generals  are  paraded  around 
Praeneste.  Finally,  the  townsfolk  surrender  in  desperation.  Marius  takes  refuge  in  a 
tunnel,  but  cornmits  suicide,  and  his  head  is  sent  to  Sulla.  Sulla  executes  all  of  Marius's 
officers,  slaughters  the  non-Roman  townsfolk,  and  plunders  the  town. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  1.87-88,90,93-94;  Plutarch,  Sulla  29.1,29.8,32.1; 
Velleius  Paterculus  2.26.1,4-6;  Valerius  Maximus  6.8.2 
114.  Langobriga  (Spain),  79  B.  C. 
Q.  Caecilius  Metellus  Pius  cuts  off  the  water  supply  to  the  town,  which  is  allied  to  the 
renegade,  Sertorius.  The  over-confident  Metellus's  troops  have  provisions  for  only  five 
days,  but  Sertorius  acquires  two  thousand  water-skins,  promising  a  reward  for  every  one 
safely  delivered  into  the  town,  and  orders  that  the  non-combatants  should  be  smuggled 
out  by  the  same  secret  route.  When  Metellus  sends  a  large  body  of  troops  out  foraging, 
Sertorius  ambushes  and  defeats  them.  Metellus  withdraws  from  the  town. 
Sources:  Plutarch,  Sertorius  13.4-6 
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115.  Isaura  Vetus  (Turkey),  75  B.  C. 
While  P.  Servilius  Vatia  is  besieging  the  town,  the  townsfolk  mount  a  nocturnal  sortie, 
mistakenly  assun-dng  the  Roman  fortification  (munitio)  to  have  been  abandoned;  the 
attack  is  repulsed  and  "the  ditches  are  half  filled  with  the  bodies  of  the  slairf'.  Servilius 
subsequently  diverts  the  nearby  river,  denying  the  town  its  water  supply.  The  inhabitants 
duly  surrender  and  are  sold  into  slavery-,  the  town  is  destroyed. 
The  neighbouring  town  of  Isaura,  Nova  promptly  seeks  terms  for  peace,  and  hands  over  a 
hundred  hostages,  plus  weapons  and  artillery  (tormenta). 
Sources:  Sallust,  Hist.  2  frg.  87  (Maurenbrecher);  Frontinus,  Strat.  3.7.1;  AE  1977, 
816 
116.  Themyscira  (Turkey),  72  B.  C. 
L.  Licinius  Lucullus  besieges  Mithridates'  garrison  with  embankments  (ch5mata),  towers 
(purgoi),  and  tunnels  "which  were  so  large  that,  in  then-4  a  multitude  could  attack  one 
another  under  the  ground"  (App.,  Mithr.  78).  The  defenders  break  into  the  tunnels  from 
above  and  insert  bears  and  other  wild  animals,  and  swarms  of  bees,  to  repel  the  sappers. 
The  siege  appears  to  have  been  abandoned. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mithr.  78;  Plutarch,  Lucullus  14.2 
117.  Heradea  Pontica  (Turkey),  72-71  B.  C. 
M.  Aurelius  Cotta  makes  an  initial  assault  on  the  town,  but  when  he  suffers  large 
casualties  he  encamps  and  prepares  for  a  siege.  He  targets  a  tower  with  a  shed  (cheldnj) 
and  a  battering-ram  (krlos),  but  the  ram  is  destroyed;  in  frustration,  he  burns  the 
machinery  (michanima)  and  beheads  the  engineers  (michanopoioi).  Resorting  to 
blockade,  the  fleet  of  his  colleague,  C.  Valerius  Triarius,  closes  off  the  harbour,  causing 
famine  and  plague  in  the  town.  Eventually,  the  garrison  commander,  Connacorex, 
escapes  by  sea,  betraying  the  town  to  Triarius.  The  Romans  pour  in  through  the  gates 
and  over  the  walls,  slaughtering  the  townsfolk  and  looting  valuables  and  furniture.  The 
town  is  destroyed. 
Sources:  Memnon  47-52  (Jacoby,  Frag,  Griech.  Hist.,  no.  434) 
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118.  Amisus  (rurkey),  72-71  B.  C. 
Lucullus  embarks  on  a  leisurely  siege  of  the  town,  and  entrusts  command  to  L.  Licinius 
Murena  while  he  pursues  Mithridates  in  search  of  a  decisive  battle.  The  siege  is  pro- 
tracted  because  the  garrison  commander,  Callimachus,  is  experienced  with  machinery 
(michanikos).  However,  Murena  storms  the  walls  when  the  watch  is  being  changed,  and 
Callimachus  abandons  the  town  after  setting  fire  to  it.  Lucullus  endeavours  to  extinguish 
the  conflagration,  but  his  soldiers  are  more  intent  on  looting  and,  by  morning,  the  town 
has  been  destroyed. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mithr.  78,83;  Plutarch,  Lucullus  14.3,15.1,19.2-6 
119.  Sinope  (Irurkey),  70  B.  C. 
Lucullus  besieges  the  town,  which  is  held  by  a  Cilician  garrison  under  the  command  of 
the  pirate  Seleucus,  acting  for  Mithridates.  The  garrison  set  fire  to  the  place,  bum  their 
heavier  ships,  and  proceed  to  escape  in  the  fighter  ones.  Lucullus  manages  to  kill  many 
before  they  can  depart,  and  restores  the  town  to  the  Sinopians. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mi1hr.  83;  Plutarch,  Lucullus  23.2-3;  Orosius,  Contra  paganos  6.3.2 
120.  Tigranocerta  (Turkey),  69  B.  C. 
Lucullus  entrusts  the  siege  of  King  Tigranes'  general,  Mancaeus,  to  a  certain  Sextilius, 
who  encircles  the  city  with  a  ditch,  brings  up  equipment  (michanai),  and  begins  to 
undermine  the  wall.  The  defenders  pour  naphtha  on  the  machinery  to  burn  it. 
Following  Tigranes'  defeat  in  battle  by  Lucullus,  Mancaeus's  disaffected  Greek 
mercenaries  admit  the  Romans  into  the  city,  which  they  duly  plunder. 
Sources:  Appian,  Mithr.  84,86;  Plutarch,  Lucullus  26.1-2;  29.2-3;  Dio/Xiphilinus 
36.1b.  1-3 
121.  Nisibis  (Turkey),  68  B.  C. 
Lucullus  arrives  in  high  summer  before  the  town,  where  Tigranes  has  left  his  brother, 
Gouras,  and  the  engineer,  Callimachus,  in  charge  of  his  treasury.  Lucullus  can  make  no 
headway  against  the  town,  with  its  thick,  double  walls  and  intervening  ditch.  By  winter, 
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the  garrison  has  grown  careless  and,  on  a  moonless,  stormy  night,  evacuate  the  outer 
defences;  Lucullus  immediately  mounts  an  assault,  using  previously  erected  embank- 
ments  (chamala)  to  ascend  the  outer  wall.  Killing  the  few  remaining  guards,  his  men  fill 
in  the  intermediate  ditch  and  easily  capture  the  inner  wall.  Some  of  the  defenders  flee  to 
the  citadel,  but  later  surrender.  Gouras  is  treated  with  clemency,  but  Callimachus  is 
imprisoned  for  having  destroyed  Amisus  (above,  118).  Lucullus  captures  the  treasury 
and  overwinters;  in  the  city. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio,  36.6.2-7.4;  Plutarch,  Lucullus  32.4 
122.  Jerusalem  (Israel),  63  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  22) 
Aristobulus  H  of  Judaea  reneges  on  his  treaty  with  Cn.  Pompeius  Magnus  (Pompey), 
refusing  to  pay  the  agreed  tribute  to  his  general,  Gabinius,  so  Pompey  arrests  Aristobulus 
and  marches  on  Jerusalem.  The  followers  of  his  brother,  Hyrcanus,  admit  Pompey  and 
his  army,  while  Aristobulus's  followers  withdraw  to  the  Temple  and  prepare  to  stand 
siege.  Pompey  tries  to  negotiate  but  is  rebuffed,  so  he  encamps  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Temple,  where  it  is  protected  by  a  deep  ditch  (60  feet  deep  and  260  feet  wide,  according 
to  Strabo,  16.2.40);  he  may  also  have  established  a  second  camp  to  the  south-west  of  the 
city  (cf  Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.506).  The  Jews  fail  to  stop  the  Romans  filling  the  ditch  with  an 
embankment  (ch6ma)  of  timber  felled  in  the  neighbourhood.  Towers  (purgoi)  are 
erected  on  it,  and  machines  (michanai)  brought  from  Tyre  breach  the  wall,  while  stone- 
projectors  (petroboloi)  repulse  those  trying  to  obstruct  the  work  from  above.  After 
three  months,  the  Romans  throw  down  one  of  the  towers,  and  two  centurions  lead  the 
assault  into  the  Temple.  It  is  the  Sabbath  and  the  Jews  offer  no  resistance  to  the  Roman 
slaughter.  Pompey  takes  no  plunder  and  leaves  the  Temple  intact  (though  Dio  alleges 
that  looting  took  place). 
Source:  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud.  14.55-76;  Bell.  Jud.  1.141-154;  Cassius  Dio  27.16 
123.  Solonium  (France),  61  B.  C. 
L.  Marius  and  Ser.  Galba,  encamp  and  set  fire  to  parts  of  the  town,  but  are  prevented 
from  capturing  it  by  the  arrival  of  a  relieving  force  under  the  command  of  Catugnatus. 
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The  governor  of  Gallia  Narbonensis,  C.  Pomptinus,  sends  reinforcements  and  captures 
the  town. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  37.48.2;  Livy,  Per.  103 
124.  Noviodunum  (France),  57  B.  C. 
C.  Julius  Caesar  endeavours  to  storm  the  town,  but  is  thwarted  by  the  breadth  of  the 
ditch  and  the  height  of  the  walls,  so  he  encamps  and  brings  up  shelters  (vineae),  builds  an 
embankment  (agger),  and  constructs  towers  (turres).  The  townsfolk  are  overawed  by 
the  scale  of  the  siege-works  and  the  speed  of  their  construction,  and  immediately 
surrender.  Caesar  takes  hostages  and  disarms  the  townsfolk. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  2.12-13 
125.  Strongholds  of  the  Vencti  (France),  56  B.  C. 
Caesar's  assault  on  the  maritime  Veneti  is  complicated  by  the  location  of  their  oppida  on 
promontories,  which  are  only  accessible  by  land  at  low  tide.  Accordingly,  at  each 
oppidum,  Caesar  builds  an  embankment  (agger  ac  moles)  to  keep  back  the  water  and 
allow  access  up  to  the  walls.  But,  in  every  case,  the  townsfolk  are  immediately 
evacuated  by  ship.  In  frustration,  Caesar  halts  the  land-based  operations;  the  Veneti  are 
later  defeated  at  sea  by  the  Roman  fleet. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  3.12 
126.  Town  of  the  Atuatuci  (Belgium),  57  B.  C. 
Caesar  constructs  a  3-mile  (41/2km)  palisade  (vallum),  with  closely-spaced  forts  (cas- 
tella),  around  the  town,  then  brings  up  shelters  (vineae)  and  constructs  an  embankment 
(agger).  The  townsfolk's  amusement  on  seeing  a  tower  (turris)  constructed  in  the  dist- 
ance  turns  to  dismay  when  they  see  the  machine  (machinatio)  approaching  the  walls. 
They  immediately  sue  for  peace,  but  beg  not  to  be  disarmed.  Caesar  agrees  to  spare 
them  if  they  surrender  before  his  battering-ram  (aries)  touches  the  wall,  but  insists  on 
disarmament.  Although  the  townsfolk  agree,  they  mount  a  night-time  attack  on  the 
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Roman  lines,  and  are  defeated.  Next  day,  Caesar  breaks  down  the  town  gates,  the  town 
is  occupied  and  the  townsfolk  are  sold. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  2.30-33 
127.  Alexandrion  (Israel),  57  B.  C. 
The  pretender,  Alexander,  the  son  of  Aristobulus,  causes  trouble  for  the  Roman  client 
king  of  Judeaea,  Hyrcanus,  and  is  defeated  in  battle  by  Gabinius,  the  governor  of  Syria, 
and  his  deputy,  M.  Antonius  (Mark  Antony).  Alexander  flees  to  the  fortress  of  Alex- 
andrion,  and  Gabinius  tries  to  negotiate  but  is  rebuffed  and  besieges  the  place  so  vigor- 
ously  that  Alexander  surrenders;  Gabinius  demolishes  the  fortress. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud.  14.82-90;  Bell.  Jud.  1.160-168 
128.  Town  of  the  Sotiates  (France),  56  B.  C. 
Having  defeated  the  Sotiates  in  battle,  P.  Licinius  Crassus  assaults  their  town,  bringing 
up  shelters  (vineae)  and  constructing  an  embankment  (agger)  for  his  towers  (turres). 
The  townsfolk  mount  a  sortie,  and  then  attempt  to  undermine  the  embankment,  but  fail, 
and  sue  for  peace.  When  Crassus  demands  their  disarmament,  their  chieftain,  Adia- 
tunnus,  leads  a  desperate  attack  but  is  driven  back  into  the  town.  Crassus  takes  hostages 
and  disarms  the  townsfolk.  The  whole  operation  takes  a  few  days. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  3.21-22 
129.  Zenodotium  (?  Turkey),  54  B.  C. 
While  M.  Licinius  Crassus's  troops  are  occupying  friendly  towns  in  Mesopotamia,  the 
townsfolk  of  Zenodotiurn  kill  a  hundred  Romans  (treachery  is  implied),  so  Crassus 
assaults  the  town,  plunders  its  wealth  and  sells  the  townsfolk  into  slavery. 
Sources:  Plutarch,  Crassus  17.5-6 
130.  Vellaunodunum  (France),  52  B.  C. 
Caesar  surrounds  the  town  (circumvallare)  in  two  days.  On  the  third  day,  the  townsfolk 
sue  for  peace,  so  Caesar  takes  hostages  and  pack  anhnals,  and  disarnis  the  townsfolk. 
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Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.11 
131.  Cenabum  (France),  52  B.  C. 
Caesar  encamps  before  the  town,  where  some  Roman  traders  have  lately  been  murdered, 
and  troops  are  detailed  to  watch  the  town  overnight.  The  townsfolk  attempt  a  nocturnal 
escape,  but  the  troops  on  watch  intercept  them,  set  fire  to  the  town  gates,  and  enter  the 
town.  Caesar  gives  them  free  rein  to  plunder  and  burn  the  town. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.11 
132.  Avaricum  (France),  52  B.  C.  (cf  fig.  11) 
Caesar  encamps  on  the  narrow  approach  through  the  surrounding  marshes;  as  the 
location  will  not  permit  a  circumrallation,  he  begins  construction  of  an  embankment 
(agger),  moves  up  shelters  (vineae),  and  builds  two  towers  (turres).  The  defenders 
attempt  to  undermine  the  embankment  and  mount  sorties  to  set  fire  to  it  and  disrupt  the 
siege  operations  (opera).  The  defenders  build  hide-covered  turrets,  which  they  incre- 
ment  in  height  to  match  the  Roman  towers,  rising  daily  with  the  heightening  of  the  em- 
bankment;  they  prevent  the  "open  tunne&'  (aperti  cuniculi;  cf.  p.  192)  from  reaching  the 
walls  by  using  fire-hardened,  sharpened  tknbers,  boiling-hot  pitch  and  very  heavy  stones. 
Despite  poor  weather,  after  25  days,  the  embankment,  330  feet  (97.6m)  wide  and  80  feet 
(23.6m)  high,  has  almost  reached  the  town  wall.  Some  of  the  defenders  tunnel 
underneath  and  start  a  fire,  while  others  on  the  wall  throw  firebrands  and  pitch,  and  still 
others  mount  sorties  on  both  sides  of  the  Roman  towers.  The  towers  are  dragged  back, 
the  embankment  is  cut  off,  and  troops  rush  to  extinguish  the  fire  and  repel  the  sorties, 
but  the  screens  (plutei)  for  the  towers  are  burnt,  preventing  the  Romans  from  easily 
giving  assistance.  A  Gaul,  throwing  burning  lumps  of  grease  and  pitch  at  one  of  the 
towers,  is  shot  by  a  scorpio,  as  is  his  con'Panion,  when  he  takes  up  the  task,  and  so  on, 
until  the  situation  is  brought  under  Roman  control. 
The  townsfolk  abandon  plans  to  escape,  fearing  that  the  Roman  cavalry  will  intercept 
them.  On  the  following  day,  the  works  (opera)  being  complete,  Caesar  brings  up  a 
tower.  The  troops  are  mustered  within  the  shelters  (vineae)  and,  under  cover  of  a  heavy 
277 Appendbr  1:  Catalogue  ofRoman  Sieges 
downpour,  suddenly  launch  an  assault,  forcing  the  defenders  back  off  the  wall  and  turrets 
and  occupying  the  wall-wak  The  defenders  arc  slaughtered  as  they  flee.  Caesar 
appropriates  the  supplies  laid  up  in  the  town. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.17,22,24-28,32 
133.  Gergovia  (France),  52  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  12) 
Caesar  reconnoitrcs  Vercingetorix's  hill-top  refuge.  Deciding  that  it  cannot  be  taken  by 
storm  (expugnatlo),  he  encamps  about  2V21an  south-east  of  the  town,  at  the  end  of  a 
ridge,  and  captures  a  Gallic  outpost,  farther  west,  on  the  summit  of  a  small  hill;  he  links 
the  two  with  twin  ditches,  12  feet  (3.6m)  wide,  in  order  to  safeguard  movements  to  and 
fro,  and  simultaneously  deny  the  townsfolk  access  to  the  river  in  the  valley  below. 
Caesar  then  decides  upon  a  surprise  assault:  while  his  Gallic  allies  create  a  diversion,  he 
secretly  transfers  troops  from  the  main  camp  across  to  the  small  camp,  and  thence  onto 
the  ridge  to  the  west  of  the  main  town  gate.  However,  some  of  the  troops  arc  over- 
enthusiastic;  one  centurion,  L.  Fabius,  is  lifted  up  onto  the  wall  by  three  of  his  comrades, 
whom  he  then  pulls  up  beside  him.  Vercingetorix  throws  fresh  Gallic  troops  into  the 
m8lde,  and  catches  the  Romans  on  disadvantageous  terrain.  Fabius  and  his  comrades  are 
cut  down  and  thrown  from  the  walls;  another  centurion,  M.  Petronius,  fails  to  hack  the 
gate  open,  and  falls  while  ensuring  the  safe  withdrawal  of  his  men.  In  total,  sixty-four 
centurions  arc  killed.  Caesar  reprimands  his  troops  in  a  parade  on  the  following  day,  and 
withdraws  from  Gergovia. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.36,41,44-53 
134.  Alesia  (France),  52  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  13) 
Caesar  encamps  before  the  town,  which  Res  on  a  hill  between  two  rivers.  He  begins  an 
II  -mile  (I  61/4km)  fortification  (munitio),  with  camps  (castra)  and  twenty-three  forts 
(castella)  for  pickets  (stationes).  Vercingetorix  evacuates  all  his  cavalry  before  the 
investment  is  completed.  The  siege-works  (munitiones)  comprise  a  20-foot  (6  m) 
square-section  ditch-,  400  feet  (118  m)  of  dead  ground;  double  15-foot  (4.5  m)  ditches, 
the  inner  of  which  is  filled  with  water  from  the  diverted  river;  and  a  palisaded  rampart 
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(agger  ac  vallum),  12  feet  (3.5  m)  high,  with  breastwork  and  battlements  and  a  chevaux 
defrise  (cervi)  at  the  junction  of  the  wicker  screens  (plutei)  with  the  rampart,  and  turrets 
every  80  feet  (23.6  m).  Caesar  comments  that  the  circuit  is  too  long  for  a  cordon  of 
troops  (corona).  To  counter  the  frequent  sorties  from  the  town,  Caesar  arranges  a  line 
of  'grave  stones'  (cippi)  -  tree  trunks,  fixed  in  trenches  5  feet  (1.5m)  deep,  with  the  pro- 
jecting  branches  sharpened  and  entangled  -  then  eight  rows  of  'lilies'  (lilia)  -  thick,  fire- 
hardened  stakes,  concealed  beneath  brushwood  in  pits  3  feet  (0.9m)  deep,  and  arranged 
in  a  quincunx  pattern  -  and,  in  front  of  them,  'spurs'  (stimuli)  -  foot-long  (0.3  m)  logs, 
sunk  into  the  ground  and  tipped  with  a  barbed  iron  point.  Broadly  the  same 
arrangements  are  duplicated  facing  outwards  on  a  14-mile  (21  km)  circuit. 
The  Gauls  try  to  send  away  the  old  and  infirm,  but  Caesar  does  not  allow  them  through 
the  siege-lines.  A  relieving  force  arrives,  but  is  defeated  by  the  Roman  cavalry.  The 
defenders,  having  issued  from  the  town  and  crossed  the  first  ditch  by  covering  it  with 
wicker  and  earth,  withdraw  again.  The  relieving  force  then  prepare  wicker  panels  (cra- 
tes),  ladders  (scalae)  and  hooks  (harpagones)  and  attack  the  outer  line  by  night,  but  are 
beaten  back.  The  defenders  simultaneously  launch  a  sortie  against  the  inner  line,  but  fall 
foul  of  the  traps  and  are  picked  off  by  artillery  (tormenta)  andpild  muralia.  The 
Romans  are  forced  to  fight  on  several  fronts  when  part  of  the  Gallic  relieving  force  seizes 
a  hill  overlooking  one  of  the  Roman  camps,  another  part  feints  at  the  siege-works,  and 
the  townsfolk  assault  the  circumvallation  with  wicker  panels,  poles,  galleries  (muscult) 
and  hooks  (falces).  After  bitter  fighting,  the  relieving  force  is  utterly  defeated  and  the 
townsfolk  repulsed.  Vercingetorix  surrenders  and  disarms;  the  townsfolk  are  taken  into 
slavery. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Gall.  7.69-74,78-89;  Cassius  Dio  40.39.340.6 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  104-111,  above. 
135.  Uxellodunum  (France),  51  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  15) 
The  Gallic  rebelsý  Drappes  and  Lucterius,  take  refuge  in  the  hifl-town,  which  C.  Caninius 
Rebilus  surrounds  with  three  camps  (castra)  and  an  unspecified  number  of  forts 
(castella).  He  begins  construction  of  an  encircling  palisade  (vallum).  Fearing  a 
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blockade,  Drappes  and  Lucterius  slip  out  of  the  town  to  organize  supplies  of  com.  Their 
forces  mount  nocturnal  assaults  on  Caninius's  forts,  so  he  halts  construction  of  the 
circumvallation  (munitiones),  in  case  it  proves  too  long  to  defend  effectively  and  thus 
weakens  each  of  his  guard  posts  (praesidia).  The  com  supplies  are  intercepted  en  route 
to  the  town,  Lucterius  flees,  Drappes  is  captured,  and  Caninius  completes  his  siege- 
works  (opera).  Caesar  arrives  and  prevents  the  townsfolk  accessing  the  river,  which 
flows  along  the  valley  below  the  town,  by  posting  archers,  slingers,  and  artillery 
(tormenta)  to  cover  the  access  route.  However,  at  the  base  of  the  town  wall  on  the 
other  side,  there  is  a  freshwater  spring.  Caesar  builds  up  a  60-foot  (17.7  rn) 
embankment  (agger)  at  this  spot,  under  cover  of  shelters  (vineae),  and  erects  a  ten- 
storey  tower  (turris)  from  which  artillery-fire  can  target  the  spring.  In  panic,  the 
townsfolk  attack  the  embankment  by  rolling  burning  barrels  of  tallow  and  pitch  down  the 
hill,  and  try  to  distract  the  Romans  from  extinguishing  the  flames.  Meanwhile,  the 
Romans  have  been  driving  "covered  tunnels"  (cuniculi  tecti)  up  to  the  head  of  the  spring, 
without  the  townsfolk  realizing,  and  divert  the  water  away.  Already  suffering  from 
thirst,  they  surrender  in  despair.  Caesar  makes  an  example  of  them  by  cutting  off  the 
hands  of  all  who  had  borne  arms. 
Sources:  Hirtius,  Bell.  Gall.  8.33-37,40-44;  Orosius,  Contra  paganos  6.11.20-29 
136.  Pindenissus  (Turkey),  51  B.  C. 
M.  Tullius  Cicero  encircles  the  mountain-top  town  with  a  palisade  and  ditch  (vallum  et 
fossa)  and  constructs  six  forts  (castella)  and  some  large  camps  (castra  maxima).  He 
begins  construction  of  embankments  (aggeres),  and  deploys  shelters  (vineae),  a  tower 
(turris  allissima)  and  much  artillery  (magna  tormentorum  copia),  besides  his  force  of 
archers.  The  town  surrenders  on  the  fifty-seventh  day  and  is  burnt. 
Sources:  Cicero,  AdFam.  2.10.3,15.4.10;  AdAit.  5.20 
137.  Corrinium  (Italy),  49  B.  C. 
Caesar  encamps  before  the  town,  whereupon  L.  Donýtius  Ahenobarbus  positions 
artillery  (tormenta)  on  the  walls.  Caesar's  reinforcements  arrive  three  days  later,  and 
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encamp  on  the  other  side  of  the  town.  He  begins  to  surround  the  town  with  a  rampart 
and  forts  (vallum  castellaque).  When  Domitius  plans  his  own  escape,  his  soldiers  betray 
him  to  Caesar-,  as  it  is  night,  Caesar  does  not  immediately  enter  the  town,  fearing  that  his 
troops  would  be  tempted  to  plunder  under  cover  of  darkness,  but  stations  troops  along 
the  siege-works  (opera)  in  an  unbroken  cordon  to  prevent  anyone  escaping.  Next  day, 
Domitius's  troops  take  an  oath  of  loyalty  to  Caesar,  and  the  siege  is  raised.  The  whole 
operation  has  taken  seven  days. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Ov.  1.16,18,20-23;  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  2.38;  Cassius  Dio 
41.10.2,11.1-3 
138.  Brundisium  (Italy),  49  B.  C. 
Caesar  blocks  the  harbour  entrance,  to  dissuade  Pompey  from  using  the  town  as  a  naval 
base.  He  extends  embankments  from  each  shore,  continuing  them  in  the  deeper  water  as 
a  double  he  of  30-foot  (8.9  m)  pontoons,  anchored  in  place,  covered  with  earth  and 
defended  by  wicker  screens  (crates  acplutei),  with  a  two-storey  turret  on  every  fourth 
pontoon.  Pompey  attempts  to  ram  the  pontoons  with  cargo  ships  equipped  with  three- 
storey  artillery  turrets.  Caesar  tries  to  negotiate  but  is  rebuffed.  Pompey  then  makes 
preparations  to  sail  for  Dyrrachium.;  in  case  Caesar's  troops  enter  the  town  to  stop  him, 
he  blocks  the  town  gates  and  open  plazas,  digs  ditches  across  the  streets,  and  creates 
hidden  traps  -  sharpened  stakes  in  pits  covered  with  wicker  panels  (crates)  and  earth. 
After  nine  days,  Pompey's  ships  arrive  to  ferry  his  troops  across  to  Dyrrachium;  the 
townsfolk,  disgruntled  at  his  treatment  of  them,  alert  Caesar,  who  mounts  an  escalade 
just  as  Pompey's  troops  are  embarking.  Two  ships  are  captured  when  they  run  afoul  of 
Caesar's  harbour  blockade. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Civ.  1.25-28;  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  2.40;  Cassius  Dio  41.12.1-3 
139.  Massifia  (France),  49  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  16) 
Pompey  puts  the  maritimc  town  on  a  war  footing,  closing  the  gates  against  Caesar, 
laying  in  supplies,  repairing  defences,  and  setting  up  armament  workshops.  Caesar 
deploys  towers  and  shelters  (turres  vineasque)  and  places  C.  Trebonius  in  charge. 
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Trebonius  begins  construction  of  two  embankments  (aggeres)  at  different  points,  brings 
up  shelters  and  towers  (vineae  lurresque),  mobilizes  a  multitude  of  men  and  pack- 
animals,  and  requisitions  osiers  and  timber.  (Lucan  misrepresents  one  of  the  two 
aggeres  as  a  rampart  connecting  the  Roman  camp  to  the  sea:  Bell.  Civ.  3.383-387.  )  One 
embankment  (agger)  is  raised  to  a  height  of  80  feet  (23.6m),  and  there  is  apparently  an 
attempt  to  tunnel  into  the  town  (Vitr.,  De  arch.  10.16.11). 
The  shelters  (vineae)  do  not  provide  adequate  protection  against  the  town's  formidable 
artillery  (tormenta);  in  particular,  12-foot  (3.5  m)  iron-pointed  stakes  fired  from  the 
largest  ballistae  crash  through  four  layers  of  wicker  panels  (crates)  before  sticking  in  the 
ground.  Accordingly,  Trebonius  constructs  galleries  (porticfis)  with  foot-thick  (0.30  rn) 
timbers  to  protect  the  workers  as  they  pass  material  forward  from  hand  to  hand  for  the 
embankment.  To  level  the  ground  in  front,  he  deploys  a  60-foot  (18  rn)  shed  (testudo), 
covered  with  all  sorts  of  materials  to  protect  against  fire  and  stones.  The  operation  is 
protracted  by  the  strength  of  the  defences,  the  quantity  of  Massiliot  artillery,  and  the 
frequency  of  their  sorties.  Consequently,  under  cover  of  screens  and  shelters  (plutei  ac 
vineae),  the  Romans  plant  a  brick  refuge  (castellum  ac  receptaculum)  near  the  town 
wall,  30  feet  (8.9m)  square,  with  walls  5  feet  (1.5m)  thick,  and  later  build  it  up  as  a  six- 
storey  tower.  Then,  a  60-foot  (17.7  m)  long  gallery  (musculus)  is  rolled  into  place, 
leading  from  the  Roman  tower  right  up  to  a  tower  on  the  town  wall,  which  the  Romans 
begin  to  undermine.  The  Massiliots  tip  blocks  of  masonry  and  blazing  barrels  of  pitch 
onto  the  roof  of  the  gallery,  which  easily  deflects  them.  The  Romans  drive  the  defenders 
away  with  artillery-fire  from  the  brick  tower,  embhng  the  successful  undermining  of  the 
tower  on  the  town  wall,  whereupon  the  town  surrenders. 
Caesar  has  forbidden  Trebonius  to  allow  the  soldiers  into  the  town,  to  prevent  indis- 
criminate  slaughter,  so  the  siege  is  suspended,  awaiting  his  arrival.  However,  after  a  few 
days,  the  Massihots  set  fire  to  the  siege-works  (opera),  destroying  the  embankment, 
screens,  shed,  tower,  artillery,  and  the  gallery  and  brick  tower  (agger,  plutei,  testudo, 
turris,  tormenta  ...  musculus  turrisque).  The  other  embankment  and  tower  are  attacked 
on  the  following  day. 
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Trebonius  builds  a  new  type  of  embankment  (agger),  because  the  neighbourhood  has 
been  stripped  of  timber:  two  6-foot  (1.8  rn)  thick  brick  walls  are  bridged  with  timbers, 
supported  beneath  by  uprights  and  cross-beams,  and  covered  with  wicker  panels  (crates) 
and  clay;  the  Romans  work  safely  inside  the  structure,  protected  in  front  by  screens 
(plutei).  It  is  completed  within  a  few  days,  whereupon  the  Massiliots  surrender. 
Sources:  Caesar,  BeM  Civ.  1.34,36,2.1-2,8-16,22;  Lucan,  Bell.  Ov.  3.375-398, 
453-508;  Vitruvius,  De  Archilectura  10.16.11-12 
140.  Utica  (Tunisia),  49  B.  C. 
Caesar's  general,  C.  Scribonius  Curio,  occupies  the  site  of  the  castra  Corneliana  (see 
64,  above),  but  the  water  supply  is  poisoned  and  his  men  fall  ill,  so  he  encamps  outside 
the  town.  After  a  skirmish,  Curio  surrounds  the  town  with  a  palisade  (vallum),  where- 
upon  the  townsfolk  consider  surrendering.  However,  hearing  of  the  approach  of  a 
relieving  force,  Curio  abandons  the  siege  and  retreats  to  the  castra  Corneliana. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Civ.  2.24,26,33-37;  Appian,  BeIL  Civ.  2.4446;  Cassius  Dio 
41.41.4 
141.  Salonae  (Croatia),  48  B.  C. 
Pompey's  general,  M.  Octavius,  tries  to  negotiate  with  the  pro-Caesarians  in  the  coastal 
town  but  is  rebuffed,  so  he  mounts  an  assault.  The  defenders  raise  timber  towers  on  the 
wall  circuit,  free  the  adult  slaves,  and  collect  their  womenfolk's  hair  for  catapult  springs. 
Octavius  surrounds  the  town  with  five  camps  (castra)  and  tries  a  combination  of 
blockade  (obsidio)  and  assault  (oppugnatio).  When  the  town's  supplies  begin  to  fail, 
and  boredom  makes  the  besiegers  careless,  the  townsfolk  mount  an  assault  on  one  of 
Octavius's  camps  and,  routing  the  besiegers,  continue  to  the  second,  and  the  third,  and 
so  on.  Octavius's  men  flee  to  their  ships  and  the  siege  is  raised. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Civ.  3.9 
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142.  Oricum  (Albania),  48  B.  C. 
Pompey's  son,  Cn.  Pompeius,  attacks  the  pro-Caesarian  town,  protected  by  water  on 
three  sides.  Caesar's  generaL  M.  Acilius  Caninianus,  secures  his  warships  in  the  inner 
harbour  by  sinking  a  merchantman  in  the  entrance  and  fastening  another  one  to  it. 
Pompey  attacks  the  town  by  land-based  escalade  and  from  shipboard,  gaining  access  to 
the  harbour  by  dragging  away  the  sunken  ship  using  a  winch  (remulcum)  and  over- 
powering  the  other  ship.  He  tows  away  four  of  Acilius's  warships  and  bums  the  rest;  the 
town  is  captured. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Ov.  3.3940;  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  2.56 
143.  Dyrrachium  (Albania),  48  B.  C.  (cE  fig.  17) 
Caesar  plants  forts  (castella)  along  a  line  of  hilltops  enclosing  Pompey's  carnp,  to 
separate  him  from  his  supply  base  at  Dyrrachium,  but  Pompey  immediately  seizes  as 
large  an  area  as  possible,  by  establishing  his  own  ring  of  twenty-four  forts,  marking  out  a 
circuit  of  15  miles  (22  krn).  Caesar  begins  to  connect  his  forts  with  a  continuous  17-mile 
(25  km)  fortification  (perpetuae  munitiones),  and  Pompey  does  likewise,  deploying 
archers  and  slingers  against  Caesar's  work  gangs,  and  in  one  area  bringing  up  artillery 
(tonnenta)  as  well.  There  are  frequent  running  battles,  and  finally,  Pompey  launches  a 
concerted  attempt  to  break  through  the  blockade  at  the  southern  end,  where  Caesar  has 
supplemented  the  inward-facing  fifteen-foot  (4.4  m)  ditch  and  ten-foot  (3  m)  rampart 
with  an  outward-facing  fortification,  600  feet  (ca.  175  m)  away,  but  has  not  yet  closed 
the  fines  off  to  the  sea.  Accordingly,  a  dawn  attack  on  the  inner  line  -  the  ditches  are 
filled  in  and  ladders  brought  up  to  facilitate  an  escalade  -  is  coordinated  with  an 
amphibious  attack  on  the  outer  fine  and  the  space  between.  Caesar's  forces  are  routed, 
and  he  abandons  the  siege,  with  an  army  apparently  suffering  from  famine  and  disease. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Ov.  3.41,43-45,49-55,62-73;  AppL-u4  Bell.  Civ.  2.60-63; 
Cassius  Dio  41.50.3;  Plutarch,  Caesar  39;  Pompey  65;  Valerius  Maximus 
3.2.23;  VeHeius  Paterculus  2.51.1-2;  Florus  2.13 
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144.  Gomph!  (Greece),  48  B.  C. 
The  townsfolk  bar  their  gates  against  Caesar,  so  he  encamps  before  the  town  and  orders 
ladders  and  galleries  (scalae  musculique)  and  wicker  panels  (crates)  to  be  prepared.  He 
launches  an  assault  in  mid-afternoon  and  captures  the  town  before  nightfall.  The  town  is 
turned  over  to  the  soldiers  to  plunder,  as  a  punishment  for  shutting  him  out. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Civ.  3.80;  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  2.64;  Plutarch,  Caesar  41 
145.  Pharos,  Alexandria  (Egypt),  48  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  18) 
Caesar  is  confined  to  the  palace  quarter  by  the  Egyptians,  so  he  fortifies  his  Position, 
creating  a  "no-man's  land"  by  demolishing  peripheral  buildings  with  battering-rams, 
reinforcing  poorly  defended  sectors  with  sheds  and  galleries  (testudines  ac  muscull),  and 
shutting  off  an  area  of  marsh  to  the  south  with  shelters  (vineae).  Both  sides  are 
equipped  with  artillery  (tormenta).  The  Egyptians  set  up  workshops,  erecting  40-foot 
(12  m)  masonry  barriers  and  building  ten-storey  wheeled  towers  (turres  ambulatoriae), 
powered  by  draft  animals.  Meanwhile,  a  number  of  naval  engagements  are  fought,  with 
the  Romans  prevailing.  Caesar  then  makes  an  opposed  landing  on  the  Pharos  island, 
and,  although  without  ladders  or  wicker  panels  (crates)  his  troops  cannot  scale  the  30- 
foot  (8.8  m)  fortifications,  the  defenders  flee.  Caesar  gives  his  troops  free  rein  to  plun- 
der,  builds  a  fort  (castellum),  and  seizes  the  Heptastadium.  causeway,  linking  the  island 
to  the  mainland.  However,  the  over-confidence  of  the  marines  loses  the  causeway  and 
the  fort  to  the  Egyptians.  Roman  reinforcements  arrive  and  the  issue  is  resolved  in  a 
pitched  battle. 
Sources:  Caesar,  Bell.  Civ.  3.111-112;  Bell.  Alex.  1-22;  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  2.90; 
Plutarch,  Caesar  49 
146.  Ulia  (Spain),  47  B.  C. 
Caesar's  general  in  Spain,  Q.  Cassius  Longinus,  encamps  outside  Ulia,  but  is  himself 
besieged  by  M.  Claudius  Marcellus  Aeserninus,  who  builds  forts  (castella)  around  the 
town  and  encloses  both  Cassius  and  Ulia  with  siege-works  (opera).  Before  the  ring  is 
complete,  Cassius  sends  away  his  cavalry.  A  relieving  force  under  Bogus  of  Mauretania 
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arrives  at  Marcellus's  outer  fortifications  (exteriores  munitiones)  but,  despite  fierce 
skirmishing,  cannot  dislodge  him.  The  governor,  M.  Aemilius  Lepidus,  arrives  to  settle 
the  quarrel,  and  Marcellus  submits  to  his  authority,  but  Cassius  demands  that  the  siege- 
works  (munitiones)  be  dismantled  first.  Work  is  under  way,  when  Bogus  attacks  one  of 
Marcellus's  forts,  and  Lepidus  is  obliged  to  intervene;  all  parties  then  disperse. 
Sourges:  Bell.  Alex.  61-63 
147.  Thapsus  (Tunisia),  46  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  19) 
Caesar  enc=ps  near  the  town  held  by  the  Pompeian,  C.  VergUius,  and  begins  to  encircle 
(circummunire)  the  coastal  headland  with  a  crescent  of  siege-works  (opera),  establishing 
guard  posts  (praesidia)  at  strategic  points.  He  plants  a  fort  (castellum)  between  the 
coast  and  the  nearby  salt  lake,  blocking  the  narrow  approach  to  the  town  from  the  south. 
The  Pompeian,  Q.  CaecUius  Scipio,  approaching  from  the  south,  is  obliged  to  skirt 
around  the  salt  lake  and  encamp  1  V2miles,  (21/4km)  to  the  north.  While  he  is  still 
entrenching,  Caesar  defeats  him  in  battle;  a  sortie  from  the  town  is  repulsed. 
Next  day,  Caesar  parades  his  troops  and  leaves  C.  Caninius  Rebilus  to  prosecute  the 
siege.  Following  Caesar's  victory  two  months  later,  a  fine  is  imposed  on  the  town  and 
plundering  is  forbidden. 
Sources:  Bell.  Afr.  79-80,86,97;  Cassius  Dio  43.7.1-9.1 
148.  Ulia  (Spain),  45  B.  C. 
Caesar  sends  L.  Vibius  Paciaccus  to  the  aid  of  Ulia,  which  Cn.  Pompeius  has  been 
besieging  for  several  months,  during  which  time  a  tower  on  the  town  wall  collapses  with 
the  weight  of  the  overcrowded  defenders.  The  Caesarian  forces  arrive  in  the  midst  of  a 
storm,  and  easily  pass  through  Pompeius's  pickets  (praesidia)  unseen.  Meanwhile, 
Caesar's  feint  at  Corduba  forces  Pompeius  to  raise  the  siege. 
Sources:  Bell.  Hisp.  34;  Cassius  Dio  43.31.4-32.6 
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149.  Ategua  (Spain),  45  B.  C. 
Caesar  encircles  the  pro-Pompeian  town  with  earthworks  (bracchia  circumducere;  Dio 
mentions  a  palisade,  staur5mata)  and  establishes  several  forts  (castella)  to  protect  his 
camp  (castra).  Then  he  builds  an  embankment  (agger)  and  brings  up  shelters  (vineae). 
The  town  defenders  make  a  nightly  attempt  on  the  siege-works,  throwing  fire  and 
missiles  from  the  walls,  but  a  sling  bullet  bearing  the  offer  of  surrender  fires  the 
Caesarians'  enthusiasm.  Next  day,  a  siegework  (opus)  is  constructed  at  the  wall,  a  large 
section  of  which  is  knocked  down  (Dio  attributes  this  to  a  mine).  There  is  renewed 
fighting  and  Caesar  throws  a  cordon  (corona)  around  the  town.  A  ballista  knocks  down 
a  (wooden)  tower,  with  the  five  men  and  the  look-out  boy  who  are  manning  it.  At  some 
point,  the  Ateguans  take  hostages  and  execute  them  on  the  town  battlements.  A  noc- 
turnal  sortie,  with  brushwood  and  wicker  panels  (crates)  for  crossing  the  ditch,  hooks 
(harpagones)  to  pull  apart  the  soldiers'  thatched  huts,  and  silverware  to  distract  the 
more  acquisitive  soldiers,  is  repulsed  with  much  slaughter.  In  further  skirmishing,  one  of 
Caesar's  towers  (turris  lignea)  is  set  alight  and  damaged  up  to  the  third  storey,  but  the 
townsfolk  lose  heart  on  account  of  Pompeius's  inaction.  Their  offer  of  surrender  is 
accepted  and  the  town  is  taken. 
Sources:  Bell.  Hisp.  6-19;  Cassius  Dio  43.33.2-34.5 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  II  If,  above. 
150.  Mutina  (Italy),  44-43  B.  C. 
Late  in  44  B.  C.,  D.  lunius  Brutus  Albinus  (Dechus  Brutus)  prepares  to  stand  siege 
against  M.  Antonius  (Mark  Antony),  and  lays  in  stores  of  salted  meat  in  preparation; 
Antony  encircles  the  town  with  ditches  and  walls.  Early  next  year,  the  townsfolk  begin 
to  suffer  from  famine,  and  the  Senate  instructs  Antony  to  raise  the  siege.  In  April, 
Antony's  army  checks  a  relieving  force  under  Octavian  and  C.  Vibius,  Pansa  at  nearby 
Forum  Gallorum,  but  is  itself  worsted  by  A.  Hirtius,  encamped  near  the  town.  Still 
hoping  to  reduce  the  town  by  starvation,  Antony  tries  to  avoid  battle,  but  is  badly  maul- 
ed  in  another  encounter  with  Octavian  and  Hirtius.  Fearing  that  Octavian  will  encircle 
his  army,  Antony  raises  the  siege  and  withdraws. 
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Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  3.49,61,65,70-72;  Cicero,  AdFam.  10.30.1-5,33.4; 
Phil.  6 
151.  Smyrna  (Turkey),  43  B.  C. 
The  conspirator,  C.  Trebonius,  refuses  P.  Cornelius  Dolabella  entry  into  Smyrna,  so  the 
latter  pretends  to  depart,  but  returns  by  night  with  ladders  and,  finding  the  walls  unman- 
ned,  takes  the  town  by  escalade.  Trebonius  is  executed  by  a  centurion,  and  his  body  and 
head  are  separately  treated  in  a  degrading  fashion. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  3.26 
152.  Laodicea  (Syria),  43  B.  C. 
The  renegade,  P.  Cornelius  Dolabella,  takes  refuge  from  C.  Cassius  Longinus  (Cassius) 
in  Laodicea,  a  town  located  on  a  peninsula.  Cassius  blocks  the  peninsula  with  a  2-stade 
(370  m)  stone  wall,  built  of  material  scavenged  from  the  suburbs,  and  defeats  Dolabella 
at  sea.  On  land,  an  embankment  (ch5ma)  is  raised,  and  an  attempt  is  made  to  break 
down  the  wall.  Cassius  fails  in  his  attempts  to  suborn  Dolabefla's  night  watch,  but  per- 
suades  some  centurions  to  open  some  posterns,  by  day,  and  captures  the  town.  Dolabella 
conunits  suicide,  the  town  is  plundered  and  the  leading  citizens  punished. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  4.60-62;  Cassius  Dio  47.30.3-7 
153.  Rhodes  (Greece),  42  B.  C. 
Having  defeated  the  Rhodian  navy  at  Myndos,  Cassius  lands  troops  on  the  island  and 
surrounds  the  town  by  land  and  sea.  They  repulse  the  land-based  assaults  of  C.  Famius, 
while  Cassius  leads  an  attack  on  the  sea  walls,  utilizing  collapsible  turrets  on  shipboard. 
The  townsfolk  fear  starvation,  and  open  discussions  with  Fannius,  but  Cassius  is  ad- 
mitted  by  partisans  within  the  town  and  captures  Rhodes  without  the  use  of  force. 
Cassius  forbids  his  troops  to  sack  the  town,  but  appropriates  the  contents  of  all  the 
public  treasuries,  and  orders  the  townsfolk  to  surrender  their  wealth.  Fifty  of  the  leading 
citizens  are  executed  and  a  garrison  installed 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Ov.  4.72-73 
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154.  Xanthus  (Turkey),  42  B.  C. 
On  the  approach  of  M.  lunius  Brutus,  the  townsfolk  dig  a  fifty-foot  (15.4  m)  ditch 
around  the  town,  having  destroyed  all  the  buildings  beyond,  to  deny  their  use  to  the 
enemy.  Some  of  the  townsfolk  attempt  to  escape  by  swimming  along  the  river  but  are 
caught  in  nets.  Working  day  and  night,  the  Romans  fill  in  the  ditch  in  a  few  days,  with 
protection  (skepastiria)  from  Xanthian  missile  fire.  They  proceed  to  attack  the  gates 
and  bring  up  machines  (michanimata)  against  the  wall,  but  when  the  wall  is  breached 
Brutus  calls  off  the  attack.  A  nocturnal  sortie  to  set  fire  to  the  machinery  (michanai)  is 
repulsed  and,  when  the  gates  are  closed  prematurely,  the  Xanthians  are  slaughtered 
outside.  Another  sortie,  this  time  by  daylight,  succeeds  in  burning  ladders  (Himakes)  and 
towers  (purgoi).  Some  Romans  manage  to  rush  into  the  town  before  the  gates  are 
closed;  trapped  in  the  town  and  pelted  from  the  roof-tops,  they  take  refuge  in  a  shrine 
near  the  walls.  Unable  to  break  through  the  gates,  a  party  cross  the  walls  using  tree- 
trunks  and  ropes,  and  open  the  main  gates  from  the  inside  to  admit  Brutus's  forces.  In 
panic,  the  Xanthians  begin  killing  their  families  and,  rejecting  Brutus's  offer  of  a  truce, 
bum  their  possessions  on  bonfires.  (Plutarch  alleges  that  the  town  walls  were  accident- 
ally  set  on  fire  by  sparks  from  the  burning  Roman  machinery,  but  that  the  townsfolk  then 
encouraged  the  conflagration.  )  Fewer  than  150  men  survive  to  be  taken  prisoner. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  4.76-80;  Plutarch,  Brutus  30.4-31.5 
155.  Perusia  (Italy),  41-40  B.  C. 
Late  in  the  year,  Octavian,  M.  Agrippa  and  Q.  Salvidienus  Rufus  surround  the  town  and, 
with  it,  L.  Antonius,  encamped  outside.  Octavian  encircles  the  town  with  a  15-foot  (4.6 
m)  ditch  and  rampart  56  stades  (10'/4km)  long,  and  closes  off  access  to  the  nearby  Tiber, 
while  Antonius  constructs  a  rampart  and  ditch  at  the  base  of  the  town  hill.  Relieving 
forces  under  C.  Asinius  Pollio  and  P.  Ventidius  are  headed  off,  and  seek  refuge  in  nearby 
towns.  Meanwhile,  Octavian  doubles  the  size  of  the  surrounding  ditch,  augmented  by 
sharpened  stakes,  and  heightens  the  wall,  adding  1,500  towers  at  60-foot  (18.5  m) 
intervals;  he  also  constructs  defences  facing  outwards.  Antonius  begins  to  succumb  to 
famine  and  forbids  food  to  be  given  to  slaves.  Despairing  of  relief,  he  mounts  a 
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desperate  dawn  assault,  with  iron  tools  for  wall-fighting  (sidirol  teichomachoi),  ladders 
(Himakes),  contrivances  (organa)  for  filling  up  the  ditches,  collapsible  towers  (Purgoi 
ptuktoi)  with  drawbridges  (sanides),  and  wicker  panels  (gerra)  to  cover  the  sharpened 
stakes.  Filling  in  the  ditch,  and  crossing  the  stakes,  his  troops  assault  the  rampart  with 
the  ladders  and  towers,  under  cover  of  stones,  arrows  and  slingshot.  Many  gain  the 
rampart  top  on  drawbridges,  but  Octavian  throws  fresh  troops  into  the  battle,  and 
Antonius's  men  are  repulsed  and  their  machinery  (michanimata)  smashed,  whereupon 
they  retreat.  Finally,  Antonius  surrenders;  his  troops  are  received  into  Octavian's  army, 
the  town  council  is  executed,  and  the  town,  which  was  to  have  been  plundered,  is  burned 
down  when  a  certain  Macedonicus  sets  fire  to  his  house  and  commits  suicide. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  5.32-38,46-49;  VeReiusPaterculus2.74.3-4;  ILLRP 
1106-1118  (sling  bullets) 
156.  Brundisium  (Italy),  40  B.  C. 
Mark  Antony  and  his  ally,  L.  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  are  denied  entry,  so  they  cut  off  the 
town  with  a  ditch  and  palisade  across  the  isthmus,  and  build  a  fine  of  towers  around  the 
harbour.  Octavian's  relieving  force  encamps  outside  these  fortifications,  whereupon 
Antony  begins  construction  of  machinery  (michanimata)  for  an  assault  on  the  town. 
However,  he  procrastinates  when  he  learns  that  further  relief  is  en  route,  and  that  his 
own  allies  are  faring  badly  elsewhere;  the  two  armies  begin  to  fraternise,  and  Antony  is 
eventually  reconciled  with  Octavian. 
Sources:  Appian,  Bell.  Civ.  5.56-59 
157.  Samosata  (Turkey),  38  B.  C. 
Mark  Antony  instructs  P.  Ventidius  Bassus  to  besiege  Antiochus  of  Commagene  on  the 
pretext  of  his  supposed  Parthian  sympathies,  but  in  reality  because  of  his  great  wealth. 
Antiochus  offers  to  pay  Ventidius  one  thousand  talents,  but  Antony,  out  ofjealousy, 
wishes  to  conclude  the  agreement  himself  On  Antony's  arrival,  the  Roman  soldiers 
become  disgruntled  on  account  of  his  treatment  of  Ventidius,  and  Antony  is  obliged  to 
make  do  with  Antiochus's  new  offer  of  three  hundred  talents. 
290 Appendix  1:  Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges 
Sources:  Plutarch,  Antony  34.2-4;  Cassius  Dio  49.20.5-22.2;  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud. 
14.439;  Bell.  Jud.  321-322 
158.  Aradus  (Syria),  38  B.  C. 
Antony's  lieutenant,  C.  Sosius,  captures  the  island  town  after  a  long  siege.  The 
townsfolk  are  reduced  to  dire  straits  through  famine  and  disease. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  49.22.3 
159.  Jerusalem  (Israel),  37  B.  C. 
When  Antigonus,  the  exiled  son  of  Aristobulus  11,  seizes  power  in  Judaea,  Herod 
marches  on  Jerusalem  with  the  aid  of  Roman  troops.  Encamping  north  of  the  Temple,  as 
Pompey  had  done  (see  122,  above),  he  commences  construction  of  three  embankments 
(ch5mata)  and  erects  towers  (purgoi)  on  them.  The  Roman  governor  of  Syria,  C. 
Sosius,  brings  two  legions.  The  defenders  attack  the  embankment  builders  from  the 
walls  and  attempt  to  repel  the  siege  machinery  (organa);  underground,  they  tunnel 
through  to  attack  Herod's  forces  unexpectedly;  and,  behind  any  threatened  sector  of 
wall,  they  erect  new  walls.  By  these  tactics,  they  prolong  the  siege  for  five  months. 
When  the  embankments  are  complete,  Herod  brings  up  machinery  (michanjinata)  to 
batter  the  north  wall,  and  breaks  through  in  forty  days;  it  takes  a  fialher  fifteen  days  to 
break  through  the  inner  wall  to  the  Upper  City,  from  where  Herod  finally  launches  an 
escalade  of  the  Temple  enclosure  by  20  picked  men  and  some  Roman  centurions.  The 
defenders  are  slaughtered  and  the  Temple  porticoes  burned;  although  Herod  tries  to  halt 
the  bloodshed  and  looting,  Sossius  permits  his  men  to  pillage,  whereupon  Herod  offers 
gifts  as  an  alternative.  Sossius  withdraws  from  Jerusalem  and  executes  Antigonus. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  49.22.3-6;  Josephus,  Ant.  Jud.  14.465-466,468-480,484-486; 
BeIL  Jud.  1.343-357 
160.  Praaspa  (Iran),  36  B.  C. 
Mark  Antony  invades  Parthia  late  in  the  year,  with  thirty  wagon-loads  of  siege  apparatus 
(michanimala),  including  a  battering-ram  (krios)  80  feet  (25m)  long.  However, 
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although  wood  is  in  short  supply  in  Media,  he  marches  ahead  of  the  siege  train,  ordering 
Oppius  Statianus  to  bring  it  along  behind.  Arriving  at  Praaspa,  Antony  builds 
embankments  (ch5mata)  with  some  difficulty.  King  Phmates  sends  a  cavalry  force 
against  Statianus,  to  destroy  the  siege  equipment  (michanai),  and  the  main  Parthian  army 
harasses  the  Ronian  foraging  columns.  Antony  runs  short  of  provisions,  but  cannot  send 
a  large  foraging  force,  which  would  leave  the  siege-works  unprotected  against  sorties, 
while  a  small  foraging  force  would  be  attacked  by  the  Parthians. 
Phraates  does  not  wish  to  prolong  the  action  through  the  winter,  so  he  offers  an  amnesty 
to  allow  Antony  to  withdraw.  Antony  accepts,  and  the  Parthians  immediately  destroy 
the  equipment  (Wehanimata)  left  in  situ  and  scatter  the  embankments. 
Sources:  Plutarch,  Antony  38.1-3;  Cassius  Dio  49.25.2-28.2 
161.  Metulum  (Croatia),  35  B.  C.  (cf  fig.  20) 
Octavian  surrounds  the  main  town  of  the  Iapodes  and  begins  to  raise  an  embankment 
(chima).  The  townsfolk  make  frequent  sorties  and  harass  the  Romans  from  the  town 
walls  with  captured  artillery  (michanao.  When  the  town  wall  is  breached,  a  new  wall  is 
built  behind  it.  Two  embankments  (ch6mata)  are  raised  and  four  boarding-bridges 
(geph)rai)  are  thrown  onto  the  new  wall.  The  Romans  fcint  at  the  other  side  of  the 
town,  while  troops  cross  the  bridges;  Octavian  observes  from  a  tower  (purgos).  There  is 
fighting  on,  and  beneath,  the  bridges,  and  three  are  broken;  nobody  dares  use  the  fourth 
bridge  until  Octavian,  accompanied  by  Agrippa  and  a  few  guards,  leads  the  way.  Then  a 
great  crowd  follows  him  and  the  bridge  breaks  under  the  weight.  New  bridges  are 
constructed  and  the  townsfolk  sue  for  peace.  They  agree  to  receive  a  garrison  but  refuse 
to  disarm,  and  are  slaughtered  in  a  last  desperate  stand;  the  town  is  burned. 
Sources:  Appian,  Ill.  19-21;  Cassius  Dio  49.35.2-4;  Florus  2.23 
162.  Segesta  (Croatia),  35  D.  C. 
When  Octavian  approaches  the  town,  the  elders  promise  hostages  and  agree  to  a  Roman 
garrison,  but  the  townsfolk  contest  his  entry.  Octavian  surrounds  the  place  with  a  ditch 
and  palisade,  bridging  the  River  Save,  and  raises  two  embankments  (ch6mata),  which  the 
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Segestans  attempt  to  capture  and  bum,  in  vain.  The  town  is  captured  on  the  thirtieth 
day-  and  Octavian  imposes  a  garrison. 
. f;, 
Sourccs:  Appian,  Ill.  23-24 
163.  Siscia  (Croatia),  35  B.  C.  (cf.  fig.  21) 
Having  agreed  to  provide  hostages,  the  townsfolk  close  their  gates  against  Octavian. 
The  strongly  walled  town  is  protected  by  the  Rivers  Kulpa  and  Save,  but  Octavian 
obtains  boats  from  which  to  assail  the  walls,  and,  when  the  townsfolk  launch  their  own 
dug-out  boats,  the  Romans  engage  them  in  riverine  conflict.  Finally,  hearing  that  their 
allies  have  been  defeated  and  cannot  send  help,  the  Siscians  surrender  the  town. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  49.37.1-6 
164.  Promona  (Croatia),  34  B.  C. 
Octavian  begins  to  encircle  the  mountain  stronghold  with  a  40-stade  (7Y2km)  wall,  and 
mounts  an  assault  before  the  circuravallation  is  complete.  Enemy  pickets  on  the  sur- 
rounding  hills  panic  in  case  they  are  cut  o%  and  flec  inside  the  stronghold.  A  relieving 
force  arrives  but  is  repulsed.  The  defenders  rush  out  to  skirmish  and,  as  they  retreat,  the 
Romans  manage  to  enter  the  town  with  them.  A  third  of  the  townsfolk  are  slaughtered; 
the  remainder  take  refuge  in  the  citadel,  where  a  Roman  cohort  is  posted  to  keep  watch. 
On  the  fourth  night,  the  townsfolk  break  out  and  rout  the  cohort  before  they  are  cap- 
tured.  Iley  surrender  and  the  offending  cohort  is  decimated. 
Sources:  Appian,  Ill.  25-26;  Cassius  Dio,  49.38.4;  Strabo  7.5.5 
165.  Genucla  (Romania),  29  B.  C. 
M.  Licinius  Crassus  assaults  this  strongly  defended  fortress  by  land  and  from  the  river 
Danube,  and  captures  it  after  hard  fighting. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  51.26.5-6 
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166.  Mons  Medullius  (Spain),  26  B.  C. 
Octavian  attacks  the  stronghold,  whose  proximity  to  the  River  Minius  encourages  many 
to  take  refuge  there.  He  surrounds  the  place  with  a  ditch,  either  18  miles  (26Y2km) 
(Florus)  or  15  miles  (22  km)  long  (Orosius).  Rather  than  submit  to  captivity,  the  def- 
enders  commit  mass  suicide. 
Sources:  Florus  2.33;  Orosius  6.21.7-8 
167.  Splonum  (Yugoslavia),  A.  D.  9 
Germanicus  Caesar  attacks  this  strongly  fortified  and  well-defended  fortress,  but  makes 
no  headway,  whether  using  machines  (michanai)  or  direct  assaults.  Then,  a  Celtic 
horseman  dislodges  a  section  of  the  battlements  with  a  stone,  knocking  down  the  def- 
ender  stationed  there.  The  others  flee  to  the  citadel,  thinking  their  fortress  taken,  and 
Germanicus  easily  occupies  the  place;  those  taking  refuge  in  the  citadel  surrender. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  56.11.1-2 
168.  Andetrium  (Croatia),  A.  D.  9 
Tiberius  besieges  the  Dalmatian  chieftain  Bato  in  his  well-provisioned  hill-top  fortress, 
but  Bato's  Daesitian  tribesmen  manage  to  disrupt  the  Roman  supply-lines.  Frustrated  by 
inactivity  and  privation,  the  disaffected  troops  create  havoc,  which  the  Daesitiates 
misinterpret  as  preparations  for  attack,  whereupon  Bato  seeks  terms  for  surrender. 
Scorning  the  difflicult.  terrain,  Tiberius  seeks  to  appease  his  troops  by  launching  a  frontal 
attack,  while  observing  from  a  platform.  The  Daesitiates  issue  out  to  meet  the  attack, 
hurling  rocks  and  rolling  stones,  singly,  in  barrels  and  in  wagon-loads,  at  the  Romans. 
But  Tiberius  sends  wave  after  wave  of  reinforcements,  and  the  Daesitiates  are  soon  cut 
off  from  retreat  and  slaughtered  piecemeal.  Those  remaining  in  the  town  surrender. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  56.12.3-14.7 
169.  Celenderis  (Turkey),  A.  D.  19 
The  disgruntled  Cn.  Calpurnius  Piso  seizes  the  Cilician  coastal  fort  of  Celenderis,  where 
he  forms  a  legion  out  of  deserters,  slaves,  new  recruits  and  Cilicians.  Cn.  Sentius 
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Saturninus,  who  has  taken  command  of  the  Syrian  army,  sounds  the  attack  on  the 
ramparts,  whereupon  the  ditch  is  filled,  ladders  are  brought  up  and  the  walls  scaled, 
supported  by  an  artillery  (tormenta)  barrage  of  spears,  stones  and  firebrands.  Piso 
surrenders  and  is  referred  to  the  emperor  in  Rome. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  2.80-81 
170.  Hillfort  of  the  Thracians  (Mons  Haernus)  (Bulgaria),  A.  D.  26 
C.  Poppaeus  Sabinus  encamps  on  a  narrow  ridge,  leading  to  the  hillfort,  and  attempts  to 
entice  the  Thracians  into  battle,  to  no  avail.  Accordingly,  he  establishes  guard-posts 
(praesidia)  around  the  hillfort,  and  links  them  with  a  4-mile  (5.9  km)  ditch  and  parapet 
(fossa  loricaque),  to  deny  the  Thracians  food  and  water.  He  also  erects  an  embankment 
(agger),  from  which  spears,  stones  and  firebrands  can  be  hurled  into  the  hillfort. 
The  Thracians  begin  to  succumb  to  thirst,  and  livestock  dying  within  the  hillfort  create  an 
atmosphere  of  pollution.  The  aged  chieftain,  Dinis,  surrenders,  along  with  the  old  and 
the  women,  but  some  of  the  young  warriors  mount  a  nocturnal  assault,  hurling  stones, 
stakes  and  branches  at  the  Roman  palisade,  filling  the  ditch  with  brushwood,  wicker 
panels  (crates)  and  corpses,  and  mounting  the  battlements  on  ready-made  gangways 
(pontes)  and  ladders  (scalae).  Most  are  repulsed  and  forced  to  surrender. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  4.49-51 
171.  Cadra  &  Davara  (Irurkey),  A.  D.  36 
The  Cilician  tribe  of  the  Cietae  migrate  into  the  Taurus  mountains,  to  avoid  paying 
tribute  to  Rome,  and  settle  on  two  hills,  Cadra  and  Davara.  The  Syrian  governor,  L. 
Vitellius,  sends  M.  Trebellius,  with  a  force  of  legionaries  and  auxiliaries  to  suppress  the 
revolt.  He  surrounds  the  two  hills  with  siege-works  (opera)  and  forces  their  surrender. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  6.41 
172.  Uspe  (Russia),  A.  D.  49 
C.  JuHus  Aqufla  and  Cotys  I  of  Bosporus  find  the  hUl-town  protected  by  a  wicker- 
panelled  (crates)  palisade  and  a  ditch.  They  bring  up  siege  towers  (turres)  and  create 
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havoc  with  spears  and  firebrands,  and  would  have  taken  the  town  but  for  nightfall.  Next 
day,  the  townsfolk  offer  to  hand  over  ten  thousand  slaves,  but  the  Romans,  having  no 
facilities  to  receive  so  many  slaves,  proceed  with  the  assault,  and,  taking  the  town  by 
escalade,  slaughter  the  townsfolk. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  12.16-17 
173.  Volandum  (?  Turkey),  A.  D.  58 
Cn.  Domitius  Corbulo  rcconnoitrcs  the  fortified  town  (castellum),  divides  his  troops  into 
four,  and  mounts  an  assault.  One  group  is  massed  in  a  testudo  shield-formation  to 
undermine  the  rampart;  another  group  moves  ladders  (scalae)  up  to  the  walls.  Many 
others  fire  spears  and  firebrands  from  artillery  (tormenta),  alongside  stone-throwers 
(fibritores)  and  slingers  (funditores),  to  clear  the  walls  of  defenders.  Before  a  third  of 
the  day  has  passed,  the  gates  are  overthrown  and  the  walls  scaled;  the  defenders  are 
massacred,  the  populace  sold  into  slavery,  and  the  town  sacked. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  13.39 
174.  Artaxata  (Armenia),  A.  D.  58 
Corbulo  sends  fight-armed  troops  to  encircle  the  town  and  begin  a  long-range  assault, 
but  the  townsfolk  immediately  open  the  gates  and  surrender  themselves  and  their  pos- 
sessions.  The  town  is  burned  and  razed. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  13.40-41 
175.  Legerda  (Turkey),  A.  D.  59 
The  Armenian  garrison  (praesidium)  issues  out  to  meet  Corbulo  in  battle,  but  is  re- 
pulsed.  The  Romans  finally  break  in,  apparently  by  the  use  of  an  embankment  (agger). 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Annales  14-25 
176.  Jerusalem  (Israel),  A.  D.  66  (cf.  fig.  22) 
C.  Cestius  Gallus,  governor  of  Syria,  encamps  with  a  large  force  seven  stades  (I  V4km) 
to  the  north-east,  on  Mount  Scopus,  hoping  to  intimidate  the  townsfolk  into  surrender. 
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After  three  days,  he  enters  the  city,  burning  the  Bezetha  sector  and  advancing  into  the 
Upper  City,  whereupon  the  rebels  retire  to  the  Lower  City  and  the  Temple.  For  five 
days,  Cestius  attempts  a  series  of  escalades  on  the  wall,  but  is  hindered  by  missile  fire 
from  the  towers.  On  the  sixth  day,  Cestius  leads  an  assault  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Temple  by  picked  men  and  archers,  under  heavy  missile  fire  from  the  porticoes,  and 
soldiers  in  the  lestudo  shield-formation  begin  to  undermine  the  wall and  prepare  to  bum 
the  gates.  However,  not  realizing  that  the  defenders  are  close  to  surrender,  Cestius 
suddenly  withdraws  to  the  camp  on  Mount  Scopus.  On  the  ensuing  days,  his  retreat  is 
turned  into  a  rout,  as  the  rebels  harry  his  flanks  and  rearguard,  and  he  abandons  his 
battering-rams  (helepoleis),  catapults  (oxybeleis)  and  other  machines  (organa)  (Jos., 
Bell.  Jud.  2.553). 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  2.527-542 
177.  Joppa  (Israel),  A.  D.  66 
Troops  sent  by  Cestius  Gallus  easily  storm  the  coastal  town  by  sea  and  by  land.  The 
townsfolk  are  slaughtered,  and  the  town  is  sacked  and  burried. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  2.507-508 
178.  Belzedek  (Israel),  A.  D.  67 
When  rebels  take  refuge  in  a  strong  tower  in  the  village  of  Belzedek,  the  Roman  com- 
mander,  Antonius,  is  unwilling  to  expend  energy  on  an  assault,  so  he  sets  fire  to  the  walls 
and  retires,  but  the  Jewish  commander,  Niger,  escapes  by  leaping  from  the  tower. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  3.23-27 
179.  Gabara  (Israel),  A.  D.  67 
Vespasian  storms  Gabara,  which  has  been  stripped  of  defenders,  and  slaughters  everyone 
from  youths  upwards.  The  town  is  destroyed,  along  with  the  neighbouring  small  towns 
and  villages,  whose  inhabitants  are  enslaved. 
Sources:  Josephus,  BeM  Jud.  3.132-134 
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180.  Jotapata  (Isme%  A.  D.  67  (cf  fig.  23) 
Vespasian  clears  an  approach  road  and  encircles  the  town  with  a  thousand  cavalry,  to 
prevent  its  commander,  Josephus,  from  escaping.  Next  day,  Vespasian  encamps  on  a 
hill,  seven  stades  (I  V4km)  to  the  north,  and  encircles  the  town  with  a  double  cordon  of 
infantry  and  a  ring  of  cavalry.  The  town  is  situated  on  a  spur,  surrounded  by  ravines  on 
three  sides,  and  accessible  only  from  the  north.  Vespasian  launches  an  attack  under 
cover  of  archers,  slingers  and  other  missile  troops,  but  is  repulsed;  he  repeats  the 
exercise  on  five  successive  days,  but  makes  no  headway,  whereupon  he  decides  to  build 
an  embankment  (ch6ma)  and  sends  men  to  fetch  wood  and  stones.  Another  party 
manufactures  wicker  screens  (gerra),  and  a  third  provides  the  embankment-builders,  with 
earth.  The  boulders  and  other  missiles,  launched  by  the  Jews,  create  a  terrifying  din,  so 
Vespasian  deploys  all  of  his  160  artillery-pieces  (Wchanal,  organa),  along  with  archers, 
javelin-rnen  and  slingers,  to  clear  the  walls.  The  Jews  mount  sorties  to  destroy  the 
shelters,  rout  the  workmen,  and  disrupt  the  construction  work,  so  Vespasian  links  up  the 
shelters  into  a  continuous  barrier. 
When  the  Roman  embankment  (ch5ma)  is  almost  at  parapet  level,  Josephus  heightens 
the  town  wall  under  cover  of  fireproof  screens.  -As  the  Jewish  sorties  continue,  Ves- 
pasian  resorts  to  blockade,  mounting  a  guard  at  the  town  exits.  The  Romans  target  their 
catapults  (oxybeleis)  at  the  townsfolks'  water  source,  but  the  Jews  scornfully  hang  drip- 
ping  garments  around  the  walls;  they  also  manage  to  bring  in  supplies  along  an  un- 
guarded  gully,  until  they  are  discovered.  Jewish  sorties  break  through  to  the  Roman 
camp  itsel&  but  are  repulsed  by  archers,  slingers,  stone-throwers  (fithobolol)  and  the 
majority  of  the  artillery  (organa). 
As  the  embankment  nears  the  wall,  Vespasian  brings  up  a  battering-ram  (krios),  with 
covering  fire  from  catapults  (katapeltai)  and  other  throwing  engines  (aphetiria),  and 
archers  and  slingers.  Josephus  deadens  the  blows  of  the  ram  with  sacks  of  chaff,  but  the 
Romans  cut  these  down  with  hooks  (drepanai),  whereupon  the  Jews  in  desperation  sally 
out  to  set  fire  to  the  siege  machinery  (michanamata),  the  wicker  screens  (gerra),  and  the 
embankments  (ch6mata).  In  the  m8l6e,  the  ram  head  is  broken  off  by  a  boulder  dropped 
from  the  wall,  but  the  machine  is  mended  by  evening,  and  working  continuously  through 
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the  night,  under  cover  of  artillery-firc  (katapeltai,  petroboloi),  finally  breaches  the  wall 
early  next  morning.  After  a  brief  rest,  Vespasian  mounts  an  escalade  to  draw  defenders 
away  from  the  breach,  while  dismounted  cavalry  lay  boarding  bridges  (michanai 
epibalMoi,  gephjr5ma1a)  under  cover  of  archery  fire.  The  Romans  advance  in  the 
testudo  formation,  but  the  Jews  pour  boiling  oil  onto  them  and  slippery  boiled  fenugreck 
onto  the  boarding  bridges.  The  assault  is  called  off  at  nightfall.  Next  day,  the 
embankments  (chftata)  are  built  higher,  and  three  fifty-foot  (15.4  in)  iron-clad  towers 
(purgoi),  manned  by  javelin-men,  archers  and  slingers,  and  equipped  with  artillery 
(aphetiria  organa),  are  erected  on  them. 
About  five  weeks  into  the  siege,  the  embankments  (ch5mata)  overtop  the  wall,  and  Titus 
leads  a  dawn  assault,  with  the  tribune,  Domitius  Sabinus,  and  a  few  legionaries,  killing 
the  sentries  and  entering  the  town.  In  the  general  slaughter,  only  women  and  children 
are  spared  for  captivity,  and  the  town  is  burned. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  3.141-288,316-339 
181.  Japha  (Israel),  A.  D.  67 
On  the  approach  of  M.  Ulpius;  Traianus,  the  townsfolk  exit  the  double-walled  town  to 
meet  him  in  battle,  and  are  defeated.  The  Romans  follow  the  retreating  Japhans  through 
the  first  set  of  gates,  wherupon  the  townsfolk,  in  panic,  shut  the  second  set  of  gates, 
before  their  own  people  can  get  through.  A  slaughter  ensues  between  the  two  walls  of 
the  town,  and  Traianus;  summons  Titus  to  witness  the  capture  of  the  town.  On  his 
arrival,  a  general  escalade  is  mounted,  but  the  remaining  townsfolk  put  up  a  desperate  6- 
hour  struggle,  during  which  the  Romans  are  pelted  from  the  roof-tops.  Finally,  all  the 
male  townsfolk  are  killed,  and  the  women  and  children  taken  into  slavery. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  3.289-306 
182.  Tarichaeae  (Israel),  A.  D.  67 
Vespasian  encamps  near  the  town,  strongly  defended  by  walls  on  three  sides  and,  on  the 
fourth,  by  the  Sea  of  Galilee.  Jewish  rebels  attempt  to  disrupt  the  Roman  camp-building, 
before  retreating  to  their  boats.  Meanwhile,  Titus,  with  600  cavalry,  and  Traianus  with 
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another  400,  engage  the  defenders  outside  the  town  walls  with  much  slaughter,  until  the 
Jews  retreat  inside.  Titus's  cavalry  circumvents  the  defences  at  the  water's  edge,  but 
some  of  the  rebels  escape  on  boats,  others  across  country.  Titus  halts  the  slaughter 
when  it  appears  that  only  bonafide  townsfolk  remain.  Vespasian  orders  the  town  to  be 
surrounded  by  guards  to  prevent  anyone  else  escaping,  and,  next  day,  he  hunts  down  the 
rebels  on  the  lake,  many  of  whom  are  taken  into  slavery. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  3.462-505,522-542 
183.  Gamala  (hrael),  A.  D.  67  (cf.  fig.  24) 
Vespasian  encamps  on  the  heights  around  the  hilltop  town,  which  is  defended  by  steep 
ravines  except  at  one  point,  where  a  spur,  fortified  by  wall  and  ditch,  connects  the  town 
to  the  surrounding  hills.  Two  of  Vespasian's  legions  rapidly  construct  embankments 
(chftata)  and  bring  up  siege  equipment  (mechanai).  A  barrage  from  the  catapults 
(katapeltlkoi)  and  stone-projectors  (petroboloi)  covers  the  advance  of  battering-rams 
(krioi)  at  three  different  points,  and  the  wall  is  breached.  When  the  defenders  retreat  to 
the  citadel,  the  pursuing  Romans  are  impeded  by  the  steepness  of  the  narrow  streets,  and 
the  low  roofs  cannot  support  the  weight  of  men  seeking  a  vantage  point,  so  Vespasian 
evacuates  his  men.  In  the  ensuing  stalemate,  many  townsfolk  escape  down  the  un- 
guarded  ravines  or  through  tunnels.  Then,  in  the  fourth  week  of  the  siege,  three  legion- 
aries  undermine  a  tower,  and  next  day  Titus  leads  an  attack  on  the  citadel,  where  the 
surviving  townsfolk  have  fled.  The  defenders  fire  missiles  and  roll  rocks  down  onto  the 
Romans,  but  they  are  quickly  overpowered  and  slain.  Many  choose  to  leap  to  their 
deaths  in  the  ravines,  and  only  two  survive. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  4.11-53,62-83 
184.  Mount  Tabor  (IsraeQ,  A.  D.  67 
Vespasian  sends  the  tribune  Placidus  with  600  cavalry  to  subdue  the  fortified  table-top 
mountain.  Placidus  offers  peace,  intending  to  capture  the  rebels,  and  lures  them  out  onto 
the  plain,  where  the  majority  are  slain.  The  survivors  flee  to  Jerusalem,  and  the 
townsfolk  surrender  to  Placidus. 
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Sources:  Josephus,  Bell,  Jud.  4.54-61 
185.  Gerasa  (Jordan),  A.  D.  68 
L.  Annius  takes  the  town  by  storm,  with  a  mixed  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry.  Males 
are  killed,  women  and  children  enslaved,  and  the  town  is  plundered  and  set  ablaze. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  4.487-489 
186.  Placentia  (Italy),  A.  D.  69 
Otho's  general,  T.  Vestricius  Spurrina,  strengthens  the  defences  against  the  Vitellians, 
under  A.  Caecina  Alienus,  but  the  hail  of  incendiary  missiles  causes  the  destruction  of  the 
amphitheatre.  Caecina  prepares  screens,  wicker  panels  and  shelters  (Plutel  cratesque  et 
vineae)  and,  at  dawn,  his  legionaries  begin  undermining  the  wall,  throwing  up  an 
embankment  (agger),  and  forcing  the  gates;  meanwhile,  other  troops  assault  the  walls 
with  stones  and  arrows.  The  defenders  throw  javelins  and  roll  miU-stones  over  the  wall, 
crushing  those  beneath.  Caecina  calls  off  the  assault  and  withdraws. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Historide  2.19,21-22 
187.  Cremona  (Italy),  A.  D.  69 
Arriving  near  Cremona  at  nightfall,  the  Flavian  general,  M.  Antonius  Primus,  restrains  his 
eager  troops  from  attacking  without  reconnaissance.  Next  day,  after  a  nocturnal  battle 
with  the  Vitellians,  Antonius  encircles  the  Vitellian  camp  outside  Cremona  with  a  ring  of 
troops  (corona)  and  a  missile  exchange  ensues.  The  Flavians  collect  pick-axes 
(dolabrae),  hooks  (falces)  and  ladders  (scalae),  and  Antonius;  assigns  different  sectors  of 
the  rampart  to  different  units,  to  inspire  competition.  When  the  Flavians,  advance  in 
testudo  shield-formation,  the  Vitellians  roll,  heavy  stones  down  onto  them,  to  break  the 
formation  and  make  the  men  vulnerable  to  spear-thrusts.  Inspired  by  the  prospect  of 
looting  the  town,  the  Flavians  try  to  undermine  the  rampart  and  break  the  gates  open, 
and  climb  onto  the  testudo  formations  to  grapple  with  the  enemy.  The  defenders  tip  a 
ballista  over  onto  the  testudo  attacking  the  main  gate,  crushing  the  men  but  damaging 
the  battlements  in  the  process.  A  hail.  of  stones  from  the  Flavian  artillery  knocks  down  a 
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nearby  wooden  tower,  and  the  gate  is  broken  down  with  axes  and  swords.  When  the 
Vitellians  make  a  dash  for  the  nearby  town,  the  Flavians  set  fire  to  outlying  properties 
and  utilize  the  taller  buildings  near  the  town  as  vantage  points  from  which  to  throw  mis- 
siles.  The  townsfolk  surrender,  but  the  Flavians  run  amok  killing  and  looting  for  four 
days,  and  the  town  is  burned;  Antonius  forbids  his  men  to  enslave  any  of  the  townsfolk. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Historide  3.20,27-34 
188.  Capitoline  Hill,  Rome  (Italy),  A.  D.  69 
Flavian  partLsans,  headed  by  thepraefectus  urbi,  T.  Flavius  Sabinus,  are  besieged  on  the 
Capitoline  Hill  by  the  unruly  Vitellian  Praetorians,  who  assault  the  outer  gate  of  the 
Capitol,  without  waiting  for  artillery  support  (tormenta),  and  are  met  with  a  hail  of 
stones  and  tiles  from  above.  Their  incendiary  attack  fires  the  gate,  and  Sabinus  bar- 
ricades  the  entrance  with  statuary,  but  the  Praetorians  are  able  to  scramble  up  through 
neighbouring  buildings  and  slaughter  the  defenders.  The  Temple  of  Jupiter  is  destroyed 
by  the  spreading  fire.  Sabinus  is  captured  and  publicly  executed. 
Sources:  Tacitus,  Historide  3.69,71-74 
189.  Jerusalem  (1srael),  A.  D.  70  (cf.  fig.  22) 
Titus  encamps  30  stades  (SY2  Ian)  from  Jerusalem  and  leads  a  cavalry  reconnaissance  of 
the  city.  He  places  his  main  camp  on  Mount  Scopus,  seven  stades  (I  V4km)  to  the  north- 
east,  with  another  camp  three  stades  (Y2km)  to  the  rear,  and  a  third  camp  on  the  Mount 
of  Olives,  six  stades  (I  km)  to  the  east  of  the  city;  this  camp  is  attacked  while  under 
construction.  Titus  tries  to  negotiate  with  the  townsfolk,  but  is  rebuffed.  In  four  days, 
Titus  clears  the  ground  from  Mount  Scopus  to  the  C'third")  city  wall  and  establishes  two 
new  camps,  two  stades  (370  m)  to  the  north-west  and  west.  After  another  mounted 
reconnaissance,  he  targets  the  level  ground  of  the  western  defences,  where  the  junction 
of  the  "third"  wall  with  the  Hippicus  tower  is  unfinished.  A  further  attempt  at  negoti- 
ation  is  rebuffed,  so  the  legions  devastate  the  suburbs  and  fell  timber  to  build  three  em- 
bankments  (ch5mata).  Archers  and  javelin-men  are  positioned  between  the  embank- 
ments,  with  arrow-firers  (oxybeleis),  catapults  (katapeltai)  and  stone-projectors  (litho- 
302 Appendbc  1:  Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges 
boloz)  in  front,  and,  although  the  Jews  disrupt  the  work  with  artillery  captured  from  the 
Antonia  garrison  (Jos.,  Bell.  Jud.  5.267)  and  from  Cestius  (above,  176),  the  legionaries 
are  protected  by  "wicker  spread  over  palinge'.  In  five  days,  the  embankments  are  close 
enough  to  the  city  wall  to  bring  up  battering-rams  (krioi)  under  cover  of  artillery-fire. 
The  Jewish  rebels  shower  the  Roman  machines  (michanimata)  with  firebrands,  shoot  at 
the  men  working  the  rams  (helepoleis),  and  sally  out  to  destroy  the  wicker  screens 
(gerra).  During  fierce  fighting  around  the  Roman  machinery  (michanai),  the  Jews  set 
fire  to  the  siege-works  (erga),  and  almost  manage  to  destroy  the  artillery  (organa), 
although  cavalry  and  archers  are  protecting  it.  The  Romans  erect  a  50-cubit  (23  rn)  iron- 
clad  tower  (purgos)  on  each  of  the  three  embankments,  manned  by  missile  troops  and 
light  artillery  (hoi  kouphoteroi  t5n  organ5n)  to  suppress  the  defenders.  After  ten  days, 
the  largest  of  the  battering-rams  (helepoleis),  knicknarned  Nik5n  ("Victory")  by  the 
Jews,  breaches  the  wall,  and  the  Romans  pour  through,  opening  the  gates  for  their 
comrades,  but  the  Jews  withdraw  to  the  second  line  of  walls. 
Titus  razes  a  long  section  of  the  "third"  wall  and  moves  his  carnp  into  the  Bezetha  sub- 
urb.  A  battering-ram  (helepolis)  is  set  to  work  and,  on  the  fifth  day,  the  Romans  are 
able  to  storm  the  wall.  However,  when  Titus  fails,  to  press  his  victory,  offering  negotiat- 
ion  instead,  the  Jews  launch  a  desperate  attack,  forcing  the  Romans  back  through  the 
breach.  The  Jews  hold  the  breach  for  three  days,  before  the  Romans  again  storm 
through;  Titus  razes  the  northern  sector  and  garrisons  the  towers  on  the  surviving 
southern  sector.  After  a  four-day  ceremonial  parade,  designed  to  overawe  the  defenders, 
Titus  begins  work  on  four  embankments  (ch5mata),  two  to  the  west  of  the  city,  30 
cubits  (14  m)  apart,  and  two  against  the  Antonia,  twenty  cubits  (9  m)  apart.  The  latter 
are  constructed  under  heavy  fire  from  the  Zealots,  using  the  300  arrow-firers  (oxybeleis) 
and  40  stone-projectors  (Uthoboloi)  stored  in  the  Antonia.  All  the  time,  Titus 
encourages  the  Jews  to  desert,  offering  free  passage;  those  captured  while  foraging  are 
crucified,  to  demoralize  the  defenders,  and  famine  leads  the  rebels  to  commit  various 
atrocities  to  guarantee  their  own  survival. 
The  embankments  are  completed  in  seventeen  days,  but  those  at  the  Antonia  are 
undermined  by  the  Zealots.  Two  days  later,  the  rebels  destroy  the  other  embankments 
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and  bum  the  rnachines  (Wchanai,  organa)  under  covering  fire  from  the  wall.  In  the 
subsequent  council  of  war,  Titus  discounts  both  rebuilding  the  embankments,  owing  to 
the  lack  of  wood,  and  throwing  a  cordon  of  troops  around  the  city,  owing  to  the  inef- 
ficiency  of  this  form  of  blockade,  but  prefers  the  option  of  a  circuinvallation,  so  a  39- 
stade  (7Y4km)  wall,  with  thirteen  forts  (phrouria),  is  constructed  in  three  days.  How- 
ever,  not  wishing  to  delay  the  capture  of  the  city,  Titus  then  orders  embankments 
(ch5mala)  to  be  constructed  at  the  Antonia  fortress,  for  which  wood  has  to  be  procured 
from  a  distance  of  90  stades  (161/2km).  The  work  is  completed  in  21  days,  and  the 
battering-rams  (helepoleis)  are  brought  up,  despite  the  stones  dropped  from  the  walls.  A 
party  of  soldiers  in  lestudo-formation  undermine  the  wall,  which  collapses  into  the  tunnel 
that  the  Zealots  had  dug  to  undermýine  the  previous  embankments.  However,  they  have 
constructed  another  wall  inside.  Twelve  soldiers,  mounting  an  escalade  of  the  wall,  are 
overwhelmed  by  the  shower  of  arrows  and  boulders  from  the  battlements.  Two  days 
later,  twenty-four  men,  including  a  standard-bearer  and  a  trumpeter,  mount  the  wall  by 
night,  summoning  reinforcements  by  trumpet  blast,  but  the  Jews  mount  a  furious  defence 
of  the  Temple. 
The  Antonia  is  now  demolished  in  seven  days,  to  make  a  broad  ascent  to  the  Temple, 
and,  using  wood  fetched  from  100  stades  (181/2km)  away,  four  more  embankments  are 
raised,  against  the  western  and  northern  porticoes.  The  rebels  bum  both  porticoes,  hav- 
ing  lured  Roman  troops  onto  the  roof  Titus  batters  the  west  wall  of  the  Temple  plat- 
form  for  six  days  with  the  stoutest  battering-ram  (helepolis),  to  no  avail,  and  unsuccess- 
fully  attempts  to  undem-dne  the  north  gate  using  machines  (organa)  and  crowbars 
(mochloi).  An  escalade  led  by  the  standard-bearers  is  repulsed,  so  Titus  turns  his 
attention  to  the  Temple  itself,  where  the  rebels  have  taken  reftige,  and  orders  the  gates  to 
be  set  on  fire. 
In  the  following  days,  during  skirmishing  in  the  Temple  precincts,  the  Temple  is 
destroyed  by  fire,  despite  Titus's  wish  to  preserve  it  intact,  and  the  soldiers'  looting  and 
wholesale  slaughter  spreads  to  the  Lower  City. 
Many  of  the  rebels  escape  to  Herod's  palace  in  the  Upper  City,  where  embankments 
(ch5mala)  are  constructed  in  eighteen  days,  although  wood  is  difficult  to  procure,  and 
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machines  (michanai)  are  brought  up.  When  the  battering-rams  (helepoleis,  krioi)  create 
a  breach  and  topple  some  of  the  towers,  the  rebels  lose  heart  and  flee.  The  Romans  run 
amok  and  the  city  is  destroyed. 
So  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  5.51-97,106-135,258-347,356-361,446-451,466- 
511,522-524;  6.5-32,54-80,149-168,177-192,220-228,232-284,323- 
355,374-377,392408;  Cassius  Dio,  65.4.1-7.2;  Tacitus,  Historiae  5.11-13 
190.  Machaerus  (Jordan),  A.  D.  71  (cf.  fig.  25) 
Sex.  Lucilius  Bassus  reconnoitres  the  hill  town,  which  is  surrounded  by  steep  valleys  and 
provided  with  an  impregnable  citadel  and  many  defensive  machines  (michanimata).  He 
raises  an  embankment  (ch6ma)  on  the  western  side  (eastern,  according  to  Josephus), 
where  a  ravine  100  cubits  deep  (46  m)  separates  it  from  the  neighbouring  hill.  The  rebels 
occupy  the  citadel,  from  where  they  mount  sorties  to  disrupt  the  Roman  work.  One  of 
them,  Eleazar,  is  captured,  and  the  rebels  trade  the  town  in  exchange  for  his  life  and  their 
safe  passage.  The  townsfolk  attempt  to  flee  by  night,  but  they  are  intercepted  by  the 
Romans,  their  menfolk  killed,  and  the  women  and  children  enslaved;  Bassus  keeps  his 
promise  to  the  rebels. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  7.163-177,190-209 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  112-114,  above. 
191.  Masada  (Isracl),  A.  D.  73  (cf.  fig.  26) 
L.  Flavius  Silva  encamps  on  the  West  side,  where  the  fortress  plateau  is  linked  to  the 
surrounding  hills  by  a  rocky  outcrop,  300  cubits  (139  m)  short  of  the  summit.  Although 
it  is  awkward  for  supplies  there,  it  is  the  only  point  where  an  assault  can  be  launched. 
He  constructs  a  wall  around  the  whole  fortress,  posts  garrisons,  and  mounts  guards. 
Then  he  raises  an  embankment  (choma)  on  the  rocky  outcrop,  200  cubits  high  (92  m), 
with  a  50-cubit  (23  m)  stone-built  runway,  upon  which  his  machines  (Wchanimata)  are 
sited.  He  constructs  an  iron-clad,  60-cubit  (28  m)  tower,  as  a  platform  for  arrow-shoot- 
ers  (oxybeleis)  and  stone-projectors  (petroboloi),  and  brings  up  a  battering-ram  (krios). 
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The  wall  is  breached,  but  the  Jewish  Sicarii  have  built  a  resilient  earth-and-timber  wall 
inside,  which  is  unaffected  by  the  battering,  so  Silva  orders  it  to  be  set  on  fire. 
Overnight,  the  Sicarii  conunit  mass  suicide.  In  the  morning,  the  Romans  extend  bridges 
(epibalhrai)  from  the  embankment  (ch5ma)  and  enter  the  deserted  fortress. 
Sources:  Josephus,  Bell.  Jud.  7.252-253,275-319,389-406 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  114-118,  above. 
192.  Hillforts  of  the  Dacians  (Romania),  A.  D.  102 
Trajan  captures  some  mountain  strongholds  of  the  Dacians,  where  he  finds  weaponry 
and  machinery  (michanimala)  captured  from  Cornelius  Fuscus  in  A.  D.  86. 
Trajan's  Column  suggests  that  forts  were  built  (LXV;  LXVIII),  artillery-positions 
established  (LXVI),  and  the  testudo  shield-formation  (L=)  employed. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  68.9.3-6;  Trajan's  Column,  scenes  LXV-LXVII  (casts  161-172), 
LXVIII-LXXI  (casts  173-182) 
193.  Sarinizegethusa  (Romania),  A.  D.  106 
Trajan  takes  the  Dacian  royal  city  of  Sarmizegethusa  Regia,  and  the  king,  Decebalus, 
commits  suicide  to  avoid  capture. 
Trajan's  Column  suggests  that  scaling-ladders  (CXIII),  pick-axes  (dolabrae)  (CXVI), 
and  the  so-called  "ship's  prow  sheds"  (CXIV)  were  employed.  An  embankment 
(CXVII)  was  perhaps  erected,  and  a  circurnvallation  thrown  around  the  town  (CXIII). 
The  defenders  will  have  rolled  barrels  downhill  (CXIV),  thrown  down  lumps  of  masonry 
(CXVI),  and  finally  set  their  town  on  fire  (CXIX)  before  fleeing  (CXXII). 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  68.14.3;  Trajan's  Column,  scenes  CXI-CXlI  (casts  293-299), 
CXIII-CXVI  (casts  300-314),  CXVII-CMI  (casts  315-332),  CXXIII- 
CXXVI  (casts  333-342) 
194.  Edessa  (Turkey),  A.  D.  116 
Lusius  Quietus  captures  the  town,  which  is  sacked  and  bumed. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  68.30.2 
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195.  Seleucia  (Iraq),  A.  D.  116 
Sex.  Erucius  Clarus  and  TL  Julius  Alexander  Julianus  capture  and  bum  the  town. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  68.30.2 
196.  Hatm  (Imq),  A.  D.  117  (cf  fig.  27a) 
Trajan  makes  an  attempt  on  the  desert  town,  but,  although  the  wall  is  breached  and  the 
cavalry  sent  forward,  the  assault  is  repulsed.  Trajan  himself  is  almost  shot  while  recon- 
noitring  the  town,  and  a  cavalryman  of  his  bodyguard  is  killed.  Poor  weather  and 
troublesome  insects  force  him  to  withdraw. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  68.31.1-4 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  125-127,  above. 
197.  Bettir  (IsraeD,  A.  D.  134/135  (cf.  fig.  28) 
C.  Julius  Severus  lays  siege  to  the  strong  hill-top  refuge.  The  Jewish  rebels  have 
constructed  subterranean  passages  and  strong  defensive  walls.  Severus  blockades  them, 
and  reduces  them  by  starvation  and  thirst. 
Sources:  Eusebius,  Historia  ecclesiastica  4.6.3;  Cassius  Dio  69.12.2-13.3 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  12  If.,  above. 
198.  Ctesiphon  (Iraq),  A.  D.  165 
C.  Avidius  Cassius  captures  the  place  and  bums  the  Parthian  palace.  Unfortunately,  the 
nearby  friendly  town  of  Seleucia  is  also  looted  and  burned.  The  Romans  contract 
plague,  and  sickness  and  shortage  of  supplies  force  them  to  withdraw. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  71.2.34;  Historia  Augusta,  Verus  7.1,8.1-4 
199.  Byzantium  (Turkey),  A.  D.  193-195 
L.  Marius  Maximus  besieges  the  coastal  city,  where  C.  Pescennius  Niger  has  equipped 
the  massive  walls  with  all  manner  of  artillery  (michanai)  for  shooting  stones  and  beams, 
and  machines  with  hooks  (harpagai)  for  ensnaring  ships  and  enemy  machinery 
(michanimata),  mostly  designed  by  Priscus  (see  also  below,  202).  The  townsfolk  pelt 
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their  assailants  with  masonry  and  bronze  statues.  When  close  to  starvation,  the  towns- 
folk  continue  to  resist;  some  sail  away  during  a  storm,  when  they  cannot  be  pursued; 
others  resort  to  camuibalism.  A  concerted  effort  to  escape  by  sea  is  kustrated  by  a 
merciless  naval  attack,  and  the  survivors  remaining  in  the  city  surrender,  after  almost  two 
years  of  siege.  Niger's  fbrces  in  the  city  are  killed,  and  the  walls  are  demolished. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  74.6.3,10.1-14.6 
200.  Ctesiphon  (Imq),  A.  D.  197 
Septimius  Sevcrus  captures  Ctesiphon  in  a  surprise  attack,  and  allows  the  soldiers  to 
plunder  the  city.  They  kill  vast  numbers,  and  take  thousands  of  women  and  children 
prisoner.  King  Vologaeses  escapes,  but  his  treasury  is  captured. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  76.9.34;  Herodian  3.9.9-11 
201.  Hatm  (Iraq),  A.  D.  198  (cf  fig.  27a) 
Severus  attacks  the  city  for  allegedly  supporting  his  enemy,  Pescennius  Niger.  The 
Hatrenes  fire  missiles,  stones  and  clay  containers  of  poisonous  insects;  many  Romans  are 
killed,  more  are  wounded,  and  their  siege  machinery  (michanimata)  is  burned.  Sickness 
also  takes  it  toll,  and  the  operation  is  abandoned.  The  Praetorian  tribune,  Julius  Crispus, 
is  executed  for  criticizing  the  conduct  of  the  siege,  and  Severus's  general,  Julius  Laetus, 
is  executed  for  sowing  discord  in  the  ranks. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  76.10.1-3;  Herodian  3.9.1,4-7 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  125-127,  above. 
202.  Hatm  (Iraq),  A.  D.  199  (cf.  fig.  27a) 
Severus's  second  attempt  proves  very  costly.  The  Hatrene  cavalry  mounts  swift  and 
violent  sorties,  and  the  Romans  suffer  from  the  defenders'  hand-thrown  missiles,  archery 
and  artillery.  Some  of  their  catapults  (miuchanat)  discharge  two  missiles  at  once,  even 
hitting  many  of  Severus's  bodyguard.  Ile  defenders  on  the  walls  pour  down  naphtha 
and  bitumen,  killing  many  soldiers  and  destroying  all  of  Severus's  machines 
(michanimata),  except  those  designed  by  Priscus  (see  above,  no.  199).  When  the  wall 
308 Appendh  1:  Catalogue  of  Roman  Sieges 
is  breached,  Severus  offers  to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed,  and  the  damaged  wall  is  repaired 
overnight.  The  European  veterans  mutiny  in  frustration,  and  the  Syrian  troops  are 
unequal  to  the  task,  so,  after  twenty  days,  Severus  withdraws  from  the  city. 
Sources:  Cassius  Dio  76.11.1-13.1 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  125-127,  above. 
203.  Aquileia  (Italy),  A.  D.  238 
The  inhabitants  repair  their  dilapidated  fortifications  and,  having  laid  in  extra  supplies, 
bar  the  gates  against  the  invading  forces  of  Maximinus  Thrax.  When  they  bombard  his 
advance  guard  with  stones,  spears  and  arrows  from  the  battlements,  Maximinus  attempts 
to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed,  so  he  devastates  the  surrounding  countryside.  A  cordon  of 
troops  is  established  around  the  town,  and  the  area  outside  the  walls  is  leveled.  Timber 
is  salvaged  from  the  demolished  buildings  to  construct  various  siege  machines 
(michanai),  and  Maximinus  exhorts  the  soldiers  to  demolish  a  section  of  town  wall.  As 
well  as  throwing  down  rocks,  the  townsfolk  ignite  a  mixture  of  sulphur,  bitumen,  pitch 
and  oil,  and  pour  it  onto  the  besiegers,  with  horrific  results.  They  also  target  the 
machinery  with  fire-arrows  soaked  in  pitch  and  resin,  and  bum  them  down.  Having 
destroyed  the  local  resources,  Maximinus's  army  begins  to  feel  the  effects  of  fan-dne  and 
thirst,  as  the  Aquileians  have  been  throwing  their  dead  into  the  river.  They  soon  become 
disgruntled,  assassinate  Maxiniinus,  and  abandon  the  siege. 
Sources:  Herodian  8.2.2-6.4;  Zosimus  1.15.1-2;  Historia  Augusta,  Maximini  Duo 
21.6-23.7,24.2-3 
204.  Castra  Practoria,  Rome  (Italy),  A.  D.  238 
In  the  unrest  following  the  accession  of  Pupienus  and  Balbinus,  the  Praetorian  Guard, 
loyal  to  Maximinus  Thrax,  is  attacked  by  a  pro-Gordian  mob.  Armed  with  weapons 
from  the  public  armouries,  and  reinforced  by  gladiators,  they  assault  the  Castra  Prae- 
toria,  but  the  Praetorians  defend  their  battlements  with  bows  and  long  spears.  When  the 
mob  eventually  withdraws,  the  Praetorians  mount  a  sortie,  killing  many,  including 
gladiators,  before  retreating  to  the  safety  of  their  camp.  Balbinus  tries  to  negotiate,  but 
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is  rebuffed.  Finally,  the  camp  water  supply  is  cut,  whereupon  the  Praetorians  rampage 
through  the  streets.  They  are  pelted  from  the  upper  storeys  with  tiles,  stones  and  pots, 
so  they  retaliate  by  setting  fire  to  some  wooden  balconies,  creating  a  conflagration. 
Sources:  Herodian  7.11.6-9,12.2-7;  Historia.  Augusta,  Maximus  et  Balbinus  10.4-8 
205.  Stronghold  of  the  Carpi  (?  Romania),  A.  D.  247 
The  emperor,  Philippus  Arabicus,  tries  to  engage  the  marauding  Carpi  in  battle,  but  they 
flee  to  a  stronghold  (phrourion)  and  are  besieged.  Seeing  that  their  comrades  are  rally- 
ing  for  an  attack,  they  mount  a  sortie  on  Philippus,  but  are  defeated  and  sue  for  peace. 
Sources:  Zosimus  1.20.1-2 
206.  Agrippina  (Germany),  A.  D.  259 
After  a  quarrel,  Gallienus's  son,  Saloninus,  and  the  Practorian  prefect,  Silvanus,  are 
besieged  by  Postumus,  the  military  commander  on  the  Rhine.  In  order  to  end  the  siege, 
the  garrison  surrender  Saloninus  and  Silvanus  to  Postumus,  who  puts  them  to  death. 
Sources:  Zosimus  1.38.2;  Historia,  Augusta,  Gallieni  duo  4.3;  tyranni  Iriginta  3.1-9 
207.  Mediolanum  (Italy),  A.  D.  268 
Gallienus  besieges  his  rebellious  general,  Aureolus,  using  all  kinds  of  machines  (omnia 
genera  machinationum).  However,  Gallienus  is  murdered  by  his  own  generals  in  a  plot. 
Sources:  Aurelius  Victor,  de  Caesaribus  33.17-19 
208.  Tyana  (Turkey),  A.  D.  271 
The  town  closes  its  gates  to  Aurelian;  enraged,  he  threatens  that  he  will  not  leave  even  a 
dog  alive  in  the  town,  and  the  soldiers  eagerly  anticipate  plunder.  One  of  the  townsfolk, 
Heraclammon,  panics  and  betrays  a  part  of  the  circuit  where  the  ground  slopes  up  like  a 
siege-embankment;  Aurelian  executes  the  man  as  a  traitor.  However,  he  is  dissuaded 
from  destroying  the  town  by  the  philosopher,  Apollonius,  and  forbids  the  soldiers  to 
plunder.  When  reminded  of  his  threat,  he  orders  all  the  dogs  in  the  town  to  be  killed. 
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Sources:  Historia  Augusta,  Aurefianus  22.5-24.9;  Anonyinus  continuator  of  Cassius 
Dio  10.4 
209.  Palmyra  (Syria),  A.  D.  272 
Aurelian  encircles  the  town,  hoping  to  take  it  by  storm.  Queen  Zenobia  has  stockpiled 
arrows,  spears  and  stones,  and  the  emperor  complains  that  every  section  of  wall  is 
protected  by  two  or  three  catapults  (ballistae),  which  even  shoot  fire.  In  despair,  he 
attempts  to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed.  However,  Aurelian  subverts  Zenobia's  Saracen 
and  Armenian  allies,  prevents  Persian  aid  from  getting  through,  and  finally  captures 
Zenobia,  as  she  attempts  to  flee.  Suffering  from  famine,  the  townsfolk  seek  terms  for 
surrender  and  receive  a  garrison.  When  they  later  kill  the  garrison,  Aurelian  razes  the 
town,  permitting  indiscriminate  slaughter. 
Sources:  Historia  Augusta,  Aurellanus  26.1-28.5,31.1-10;  Zosimus  1.54.2-56.2, 
60.1-6  1.1;  Anonymus  continuator  of  Cassius  Dio  10.5 
210.  Cremna  (Turkey),  A.  D.  278  (cf.  fig.  29) 
When  Lydius  (or  Palfuerius)  begins  ravaging  the  countryside,  the  arrival  of  a  Roman 
army  (possibly  led  by  the  emperor  Probus)  forces  him  to  seek  shelter  in  the  hill-top  town. 
Lydius  turns  over  areas  of  the  town  for  agricultural  production,  attempts  to  secretly 
import  livestock,  and  finally  resorts  to  killing  non-combatants  to  preserve  dwindling 
supplies.  When  one  of  his  artillerymen  ("a  man  skilled  in  the  construction  of  michanal, 
and  capable  of  shooting  missiles  from  michanai  with  great  accuracy",  Zos.  1.70.1)  is 
punished  for  missing  his  aim,  he  defects  to  the  Romans  and  uses  his  skill  to  target  his 
erstwhile  commander.  After  Lydius's  death,  the  defenders  surrender. 
Sources:  Zosimus  1.69.1-70.5;  Historia,  Augusta,  Probus  16-17 
Archaeological  evidence  discussed  on  pp.  122-124,  above. 
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211.  Gesoriacum  (France),  A.  D.  293 
Constantius  I  blockades  the  town  and  builds  a  mole  (vallum)  across  the  harbour  mouth 
to  trap  the  enemy  vessels  inside  and  deny  access  to  a  relieving  fleet;  the  garrison  sur- 
renders. 
Sources:  Panegwid  Latini  8  (5),  6.1-4;  6  (7),  5.2 
212.  Alexandria  (Egypt),  A.  D.  296-297 
When  L.  Domitius  Domitianus  is  declared  Augustus  at  Alexandria,  Diocletian  himself 
besieges  the  town  for  eight  months,  finally  permitting  the  town  to  be  looted. 
Sources:  Eutropius,  Breviarium  9.23;  Orosius,  Contra  paganos  7.25.8 
213.  Verona  (Italy),  A.  D.  312 
Invading  Italy,  Constantine  I  attempts  to  negotiate  with  the  Praetorian  prefect,  Ruricius 
Pornpeianus,  in  command  of  Verona.  The  River  Athesis  prevents  an  assault  from  the 
west,  so  troops  ford  the  narrow  stream  upriver  and  blockade  the  town  from  the  other 
side.  Hemmed  in  on  two  sides,  Pompeianus  decides  to  mount  a  sortie,  which  develops 
into  a  major  engagement  in  which  he  is  killed.  The  town  surrenders. 
Sources:  PanegyriciLatinil2(9),  8.1-4,11.1;  4(10),  25.3-7 
214.  Byzantium  (Turkey),  A.  D.  324 
After  defeating  Licinius's  fleet  in  the  Hellespont,  Constantine  blockades  the  town  by  sea. 
Erecting  an  embankment  (ch6ma)  up  to  wall-height,  he  mounts  siege-towers  on  it  to 
overlook  the  walls  and  subject  Licinius's  guards  to  archer-fire.  Then,  he  sends  forward 
battering-rams  (krioi)  and  other  machines  (michanai),  whereupon  Licinius  flees  the 
town.  Byzantium  surrenders  to  Constantine. 
Sources:  Zosimus,  Historia  nova  2.23.1-26.3 
215.  Mursa  (Croatia),  A.  D.  351 
On  Magnentius's  approach,  the  gates  are  closed  and  the  battlements  are  manned  by 
missile  troops.  As  he  has  no  siege  machinery  (michanai),  he  attempts  to  burn  down  the 
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gates,  hoping  to  melt  the  iron  sheathing,  but  the  defenders  pour  water  from  the  battle- 
ments  and  extinguish  the  fire.  The  arrival  of  Constantius  11  draws  Magnentius  away. 
Sources:  Zosimus,  Historia  nova  2.49.3-50.4 
216.  Forts  on  the  River  Meuse  (France),  A.  D.  357 
Julian  blockades  six-hundred  Franks,  who  have  taken  refuge  in  two  abandoned  forts. 
After  fUly-four  days,  he  breaks  the  ice  on  the  river,  so  that  the  Franks  cannot  surrep- 
titiously  cross  over  by  night,  so  they  surrender  in  despair. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  17.2.1-3 
217.  Bezabde  (Turkey),  A.  D.  360 
Constantius  II  encamps  and  reconnoitres  the  Persian-occupied  town;  when  his  offer  to 
negotiate  is  rebuffed,  he  prepares  for  a  siege.  The  testudo  shield-formations  of  the 
legionaries,  attempting  to  undermine  the  walls,  are  broken  under  the  torrent  of  missiles 
from  above.  The  wicker  panels  (vimineae  crates)  protecting  the  Roman  advance  are 
smashed  by  storage  jars,  millstones  and  column  drums,  thrown  from  above,  and  battle 
rages  around  the  shelters  (vineae)  and  artillery  (tormenta),  with  stones  and  slingshot 
creating  destruction  on  both  sides.  The  Romans  construct  embankments  (aggeres)  and 
bring  up  a  massive  battering-ram  (aries,  machina),  which  the  Persians  had  used  at 
Antioch  and  subsequently  abandoned,  and  several  smaller  ones.  The  Persians  attempt  to 
burn  them  with  fire-arrows  (malleoli),  but  the  machines  have  been  fireproofed  with  wet 
hides  and  patchwork,  or  with  alum  coating.  However,  in  the  process  of  smashing  a 
tower,  the  giant  ram  is  snared  in  a  lasso,  and  the  Persians  pour  down  boiling  pitch.  A 
sortie  with  firebrands  and  iron  fire-pots  is  repulsed,  but  a  second  one,  with  iron  baskets 
of  burning  brushwood,  succeeds  in  igniting  all  the  siege-machinery  (machinae),  except 
the  giant  ram,  which  is  pulled  free  of  the  ensnaring  ropes,  and  salvaged,  half-charred. 
Next  morning,  under  cover  of  baffistae,  deployed  two  per  embankment  (clivus  struct- 
ilis),  the  Romans  assault  the  walls  with  ladders  (scalae),  as  well  as  mattocks  (ligones), 
pick-axes  (dolabrae)  and  crowbars  (vectes),  and  a  ram  is  brought  forward  against  one  of 
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the  towers.  But  the  Persians  surreptitiously  set  fire  to  one  of  the  embankments  by 
inserting  live  coals  into  the  structure,  and  the  Romans  abandon  the  enterprise. 
Sources:  Anunianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  20.11.6-25 
218.  Aquileia  (Italy),  A.  D.  361 
Julian's  deputy,  Immo,  throws  a  double  cordon  around  the  town,  where  two  mutinous 
legions  have  taken  refuge.  His  offer  to  negotiate  is  rebuffed,  so  he  attempts  to  under- 
mine  the  walls  under  cover  of  screens  (plutei)  and  wicker  panels  (crates),  using  various 
iron  tools  (ferramenta).  Ladders  (scalae)  are  deployed,  but  a  hail  of  stones  and  missiles 
from  artillery  (tormenta)  on  the  town  wall  prompts  a  general  retreat.  The  river  prevents 
battering-rams  approaching  the  walls,  so  the  besiegers  mount  two-storey  towers  on 
lashed-together  boats.  But  these  are  inundated  with  combustible  material  and  set  ablaze 
with  fire-arrows  (malleoli)  soaked  in  pitch.  Some  towers  capsize;  the  crews  of  others 
are  picked  off  by  artillery  (tormenta);  and  those  who  land  at  the  other  side  are  crushed  by 
enormous  stones  from  above.  After  another  failed  assault,  Immo  resorts  to  blockade, 
cutting  the  town's  water  supply  and  diverting  the  river,  but  the  town  has  wells.  Finally, 
learning  of  the  death  of  Constantius,  the  mutineers  surrender,  escaping  punishment  on 
the  grounds  that  they  were  only  following  the  orders  of  one  of  their  officers. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  21.11.2-12.20 
219.  Anatha  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
Julian's  deputy,  Lucillian,  launches  an  amphibious  night  assault  on  the  Euphrates  island 
fortress.  When  he  is  detected,  Julian  himself  sails  across  with  siege  machinery  (machinae 
obsidionales,  michanai),  but,  realising  the  risk  involved  in  the  operation,  he  decides  to 
negotiate  instead.  The  garrison  surrenders  and  the  fort  is  burned. 
Sources:  Ammianus,  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  24.1.6-10;  Libanius,  Orationes  18.218; 
Zosimus  3.14.2-4 
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220.  Diacira  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
The  townsfolk  flee  at  the  approach  of  Julian's  army.  The  Romans  find  stores  of  grain 
and  salt.  They  kill  some  women  who  have  remained  in  the  town,  and  bum  the  place. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  24.2.3;  Zosimus  3.15.2-4 
221.  Ozogardana/Zaragardia  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
The  townsfolk  flee  at  the  approach  of  Julian's  army,  and  the  town  is  sacked  and  burned. 
Sources:  Ammianus,  MarcelUnus,  Res  gestae  24.2.4;  Zosimus  3.15.4 
222.  Pirisabora  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
Julian  reconnoitres  the  place  and  attempts  to  negotiate,  but  is  rebuffed,  so  he  throws  a 
triple  cordon  of  men  around  the  town.  In  the  subsequent  missile  exchange,  the  defenders 
spread  out  loose  garments  from  the  battlements.  After  nightfall,  Julian  brings  up 
machinery  (machinae)  and  begins  filling  the  ditch.  At  dawn,  a  battering-ram  (aries) 
breaches  a  comer  tower,  and  the  Romans  burst  in,  burning  the  houses  and  setting  up 
machines  (michanai)  and  artillery  (catapultae  atque  ballistae)  in  the  ruins.  The  de- 
fenders,  retreating  to  their  citadel,  reply  with  arrows  and  hand-thrown  stones.  Next  day, 
Julian  leads  a  testudo  shield-formation  in  an  assault  on  a  gate,  but  is  repulsed.  Rather 
than  bring  up  shelters  (vineae)  for  the  erection  of  embankments  (aggeres),  Julian  starts 
to  construct  a  siege-tower  (helepolis),  whereupon  the  townsfolk  surrender.  They  are 
granted  safe  conduct,  but  the  place  is  looted  and  burned. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  24.2.9-22;  Libanius,  Orationes  18.227- 
228;  Zosimus  3.17.3-18.3 
223.  Maiozamalcha  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
Julian  reconnoitres  the  rocky  plateau  on  foot  and  narrowly  escapes  a  Persian  ambush. 
He  moves  his  camp  nearer  and,  while  the  cavalry  pillage  the  neighbourhood,  the  infantry 
throw  a  triple  cordon  around  the  town.  When  his  offer  to  negotiate  is  rebuffed,  he  builds 
high  platforms  (suggestas),  levels  up  the  ditches,  digs  tunnels  (cuniculi)  under  cover  of 
shelters  (vineae),  and  the  engineers  (artijilces)  set  up  the  artillery  (tormenta  muralia). 
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Men  move  forward  in  the  testudo  shield-formation,  or  protected  by  wicker  screens 
(vimineae  crates),  and  a  bombardment  of  arrows  and  stones  is  laid  down  by  the  ballistae 
and  onagers.  The  Persians  reply  with  archery-fire,  sling-stones  and  fire-missiles 
(malleoh),  and  by  rolling  down  huge  stones.  The  assault,  abandoned  at  noon,  is  renewed 
next  day.  Finally,  a  battering-ram  (aries)  brings  down  a  tower  and  section  of  wall; 
fighting  continues  at  the  breach  until  nightfall.  Meanwhile,  the  tunnels  are  completed,  so 
the  assault  is  renewed  and  troops  pour  into  the  town.  Wholesale  slaughter  ensues,  but 
the  garrison  commander,  Nabdates,  and  eighty  others  are  taken  prisoner.  The  town  is 
razed  and  the  spoil  is  divided  according  to  each  man's  entitlement. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  24.4.2-30;  Libanius,  Oraliones  18.235- 
242;  Zosimus  3.20.2-22.7 
224.  Fort  near  Seleucia  (Iraq),  A.  D.  363 
Julian  reconnoitres  the  fort  (castellum)  but  is  fired  upon  by  the  mural  artillery  (torment- 
um  muralia),  and  his  companion  is  wounded.  He  resolves  to  mount  an  assault,  and  the 
shelters  (vineae)  and  other  equipment  are  ready  by  nightfall.  Vhen  the  garrison  mounts 
a  sortie,  supported  by  Persian  reinforcements,  Julian  repulses  them  vigorously,  and  the 
fort  is  captured  and  burned. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  24.5.6-11 
225.  Cyzicus  (Turkey),  A.  D.  365 
The  usurper,  Procopius,  is  held  at  bay  by  arrows,  sling-shot  and  other  missiles,  and  the 
defenders  stretch  an  iron  chain  across  the  harbour  mouth,  to  deny  access  by  sea.  How- 
ever,  an  enterprising  tribune  severs  the  chain  with  an  axe,  under  cover  of  a  testudo 
shield-formation,  assembled  on  the  deck  of  his  ship.  Sailing  into  the  harbour,  Procopius 
captures  the  town  and  spares  the  garrison,  except  for  their  commander,  Serenian,  who  is 
imprisoned. 
Sources:  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  Res  gestae  26.8.7-11 
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Figure  3:  Syracuse  (no.  50) 
(after  Lazenby  1978) 
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Figure  4:  Cartagena  (no.  55) 
(after  Scullard  1970;  camp  location  suggested  on  topographic  grounds.  ) 
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Figure  5:  Utica  (nos.  64  &  140) 
(after  Scullard  1970;  camp  locations  suggested  on  topographic  grounds.  ) 
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Figure  6:  Hatiartus  (no.  88) 
(after  Fossey  1988) 
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Figum  7:  Ambracia  (no.  83) 
(after  Hanunond  1967) 
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Figure  8:  Carthage  and  environs  (no.  95) 
(after  Hurst  &  Roskams  1984) 
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Figure  9:  Numantia  (nos.  98,  "&  102) 
(after  Salvatore  1996) 
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Figure  10:  Athens  and  Piraeus  (nos.  111-112) 
(after  Roberts  1984) 
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Figure  12:  Gergovia  (no.  133) 
(after  FuUer  1965) 
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Figure  11:  Avaricum  (no.  132) 
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Figure  13:  Alesia  (no.  134) 
(after  Bdnard  1996;  the  features  labelled  G,  H,  I,  K,  and  10  are  no  longer 
thought  to  be  Roman) 
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Figure  14a:  Alesia:  the  circumvaHation  On  the  Montagne  de 
Bussy  at  Camp  C  (after  Bdnard  1996) 
IVA 
Figure  14b:  Alesia:  the  circumvaHation  on  the  Plaine  des 
Laumes  at  14  bis'  (after  Benard  1996) 
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Figure  15:  Uxeflodunum  (no.  135) 
(after  FuUer  1965;  camp  locations  suggested  on  topographic  grounds;  no 
remains  of  circurnvallation  evident.  )  332 Appendix  2.  -  Illustrations 
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Figure  16:  Massilia  (no.  139) 
(after  Rivet  1988) 
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Figure  17:  Dyrrachium  (no.  143) 
(after  Veith  1906;  camp  locations  suggested  on  topographic  grounds;  no 
remains  of  circumvallation  evident.  ) 
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Figure  18:  Alexandria  (no.  145) 
(after  Townend  1988) 
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Figure  19:  Thapsus  (no.  147) 
(after  Fuller  1965;  camp  locations  suggested  on  topographic  grounds;  no 
remains  of  circumvallation  evident.  ) 
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Figure  20:  Metulum  (no.  161) 
(after  Holmes  1928;  camp  location  suggested  on  topographic  grounds.  ) 
Figure  21:  Siscia  (no.  163) 
(after  Holmes  1928;  camp  location  suggested  on  topographic  grounds) 
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Figure  22:  Jerusalem  (nos.  122,159,176  &  189) 
(after  Price  1992) 
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Figure  23:  Jotspata  (Yodefat)  (no.  180) 
(after  Adan-Bayewitz  &  Avimn  1997) 
338 Appendix  Z  Illustrations 
2so 
200 
ISO  3SO 
200 
2so 
250 
TOWN  wall  200 
200 
00  ISO,, 
200 
2SO 
300 
3501, 
Figure  24:  Gamala  (no.  -  183) 
(after  Gutman  1981) 
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Figum  25:  Machaerus  (no.  190) 
(after  Kennedy  &  Riley  1990;  the  NE  sector,  represented  by  a  broken  line, 
was  not  surveyed  on  the  ground,  but  is  visible  from  the  air) 
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Figum  26:  Masada  (no.  191) 
(after  Riclunond  1962) 
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Figure  27a:  Hatra  and  environs  (nos.  196  &  201-202) 
(after  Andrae  1912) 
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Figum  27b:  listra:  circumvaHation  waU  (after  Andrae  1912) 
342 Appendix  2.  Illustrations 
or  I!  ý%\r1.  il  f  I  \%  o-  r.; 
a 
ýý  oe  -"  -)  .)  1ý 
.  JI  I-  tot  /,  -  "'.  k*1. 
,. 
% 
."\ 
Poo 
ol 
1900, 
100-  F13 
'00 
"000 
goo  I  ty  100000ýA  C 
. 00, 
% 
J.,  600"- 
C% 
Jr  N 
. 01 
1(\,  E 
. 
ft  (-iI.  I.  .  ",  r-  -0 
900U.  0  Soo  2000m  r 
Figum  28:  Bettir  (no.  197) 
(after  Schulten  1933  and  Kemedy  &  Mey  1990) 
Stretches  surveyed  by  Schulten,  but  invislible  from  the  air,  arc  shown  as 
dashed  fines. 
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Figure  29:  Cremna  (no.  210) 
(after  MitcheU  1995) 
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Figure  30:  Nahal  Hever,  North  camp  (cE  pp.  89E) 
(after  Yadin  1963) 
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Figure  31:  Burnmark  (cE  pp.  90ff.  &  127fE) 
(after  R.  CAH.  M.  S.  1997) 
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Figure  32:  Narbata  (Khirbet  el-Hamam)  (cE  pp.  119M) 
(after  Zertal  1995) 
Camp  A  is  suggested  on  topographic  grounds  only-,  on  the  putative  siege 
embankment,  see  pp.  154f 
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Figure  33:  Avaricum:  the  embankment,  according  to  Napolkon  III 
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Figure  34:  Machacrus:  the  embankment  (after  Strobel) 
349 Appendix  2:  Illustrations 
.2 
r-  u lu  'It 
E  :3 
uj  tn 
a  E 
m  0  .9  E  -0  0  ol 
0  C 
FE 
LU  0  5t  00  0'  0  O  8(  n8  0  C" 
Iz 
Q 9.0 
6. 
350 Appendix  2:  Illustrations 
ý22-,  5-22 
- 
Figure  36a:  Catapulta  (arrow-firer)  from  Ampurias  (after  Schramm) 
Figure  36h:  Ballista  (stone-projector),  according  to  Vitruvius,  (after 
Schramm) 
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Figure  37:  Catapult  washers,  3rd  C B.  C.  to  Ist  C  A.  D.  (after  Bantz  1"4) 
1-3  Ephyra;  4  Ampurias;  5  Mahdia;  6  La  Caridad; 
7&  10  Cremona;  8  Bath;  9  Auerberg 
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Figure  38:  Catapult  washers,  3rd  to  4th  C  A.  D.  (after  Baatz  1994) 
1  a-c  Lyon;  2  Hatra;  3  Pityus 
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Figure  39:  Trajan's  Column,  Rome:  scene  XXXII 
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Figure  40:  Trajan's  Column,  Rome:  scene  LXV-t,  XVI 
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Figure  41:  Trajan,  s  Column,  Rome:  scene  LXVI 
Figure  42:  Trajan's  Column,  Rome:  scene  CXIII 
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Figure  44:  Trajan's  Column,  Rome:  scene  CXVII 
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Figure  43:  Trajan's  Column,  Rome:  scene  CXIV . 
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Figure  45a:  Arch  of  Septimius  Severus,  Rome:  panel  2 
Figure  45h:  Artist's  impression  of  Roman  ram-shed  (after  Lendle) 
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Figure  46a:  Arch  of  Septimitis  Severus,  Rome:  panel  4 
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Figure  46h:  Roman  siege-tower  with  battering-ram  (after  Lendle) 
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Figure  47:  Gamala:  view  from  east 
(Photo:  DBQ 
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Figurv  48:  Gamala:  ballista  baUs  (ca.  7  cm  diameter  =  ca.  1  kg) 
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Figure  51:  Masada:  eastern  circumvallation  in  Wadi  Sebbe,  rebuilt 
(Photo:  DBQ 
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Figure  52:  Masada:  Camp  C,  with  eastern  circumvaRation 
(Photo:  DBQ 
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Figure  53:  Masada:  view  west  from  fortress  towards  Richmond's 
"hummock7  (Photo:  DBQ 
Figure  54:  Masada:  Camps  E  and  F,  with  western  circumvaflation 
(Photo:  DBQ 
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Figure  55:  Masada:  west  side  and  Roman  embanlunent 
(Photo:  DBQ 
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Figure  56:  Masada:  Roman  embankment:  view  from  Masada 
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Figure  57:  Hatra:  view  from  north  with  traces  of  circumvaRation 
(PtK*o:  DBC) 
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Figure  58:  Hatra:  accumulated  baffista  balls 
(Photo:  DBQ Appendix  2:  Illustrations 
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Figure  59:  Hatra:  baUisle  balls  (ca.  6-8  cm  =  ca.  0.5-1.0  kg) 
(Photo:  DBQ 
Figurt  60:  Hatre:  Wi«a  ball  (ca.  10  cm  =  ca.  2  kg) 
(Photo-.  DBC) 